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2004-2005 NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST
TO ESTATE PLANNERS
A.

INCOME TAX MATTERS
1.

Death Benefit Under Deferred Annuity Contract Is IRD. Rev. Rul. 2005-30, 2005-20 IRB 1,

dealt with a situation where an owner-annuitant purchased a deferred annuity contract and died before the annuity
starting date. In question were the income tax effects of payments from the annuity. Rev. Rul. 79-335 provides that
amounts received by a beneficiary under a deferred annuity contract that exceeded the owner's investment in the
contract were included in the beneficiary's income under section 72(e). The contract was ineligible for a basis stepup under section 1014 (see 1014(b)(9)(A)). Because the annuitant would have income had the contract been
surrendered during the owner's life, the IRS determined that the amounts were IRD. PLR 200041018 had reached a
similar result.

2.

Exclusion of Gain

section 121 dealing with

th~

~rom

Sale of Principal Residence. Final regulations have been issued under

exclusion of gain from the sale of a principal residence. T.D. 9152.

Section 121(c)

allows taxpayers who do not meet the usual test for exclusion of $250,000 or $500,000 of capital gains on the sale of
a principal residence - - use as a residence for two of the preceding five years and no gain exclusion on a sale within
the last two years - - to exclude some gain. In general, in order to make use of the special rule of section 121(c) a
taxpayer must have sold the residence on account of a change in place of employment (general rule: the new
workplace must be 50 miles further from the residence than the old workplace), a health issue (change of residence is
to obtain, provide, or facilitate the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or treatment of disease, illness, or injury of the
taxpayer owner), or unforeseen circumstances (death, divorce, multiple births, condemnation are among the things
which the IRS lists as unexpected; marriage and adoption the IRS thinks are foreseeable). The regulations elaborate
on these and create various safe-harbors.

3.

Consequences of Policy Loans. In Revolinski et. al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Ope 2005-26

(2005) (unpublished), the Tax Court held that a taxpayer's withdrawals of funds from a universal life policy were
loans and when the policy was surrendered he received a taxable distribution in an amount calculated by taking the
accumulated value of the policy and subtracting his investment in the policy. In determining the accumulated value
the amount of the loans was included., as was interest on the amount.

4.

Grantor and Grantor Trust May Not Form Partnership Alone. Rev. Rut. 2004-77,2004-31

IRB 119, sets forth that a partnership may not be formed between a person and an entity which is disregarded as to
that person.
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B.
CHARITABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT MATTERS - Sections 170, 642, 664, 501, 509, 2055, 2522, and
4940-4947

1.

Making Changes to a Charitable Remainder Trust. In PLR 200441019 the IRS gave effect to

a state court reformation of a charitable remainder unitrust. The trust was drafted with a 7% payout but should have
been a 5% payout. The unitrust recipient returned the extra cash which had been distributed to the trust. The
reformation and repayment was not self-dealing. In PLR 200502037 a CRUT was divided incident to a divorce. As
part of that division the grantor renounced the power to revoke the spouse's interest in the trust and charity remained
the trustee and beneficiary of each trust.
2.

Assignment of Income Issues ("Palmer Problems"). In PLR 200230004 husband and wife

proposed to transfer 495 of 500 shares of a C corporation to a charitable remainder unitrust and asked whether the
redemption by the corporation would be self-dealing. The ruling determined it would not be self-dealing because
there is an exception to the self-dealing rules:
Section 53.4941 (d)-3(d)( 1) of the foundation regulations provides that, in
general, Under section 4941(d)(2)(F), any transaction between a private
foundation and a corporation which is a disqualified person will not be an act of
self-dealing if such transaction is engaged in pursuant to a liquidation, merger,
redemption, recapitalization, or other corporate adjustment, organization, or
reorganization, so long as all the securities of the same class as that held (prior to
such transaction) by the foundation are subject to the same terms and such terms
provide for receipt by the foundation of no less than fair market value. For
purposes of this paragraph, all of the securities are not subject to the same terms
unless, pursuant to such transaction, the corporation makes a bona fide offer on a
uniform basis to the foundation and every other person who holds such
securities.
The taxpayers also asked whether the C corporation dividends would be unrelated taxable income and the
answer was no, even though the corporation would be a controlled corporation, because dividends are excepted:
Section 512(b)(13)(A) of the Code provides that notwithstanding section
512(b)(1), (2), and (3), an organization (controlling organization) receiving a
specified payment from another entity which it controls (controlled entity), shall
include such payment as an item of gross income derived from an unrelated trade
or business to the extent such payment reduces the net unrelated income of the
controlled entity (or increases any net unrelated loss of the controlled entity).
There shall be allowed all deductions of the controlling organization directly
connected with amounts treated as derived from an unrelated trade or business
under the preceding sentence.
Section 512(b)(13)(C) of the Code provides that the term "specified payment"
means any interest, annuity, royalty, or rent.
Section 512(b)(13)(D)(i) of the Code provides, in part, that the term "control"
means in the case of a corporation, ownership (by vote or value) of more than 50
percent of the stock of such corporation, and in any other case (other than a
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corporation or a partnership) ownership of more than 50 percent of the beneficial
interests in the entity.
The modifications contained in section 512(b) of the Code, in effect, constitute
an exception to the general rule by excluding from the computation of unrelated
business taxable income items such as dividends, interest, annuities, royalties,
and rents. If these modifications, which are provided in section 512(b)(1), (2),
and (3), are considered an exception to the general rule of taxing the unrelated
business income of exempt organizations, then section 512(b)(13) may be
considered an exception to the exception. Under section 512(b)(13), the
exclusion of interest, annuities, royalties, and rents provided by section
512(b)(1), (2), and (3) does not apply where such amounts are derived from
"controlled organizations."
The exception to the modifications contained in section 512(b) of the Code is not
applicable in this case. Although Trust, which holds the majority of X stock, is a
"controlling organization" within the meaning of section 512(b)(13), the income
earned by X while part of its stock is owned by Trust will not constitute UBTI to
Trust. The distributions to Trust from X while Trust owns part of its stock are
dividends. The receipt of dividends is not taxable to Trust, because section
512(b)( 1) excludes dividends from the UBTI, and the rules of section 512(b)(13)
do not apply to the payment of dividends.
Therefore, the income earned by X while part of its stock is owned by Trust will
not constitute unrelated business taxable income to Trust. In addition,
distributions to Trust from X while Trust owns part of its stock will constitute
dividends that are excluded from unrelated business income under section
512(b)(1) of the Code, so long as they are not interest, annuities, royalties, and
rents derived from the controlled corporation.
Finally, the taxpayers asked whether the redemption would be treated as an assignment of income. The
ruling states:
This request involves Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684 (1974); affd. on
other grounds, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975), acq., 1978-1 C.B. 2. In the Palmer
case, the Tax Court held that a taxpayer's gift of stock in a closely held
corporation to a private foundation, followed by a redemption, was not to be
recharacterized as a sale or redemption between the taxpayer and the corporation
followed by a gift of the redemption proceeds to the foundation, even though the
taxpayer held voting control over both the corporation and the foundation. The
Tax Court based its opinion, in part, on the fact that the foundation was not
legally obligated to redeem the stock at the time it received title to the shares.
In Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, the Internal Revenue Service announced
that it will treat the proceeds of a redemption of stock under facts similar to those
in the Palmer case as income to the donor only if the donee is legally bound or
can be compelled by the corporation to surrender the shares for redemption.
In the present case, at the time X shares are transferred to Trust, X will be under
no legal obligation to redeem the contributed stock. There is no agreement
among the parties under which X would be obligated to redeem, or Trust would
be obligated to surrender for redemption, the stock. Trust is not legally obligated
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to accept any offer of redemption made by X. Accordingly, any redemption by X
of the stock contributed by Grantors to Trust will be respected.
Based on the representations submitted and information described above, we
conclude that a purchase by X of the stock transferred by Grantors to Trust will
be treated as a redemption of the stock from Trust, and will not be treated as a
redemption of stock from Grantors or a distribution by X to Grantors. Therefore,
the sale or redemption by Trust of its X stock will not result in the capital gain in
such sale or the redemption price being attributed for tax purposes to Grantors.
Among the representations made - whether required or given voluntarily - was:
In addition, A, as president and sole shareholder of X and grantor and co-trustee
of Trust, represents the following:
(1)
I, A, grantor and co-trustee of Trust, hereby represent that neither I nor
any family member of me will acquire, offer to acquire, or become obligated to
acquire shares of X stock from Trust earlier than at least one year after the date
of any transfer of shares of X stock to Trust.
(2)
I, A, President and sole shareholder of X, hereby represent that X will
not redeem, offer to redeem, or become obligated to redeem shares of X stock
from Trust earlier than at least one year after the date of any transfer of shares of
X stock to Trust, directly or indirectly, by the grantor of Trust or a family
member of the grantor.
(3)
I, A, President and sole shareholder of X, and grantor and co-trustee of
Trust, hereby represent that neither X nor I am aware of any plan or intention of
Trust to transfer any corporate stock, or to have any person acquire any
corporate stock from Trust.
The application of Revenue Ruling 78-197 arose in Gerald A. Rauenhorst, et ux. v. Commissioner, 119
T.C. No.9 (2002). Arbeit (a partnership) owned warrants enabling it to purchase NMG stock. On September 28,
1993, WCP (a corporation) offered to purchase all NMG stock. On November 9, 1993 the partnership assigned
come warrants to four charities. On November 19 sold its remaining warrant to WCP, and the charities sold their
warrants to WCP. On November 22, 1993, WCP and NMG agreed on a sale of all the NMG stock.
The government argued that the bright-line rule of Rev. Rul. 78-197 was not controlling. The Opinion
states:
Respondent argues that petitioners are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and that genuine issues of material fact remain for trial. Respondent argues that
the question whether the donees were bound or could be legally compelled to
surrender their NMG warrants is not "the critical issue" to be resolved and,
accordingly, neither Carrington v. Commissioner, supra, nor Rev. Rul. 78-197,
supra, controls this case. It is respondent's position that "the critical issue" in this
case is "a factual one": whether petitioners' rights to receive the proceeds of the
stock transaction involving WCP "ripened to a practical certainty" at the time of
the assignments. Respondent relies on Ferguson v. Commissioner, 174 F.3d 997
(9th Cir. 1999), Jones v. United States, supra, Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d
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1058 (2d Cir. 1973), affg. 58 T.C. 259 (1972), Hudspeth v. United States, 471
F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972), and Estate of Applestein v. Commissioner, supra.
Respondent purports to distinguish both Carrington and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra,
on the facts of the case and the ruling. To that end, he contends that Carrington
and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, are not inconsistent with the cases he relies upon
above. Respondent claims that in this case, and the cases upon which he relies,
there was a pending "global" transaction for the purchase and sale of all the
stock of a corporation at the time of the gift or transfer at issue. He then surmises
that because Carrington and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, did not involve a pending
"global" transaction, the legal principles of those authorities do not apply.
Instead, he argues that we must apply the principles of the cases he relies upon,
and, accordingly, we must conduct a detailed factual inquiry for purposes of
determining whether the sale of the stock warrants had ripened to a· practical
certainty at the time of the assignments.
We cannot agree that respondent has effectively distinguished Carrington and
Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, on their facts. First, neither this Court nor the Courts of
Appeals have adopted respondent's theory of a pending "global" transaction as a
means of distinguishing cases such as Carrington and Palmer v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 684 (1974). Indeed, the case law in this area applies essentially the same
anticipatory assignment of income principles to cases of a "global" nature as
those applicable to cases of a "nonglobal" nature. See, e.g., Greene v. United
States, supra at 581. We can only interpret respondent's use of the phrase
"pending global transaction" as simply a restatement of the principles contained
in the cases upon which he relies. Thus, we cannot agree that respondent's
reliance on a pending global transaction distinguishes either Carrington, Rev.
Rul. 78-197, supra, or other cases upon which petitioners rely. With that being
said and leaving Carrington and those other cases aside at this point, the
bright-line test of Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, which focuses solely on the donee's
control over the contributed property, stands in stark contrast to the legal test and
the cases upon which respondent relies and which consider the donee's control
to be only a factor.
The Court took a dim view of the government's urging that Rev. Rul. 78-197 be ignored:
While this Court may not be bound by the Commissioner's revenue rulings, and
in the appropriate case we could disregard a ruling or rulings as inconsistent with
our interpretation of the law, see Stark v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 243, 251
(1986), in this case it is respondent who argues against the principles stated in
his ruling and in favor of our previous pronouncements on this issue. The
Commissioner's revenue ruling has been in existence for nearly 25 years, and it
has not been revoked or modified. No doubt taxpayers have referred to that
ruling in planning their charitable contributions, and, indeed, petitioners submit
that they relied upon that ruling in planning the charitable contributions at issue.
Under the circumstances of this case, we treat the Commissioner's position in
Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, as a concession. Accordingly, our decision is
limited to the question whether the charitable donees were legally obligated or
could be compelled to sell the stock warrants at the time of the assignments.
On the facts, the court found in favor of the taxpayer:
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Petitioners argue that as of November 12, 1993, the date the warrants were
transferred on the books ofNMG, the donees had not entered into any agreement
to sell the warrants and could not be compelled by any legal means to transfer
the warrants. Accordingly, they contend that, as a matter of law, there was not an
assignment of income. Petitioners submitted affidavits from representatives of
the donees in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. Each of
those affidavits outlines the events which preceded the assignments, each states
that the stock warrants were received on November 12, 1993, and each also
states that, as of that date, the donees had not entered into agreements to sell the
stock warrants.
Respondent questioned the reliability of those affidavits, and he contended that
the affidavits were deficient in that they failed to state the personal involvement
of the representatives with respect to petitioners' contributions. He also asserted
that the testimony of those affiants is "unknown", and he questioned whether
they were involved in any negotiations or discussions with NMG, WCP, or
Arbeit regarding WCP's proposed acquisition of NMG stock and warrants.
Respondent also questioned the affiants' competency "to opine upon, or reach
any conclusion as to, what constitutes a binding agreement or whether their
respective organizations had indeed entered binding agreements in connection
with the transactions at issue." We do not share respondent's reservations with
respect to the affidavits, and we fmd those affidavits credible.
First, in response to respondent's allegations, petitioners submitted additional
affidavits from each of the affiants. Each of those affidavits states: (1) The
affiants were personally involved with respect to petitioners' contributions; (2)
before the donees' execution of the warrant purchase and sale agreement, there
were no agreements amongst the donees, Arbeit, Mr. Rauenhorst, or any o~er
person or entity regarding the sale of the warrants; and (3) through November
12, 1993, there were no negotiations or communications between the donees and
NMG or parties representing NMG, except for the letters from NMG's legal
counsel requesting that the donees sign an Additional Party Signature Page.
Second, respondent relies on nonspecific allegations of an informal agreement or
understanding between the donees and NMG, WCP, Mr. Rauenhorst, and/or
Arbeit. Summary assertions and conclusory allegations are simply not enough
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. [citations omitted]
Respondent alleges no facts or evidence to substantiate his position, and he has
submitted no affidavits in response to the affidavits that petitioners submitted.
Instead, he points out that the record lacks information regarding any
discussions, deliberations, or negotiations which may have taken place between
the donees and the other parties. Respondent has had ample opportunity to
investigate the facts surrounding these transactions, and it is clear that
respondent could have requested additional information from the individuals
involved. See Rule 121(e). He has requested neither additional discovery nor a
continuance for purposes of additional discovery. He has not demonstrated to
our satisfaction that the only available method for opposing the statements in the
affidavits is through cross- examination at trial. Further, it is insufficient for the
opposing party to argue in the abstract that the legal theory involved in the case
encompasses factual questions. Hibernia Natl. Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 98
(5th Cir. 1993); Daniels v. Commissioner, supra. Since petitioners have offered
affidavits directly supporting their position on a material issue of fact, and since
respondent has failed to counter those affidavits with anything other than
unsupported allegations, respondent cannot avoid summary judgment on this
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issue. See Greene v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 1165, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
affd. 13 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994). Thus, we fmd that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the donees entered into a legally binding
agreement to sell their stock warrants before, or at the time of, the assignments
by petitioners.
Footnote 14 states:
The record indicates that no agreement was entered into by the donees before
Nov. 19, 1993, the date they signed the warrant purchase and sale agreement. On
Nov. 16, 1993, NMG's legal counsel sent letters to each of the donees enclosing
a warrant purchase and sale agreement. Those letters state that pursuant to the
warrant purchase and sale agreement, the donees would agree to sell their
reissued warrants to WCP and "to abstain from either exercising its Warrant or
selling or otherwise transferring it to any other party through Dec. 31, 1993."
Certainly, the formality of having the donees enter into the warrant purchase and
sale agreements suggests that they had not entered into any binding agreements
before Nov. 19, 1993.
Subsequent to the decision, the government has reiterated its intention, generally, to follow its own rulings
in litigation.

In PLR 200321010 a retired officer of a corporation intended to give shares of the corporation to a CRUT.
The corporation had the right to purchase the stock if it so desired, and the agreement also bound the trust:
X proposes to establish a CRUT (as defmed in § 664 of the Internal Revenue
Code). Upon establishment of the CRUT, X will notify Company ofX's intent to
transfer a portion ofX's Company stock purchased under the Plan to the CRUT,
thereby triggering Company's option to purchase the stock for the formula price
set forth in the stock restriction agreements applicable to such stock. Taxpayer
represents that Company will likely decline to purchase the stock for the formula
price set forth in the stock restriction agreements and thus X will be free to
transfer the stock to the CRUT. The stock transferred to the CRUT will continue
to be subject to the terms of the stock restriction agreements under the Plan in
accordance with the terms of the stock restriction agreements. Therefore, if the
trustee of the CRUT wishes to sell or otherwise dispose of the stock, Company
will have a right to purchase the stock for the formula price set forth in the stock
restriction agreements. The trustee will notify Company that the CRUT wishes to
sell Company stock prior to any proposed sale or disposition. X represents that
Company has always exercised its option under the stock restriction agreements
in the past for the formula price set forth therein.
The ruling described the "bright-line" test of Palmer, citing Rauenhorst:
The Service has acquiesced in the Palmer decision. See 1978-1 C.B. 2. In Rev.
Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, the Service concluded that it will treat the
proceeds of a redemption of stock under facts similar to those in Palmer as
income to the donor only if the donee is legally bound or can be compelled by
the corporation to surrender the shares for redemption. The Tax Court has
characterized the "legally bound" standard in Rev. Rul. 78-197 as a "bright line"
test for determining if a contribution of stock to a charity followed by a
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redemption of that stock from that charity should be respected in form or
recharacterized as a redemption of the stock from the donor followed by a
contribution of the proceeds by the donor to the charity. See generally,
Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. No.9 (October 7, 2002).
Thus, the ruling concludes:
Consequently, the test for purposes of this ruling request, is whether the CRUT
will be legally bound or can be compelled by Company to surrender the stock for
redemption at the time of the donation. Here, X proposes to transfer the
Company stock to the CRUT. Under the restrictions contained in each year's
stock restriction agreement, the CRUT must fIrst offer the stock to Company at a
set formula price should the CRUT propose to dispose of the shares. This
provision amounts to a right of fIrst refusal. However, it does not mean that the
CRUT is legally bound or can be compelled by Company to surrender the stock
to Company at the time of the donation. The information submitted contains no
indication that the CRUT will be legally bound, or could be compelled by
Company, to redeem or sell the gifted stock. That all or a portion of the gifted
stock was subject to restrictions upon transfer to a third party by X, and thus by
the CRUT following the transfer, does not give Company the ability to compel
its redemption or sale from the CRUT. The CRUT is free to retain title to and
ownership of the stock indefmitely.
Because the CRUT is not legally bound and cannot be compelled by Company to
redeem or sell the stock, we conclude that the transfer of the Company stock by
X to the CRUT, followed by any subsequent redemption of the stock by
Company, will not be recharacterized for federal income tax purposes as a
redemption of the stock by Company from X followed by a contribution of the
redemption proceeds to the CRUT. See Palmer v. Commissioner, supra, and
Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra. The same principles apply if the stock is sold by the
CRUT rather than redeemed by Company. Thus, provided there is no
prearranged sale contract whereby the CRUT is legally bound to sell the stock
upon the contribution, we conclude that any subsequent sale will not be
recharacterized for federal income tax purposes as a sale of the stock by X,
followed by a contribution of the sale proceeds to the CRUT. Accordingly, any
redemption proceeds or sales proceeds received by the CRUT for the stock will
not be treated as taxable income received by X.

3.

Flexible Deferred Gift Annuities. In PLR 200449033 the donor contributed assets to a charity in

exchange for the charity paying an annuity to the donor for life beginning at a date to be specified in the future. The
donor may elect a starting date during an eight year period and the annuity amount will be calculated then with the
annuity agreement specifying the rates payable as of various dates. Presumably in valuing the charitable gift the
charity and donor must assume that an annuity having the highest possible value will be paid.
4.

Bequest of Art. PLR 200418002 deals with a bequest of art to a museum will qualify for a section

2055 charitable deduction. The bequest would be subject to extensive requirements of the museum. The ruling
summarizes the agreement:
The Taxpayers entered into an Agreement on Date 1 with Foundation and the
Trustees of Museum concerning the Taxpayers' donation of the Collection either
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during the lifetime of either or both of them or upon the death of the survivor of
them (Donation). The Agreement was later amended on Date 2 and Date 3.
Section I.A of the Agreement provides that in the event the Taxpayers elect, in
their sole discretion, to make the Donation, the Trustees of Museum shall accept
the Collection on behalf of the Museum, and the Trustees shall display and
maintain the Collection in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth
herein. Immediately upon the occurrence of the Donation, title to the Collection
shall vest in the Trustees, for the benefit of Museum, and at all times thereafter
the Trustees shall be and remain solely responsible for the custody, control,
management, exhibition, conservation of and curatorial services for, the
Collection in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. Trustees
acknowledge and agree that nothing contained in this Agreement shall be
deemed to obligate the Taxpayers to make the Donation.
Section 2.A (i) provides that the intention of the parties is that each work of art
comprising the Collection shall at all times be located, housed and permanently
displayed, in perpetuity, at either the Museum or Donors' Gallery. The Museum
shall at all times utilize the Donors' Gallery to its capacity for the exhibition of
works of art from the Collection, or the exhibition of works of art by artists
whose works comprise part of the Collection which are either part of the
Museum's collection, or on loan to the Museum, or exhibited in connection with
special temporary exhibitions. At all times, a minimum number of works of art
from the entire Collection shall be housed and permanently displayed, in
perpetuity, at the Museum. The minimum number is defined as a number not less
than the total number of gifts of works of art made by the Taxpayers prior to the
Donation, excluding works on paper. In accordance with the provisions of the
Agreement, if after utilizing the Donors' Gallery to its capacity and adhering to
the provisions of paragraph 2.A.(i) in the Agreement with respect to the
Minimum Number, there remain works of art in the Collection not on display,
the Museum will use its best efforts to exhibit such works of art at the Museum.
Section 2.A (ii) provides that all works of art on paper comprising part of the
Collection shall at all times be located, housed and/or displayed at the Donors'
Gallery, consistent with generally accepted conservation guidelines in effect
from time to time. Such works of art on paper shall be subject to temporary
relocation to the Museum for the sole purpose of exhibiting such works of art on
paper at the Museum, or in connection with research.
Section 2.B provides that upon the Donation, the Trustees of Museum shall
promptly cause all works of art in the Collection to be included within the
Museum's blanket insurance policy, which insures the Museum's entire collection
from time to time. The proceeds of any such insurance shall, at the option of the
Trustees, be used either for the restoration of the damaged work, or the purchase
of a replacement work of art by any of the artists whose works of art comprise
the Collection.
Section 2.C provides that the Museum will provide all conservation and
curatorial services for each work of art in the Collection, wherever located, in the
same manner as is provided for the Museum's permanent collection, at the sole
cost and expense of Museum. The conservation and curatorial services for the
Collection shall include, but shall not be limited to, all cleaning, framing,
hanging, handling, restoration, transportation, and insurance. In the event that
any work of art in the Collection requires restoration, the Museum shall select a
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restorer who is an expert in the school of art and/or artist of the work involved,
whether or not that restorer is employed by Museum.
Section 2.D provides that all of the works in the Collection which are displayed
at the Museum will be displayed in galleries which have been decorated,
equipped, and maintained in a manner which, in the professional judgment of the
Director or Chief Curator of Museum, will enhance the aesthetic appeal of the
works in the Collection, will provide for the comfortable enjoyment of the
Collection by the public, and will be comparable in quality and aesthetic appeal
to the permanent collection currently displayed at the Museum. The Museum
will be solely responsible for all reasonable costs and expenses relating to the
decoration, equipping and maintenance of the galleries at the Museum in which
the Collection is displayed, which will include the responsibility for all lighting,
air conditioning and humidity controls, cleaning, installation, security systems,
security, seating and floor coverings in the galleries. In addition, the galleries in
which the Collection is displayed shall be in locations which are at all times
during Museum hours easily accessible to the public.
Section 2.E provides that the Museum shall be responsible for all conservation
and curatorial services for each work of art from the Collection located at the
Donors' Gallery, including all cleaning, framing, hanging, handling, restoration,
transportation, and insurance, and all costs and expenses related thereto. The
Trustees shall select an administrator of the Donor's Gallery who shall
coordinate the respective duties and activities of the Trustees and the Board, and
act as liaison between them. The Trustees shall have the right to change the
Administrator from time to time in their sole discretion. The Administrator shall
be responsible for the administration and operation of the Donors' Gallery and
the Taxpayers' residence, including, but not limited to, all lighting, air
conditioning and humidity controls, cleaning (other that the works of art in the
Collection), security systems, security, seating and floor coverings; and all of the
expenses in connection with the foregoing, including the salary of the
Administrator, shall be borne by the Foundation.
Section 2.F provides that each work of art in the Collection, as well as the entire
Collection, wherever located, will at all times be attributed, clearly and visibly,
as part of the Collection.
Section 2.G provides that the Trustees of Museum shall not, at any time, sell,
trade, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or permit the sale, trade, transfer or other
disposition of, all or any of the works of art in the Collection. In the event of any
attempted sale, trade, transfer or disposition of any work of art in the Collection
in violation of the terms of this Agreement, the ownership of that work of art
shall immediately and automatically vest in the Foundation, without any action
on the part of the Foundation.
Section 2.R provides that subject to the provisions of paragraph 2.A hereof, the
Trustees shall not, at any time, store, loan or relocate, or permit the storage,
lending or relocation, of any of the works of art in the Collection (other than the
relocation of works of art in the Collection between the Donors' Gallery and the
Museum), except under special circumstances approved by the Museum's senior
staff Member(s) of Period art, such as a major retrospective or in order to
enhance the reputation of a particular artist or artists in connection with an
exhibition of the works of such artist or artists.
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Section 2.1 provides that the Trustees agree to display works of art at the Donors'
Gallery at all times of sufficient quantity, quality and variety so as to establish
the high standards established by Taxpayers. Accordingly, in the event that the
Trustees remove any works of art which are part of the Collection from the
Donors' Gallery for the purpose of exhibiting such works of art at the Museum,
or for any reason permitted under the provisions of this Agreement, the Trustees
shall, in place of the works of art so removed, exhibit works of art which are not
part of the Collection, provided that such works of art are by artists whose works
of art are part of the Collection.
Section 2.J provides that the Museum will promote the use of Donors' Gallery so
as to make the public aware of the quality of the Collection and the setting in
which the Collection is displayed, all to the end that the Collection shall become
open and accessible to, and stimulate the interest of, the general public.
Section 3 provides that prior to or simultaneously with the Donation, the
Taxpayers will contribute to the Foundation the Donors' Gallery, the Taxpayers'
residence, and funds to generate an income stream which will, in the opinion of
the Taxpayers, be sufficient to operate the Foundation, operate and maintain the
Donors' Gallery and the Taxpayers'· residence, and otherwise comply with the
Foundation's other obligations under this Agreement.
Section 6 provides that in the event that Museum defaults in its obligations, the
Foundation shall have the option, upon written notice to the Trustees, to
terminate the Agreement, andlor to exercise any other remedies available to them
at law or in equity. Upon termination of the Agreement, the ownership of all of
the works of art comprising the Collection which have been given or donated to
the Trustees for the benefit of Museum shall immediately revert to the
Foundation.
Section 7.A provides that the Foundation shall operate the Donors' Gallery for a
minimum of ten years from the date of the Donation. At any time after the
expiration of such ten year period, the Foundation shall have the right to
terminate this Agreement, upon thirty days written notice to the Trustees, in the
event that: (i) the Collection is on permanent display at the Museum; (ii) in the
opinion of the Foundation, it is not economically feasible to continue to operate
and maintain the Donors' Gallery and the Taxpayers' residence; or (iii) in the
opinion of the Foundation, the continued operation of the Donors' Gallery and
the Taxpayers' residence is not consistent with the intent of the Taxpayers.
Section 7.B provides that in the event that the Foundation elects to terminate this
Agreement in accordance with the provisions set forth in Paragraph A, the
Trustees shall promptly cause any portion of the Collection remaining at the
Donors' Gallery to be delivered to the Museum, which delivery shall be fully
insured, all at the cost and expense of the Museum. After termination of this
Agreement, neither the Trustees nor the Museum shall have any claim to any
assets of the Foundation.
Section 7.C provides that in the event that the Foundation terminates this
Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph A above,. or in the
event that the Foundation has not terminated this Agreement and there is a
material diminution of the gallery space at the Donors' Gallery for other than a
temporary period of time, the Trustees shall thereafter use their best efforts to
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locate, house and display the entire Collection at the Museum in accordance with
the provisions of Paragraph 2.A.
The ruling concludes favorably:
In the present case, under the terms of both Husband's and Wife's will, the works
of art comprising the Collection will pass to the Museum upon the death of the
survivor of the Taxpayers. Museum is an organization described in section
501(c)(3). If the Museum does not accept the Collection, then the Collection will
pass to the Foundation, an organization described in section 501(c)(3). Under the
Agreement, Museum may not sell any of the Collection and may loan art in the
Collection under specially defmed circumstances. Further, under the Agreement,
if Museum defaults on its obligation, the Collection reverts to the Foundation.
Under no circumstances will the Collection revert to the Taxpayers or inure to
the benefit of other private individuals. Accordingly, based upon the facts
submitted and the representations made, we conclude that:
1. The value of the proposed bequest upon the death of the survivor of
Taxpayers to the Museum (or if the Museum refuses to accept the
contribution, to the Foundation), of the Taxpayer's interest in the works
of art comprising the Collection, subject to the conditions of the
Agreement, will be deductible from the Taxpayer's gross estate under
section 2055.
2. The amount of the deduction under section 2055 for the proposed
bequest, upon the death of the survivor of the Taxpayers, to the
Museum (or if the Museum refuses to accept the contribution, to the
Foundation), of the Taxpayer's interest in the works of art comprising
the Collection, will be equal to the full fair market value of the
Taxpayer's interest in the works of art comprising the Collection
includible in the Taxpayer's gross estate under sections 2031 and 2033.
5.

Charitable Split-Dollar Income Tax Deduction. In Addis v. Commissioner, 374 F.3d 881 (9th

Cir. 2004) the court affrrmed the Tax Court's disallowance of an income tax deduction in a charitable split-dollar
arrangement, on the grounds that the charity improperly represented that it had provided no goods or services to the
taxpayer insured. See also Weiner v. Commissioner, 102 Fed. Appx. 631 (9th Cir. 2004), and David C. Roark v.
Commissioner, T. C. Memo 2004-271, for similar decisions.
6.

Termination of Charitable Remainder Unitrust. Another ruling approving the early termination

of charitable remainder trust is PLR 200441024. There is no self-dealing but the entire amount received by the
settlor of the trust is long-term capital gain.
7.

Effect of Spousal Election on Charitable Remainder Trusts. Under the law of certain states, a

spouse's elective share may be satisfied using assets set aside in inter vivos transfers, such as a charitable remainder
trust. This is the "augmented estate" approach of the Uniform Probate Code. Under section 664(d) the ability of
assets in a charitable remainder trust to be paid to another (e.g. an electing spouse) causes the trust to fail to qualify
as a charitable remainder trust. To minimize this problem, in Rev. PIOC. 2005-24, 2005-16, IRB 1, the IRS created a
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safe-harbor allowing a spouse to waive the right of election with respect to charitable remainder trust assets. The
waiver must be in writing, signed and dated by the spouse and delivered to the trustee. The waiver need not waive
any other rights of the spouse to other property or to the annuity or unitrust payments from the trust.
The waiver must be executed within six months after the due date (including extensions) of Form 5227
(Split-Interest Trusts) for the year in which the LATER of the following occurs: (1) the trust is created, (2) the donor
marries the spouse, (3) the donor becomes subject to a jurisdiction giving rise to the right of election, or (4) the
effective date of a new state law in the state of applicable jurisdiction which creates the right of election.
The waiver will be required for all charitable remainder trusts created on or after June 28,2005. For trusts
created previously, the right of waiver will be ignored unless the surviving spouse does make the election.
The Rev. Proc. requires that the waiver be valid under applicable state law.
8.

Donor's Investment Control'. In PLR 200445023 and PLR 200445024 the IRS outlined the

rather substantial control a donor may retain over funds contributed to a charity. The charity was a college. One
donor was an individual and the other was a limited liability company. The agreement between the donors and the
college specifically stated that the donated assets were the sole property of the college and any act of self-dealing
was prohibited. Nonetheless. the donor, or the donor's investment manager, retained investment authority over the
assets subject only to a stated investment policy. The IRS concluded that income and gift tax deductions were
allowed for the donated assets.

9.

Private Foundation Rules. In PLR 200448049 the IRS determined that a Delaware corporation

which owns a limited liability company which in turn owns various interests in private equity investment funds
would not be treated as a business subject to the excess business holdings limits of section 4943; instead the limits
would be subject to the limits.
In PLR 200432026 a private foundation obtained a private letter ruling regarding various unrelated business
income issues. The Foundation's payment of the costs of obtaining the ruling, even though it also involved other
taxpayers and disqualified persons, was not self-dealing.
10.

Changes Made by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Three significant changes were

made to the charitable contribution rules by the last tax act. First, for contributions of property other than cash,
marketable securities, inventory, and vehicles, any gift of more than $5000 must be substantiated with a qualified
appraisal or the deduction is denied. The appraisal must be attached to the return if the donation exceeds $500,000.
Second, for vehicles - - cars, boats, airplanes - - the donee must provide contemporaneous acknowledgment
containing the vehicle identification number and the charity must also certify the terms on which it was either used or
sold, and, if sold, the gross proceeds. The amount of the charitable deduction cannot exceed the gross proceeds.
Third, for intellectual property, a deduction is allowed at the time of contribution only for the lesser of basis or fair
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market value but subsequent deductions are allowed calculated on the basis of the amount earned by the charity over
the next 12 years., beginning with a deduction equal to 100% of the income earned in the fIrst two years declining to
10% in the last two years. The donor and donee have various reporting requirements as well.

11.

Charitable Remainder Trust Distribution Ordering Rules. On March 16, 2005 the IRS issued

fmal regulations on the section 664(b) ordering rules for characterizing charitable remainder trust distributions. T.
D. 9190. The regulations are effective as of March 16, 2005.The regulations require the income of a CRT be
assigned, in the year it must be taken into account by the CRT, to one of three categories: ordinary income, capital
gains, and other income. Within a category, items of income are tracked separately based on the income tax rate
applicable to the type of income. Distributions from a CRT are deemed to carry out fIrst ordinary income, then
capital gains, and then other income, and within a category, fIrst to carry out the class of income in the highest
income tax bracket, then the next, and so on through the lowest bracket. Within the capital gains category, long-term
gains and losses are netted before netting against short-term gains and losses. The determination of categories and
classes of income is made at the end of the CRT tax year. The recipient of a distribution from a CRT pays income
tax at the rates in effect in the year of distribution not the year in which the CRT received the income. These same
ordering rules apply even for a year in which the trust is not tax-exempt.

c.

SECTION 408 - IRAs AND RETIREMENT PLANS
1.

Posthumous IRA Rollover. In PLR 200415011 an unmarried taxpayer died after taking an IRA

distribution and the executor, the decedent's son and a beneficiary, repaid the IRA. The IRS determined that the
distribution was taxable. On the other hand, in PLR 200415012 permitted a surviving spouse to do a post-death
rollover more than 60 days after the decedent withdrew funds from an IRA, granting her a hardship waiver under
Rev. Proc. 2003-16.
2.

Roll-Over of Statutory Share. In PLR 200438045 the IRS allowed a surviving spouse who took

half of an IRA as part of her statutory share to execute a spousal roll-over.

3.

Liberal 60 Day Roll-Over Ruling Position. The IRS appears to have adopted a very liberal

ruling policy with respect to the 60 day IRA roll-over provisions. In general, the IRS appears to allow almost any
mistake to be corrected so long as basic intent to roll-over is shown and the funds distributed to the taxpayer were
not spent for personal expenses or living expenses. See Thomas Murphy, "IRs Rulings on IRA Rollovers Have Now
Been Liberalized," 32 Estate Planning 4 (Apri12005) at pages 36 - 39 for a summary of various rulings.
4.

Disclaimers Make Spouse Designated Beneficiary.

In PLR 200505030 decedent, a state

employee, had designated an inter vivos trust as beneficiary of a Salaried Employees Retirement System plan and a
Deferred Compensation Plan. Subsequently the decedent created a second trust which received the residue of his
estate, and provided trusts for his wife after death, and destroyed the first as part of his estate planning. The state
plans provided that if there were no designated beneficiary a decedent's estate would be the beneficiary.
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The beneficiaries of the trusts disclaimed, and then the intestate takers disclaimed such that, eventually,
surviving spouse became the sole beneficiary. The IRS allowed the decedent's wife to roll over the distributions into
her IRA.

5.

IRAs in Bankruptcy. In Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 1561 (2005) the Supreme

Court held that the assets in a rollover IRA could not be reached by the creditors of the IRA owner who had filed for
bankruptcy. In Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) the Court held that many qualified plans were exempt
from claims in bankruptcy and this holding was an extension of that one. Here, the Court did not specifically deal
with non-rollover IRAs. Regardless, the benefits of the decision are limited. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 changes the Bankruptcy Code to limit the amount of an IRA which is exempt from
claims to $1,000,000 on top of any amount attributed to roll-overs from qualified plans.
D.

SECTIONS 671-678 -- GRANTOR TRUST RULES.

1.

Non-Grantor, Non-Gift Trust Created

PLR 200148028 is very helpful.

established a trust that is not a grantor trust but gifts to which are incomplete. The facts were:
Grantor proposes to establish an irrevocable Trust which will be funded by
intervivos and testamentary transfers. The Trust provides for one trustee
(Trustee) and two members of a Distribution Committee. Article 1.1 provides
that during the lifetime of the Grantor ("Initial Term"), the Trustee shall have no
power or authority to make any distribution of net income or principal of the
trust estate, to, or for the benefit of, any trust beneficiary at any time when any
person is serving as a member of the Distribution Committee unless the
distribution is made at the direction of the Distribution Committee. Distributions
may be made to the Grantor, the Grantor's.Spouse or any of the descendants of
the Grantor's parents.
Article 3.6 provides that the initial members of the Distribution Committee shall
be the two eldest adult and competent persons eligible to receive distributions
out of the Trust estate (other than the Grantor or the Grantor's spouse). At all
times during the Grantor's life, the Distribution Committee shall be comprised of
two persons, then eligible to receive distributions out of the Trust estate (other
than the Grantor or the Grantor's spouse). During the Initial Term, the
Distribution Committee shall direct the Trustee with regard to (i) all
discretionary distributions from the Trust estate to beneficiaries, and (ii) certain
of the Trustee's powers. The Trustee is authorized and directed to follow the
direction of the Distribution Committee. All rights and powers conferred on the
Distribution Committee shall be exercisable only by unanimous action of all
members of the Distribution Committee except that any member of the
Distribution Committee acting alone may direct the Trustee to make one or more
distributions upon obtaining the Grantor's prior written consent to each such
distribution and filing such consent with the Trustee.
The Trust lasts during the lifetime of the Grantor. Under Article 1.2, upon the
death of the Grantor, income and principal of the Trust estate, as it is then
constituted shall be transferred, conveyed and paid over to such person or
persons then eligible to receive distributions out of the Trust estate, other than
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The taxpayer

the Grantor, as the Grantor appoints by the Grantor's will. To the extent all, or
any portion of the income and principal of the Trust estate is not so effectively
appointed, such income and principal shall be divided into a sufficient number of
equal shares so that there shall be set aside one such share for each child of the
Grantor who is then living, and one such share for the collective descendants
who are then living of any child of the Grantor who is not then living. From each
such share so set aside for the collective descendants who are then living of any
child of the Grantor who is not then living there shall be set aside per stirpital
parts for such descendants. If no descendant of the Grantor is living at the death
of the Grantor, the income and principal of the Trust, to the extent not effectively
appointed, shall be distributed, free from Trust, to the then living descendants
per stirpes, of the Grantor's parents.
Article 1.3 provides that the Grantor may, at any time during the Grantor's life
release the Grantor's right to receive discretionary distributions of income and
principal from the trust estate, the right to consent to distributions as described in
Article 3.6, and/or the power of appointment described in Article 1.2, and may
limit the persons or entities in whose favor the power of appointment described
in Article 1.2 may be exercised. Article 1.3 further provides that notwithstanding
any of the foregoing or any other provision of this Agreement, the Grantor shall
have no power or authority to change the class of persons eligible to receive
distributions during the Initial Term (except to cause the Grantor personally to
be excluded from the class by releasing the Grantor's own right to be eligible to
receive such distributions.)
With respect to why the trust would not be a grantor trust the ruling states:
Because of the discretion of the Distribution Committee, acting together, or
singly with the consent of the Grantor, to make distributions from income and/or
corpus to one or more of the beneficiaries which includes the members of the
Distribution Committee, the members of the Distribution Committee have a
substantial beneficial interest in both the income and corpus portions of the
Trust. Any distribution that the Grantor wishes to make from assets contributed
to the Trust by that Grantor, could be made only if one of the members of the
Distribution Committee agrees. Since each of the two Distribution Committee
members is a potential recipient of Trust distributions, a consent to a distribution
could adversely affect that individual's beneficial interest in the Trust. Thus,
with respect to the Grantor, both of the members of the Distribution Committee
are adverse parties within the meaning of section 672(a).
The requirement in Article 3.6 that the initial members, and any current or
successor member of the Distribution Committee shall be the two eldest adult
and competent persons eligible to receive· distributions out of the Trust estate
and that at all times during the Grantor's life, the Distribution Committee shall
be comprised of two persons, then eligible to receive distributions out of Trust
estate, ensures that the Grantor will not be able to act independently of an
adverse party. The restrictions on the powers of the Trustee preclude the Trustee
from independently controlling distributions or making loans without the consent
of an adverse party.
The Grantor does not have a reversionary interest in excess of five percent in any
portion of the Trust. Accordingly, section 673 does not apply to treat Grantor as
owner of any portion of the Trust. Because control over the beneficial enjoyment
of, and any distributions of, income and corpus is exercisable by the Grantor,
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only with the consent of a Distribution Committee member, who is an adverse
party, Grantor will not be treated as the owner of any portion of the Trust under
section 674 or section 677. The Trust agreement does not authorize any of the
circumstances that cause administrative controls to be considered exercisable
primarily for the benefit of the grantor under section 675. Section 676 does not
apply to Grantor because Grantor cannot revest title in the Grantor in any portion
of the Trust. Section 678 is not applicable since none of the trustees and no other
person will have a power exercisable solely by that person to vest the corpus or
income of the Trust in that person.
The existence of the grantor's special testamentary power of appointment prevented the gift from being
complete until such time as distributions were made from the trust to someone other than the grantor.
In PLR 200247013 the taxpayer was arguably more aggressive.

The class of beneficiaries was the

descendants of the Taxpayer's parents, and two of the taxpayers siblings were the Distribution Committee.
This kind of trust will help grantors avoid state capital gains taxes on sales of assets.
See also PLR 200502014 for a similar ruling.

E.

SECTION 1361 - S CORPORATIONS
1.

Life Tenant as Qualified Shareholder. PLR 200404033 allowed a life estate to qualify as a

Qualified Subchapter S Trust. The life tenant received all the income annually, could sell the shares and reinvest the
proceeds, and could not dispose of the shares in a manner to defeat the remainderman's interest.

2.

Voting and Non-Voting Shares as One-Class of Stock. PLR 200407006 confrrms that voting

and non-voting shares are one class of stock for S corporation purposes.

3.

Changes Made By the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. The new tax act makes various

changes to the S corporation rules. Among the changes are: (a) the number of shareholders is increased from 75 to
100 and an election may be made to treat members of a family as one shareholder with a "family" being the lineal
descendants of a common ancestor (and their spouses or former spouses) but the common ancestor may not be more
than six generations removed from the youngest generation of shareholders at the time the S election is made; (b) in
determining whether a trust may qualify as an ESBT, unexercised powers of appointment are ignored; (c) an ESBT
has one year (rather than 60 days) to dispose of S corporation stock if an ineligible shareholder becomes a
beneficiary; (d) when a Qualified Subchapter S Trust disposes of S stock the beneficiary may deduct suspended
losses under the passive activity and at-risk rules; and (e) if losses have been suspended because they exceed a
shareholder's basis and the shares are transferred incident to a divorce, the losses/deductions are shifted to the
shareholder's spouse or former spouse.
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F.

SECTIONS 2031 and 2512 - VALUATION
1.

Subsequent Sales as Evidence of Value. Helen Noble died on September 2, 1996 owning 116 of

1000 shares of Glenwood Bank. The other shares were held by Glenwood Bancorporation. The estate valued the
shares at book value less a 45% minority interest discount for a total of just over $900,000. In October 1997
Glenwood Bancorporation bought the 116 shares for $1,100,000.

At issue in Estate of Helen M. Noble v.

Commissioner, T. C. Memo 2005-2, was of what significance was the subsequent sale in establishing the value of the
shares.
The estate argued that two sales prior to death, of 10 shares and seven shares, were relevant but that a postdeath sale was not relevant. The Tax Court disagreed and held that a post-death sale was the most relevant where it
occurred 14 months after death. The opinion states:
Petitioners conceded at trial that they bear the burden of proof in this case. They
acknowledge that an arm's-length sale of property near the valuation date is the
best indicium of its fair market value on the valuation date, but, they assert, only
certain sales near a valuation date are "competent, substantial and persuasive
evidence" of that fair market value. According to petitioners, sales may be
probative of fair market value only if they occur within a reasonable time before
the valuation date. Petitioners primarily support this position with a citation of
Douglas Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 766, 772 (8th Cir. 1951), affg. 14
T.C. 1136 (1950). They also assert that a prior sale of property conclusively sets
the fair market value of that property on a later valuation date even if the seller
was not knowledgeable of all relevant facts as to that property and even if the
property that was the subject of the sale was not of comparable size to the
property subject to valuation. They recognize that a determination of fair market
value on the basis of actual sales has often been said to include requirements that
a seller be knowledgeable and that the seller's property be comparable to the
property subject to valuation. They assert, however, that the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 243 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th
Cir. 2001), revg. Estate of Kaufman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-119,
eroded these requirements to now make them irrelevant.
We disagree with petitioners' assertion that the two prior sales of 10 shares and 7
shares, either separately or together, are an accurate measure of the applicable
fair market value of decedent's 116 shares. In Morrissey, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that sales of 10,000 and 6,960 shares of stock on May
12 and June 16, 1994, respectively, at $29.70 per share, reflected the fair market
value of 46,020 shares of that stock as of an earlier valuation date of April 14,
1994. The Court of Appeals stated that the sellers were under no compulsion to
sell their shares and that they did so at the price that the buyer had represented
was the price listed in a recent appraisal. The Court of Appeals stated that each
seller testified at trial that the price was fair and that the sale had not been
compelled.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, we read nothing in Morrissey to indicate that
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit eroded the requirements that a seller
of stock be knowledgeable and that the seller's shares be comparable in number
to the shares subject to valuation in order for the sale to be probative of a
valuation of the latter shares. 1 In fact, the Court of Appeals noted specifically as
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to the knowledge requirement that both sellers had sold their stock at
approximately the same price as listed in the appraisal and that both sellers were
aware that dividends had been meager even in prosperous years. Id. at 1148. The
Court of Appeals also indicated as to the comparable property requirement that
the prior sales of stock were not unrepresentative of the stock subject to
valuation.Id.
As to the two prior sales of stock in this case, we also are unpersuaded that either
of those sales was made by a knowledgeable seller who was not compelled to
sell or was made at arm's length. See Estate ofFitts v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d
at 731 (taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that sales are made at arm's
length and in the normal course of business). In addition, contrary to the factual
setting of Morrissey v. Commissioner, supra, the two prior sellers in this case did
not sell their stock for the amount set forth in an appraisal. They sold their stock
for much less than the per-share value set forth in the later appraisal; the estate,
in turn, sold its shares after the appraisal for more than the fair market value set
forth therein. Moreover, the two respective prior sales represented 1 percent and
.7 percent of Glenwood Bank's outstanding stock. Decedent's 116 shares, by
contrast, represented 11.6 percent of that outstanding stock and were the only
shares of Glenwood Bank stock not owned by the other shareholder. Mercer
testified credibly that it was reasonably foreseeable as of the applicable valuation
date that the other shareholder, Bancorporation, would eventually want to buy
that 11.6-percent interest at some unknown time and that this added a special
value to the interest. Our hypothetical seller would have known the same at the
time of the hypothetical sale and as part of that hypothetical sale would have
demanded compensation for this special value so as otherwise to not equate the
selling price for the 10 shares and 7 shares with the hypothetical selling price of
decedent's 116 shares. 2
As to the third sale, which occurred on October 24, 1997, approximately 14
months after the applicable valuation date, we disagree with petitioners that only
sales of stock that predate a valuation date may be used to determine fair market
value as of that valuation date. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the
court to which an appeal of this case most likely lies, has held specifically that
"In determining the value of unlisted stocks, actual sales made in reasonable
amounts at arm's length, in the normal course of business, within a reasonable
time before or after the basic date, are the best criterion of market value." Estate
of Fitts v. Commissioner, supra at 731; accord Rubber Research, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 422 F.2d 1402, 1405- 1406 (8th Cir. 1970), affg. T.C. Memo.
1969-24; see also Estate of Jung v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 412, 430-432
(1993); Estate of Scanlan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-331. Although
petitioners observe correctly that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
stated in Douglas Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d at 772, that "Evidence of
what property sold for within a reasonable time before the material date upon
which its fair value is to be determined is universally considered competent,
substantial, and persuasive evidence of its fair value on the material date", this
statement was made solely with respect to the evidentiary value of a sale that
predated the date of valuation there. The Court of Appeals did not state as
petitioners ask us to hold that only sales which occur before a valuation date are
probative as to fair market value on the valuation date. In fact, the Court of
Appeals went on to state specifically as to prior sales that "It is, of course, not
the only evidence which may be considered on the subject" of valuation. Id.;
accord Polack v. Commissioner, 366 F.3d at 612 ("subsequent events that shed
light on what a willing buyer would have paid on the date in question are
admissible, such as 'evidence of actual sales prices received for property after the
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date [in question], so long as the sale occurred within a reasonable time ... and
no intervening events drastically changed the value of the property.'" (quoting
First Natl. Bank v. United States, 763 F.2d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 1985))); see also
Estate of Jung v. Commissioner, supra at 431-432; Estate of Scanlan v.
Commissioner, supra.
Generally speaking, a valuation of property for Federal tax purposes is made as
of the valuation date without regard to any event happening after that date. See
Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). An event occurring after
a valuation date, however, is not necessarily irrelevant to a determination of fair
market value as of that earlier date. An event occurring after a valuation date
may affect the fair market value of property as of the valuation date if the event
was reasonably foreseeable as of that earlier date. First Natl. Bank v. United
States, supra at 894; Bank One Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. at 306. An
event occurring after a valuation date, even if unforeseeable as of the valuation
date, also may be probative of the earlier valuation to the extent that it is relevant
to establishing the amount that a hypothetical willing buyer would have paid a
hypothetical willing seller for the subject property as of the valuation date. 3
Polack v. Commissioner, supra at 612; First Natl. Bank v. United States, supra
at 893-894; Estate ofGilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 52-54 (1987); Estate
ofJephson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 999, 1002-1003 (1983); Estate ofScanlan
v. Commissioner, supra. Unforeseeable subsequent events which fall within this
latter category include evidence, such as we have here, '''of actual sales prices
received for property after the date [in question], so long as the sale occurred
within a reasonable time . . . and no intervening events drastically changed the
value of the property.'" Polack v. Commissioner, supra at 612 (quoting First
Natl. Bank v. United States, supra at 894); First Natl. Bank v. United States,
supra at 893-894; see also Estate of Jung v. Commissioner, supra at 431-432;
Estate ofScanlan v. Commissioner, supra.
The court did allow a 3% adjustment for inflation between the valuation date and sales date.
2.

Discounting Assets For Built-In Income Taxes.

No discount was allowed in valuing retirement plans by the U.S. District Court in Estate of Louis R. Smith
v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D. Tex. 2004), affd 391 F.3d 621 (5 th Cir. 2004). A willing buyer would
not have income tax and thus under the hypothetical willing buyer - willing seller test there should be no discount
said the court. That the estate and its beneficiaries would have IRD is not relevant because they are particular
parties, not the hypothetical parties required by the test. Further, the IRD deduction under section 691 (c) remedies
any "fairness concerns" of the estate. See also In re: Neiderhiser, Pa. Commw. Ct., No. 1625 C.D. 2003 (May 14,
2004).
In Estate of Frazier Jelke III V. Commissioner, T. C. Memo 2005-131, the decedent's estate included 6.44%
of a closely-held C corporation (CCC) the assets of which included $178,000,000 in marketable securities (out of a
total value of $188,000,000) with $51,000,000 of built-in capital gains. The issue before the court was what
discount should be allowed on account of eventual tax on the built-in gains. The court reviewed the state of the law:
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Since the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, this Court has, on several
occasions, considered the impact of built-in capital gain tax liability in valuing
corporate shares. Our approach to adjusting value to account for built-in capital
gain tax liability has varied and has often been modified or overruled on appeal.
See, e.g., Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530, 552-554 (1998);
Estate ofDunn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-12, revd. 301 F. 3d 339 (5th
Cir. 2002); Estate ofJameson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-43, revd. 267
F. 3d 366 (5th Cir. 2001); Estate of Welch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998167, revd. without published opinion 208 F. 3d 213 (6th Cir. 2000); Eisenberg v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-483, revd. 155 F. 3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998); Gray
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-67.
In one case, we held that a discount for built-in capital gain tax liability was
appropriate because even though corporate liquidation was unlikely, it was not
likely the tax could be avoided. See Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, supra.
However, this Court has not invariably held that discounts or reductions for
built-in capital gain tax liability were appropriate where it had not been shown
that it was likely the corporate property would be sold and! or that the capital
gain tax would be incurred. See, e.g., Estate of Welch v. Commissioner, supra;
Eisenberg v. Commissioner, supra; Gray v. Commissioner, supra.
Appellate courts in two of these cases reversed our decisions that a reduction in
value for built-in capital gain tax liability was inappropriate. The ·Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that, although realization of the tax may
be deferred, a willing buyer would take some account of the built-in capital gain
tax. Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F. 3d at 57-58. Likewise, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with our specific holding that the
potential for a capital gain tax liability was too speculative. Estate of Welch v.
Commissioner, supra. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to some extent,
agreed with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's approach in Eisenberg.
Neither the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit nor the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit prescribed the amount of reduction or a method to calculate it.
The Commissioner has since conceded the issue of whether a reduction for
capital gain tax liability may be applied in valuing closely held stock by
acquiescing to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in
Eisenberg. See 1999-1 C.B. xix. In addition, in this case the parties agree and we
hold that a reduction for built-in capital gain tax liability is appropriate.
However, controversy continues with respect to valuing such a reduction. In two
such cases involving the question of valuing reductions for built-in capital gain
tax liabilities, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has reversed our
holdings. See Estate of Dunn v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of Jameson v.
Commissioner, supra.
How should the discount be computed? The court agreed with Mr. Shaked, the IRS expert, stating:
Having held that an assumption of complete liquidation on the valuation date
does not apply in this case, we must consider the amount of the reduction to be
allowed for the built-in capital gain tax liability. Respondent's expert began with
the total amount of built-in capital gain tax liability ($ 51,626,884); and after
determining when the tax would be incurred, he discounted the potential tax
payments to account for time value principles. The estate attacks that approach
by contending that CCC's securities will appreciate, increasing the future tax
payments and thereby obviating the need to discount.
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The estate's expert, in an effort to support this theory, testified that if the premise
is that the liquidation or sale of substantially all of a corporation's assets would
occur in the future, there should also be:
a long term projection * * * that the stock will appreciate. If the stock
appreciates, the capital gains tax liability will appreciate commensurate
[sic]. The present value of the capital gains tax liability will be the
same. Only if you assume there's no appreciation in the stock would you
discount the capital gains tax. And that's a completely unreasonable
assumption.
Thus, the estate through its expert, Mr. Frazier, contends that irrespective of the
unlikelihood of liquidation there should be a dollar-for-dollar decrease for the
built-in capital gain tax liability, representing the present value of that liability
because the liability will increase over time. In that regard, the estate argues that
Mr. Shaked incorrectly assumed that the stock would not appreciate.
In addressing this argument, Mr. Shaked explained that the need to discount the
built-in capital gain tax liability is analogous to the need to discount
carryforward losses because they cannot be used until years after the valuation
year. Mr. Shaked's approach is to calculate the built-in capital gain tax liability
by determining when it would likely be incurred. We agree with Mr. Shaked's
approach of discounting the built-in capital gain tax liability to reflect that it will
be incurred after the valuation date.
Because the tax liabilities are incurred when the securities are sold, they must be
indexed or discounted to account for the time value of money. Thus, having
found that a scenario of complete liquidation is inappropriate, it is inappropriate
to reduce the value of CCC by the full amount of the built-in capital gain tax
liability. See Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. at 552-553.12 If we
were to adopt the estate's reasoning and consider future appreciation to arrive at
subsequent tax liability, we would be considering tax (that is not "built in") as of
the valuation date. Such an approach would establish an artificial liability. The
estate's approach, if used in valuing a market-valued security with a basis equal
to its fair market value, would, in effect, predict its future appreciated value and
tax liability and then reduce its current fair market value by the present value of
a future tax liability.
In that same vein, the estate argues that the Government, in other valuation
cases, has offered experts who computed the capital gain tax on the future
appreciated value of assets and discounted the tax to a present value for purposes
of valuing a corporation. In one of those cases, the Court was valuing a
corporation that owned rental realty (shopping centers). Estate of Borgatello v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-264. As part ofa weighting of factors to arrive
at a discount, the Commissioner's expert calculated the potential for appreciation
in the real estate market and the amount of built-in capital gain tax liability. This
Court, to some extent, relied on the expert's methodology in its holding on value.
In the other case relied upon by the estate, although the Commissioner's expert
advanced a similar analysis, this Court rejected that expert's approach as an
unsubstantiated theory. Estate of Bailey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002152.
The guidance of the expert was rejected in one of the cases cited by petitioner
and was part of a discounting approach to assist the fmder of fact (Court) to
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decide upon a discounted value in the other case. Although the expert's guidance
in the latter case was considered in reaching a factual fmding, the expert's
approach does not represent the ratio decidendi of the case. In our consideration
of the value of the marketable securities in this case, we are not bound to follow
the same approach used by an expert in other cases. More significantly we do not
fmd that approach to be appropriate in this case. Therefore, we find that in
valuing decedent's 6.44-percent interest, CCC's net asset value need not be
reduced by the entire $51,626,884 potential for built-in capital gain tax liability
and that future appreciation of stock need not be considered. We fmd Mr.
Shaked's use of a 13.2-percent discount rate to be reasonable.13 In addition, the
turnover rate of securities used by Mr. Shaked is conservative and reasonable
under the circumstances. The asset turnover rate reasonably predicts the period
over which the company's assets will be disposed of and thus built-in capital gain
tax liability would likely be incurred. Consequently, we find it appropriate to use
a 16-year period of recognition for the tax liability attributable to the built-in
capital gain. We therefore accept Mr. Shaked's computation arriving at a
$3,226,680.25 annual tax liability and a discounted total liability of
$21,082,226.
The court also determined a 10% lack of control discount and a 15% lack of marketability discount for a
total combined discount of 23.5%. Looked at as whole, the 6.44% interest in CCC, with no reductions, was worth
$12,148,000; the Tax Court value was $8,255,000.
3.

Lottery Payments. Valuation of a stream of lottery payments continues to generation litigation.

In Estate of Paul C. Gubauskas v. Commissioner, 342 F. 3d85 (2003), the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court
and held that lottery winnings in an estate should not be valued using section 7520. The Ninth Circuit held the same
in Shackleford v. U.S., 262 F.3d 1028 (2001). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit applied section 7520 in Cook v.
Commissioner, 349 F.3d 850 (2003). So, there is a split among the Circuits which may lead to Supreme Court
review (imagine!). Meanwhile, a U. S. District Court in Massachusetts followed Cook in Estate of John R. Donovan,
Jr. v. United States, 95 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-2131(0. Mass. 2005).
4.

Closely-Held Stock. Josephine Thompson died on May 2, 1998 a New York resident. Here

executors were New York residents as well and a substantial asset in her estate was 20.57% of a New York closelyheld company, TPC. TPC published business directories. The executors hired an Alaskan lawyer to appraise the
decedent's interest in the business apparently in hopes of having the IRS Alaska office audit the return (to that end,
the appraiser was also given limited administrative authority in the estate). The lawyer hired an accountant to help
him and they valued the estate's TPK interest at $1,700,000. The IRS hired an expert who arrived at a higher value,
about $32,388,000.
In Estate of Josephine T. Thompson, et. at v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo 2004-174, the court considered
the appropriate value and determined it was about $13,500,000. The court allowed a 15% minority interest discount
and a 30% lack of marketability discount in its determination. It would be fair to say that the court was not
impressed with either expert.
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Whether the estate should be subjected to a underpayment penalty was also at issue. Section 6662 applies a
40% penalty where the value reported is less than 25% of the value fmally determined. Section 6664 provides an
exception if the estate shows reasonable cause for the understatement and that it acted in good faith. An appraisal is
an indication of good faith under the regulations. The opinion states:
The valuation herein of the estate's 20-percent stock interest in TPC was
particularly difficult and unique. Companies comparable to TPC were not
found. Valuation of the estate's 20-percent TPC stock interest under the
capitalization of income and under the discounted cashflow methods involved a
number of difficult judgment calls. We believe it noteworthy and relevant to the
appropriateness of the section 6662 penalty that even respondent's expert made
significant errors in his various calculations.
Complicating the valuation presented to the parties and to the Court herein was
the difficult question as to how the Internet and the risks and opportunities
associated therewith should be regarded as affecting TPC. The evaluation in this
case of such intangible risks and opportunities was difficult and imprecise.
Certainly, the experts for the estate were aggressive in their relatively low
valuation of TPC. Respondent's expert was aggressive in his relatively high
valuation of TPC. We note that our valuation of TPC and of the estate's 20percent interest in TPC is closer to the estate's valuation than to respondent's
valuation.
On the record before us, we believe it inappropriate to impose the accuracyrelated penalty. The estate is not liable for the accuracy-related penalty.

G.
SECTION 2032 VALUATION
1.

ALTERNATE VALUATION AND SECTION 2032A -

Manner and Time of Election of Alternate Valuation.

Final regulations have been issued

changing Treas.Reg. § 20.2032-1(b). T. D. 9172. The regulations state:
(b) Method and effect of election -- (1) In general. The election to use the
alternate valuation method is made on the return of tax imposed by section 2001.
For purposes of this paragraph (b), the term return of tax imposed by section
2001 means the last estate tax return filed by the executor on or before the due
date of the return (including extensions of time to file actually granted) or, if a
timely return is not filed, the fIrst estate tax return filed by the executor after the
due date, provided the return is filed no later than 1 year after the due date
(including extensions of time to file actually granted). Once the election is made,
it is irrevocable, provided that an election may be revoked on a subsequent
return filed on or before the due date of the return (including extensions of time
to file actually granted). The election may be made only if it will decrease both
the value of the gross estate and the sum (reduced by allowable credits) of the
estate tax and the generation-skipping transfer tax payable by reason of the
decedent's death with respect to the property includible in the decedent's gross
estate. If the election is made, the alternate valuation method applies to all
property included in the gross estate and cannot be applied to only a portion of
the property.
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SPECIAL USE

The proposed regulations allow a protective election, which is helpful:
(2) Protective election. If, based on the return of tax as filed, use of the alternate
valuation method would not result in a decrease in both the value of the gross
estate and the sum (reduced by allowable credits) of the estate tax and the
generation-skipping transfer tax liability payable by reason of the decedent's
death with respect to the property includible in the decedent's gross estate, a
protective election may be made to use the alternate valuation method if it is
subsequently determined that such a decrease would occur. A protective election
is made on the return of tax imposed by section 2001. The protective election is
irrevocable as of the due date of the return (including extensions of time actually
granted). The protective election becomes effective on the date on which it is
determined that use of the alternate valuation method would result in a decrease
in both the value of the gross estate and in the sum (reduced by allowable
credits) of the estate tax and generation- skipping transfer tax liability payable by
reason of the decedent's death with respect to the property includible in the
decedent's gross estate.
2.

Combining Partnership Discounts and Section 2032A. In PLR 200448006 the decedent died

owning general and limited partnership interests in a farm business. The interests passed as part of the residue of the
decedent's estate to a trust for the benefit of decedent's children and grandchildren.

The estate valued the

partnership interests applying minority and lack of marketability discounts and then reduced the value as allowed
under section 2032A. The IRS approved this method.
H.

SECTION 2033 -----GROSS ESTATE
1.

Reciprocal Trusts.

PLR 200426008 is fascinating.

Husband and Wife created parallel

Crummey trusts and need to ensure they were not reciprocal. In most respects the trusts were identical. The IRS
determined the trusts were not reciprocal and described the differences between the trusts as follows:
In the present case, Husband's Trust differs from Wife's Trust in severai respects.
Husband's Trust grants Wife the right to withdraw specified amounts of trust
principal after Sonl's death. Husband's Trust also grants Wife an inter vivos
special power, effective at Sonl's death, to appoint trust principal among any of
Husband's issue and their spouses or any trust created primarily for the benefit of
one or more of those persons. Further, to the extent Wife does not exercise her
inter vivos special power, Husband's Trust grants Wife an inter vivos or
testamentary special power, effective at Son1's death, to appoint trust principal
among any of Husband's issue and any charities Wife designates or any trust
created primarily for the benefit of one or more of those persons. Finally, if a
Marital Trust is established, Husband's Trust grants Wife a testamentary special
power to appoint the assets remaining in the Marital Trust among any of
Husband's issue and any charities Wife designates or any trust created primarily
for the benefit of one or more of those persons.
Under Wife's Trust, with respect to any trust established under Wife's Trust
except a Marital Trust, Husband cannot be a beneficiary until three years after
Wife's death and then will only be a beneficiary at any time when his net worth is
under $~ and his income from personal services is under $~. Distributions to
Husband under this provision are limited to an amount equal to $h reduced by
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Husband's income from personal services during the calendar year of the
distribution.

I.

SECTIONS 2035-2038 - RETAINED INTERESTS
1.

Application of Section 2036 to Family Limited Partnerships.

The IRS has attempted to

minimize or eliminate the discounts claimed by taxpayers through family limited partnerships with various
arguments, some based on general tax principles like the step-transaction doctrine and others more specifically Code
based, typically sections 2703 and 2704. None of these arguments have been proven winners for the government. In
fact, to date, most of the instances in which taxpayers have had difficulty have been when the form of the partnership
was not respected by those involved. Stated another way, mistakes by the taxpayer and the taxpayer's family have
generated about as many wins for the government as the government has earned on its own.
That line of cases is represented by Estate of Morton B. Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121,
The decedent, Mr. Harper, and his children, Michael and Lynn, formed a limited partnership using the assets in Mr.
Harper's living trust. The particular facts recited by the court are important:
At a time not entirely clear from the record, decedent made the decision to form
a limited partnership and to contribute thereto the majority of his assets. An
Agreement of Limited Partnership for Harper Financial Company, L. P. (HFLP),
was prepared and sets forth the governing provisions for the entity. The
document begins with language stating that the Agreement was made "as of the
1st day of January, 1994", but later recites that the partnership shall commence
its existence upon the date a certificate of limited partnership is duly filed with
the California Secretary of State.

***
Michael and Lynn were named as the general partners of HFLP and the Trust as
the sole limited partner, with interests of .4 percent, .6 percent, and 99 percent,
respectively. Michael was also designated to serve as the managing general
partner.

***
Although "the Portfolio" is not defmed in the Agreement, there appears to be no
dispute between the parties that it consisted of: (1) Securities held in a brokerage
account at M. L. Stem & Co., Inc., (2) securities held in a Putnam Investments
account, (3) securities held in two Franklin Fund accounts, (4) 2,500 shares of
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc., and (5) a $450,000 note receivable from
Jack P. Marsh. The parties value these assets at between $1.6 and $1.7 million
(rounded), an amount representing approximately 94 percent of decedent's total
assets. The Trust's capital account in HFLP was credited with 99 percent of the
value of the property contributed. Decedent retained, personally or through the
Trust, his personal effects, a checking account, an automobile, and his Palm
Springs condominium.

***
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The Agreement was signed by decedent on behalf of the Trust, by Michael, and
by Lynn. Although the signatures are undated, the document was executed by
Michael in Mayor June of 1994. Lynn could not remember when she signed the
Agreement and did not read it prior to signing. A certificate of limited
partnership was filed on behalf of HFLP with the California Secretary of State
on June 14, 1994.
From June 17 to June 20, 1994, decedent was hospitalized in Palm Springs.
Medical records prepared at that time contain the explanation set forth below:
This is one of multiple Desert Hospital admissions for this 85-year-old
Caucasian who is well known to have metastatic colonic carcinoma and
prostatic carcinoma and admitted at the present time for poor oral
intake, poor fluid intake, dehydration and for further rehydration, close
observation, nutrition support, etc.
After his release, decedent went to Oregon, where he resided until his death. He
flIst stayed with Michael for approximately a. month and then moved into a
nearby Oregon retirement facility known as Carmen Oaks. Carmen Oaks served
independent individuals and was not a nursing center.
Thereafter, by a document entitled Assignment of Partnership Interest and
Amendment No. 1 to Agreement of Limited Partnership for Harper Financial
Company, L. P., dated and made effective as of July 1, 1994, the Trust
transferred to Michael and Lynn 60 percent of the Trust's partnership interest.
As a result, Michael and Lynn became holders of 24-and 36-percent limited
partnership interests, respectively, and were given corresponding percentages of
the Trust's capital account balance. The limited partnership interests held by
Michael and Lynn were designated as "Class B Limited Partnership Interest[s]"
and were entitled to 60 percent of the income and loss of the entity, with 40
percent thereof going to Michael and 60 percent to Lynn.
The Amendment also reclassified the Trust's remaining 39- percent limited
partnership interest as a "Class A Limited Partnership Interest" which was
entitled to 39 percent of the entity's income and losses and to a "Guaranteed
Payment" of "4.25% annually of its Capital Account balance on the Effective
Date, payable quarterly no later than twenty (20) days after the close of any such
calendar quarter (or sooner, if cash flow permits)." Decedent, as trustee of the
Trust, Michael, and Lynn signed the document.
On July 26, 1994, decedent commenced the process of transferring the Trust's
portfolio to the partnership, which process continued for approximately the next
4 months. On July 26, 1994, decedent executed as trustee an allonge
endorsement assigning to HFLP the Trust's interest in the Marsh note. A
collateral assignment of the Trust's interest in property securing the note was
also signed on that date. Then, on August 28, 1994, a letter agreement
confIrming and/or fmalizing the transfer was executed by or on behalf of Mr.
Marsh, the Trust, and HFLP.
Next, a letter dated September 29, 1994, was sent by decedent to M. L. Stem &
Co. confIrming instructions for (1) the sale of all securities held in the Trust's
account and (2) the use of the proceeds for the immediate repurchase of the same
securities for an account established on behalf of the partnership. Michael, as
managing general partner, completed the requisite form opening a new account
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with M. L. Stem & Co. for the partnership. The form designated Michael as the
"individual * * * authorized to enter orders on behalf of customer". Neil Hattem
served as decedent's broker and subsequently as the broker on the HFLP
account.
Letters dated September 30, 1994, were then sent by decedent to Putnam
Investor Services and to Franklin Templeton requesting transfer of the respective
Putnam and Franklin Fund accounts to HFLP. Lastly, by a letter dated November
22, 1994, decedent requested transfer of the Trust's stock in Rockefeller Center
Properties to the partnership.
During this period, on September 23, 1994, Michael opened a checking account
at Bank of America in the name of the partnership with a $200 deposit.
Thereafter, the frrst activity in the account, other than the debiting of a monthly
service charge, was a deposit on October 13, 1994, of $3,750 representing
interest paid on the Marsh note.
The Tax Court concluded that there was an implicit agreement that the decedent would retain enjoyment
(economic benefit) of the assets transferred. The opinion states:
In Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 147-148, the decedent formed a
family limited partnership, the general partner of which was a revocable trust
created on the same date. The decedent and his two children were named as
cotrustees, but only the decedent performed any meaningful functions as trustee.
Id. at 147, 152. He was the only trustee to sign the articles of limited partnership,
to open brokerage accounts, or to sign partnership checks. Id. at 152. He
transferred his residence and all of his other property (except for his car,
personal effects, and a small amount of cash in his checking account) to the
partnership and subsequently gave his two children limited partnership interests.
Id. at 148-149, 152-153. The decedent deposited partnership income in his
personal account, used the partnership checking account as his personal account,
and lived at his residence without paying rent to the partnership. Id. at 152.
Based on these facts, we concluded that nothing but legal title changed in the
decedent's relationship to his assets after he transferred them to the partnership.
Id. at 152-153.
In Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, the decedent formed three
limited partnerships. The decedent and one of her three children were named as
the general partners of each partnership, with the decedent's being designated as
the managing partner. Id. The decedent transferred business assets, including real
estate, partnership interests, and notes receivable, to the partnerships in
undivided one-third shares. Id. Limited partnership interests in these entities
were given to family members. Id. Partnership bank accounts were opened, but
the decedent deposited the income earned by the partnerships into the account
she used as her personal checking account, where it was commingled with funds
from other sources. Id. Checks were then written from this account to pay both
personal and partnership expenses. Id. The decedent's children later
acknowledged at trial that formation of the partnerships was merely a way to
enable the decedent to assign interests in the partnership assets to family
members, with the assets to be managed by the decedent exactly as in the past.
Id. We therefore found the assets includable under section 2036(a). Id..

*
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*

*

As regards commingling of funds, we note that this fact was one of the most
heavily relied upon in both Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 152,
and Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra. We fmd the disregard here
for partnership form to be equally egregious. The Agreement specified: "All
funds of the Partnership shall be deposited in a separate bank account or
accounts". Yet no such account was even opened for HFLP until September 23,
1994, more than 3 months after the entity began its legal existence. Prior to that
time, partnership income was deposited in the Trust's account, resulting in an
unavoidable commingling of funds.
Michael testified concerning this delay as follows:
Inadvertently, either my account or I failed to apply timely for any an employee [sic] identification number. That is required before a
checking account is open. So I just made the determination that without
a checking account and I wanted the flow of cash, what we would do is
use the Morton B. Harper Trust account as a holding account, and then
I instructed the accountant to properly credit and account for those
funds. * * *
This explanation, however, seems to beg the question. Had Michael sought
promptly upon HFLP's creation to establish a bank account, he would have been
immediately alerted to the need for an EIN. Hence, he either neglected to attempt
opening and/or using an account or allowed the lack of an EIN to continue for
several months after having been reminded of its necessity. Both reflect at best a
less than orderly approach to the formal partnership structure so pressed by the
estate.
Moreover, we fmd Michael's reliance on post mortem accounting manipulations
to be especially unavailing. Michael and Mr. Blankstein, HFLP's accountant,
each testified that no moneys actually changed hands in connection with the
adjustments.

*

*

*

Closely related to the delay in opening the partnership bank account and
consequent commingling of income is the delay in formally transferring the
underlying portfolio assets to HFLP. No attempt was made to begin the process
of title transfer until July 26, 1994, when decedent executed an allonge
endorsement assigning the Marsh note to HFLP. No action was taken with
respect to any of the other securities until September 29 and 30, 1994, when
letters addressing transfer of the M. L. Stem & Co., Putnam, and Franklin
accounts were drafted and an account with M. L. Stem & Co. was opened on
behalf of HFLP. A letter requesting transfer of the Rockefeller Center Properties
stock was not prepared until November 22, 1994.
When Michael was asked on cross-examination to explain this delay between the
effective date of the partnership and the formal transfer of assets into the entity,
he replied: "Probably for different reasons, some mechanical delays and who
we're dealing with, but generally, there was no rush to do it. We were just doing
it in an orderly fashion." Next, in response to a further question asking why there
was no rush, he continued: "There was no rush. I mean, we were just handling
the business in an orderly fashion. There wasn't any deadline or urgency to do it
and get it done."
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The estate also argued that the partnership units were consideration sufficient to move the transaction out of
section 2036. The court rejected the contention:
Having decided that decedent retained enjoyment of the transferred assets for
purposes of section 2036(a), we turn to the question whether the statute's
application may nonetheless be avoided on the basis of the parenthetical
exception for "a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth". The estate contends:
The primary reason why I.R.C. 2036 does not apply to Petitioner is that
the Trust's transfer of the Portfolio to the Partnership in exchange for a
credit to its capital account for 99% of the fair market value of the
Portfolio assets and a 99% interest in profits and losses is a "bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." * * *
We, however, disagree on the ground that the estate's position fails to take into
account significant aspects of the jurisprudence addressing this exclusionary
language. The phrase, as used in a predecessor statute, was explained in early
caselaw of this Court, as follows:
Accordingly, the exemption from tax is limited to those transfers of
property where the transferor or donor has received benefit in full
consideration in a genuine arm's length transaction; and the exemption
is not to be allowed in a case where there is only contractual
consideration but not "adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth." * * * [Estate of Goetchius v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.
495, 503 (1951).]

***
On the facts before us, HFLP's formation at a minimum falls short of meeting
the bona fide sale requirement. Decedent, independently of any other anticipated
interest-holder, determined how HFLP was to be structured and operated,
decided what property would be contributed to capitalize the entity, and declared
what interest the Trust would receive therein. He essentially stood on both sides
of the transaction and conducted the partnership's formation in absence of any
bargaining or negotiating whatsoever. It would be an oxymoron to say that one
can engage in an arm's-length transaction with oneself, and we simply are unable
to fmd any other independent party involved in the creation ofHFLP.
Furthermore, lack of a bona fide sale aside, we believe that to call what occurred
here a transfer for consideration within the meaning of section 2036(a), much
less a transfer for an adequate and full consideration, would stretch the exception
far beyond its intended scope. In actuality, all decedent did was to change the
form in which he held his beneficial interest in the contributed property. We see
little practical difference in whether the Trust held the property directly or as a
99-percent partner (and entitled to a commensurate 99-percent share of profits)
in a partnership holding the property. Essentially, the value of the partnership
interest the Trust received derived solely from the assets the Trust had just
contributed. Without any change whatsoever in the underlying pool of assets or
prospect for profit, as, for example, where others make contributions of property
or services in the interest of true joint ownership or enterprise, there exists
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nothing but a circuitous "recycling" of value. We are satisfied that such instances
of pure recycling do not rise to the level of a payment of consideration. To hold
otherwise would open section 2036 to a myriad of abuses engendered by
unilateral paper transformations.

***
We therefore hold that where a transaction involves only the genre of value
"recycling" described above and does not appear to be motivated primarily by
legitimate business concerns, no transfer for consideration within the meaning of
section 2036(a) has taken place. Hence, the exception provided in that statute is
inapplicable. Furthermore, although section 2043 can entitle taxpayers to an
offset for partial consideration in cases where a transfer is otherwise subject to
section 2036, this section, too, is inapplicable where, as here, there has been only
a recycling of value and not a transfer for consideration.
.
On June 17,2002 the Fifth Circuit remanded Estate ofStrangi, now called Rosalie Gulig v. Commissioner,
No. 01-60538, so that the Tax Court could consider section 2036. In Strangi the decedent's attorney-in-fact formed
the partnership two month's before the decedent's death. The decedent retained a 99% limited interest and a 47%
interest in the 1% corporate general partner. The decedent's children paid for the other shares in the general partner.
Over 75% of the partnerships' assets were marketable securities. The point here is not only section 2036(a)(l) but
also 2036(a)(2), namely that by having an interest in the general partner the decedent had the right to designate those
who would enjoy property.
In its initial Strangi opinion, which did not consider section 2036, the Tax Court fIrst determined that the
"business purposes" for the partnership were bogus but that the partnership would be respected anyway because the
partnership was validly formed under state law. The Tax Court then rejected the applicability of section 2703 and
went on to consider whether there was a gift on formation:
In this case, the estate claims that the assets were transferred to SFLP for the
business purposes discussed above. Following the formation of SFLP, decedent
owned a 99-percent limited partnership interest in SFLP and 47 percent of the
corporate general partner, Stranco. Even assuming arguendo that decedent's
asserted business purposes were real, we do not believe that decedent would give
up over $3 million in value to achieve those business purposes.
Nonetheless, in this case, because we do not believe that decedent gave up
control over the assets, his beneficial interest in them exceeded 99 percent, and
his contribution was allocated to his own capital account, the instinctive reaction
that there was a gift at the inception of the partnership does not lead to a
determination of gift tax liability. In a situation such as that in Kincaid, where
other shareholders or partners have a significant interest in an entity that is
enhanced as a result of a transfer to the entity, or in a situation such as Shepherd
v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. _, _ (2000) (slip. Ope at 21), where contributions of
a taxpayer are allocated to the capital accounts of other partners, there is a gift.
However, in view of decedent's continuing interest in SFLP and the reflection of
the contributions in his own capital account, he did not transfer moOre than a
minuscule proportion of the value that would be "lost" on the conveyance of his
assets to the partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. See Kincaid v.
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United States, supra at 1224. Realistically, in this case, the disparity between the
value of the assets in the hands of decedent and the alleged value of his
partnership interest reflects on the credibility of the claimed discount applicable
to the partnership interest. It does not reflect a taxable gift.
Clearly the court thought another theory should be asserted, but was not - section 2036:
The actual control exercised by Mr. Gulig, combined with the 99-percent limited
partnership interest in SFLP and the 47- percent interest in Stranco, suggest the
possibility of including the property transferred to the partnership in decedent's
estate under section 2036. See, e.g., Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114
T.C. 144 (2000). Section 2036 is not an issue in this case, however, because
respondent asserted it only in a proposed amendment to answer tendered shortly
before trial. Respondent's motion to amend the answer was denied because it
was untimely. Applying the economic substance doctrine in this case on the basis
of decedent's continuing control would be equivalent to applying section
2036(a) and including the transferred assets in decedent's estate. As discussed
below, absent application of section 2036, Congress has adopted an alternative
approach to perceived valuation abuses.
The IRS expert allowed a 31 % discount which the court, reluctantly, accepted.
The Fifth Circuit stated on remand:
Fifty-two days before trial, the Commissioner filed a motion to amend to add a
claim that under §§ 2036 the estate should include the value of SFLP's assets
transferred from the decedent. The tax court denied the motion to amend,
apparently because it considered the motion untimely. We review the tax court's
decision to deny leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Halbert v. City of
Sherman, Tex., 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). "A decision to grant leave is
within the discretion of the court, although if the court lacks a substantial reason
to deny leave, its discretion is not broad enough to permit denial." State of
Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1995)
(internal citations and quotes omitted). "In the absence of any apparent or
declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave sought should, as the rules
require, be 'freely give. ,,, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The only insight we have into the tax court's reasoning for the denial is its
statement that, even though §§ 2036 might apply on the facts, it was "not an
issue in this case, however, because respondent asserted it only in a proposed
amendment to answer tendered shortly before trial. Respondent's motion to
amend the answer was denied because it was untimely." However, the motion
was made nearly two months, not "shortly," before trial and was unlikely to
cause delay or prejudice. If the tax court's true reasoning was that the
Commissioner could have sought to assert the applicability of §§ 2036 earlier in
the proceedings, it did not assert such and did not discuss any evidence of bad
faith or dilatory motive. We cannot assume bad faith on the record here. The
record does not present an obvious reason for denial of leave to amend. See
Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Where reasons for
denying leave to amend are 'ample and obvious,' the district court's failure to
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articulate specific reasons does not indicate an abuse of discretion."). We fmd
that the denial was an abuse of discretion.
Judge Cohen issued the second Tax Court opinion in Strangi on May 20,2003. T. C. Memo 2003 - 145.
The opinion is not a reviewed decision. The opinion deals with both section 2036(a)(l) and 2036(a)(2). The latter
analysis will cause more concern. The opinion summarizes the relevant facts as follows:
The SFLP agreement provides that distributions of proceeds and assets from the
entity shall be made in the sole discretion of the managing general partner. The
SFLP agreement also designates Stranco as the managing general partner.
Stranco, in turn, executed the management agreement employing Mr. Gulig to
manage the day-to-day business of SFLP, as well as of Stranco itself. Yet Mr.
Gulig was already decedent's attorney in fact pursuant to the 1988 general power
of attorney. Under this instrument, Mr. Gulig was granted full and durable
authority to act for decedent in his "name, place and stead". Mr. Gulig set up the
SFLP/Stranco arrangement to facilitate decedent's estate planning goals and
capitalized the partnership primarily with decedent's property.
When distilled to their most essential terms, the governing documents gave Mr.
Gulig authority to specify distributions from SFLP, which is entirely consistent
with his authority under the 1988 power of attorney. Although the estate protests
that Mr. Gulig's authority under the management agreement was limited to
managing "the day-to-day business" of the partnership and did not extend to
making distributions or loans, the pertinent instruments provide no basis for
concluding that making distributions would be outside the day-to-day business of
a partnership capitalized nearly exclusively with investment assets. As a practical
matter, actual disbursement of funds occurred when checks were issued by Mr.
and Mrs. Gulig in their various related capacities, pursuant to rights granted to
them by decedent, acting through Mr. Gulig.
Hence, to summarize, the SFLP agreement named Stranco managing general
partner with the sole discretion to determine distributions. The Stranco
shareholders, including decedent (through Mr. Gulig), then acted together to
delegate such authority to Mr. Gulig under the management agreement.
Decedent's attorney in fact thereby stood in a position to make distribution
decisions. Mrs. Gulig effectuated these decisions by signing checks to the
recipients so designated.
The fIrst issue for the court was the application of section 2036(a)(l).

The taxpayer attempted to

distinguish this case from the Schauerhamer to Reichardt and Harper line of cases. The court acknowledged that the
taxpayer here dotted more "i's" and crossed more "t's" than in the aforementioned cases but ultimately reached the
same result. Judge Cohen writes:
At the outset, we acknowledge that, in contrast to certain of the prior cases, the
participants involved in the SFLP/Stranco arrangement generally proceeded such
that "the proverbial 'i's were dotted' and 't's were crossed'." Strangi I at 486.
Steps were taken to abide by the formal terms of the structure created. Such
measures may give SFLP and Stranco sufficient substance to be recognized as
legal entities in the context of valuation, which requires assumption of a
hypothetical buyer and seller. They do not preclude implicit retention by
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decedent of economic benefit from the transferred property for purposes of
section 2036(a)(I).
First, we cannot lose sight of the fact that decedent contributed approximately 98
percent of his wealth, including his residence, to the SFLP/Stranco arrangement.
Respondent alleges that the transfer left decedent with inadequate assets and
cash flow to meet his living expenses, to which the estate takes objection. The
estate goes to great lengths to counter respondent's assertion, claiming that
decedent at his death possessed liquefiable assets of at least $172,000 and
received on a monthly basis a pension of $1,438.18 and Social Security of
$1,559. The estate also stresses that respondent has not established the amount
of decedent's living expenses and maintains that, even if the $33,323.22 in
checks paid from decedent's account in August and September were used as an
estimate, the purported liquefiable assets would have covered decedent's needs
for his concededly short life expectancy of 12 to 24 months. However, the
relative dearth of liquefied (decedent's Form 706 showed two bank accounts
with funds totaling $762), as opposed to "liquefiable", assets persuades us that
decedent and his children and Mr. Gulig all expected that SFLP and Stranco
would be a primary source of decedent's liquidity. It is unreasonable to expect
that decedent would be forced to rely on sale of assets to meet his basic costs of
living.
A second feature highly probative under section 2036(a)(I) is decedent's
continued physical possession of his residence after its transfer to SFLP. The
estate maintains that any otherwise negative implications of this circumstance are
neutralized by the fact that SFLP "charged Mr. Strangi rent" on occupancy of the
home and reported rental income on its 1994 tax return. Decedent likewise
reported a rent obligation on his estate tax return. For accounting purposes, the
accrued rent was recorded by SFLP on its books. Yet the accrued amount was
not paid until January 1997. A residential lessor dealing at arm's length would
hardly be content merely to accrue a rental obligation for eventual payment more
than 2 years later. As we have remarked, accounting entries alone are of small
moment in belying the existence of an agreement for retained possession and
enjoyment. Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 154-155; Estate of
Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121.
Concerning factors that relate to use of entity funds, the estate emphasizes that
each disbursement for decedent or his estate was accompanied by a pro rata
allotment to Stranco. Where, as here, the only interest in the partnership other
than that held by the decedent is de minimis, a pro rata payment is hardly more
than a token in nature. In these circumstances, pro rata disbursements are
insufficient to negate the probability that the decedent retained economic
enjoyment of his or her assets. After all, distributing 1 percent to Stranco would
not in any substantial way operate to curb decedent's ability to benefit from
SFLP property. Accordingly, we direct our attention to the purpose, as opposed
to the mechanics, ofpartnership distributions and expenditures.
The record reveals several instances where SFLP expended funds in response to
a need of decedent or his estate. SFLP paid for Ms. Stone's back surgery to
alleviate an injury she sustained in caring for decedent prior to the formation of
SFLP. In 1994, SFLP expended nearly $40,000 for funeral expenses, estate
administration, and related debts, including a $19,810.28 check to Olsten to pay
for nursing services rendered to decedent before his death. These sums were
followed in 1995 and 1996 by further payment of over $65,000 for estate
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expenses and a specific bequest. SFLP also disbursed approximately $3 million
directed toward decedent's estate and inheritance taxes.
The estate seeks to justify these payments primarily by emphasizing that they
were accounted for on SFLP's books as advances to partners and later closed as
distributions, with pro rata amounts either advanced or distributed to Stranco.
The evidence also indicates that the $65,OOO-plus amount was repaid in January
1997. The estate further explains that certain of these payments from SFLP were
necessitated by the delay in probate of decedent's estate engendered by the
process of getting TCB to decline executorship.
To the extent that the estate's arguments focus on accounting manipulations, they
are unavailing. As demonstrated in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra
at 154-155, and Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, supra, accounting
adjustments do not preclude a conclusion that those involved understood that the
decedent's assets would be made available as needs materialized. Belated
repayment of certain amounts likewise does not refute the inference of an
implicit agreement for retained enjoyment that arises from the demonstrated and
contemporaneous availability of large sums. Furthermore, to the extent that the
estate's explanations focus on a delay in probate, they lack specificity. The more
salient feature would appear to be the insufficiency of the assets not contributed
to SFLP and Stranco to cover the significant expenses reasonably to be expected
to ensue in connection with decedent's poor health and death. That, in turn,
speaks to retained enjoyment.
Regarding testamentary characteristics, the SFLP/Stranco arrangement also bears
greater resemblance to one man's estate plan than to any sort of arm's-length,
joint enterprise. As in Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, supra, "the largely
unilateral nature of the formation, the extent and type of the assets contributed
thereto, and decedent's personal situation are indicative." Mr. Gulig established
the entities using Fortress documents with little, if any, input from other family
members. The contributed property included the majority of decedent's assets in
general and his investments, a prime concern of estate planning, in particular.
Decedent was advanced in age and suffering from serious health conditions.
Furthermore, as discussed in Strangi I at 485-486, the purpose of the partnership
arrangement was not to provide a joint investment vehicle for the management of
decedent's assets, but was consistent with testamentary intent.
Moreover, the crucial characteristic is that virtually nothing beyond formal title
changed in decedent's relationship to his assets. Mr. Gulig managed decedent's
affairs both before and after the transfer. Decedent's children did not obtain a
meaningful economic stake in the property during decedent's life. They raised no
objections or concerns when large sums were advanced for expenditures of
decedent or his estate, thus implying an understanding that decedent's access
thereto would not be restricted.
In face of the foregoing realities, the estate argues that whatever possession or
enjoyment of the contributed property decedent may have experienced was
neither "retained" by means of a contemporaneous agreement nor "with respect
to the transferred property". As regards the first point, the estate contends that
respondent has offered no evidence to prove a contemporaneous agreement
requiring the distributions made, as opposed to an independent subsequent
decision by Stranco to make the same outlay. According to the estate:
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Even if decisions to make distributions were made based on "sympathy
for poor old dad," i. e., "Oops, Mr. Strangi imprudently put too much
money into SFLP and we need to give some back" that would not meet
the criteria set by judicial precedent for determining the existence of a
retained expectation of possession of [sic] enjoyment: which is that
there must have been an implied agreement that was contemporaneous
with the transfer of the property at issue, not a subsequent agreement or
act. * * * [Fn. ref. omitted.]
Weare persuaded that the evidence and circumstances detailed above render
such a contemporaneous agreement more likely than not.
The second point mentioned stems from the estate's view that pro rata
distributions were made not with respect to the transferred property, in which
decedent possessed no legal interest under the Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act (TRLPA), Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132a-l, sec. 7.01
(Vernon Supp. 2003), but with respect to his partnership interest. Yet this
argument relies on paper title to the exclusion of the practicalities that are the
focus of section 2036(a)(I). The property contributed by decedent was the
source of the payments made. Furthermore, the record suggests that the impetus
underlying a number of significant SFLP disbursements was needs of decedent
or his estate, rather than exigencies pertaining to Stranco or the partnership itself.
To this point, the opinion has been a bit more aggressively anti-taxpayer than the previous 2036(a)(I) cases
have been, but nonetheless the issues raised were essentially the same. However, the court did not stop there.
Noting that the taxpayer and the government argued extensively about the application of section 2036(a)(2) the court
decided to weigh in.

(So, before going further, remember this is arguably dicta in an unreviewed Tax Court

opinion.)
Judge Cohen describes the application of section 2036(a)(2) and the meaning of~ as follows:
As stated above, section 2036(a)(2) mandates inclusion in the gross estate of
transferred property with respect to which the decedent retained the right to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or its income. This
provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Byrum, 408
U.S. 125 (1972), and both parties devote a significant portion of their respective
arguments to the implications of that decision. We address these arguments as
an alternative to our conclusions concerning section 2036(a)(I) and with
particular consideration of the facts of this case.
In United States v. Byrum, supra at 126, the decedent, Mr. Byrum, created an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of his children. He funded the trust with shares of
three closely held corporations but retained the right to vote the shares and to
veto any sale or transfer of the stock. Id. at 126-127. As a result, Mr. Byrum at
his death continued to have the right to vote not less than 71 percent of the
common stock in each of the three corporations. Id. at 128-129. The three
corporations were involved in lithography-related businesses and had a
substantial number of minority shareholders unrelated to Mr. Byrum. Id. at 130
& n. 2, 142 & n.20. (The Supreme Court noted that 11 of 12, 5 of 8, and 11 of
14 stockholders, respectively, in the three corporations appeared to be unrelated
to Mr. Byrum. Id. at 142 n.20.) The trust instrument specified that there be, and
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Mr. Byrum named, an independent corporate trustee. Id. at 126. The trustee was
authorized in its "absolute and sole discretion" to pay income and principal to or
for the benefit of the beneficiaries. Id. at 127.
The Commissioner argued that, by retaining voting control over the
corporations, Mr. Byrum was in a position to select the corporate directors and
thereby to control corporate dividend policy. Id. at 131-132. According to the
Commissioner, the scenario in dispute gave Mr. Byrum the ability to regulate the
flow of income to the trust, which ability was characterized as tantamount to a
grantor-trustee's power to accumulate trust income for remaindermen or to
distribute to present beneficiaries. Id. at 132. The Court had previously ruled that
the latter power to accumulate rather than disburse constituted a right to
designate under section 2036(a)(2). Id. at 135-136; United States v. O'Malley,
383 U.S. 627,631 (1966).
Given the above facts, the Supreme Court held "that Byrum did not have an
unconstrained de facto power to regulate the flow of dividends to the trust, much
less the 'right' to designate who was to enjoy the income from trust property."
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 143. The Court rejected the Commissioner's
"control rationale" as it "would create a standard - not specified in the statute
- so vague and amorphous as to be impossible of ascertainment in many
instances." Id. at 137 n. 10. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on a
series of "economic and legal constraints" to which any power that Mr. Byrum
might have had was subject and which prevented such power from being
equivalent to a right to designate persons to enjoy trust income. Id. at 144.
The Court emphasized that the independent corporate trustee alone had the right
under the trust instrument to payout or withhold income. Id. at 137. Even if Mr.
Byrum had managed to flood the trust with dividends, he had no way of
compelling the trustee to payout or accumulate that income. Id. at 143. The
Court also noted that the power to elect directors conferred no legal right to
command them to payor not pay dividends. Id. at 137. Moreover, the flow of
dividends from the corporations would be subject to economic vicissitudes,
retained earnings policies, and business needs. Id. at 139-140. In this regard, the
Court explained:
There is no reason to suppose that the three corporations controlled by
Byrum were other than typical small businesses. The customary
vicissitudes of such enterprises - bad years; product obsolescence;
new competition; disastrous litigation; new, inhibiting Government
regulations; even bankruptcy - prevent any certainty or predictability
as to earnings or dividends. There is no assurance that a small
corporation will have a flow of net earnings or that income earned will
in fact be available for dividends. Thus, Byrum's alleged de facto
"power to control the flow of dividends" to the trust was subject to
business and economic variables over which he had little or no control.
[ Id. at 249.]
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stressed that "A majority shareholder has a
fiduciary duty not to misuse his power by promoting his personal interests at the
expense of corporate interests" and the directors of a corporation "have a
fiduciary duty to promote the interests of the corporation." Id. at 137-138. Such
duties were legally enforceable by means of, for example, a derivative suit. Id. at
141-142.
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The court then noted that in fact Mr. Strangi had the ability to designate who would receive the benefits of
the partnership acting in conjunction with others, namely the general partner.

The simplest illustration of the

principle is that Mr. Strangi, as limited partner, could act with the general partner to liquidate the partnership, and
thus receive the vast majority of the partnership assets. The opinion states:
With respect to SFLP income and as previously recounted in greater detail, the
SFLP agreement named Stranco managing general partner and conferred on the
managing general partner sole discretion to determine distributions. The Stranco
shareholders, including decedent (through Mr. Gulig), then acted together to
delegate this authority to Mr. Gulig through the management agreement. The
effect of these actions placed decedent's attorney in fact in a position to make
distribution decisions. Mrs. Gulig effectuated such decisions by executing
checks to the recipients so designated.
In addition to the rights described above related to income, decedent also
retained the right, acting in conjunction with other Stranco shareholders, to
designate who shall enjoy the transferred SFLP property itself. The Supreme
Court indicated in United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 143 n.23 (citing
Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946)), that a "power to
terminate the trust and thereby designate the beneficiaries at a time selected by
the settlor" would implicate section 2036(a)(2). Pursuant to the SFLP agreement,
the partnership would be dissolved and terminated upon a unanimous vote of the
limited partners and the unanimous consent of the general partner. The
shareholders agreement likewise specifies that dissolution of SFLP requires the
affrrmative vote of all Stranco shareholders. Once dissolution and termination
occur, liquidation is accomplished as set forth in the SFLP agreement. The
managing general partner is named as the liquidator, which in turn disburses
partnership assets first in payment of debts and then in repayment of partners'
capital account balances. Authority is expressly granted for distributions in kind.
Accordingly, decedent can act together with other Stranco shareholders
essentially to revoke the SFLP arrangement and thereby to bring about or
accelerate present enjoyment of partnership assets. Furthermore, it is noteworthy
that such action would likely revest in decedent himself, as the 99-percent
limited partner, the ·majority of the contributed property.
As regards property transferred to Stranco and income therefrom, decedent held
the right, in conjunction with one or more other Stranco directors, to declare
dividends. The corporation's bylaws authorize the board of directors to declare
dividends from the entity. For the board to take such action, a majority vote of
the directors at a meeting with a quorum present is sufficient. Under the bylaws,
a majority of the directors then serving constitutes a quorum. Because Stranco
had five directors, a quorum would consist of three, so two directors (e. g.,
decedent through Mr. Gulig and one other) could potentially act together to
declare a dividend. The Stranco shareholders agreement further provided that
each of the initial five directors would be reelected annually, thus effectively
ensuring decedent's position on the board.
In response to various of the above concepts pertaining to joint action,
particularly by stockowners, the estate suggests: "If the mere fact that a
shareholder could band together with all of the other shareholders of a
corporation and such banding together would be sufficient to cause inclusion
under Section 2036, then it would have been impossible for the United States
Supreme Court to reach the decision that it did in ~." The estate's
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observation ignores the existence in United States v. Byrum, supra, of the
independent trustee who alone had the ability to determine distributions from the
disputed trust, notwithstanding any prior action by corporate owners or directors.
It also ignores the identity of the shareholders in this case and the dual roles
played by Mr. Gulig.
To summarize, review of the documentary evidence discussed above reveals that
decedent here retained rights of a far different genre from those at issue in
United States v. Byrum, supra. Rather than mere "control", management, or
influence, there are traceable to decedent through the explicit provisions of the
governing instruments ascertainable and legally enforceable rights to designate
persons who shall enjoy the transferred property and its income. The estate's
reliance on a limited partner's lack under the TRLPA of participation in control
and under the SFLP agreement of management authority is thus misplaced. The
alleged absence of such powers cannot negate the dispositive rights granted in
the instant case. The SFLP/Stranco arrangement placed decedent in a position to
act, alone or in conjunction with others, through his attorney in fact, to cause
distributions of property previously transferred to the entities or of income
therefrom. Decedent's powers, absent sufficient limitation as discussed infra,
therefore fall within the purview of section 2036(a)(2).
What about the fiduciary duty argument that saved the taxpayer

in~?

The court gave the argument

short-shrift fmding that the fiduciary duties which existed mostly ran to Mr. Strangi himself:
The fiduciary duties present in United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), ran
to a significant number of unrelated parties and had their genesis in operating
businesses that would lend meaning to the standard of acting in the best interests
of the entity. As a result, there existed both a realistic possibility for enforcement
and an objective business environment against which to judge potential
dereliction. Given the emphasis that the Supreme Court laid on these factual
realities, ~ simply does not require blind application of its holding to
scenarios where the purported fiduciary duties have no comparable substance.
We therefore analyze the situation before us to determine whether the fiduciary
duties relied upon by the estate would genuinely circumscribe use of powers to
designate.
The estate summarizes its contentions regarding fiduciary duties as follows:
Just like Mr. Byrum, Mr. Strangi's "rights" (whatever those rights
appear to be) were severely limited by the fiduciary duties of other
people who (according to ~) presumably could be counted on the
[sic] observe those restraints against whatever desires they might
otherwise have had to run pell-mell to do the bidding of the Decedent:
(1) Mr. Gulig, who (separate and apart from his role as attorney-in-fact
for Mr. Strangi) had fiduciary duties to Stranco, whom he served as
manager; (2) the directors of Stranco, who had fiduciary duties to both
Stranco and to SFLP as a whole; and (3) McLennan County Community
College ("MCCC"), which had rights as a minority shareholder of
Stranco and a fiduciary obligation to enforce such rights for the benefit
of its own beneficiaries as well as the people of the State of Texas (with
the Attorney General of Texas having the ability to step in to enforce
such rights ifMCCC failed in its duties). * * *
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None of the foregoing obligations cited by the estate is sufficiently on par with
those detailed in United States v. Byrum, supra, to bring the present case within
the Supreme Court's rationale.
Concerning Mr. Gulig, any fiduciary duties that Mr. Gulig might have had in his
role as manager of Stranco (and thereby of SFLP) are entitled to comparatively
little weight on these facts. Prior to his instigation of the SFLP/Stranco
arrangement, Mr. Gulig stood in a confidential relationship, and owed fiduciary
duties, to decedent personally as his attorney in fact. Thus, to the extent that
Stranco or SFLP's interests might diverge from those of decedent, we do not
believe that Mr. Gulig would disregard his preexisting obligation to decedent.
As regards fiduciary obligations of Stranco and its directors, these duties, too,
have little significance in the present context. Although Stranco would owe a
fiduciary duty to SFLP and to the limited partners, decedent owned the sole,
99-percent limited partnership interest. The rights to designate traceable to
decedent through Stranco cannot be characterized as limited in any meaningful
way by duties owed essentially to himself. Nor do the obligations of Stranco
directors to the corporation itself warrant any different conclusion. Decedent
held 47 percent of Stranco, and his own children held 52 of the remaining 53
percent. Intrafamily fiduciary duties within an investment vehicle simply are not
equivalent in nature to the obligations created by the United States v. Byrum,
supra, scenario.
With respect to the role of MCC Foundation, United States v. Byrum, supra,
affords no basis for permitting outcomes under section 2036(a)(2) to turn on
factors amounting to no more than window dressing. A charity given a gratuitous
I-percent interest would not realistically exercise any meaningful oversight.
Finally, and not unsurprisingly, Judge Cohen concluded that the arrangement had not been entered into for
full and adequate consideration. She writes:
We see no distinction of consequence between the scenario analyzed in Estate of
Harper v. Commissioner, supra, and that of the present case. Decedent
contributed more than 99 percent of the total property placed in the
SFLP/Stranco arrangement and received back an interest the value of which
derived almost exclusively from the assets he had just assigned. Furthermore, the
SFLP/Stranco arrangement patently fails to qualify as the sort of functioning
business enterprise that could potentially inject intangibles that would lift the
situation beyond mere recycling. Cf. Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1987-8; Church v. United States, 85 AFTR 2d 2000-804, 2000-1 USTC
par. 60,369 (W.D. Tex. 2000), affd. without published opinion 268 F.3d 1063
(5th Cir. 2001) (both involving contributions by other participants not de
minimis in nature, for a genuine pooling of interests). We therefore hold that
decedent did not engage in any transfer for consideration upon the creation and
funding of SFLP and Stranco. Accordingly, the estate is entitled to no exception
to the treatment mandated by section 2036(a).
If the limited interests had been held in a marital trust included in Mr. Strangi's estate would the result have
been different? What if Mr. Strangi had transferred the limited interests to a trust over which he retained a special
power of appointment but no other rights? That is, if the limited partnership interests had been included in his estate
but in fact he had not had the right to assist in the liquidation of the partnership would Judge Cohen have held
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differently? Supposing such were the case, presumable section 2035 would impose the three-year rule. Is the effect
any diffeient were the limited interests given away prior to death?
The practical effect of Strangi will be to embolden the IRS to argue against significant discounts when
valuing limited partnership interests in estates. The theoretical underpinnings of Strangi are more suspect. The
opinion pushes taxpayers to create partnership arrangements and avoid ever having control over the partnership. In
turn, that raises the possibility that the "gift on formation" issue reappears. Arguably, the Tax Court analysis dealing

with the gift on formation has not directly confronted a situation in which the Tax Court believes the creator did not
retain de facto control over the partnership.
The taxpayers defeated a section 2036(a)(l) argument in Estate of Eugene E. Stone, III v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2003-309, because the Court found full and adequate consideration rather than a "mere recycling" of
value. The Court held as follows:
On the record before us, we agree with the estates' position and reject
respondent's position. The instant cases are distinguishable from Estate of
Harper v. Commissioner, supra, and other cases factually similar to Estate of
Harper on which respondent relies, and respondent's reliance on such cases is
misplaced. Unlike the transfers involved in Estate of Harper and those other
cases, we have found on the record in the instant cases that the respective
transfer~ of assets by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone to each of the Five Partnerships,
as well as the respective transfers of assets by the other partners to each such
partnership, were bona fide, arm's-length transfers.
On the record before us, we reject respondent's contention that, because Mr.
Stone and Ms. Stone did not actively participate in the negotiations by the
children, the respective transfers of assets by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone to each of
the Five Partnerships were not bona fide, arm's-length transfers. Each member of
the Stone family was represented by his or her own independent counsel and had
input into the decision-making as to how each of the Five Partnerships was to be
structured and operated and what property was to be transferred to each such
partnership. The Stone family understood that Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone would
not be bound by any agreements that the children were able to reach as a result
of the children's negotiations and that Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone would make the
ultimate decision as to which, if any, of their respective assets to transfer to each
of the Five Partnerships. In this connection, although Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone
agreed to form the Five Partnerships, they did not intend to, and did not, transfer
all their respective assets to such partnerships. Instead, they retained sufficient
assets to enable them to maintain their respective accustomed standards of living.
Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone did not accept the children's recommendations
resulting from the children's negotiations regarding the structure, funding, and
operation of the Five Partnerships without thought, comment, or question. For
example, it was Mr. Merline, Mr. Stone's attorney, who drafted proposed
partnership agreements for the Five Partnerships. Mr. Merline discussed with
Mr. Stone the children's and their respective attorneys' suggested changes to
those proposed agreements. Only after Mr. Stone agreed to certain of those
suggested changes did Mr. Merline revise the proposed partnerships agreements
to reflect the changes to which Mr. Stone agreed.
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The record also establishes that the respective transfers at issue did not constitute
gifts by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone, respectively, to the other partners of each of
the Five Partnerships. In addition, the record shows that those transfers were
motivated primarily by investment and business concerns relating to the
management of certain of the respective assets of Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone
during their lives [and thereafter and the resolution of the litigation among the
children.
Unlike the decedent in Estate of Harper and other cases factually similar to that
case, the record in the instant cases establishes that Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone did
substantially more than "change the form in which he [and she] held his [and
her] beneficial interest in the contributed property." Estate of Harper v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121. The record in the instant cases shows that
the Five Partnerships had economic substance and operated as joint enterprises
for profit through which the children actively participated in the management
and development of the respective assets of such partnerships during their
parents' lives (and thereafter). When the partners of ES3LP formed and funded
that partnership, they contemplated and intended that ES3LP operate as a joint
enterprise for profit for the management of its assets and that the, children
contribute their services in providing such management. After ES3LP was
funded in April 1997, the children actively managed the assets of that
partnership, as Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone intended. When the partners of ES4LP
formed and funded that partnership, they contemplated and intended that ES4LP
operate as a j oint enterprise for profit for the management of its assets and that
Eugene Earle Stone, IV, contribute his services in providing such management.
After the funding of ES4LP in April 1997, Eugene Earle Stone, IV, began
actively managing the assets of ES4LP, as Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone intended.
When the partners of CRSLP formed and funded that partnership, they
contemplated and intended that CRSLP operate as a joint enterprise for'profit for
the management of its assets and that C. Rivers Stone contribute his services in
providing such management. After the funding of CRSLP in April 1997, C.
Rivers Stone began actively managing the assets of that partnership, as Mr.
Stone and Ms. Stone intended. When the partners of RSMLP formed and funded
that partnership, they contemplated and intended that RSMLP operate as a joint
enterprise for profit for the management of its assets and that Ms. Morris
contribute her services in providing such management. After the funding of
RSMLP in April 1997, Ms. Morris began actively managing the assets of that
partnership, as Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone intended. When the partners ofMSFLP
formed and funded that partnership, they contemplated and intended that MSFLP
operate as a joint enterprise for profit for the management of its assets and that
Ms. Fraser contribute her services in providing such management. After the
funding of MSFLP in April 1997, Ms. Fraser began actively managing the assets
of that partnership, as Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone intended.
On the record in the instant cases, we fmd that, unlike the transfers involved in
Estate of Harper and other cases factually similar to that case, the respective
transfers at issue by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone did not constitute "circuitous
'recycling' of value".
On the record before us, we further fmd that the respective transfers of assets by
Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone to each of the Five Partnerships were for adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth. We have found that such transfers
were not, and respondent does not claim that they were, gifts by Mr. Stone and
Ms. Stone, respectively, to the other partners of each such partnership. We have
also found, and respondent agrees and/or does not dispute, that after all the
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partners of each of the Five Partnerships transferred to each such partnership
certain of their respective assets and after certain gifts were made by Mr. Stone
in April 1997 to correct the unintended consequences of certain ~advertent
valuation errors: (1) All partners of each of the Five Partnerships held respective
partnership interests in each such partnership that were proportionate to the fair
market value of the assets that such partners respectively transferred to each such
partnership; (2) the respective assets that the partners of each such partnership
transferred to each such partnership were properly credited to the respective
capital accounts of such partners; and (3) upon the termination or dissolution of
each of the Five Partnerships, the partners of each such partnership were entitled
to distributions from each such partnership in amounts equal to their respective
capital accounts. Under the circumstances presented in the instant cases, we fmd
that Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone, as well as the other partners of each of the Five
Partnerships, received in exchange for their respective transfers of assets to each
such partnership respective partnership interests in each such partnership that
were adequate and full equivalents reducible to a money value. See sees.
20.2036-1(a), 20.2043-1(a), Estate Tax Regs.; see also Estate of Goetchius, 17
T.C. at 503.
Respondent nonetheless argues that, because Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone received
respective partnership interests in each of the Five Partnerships the value of
which, taking into account appropriate discounts, was less than the value of the
respective assets that they transferred to each such partnership, they did not
receive adequate and full consideration for the assets transferred. Respondent's
argument in effect reads out of section 2036(a) the exception for "a bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth" in any
case where there is a bona fide, arm's- length transfer of property to a business
entity (e.g., a partnership or a corporation) for which the transferor receives an
interest in such entity (e.g., a partnership interest or stock) that is proportionate
to the fair market value of the property· transferred to such entity and the
determination of the value of such an interest takes into account appropriate
discounts. We reject such an argument by respondent that reads out of section
2036(a) the exception that Congress expressly prescribed when it enacted that
statute.
Respondent's argument about the discounted values of the partnership interests at
issue also ignores the fact that each of the Five Partnerships was created, funded,
and operated as a joint enterprise for profit for the management of its assets in
which there was a genuine pooling of property and services. We have found that,
when the partners of each of the Five Partnerships formed and funded each such
partnership, they contemplated and intended that each such partnership operate
as a joint enterprise for profit for the management of its assets and that the
children contribute services in providing such management in the case of ES3LP
and that Eugene Earle Stone, IV, C. Rivers Stone, Ms. Morris, and Ms. Fraser
contribute services in providing such management in the case of ES4LP,
CRSLP, RSMLP, and MSFLP, respectively. As Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone
intended, after the funding of ES3LP, the children actively participated in the
management of the assets of that partnership, and after the funding of ES4LP,
CRSLP, RSMLP, and MSFLP, Eugene Earle Stone, IV, C. Rivers Stone, Ms.
Morris, and Ms. Fraser, respectively, actively participated in the management of
the assets of such partnerships.
Based upon our examination of the entire record before us, we fmd that the
respective transfers of assets by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone to each of the Five
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Partnerships were bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth under section 2036(a).
The Stone case is important for at least two reasons. One, that services were held bona fide contributions
by the children to the various family partnerships. Two, that simple management of assets was deemed a joint
enterprise.
Estate of Ida Abraham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-39, involved 2036(a)(1). Mrs. Abraham was
declared incompetent on March 10, 1993; on December 30, 1993 the guardians received court permission to make
gifts on behalf of Mrs. Abraham; and on June 13, 1994 Mrs. Abraham's children and the guardians agreed upon a
giving plan involving various partnerships, corporate general partners, and trusts.
Judge Ruwe held that Mrs. Abraham was always to receive the income from the assets transferred to the
partnerships because that was the plan. The opinion states:
It is clear from the documentary evidence and the testimony elicited at trial that,
regardless of the form of decedent's transfers, she continued to enjoy the right to
support and maintenance from all the income that the FLPs generated. According
to the decree (the document which authorized the creation of the FLPs),
decedent's needs for support were contemplated fIrst from the income that the
FLPs generated. Only after decedent's support needs, if any, were met did the
children/limited partners receive their proportionate share of the partnership
income. Decedent's support needs were treated as an obligation of the FLPs. For
example, the decree provided that decedent's children
shall receive income from said * * * [FLPs] * * * after deducting from
the gross income of the partnership all fees, taxes, partnership
administration expenses, reserve for expenses and monies needed in the
discretion of the limited Guardian ad litem * * * for Ida Abraham's
support.
In the decree, decedent's children agreed that they would
share equally any and all costs and expenses related to * * * the support
of Ida Abraham insofar as the funds generated by Ida Abraham's
properties maintained by her do not provide sufficient funds for her
adequate health, safety, welfare and comfort as determined by the
limited Guardian ad litem * * *
The document further provided:
Ida Abraham's living arrangement shall remain in accordance with the
present arrangement and every effort will be made to maintain her in
"status quo." Her segregated assets shall be maintained at a level
established by the limited Guardian ad litem in his sole discretion.
The Tax Court has been affrrmed on appeal. Estate of Ida Abraham v. Commissioner, 2005 TNT 102-11
st

(1 Cir. 2005) (decided May 25,2005). The court had little trouble with the case. Indeed, apparently the estate's
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primary argument was that the IRS' Notice of Deficiency was not detailed enough, an argument the court rejected as
follows:
The Estate's main argument is that the Notice was "latently ambiguous,
overly broad and confusing" and failed to specify all the elements of the
Commissioner's argument that under § 2036, the FLP interests were
100% taxable to the estate. The Estate argues that the Notice should
have described "why the consideration was inadequate" and "the
amount of consideration the Government would consider adequate," as
well as "which of the alternative possession, enjoyment or right to
income theories it is relying on alleging a taxable event has occurred
pursuant to § 2036(a)." The Estate also argues that the Notice failed to
explain how the Commissioner valued the FLP interests at the fair
market values of the underlying real estate. Therefore, the Estate
argues, the burden of proof on all of these "new matters" should have
been placed on the Commissioner. II
Acceptance of the Estate's arguments would amount to a requirement
that the Notice of Deficiency be as detailed as trial briefs. There is no
such requirement. The standard of specificity for notices of deficiency
is much lower. "In fact, if a deficiency notice is broadly worded and the
Commissioner later advances a theory not inconsistent with that
language, the theory does not constitute new matter, and the burden of
proof remains with the taxpayer." Abatti v. Comm'r, 644 F.2d 1385,
1390 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Shea, 112 T.C. at 191. The
Commissioner did not seek to change the amount of the deficiency or
advance a theory inconsistent with the language of the Notice.
On the merits, the court found a clear understanding among the parties:
What the Tax Court did fmd was that "[t]he documentary evidence,
including the stipulated decree of the probate court, and the
understanding of decedent's children and legal representatives
demonstrate that decedent was entitled to any and all funds generated
from the partnership for her support fITst." Estate of Abraham, 87
T.C.M. (CCH) at 981 (emphasis in original). This fmding is not clearly
erroneous.
Evidence adduced at trial shows that the motivation for the formation of
the FLPs was to protect Mrs. Abraham's financial needs so as to
maintain her in status quo and to prevent her estate from being drained
by litigation. The FLPs were formed, according to Donna, so that
"[t]here would always be money there" for Mrs. Abraham. The probate
court decree memorializing the understanding of the parties at the time
of the creation of the FLPs explicitly made "monies needed in the
discretion of the limited Guardian ad litem . . . for Ida Abraham's
support" into an obligation of the FLPs which must be met before any
partnership income could be disbursed to the partners.
The Estate chooses to focus on the FLP agreements, which do not
include Mrs. Abraham's support as obligations of the FLPs, and argues
that the discretion of Goldman, Mrs. Abraham's guardian ad litem and
the person in control of the general partner management companies for
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the FLPs, is limited by his fiduciary duties to the other limited partners.
But these arguments, at most, show that Mrs. Abraham's flIst-priority
claim on all the income from the FLPs may not be legally enforceable.
They do not show that there was no such understanding among the
parties.
In fact, the weight of the evidence was just the opposite. The evidence
showed that all parties understood that Goldman, as Mrs. Abraham's
guardian ad litem, had the discretion and the approval of the family to
use all FLP income, if necessary, for Mrs. Abraham's support. Donna
testified that if Mrs. Abraham's needs exceeded her share of the
partnership income, "it had to come out of my partnership shares or my
brother's, but the protection was there for her as a guarantee that she
would live status quo." Goldman testified that he had exclusive control
over the FLP accounts; he understood his authority and duties to come
primarily from the court decree and also understood that he was
appointed primarily to work on Mrs. Abraham's behalf. The evidence is
that Goldman failed to segregate what was supposed to be Mrs.
Abraham's personal funds from the funds in her revocable trust and
commingled all monies in the bank accounts for the FLPs. Such
commingling in disregard of the partnership form is indicative of Mrs.
Abraham's retained interest over all the FLP "income. See Estate of
Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1649. Goldman also testified that it was
his and the family's understanding that should it be necessary, all FLP
income could be used to pay Mrs. Abraham's expenses, to the exclusion
of paying out the shares to any of the other limited partners because that
would be "what the family would have wanted." 15
Neither is it dispositive that, according to the Estate, the FLPs'
payments for Mrs. Abraham's maintenance never exceeded what Mrs.
Abraham was legally entitled to by virtue of her ownership of FLP
percentage interests. That Mrs. Abraham's guardian ad litem did not
have the occasion to, or did not choose to, exercise what was conceded
to be an available option -- the diversion of all FLP income for Mrs.
Abraham's maintenance -- cannot be taken to make the Tax Court's
fmding that this option existed clearly erroneous.
Estate of Lea K. Hillgren v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-46, also involved section 2036 (a)(I). On
October 31, 1996 the decedent attempted suicide; on January 1, 1997 the decedent and her brother formed a limited
partnership together; on June 5, 1997 the decedent committed suicide. The decedent and her brother had a variety of
business deals together, loans between them, etc.

The opinion describes the formation and operation of the

partnership, known as LKHP:
Decedent and Hillgren formed LKHP with an effective date of January
1, 1997. The term of the partnership was set for 29 years. Walsworth
represented both decedent and Hillgren in the formation of the
partnership. Decedent held a 99.95-percent capital interest and a 75percent profit interest in LKHP. Decedent gave Hillgren a .05- percent
capital interest and a 25-percent profit interest in the partnership. The
term "profit interest" was defmed in the partnership agreement as "a
partnership interest other than a capital interest * * * which will give
rise to a partnership capital account * * * only if and when there is
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future economic income" (25-percent profit interest). The partnership
agreement also provided Hillgren with 25 percent of the amount, if any,
by which the partnership profits from operations in any year exceeded
profits from operations realized by decedent in 1996 from the
properties transferred (25-percent operational interest). The 25-percent
operational interest was compensation to Hillgren for time spent in the
management of LKHP. Decedent made no other gifts of partnership
interests.
Decedent contributed seven properties (the LKHP properties) to LKHP,
as described in exhibit B to the partnership agreement. Hillgren did not
contribute any property to LKHP. The seven LKHP properties that
were contributed to the partnership at its formation included the three
Orange County properties and the University property that were already
the subject of the BLA and that were used to fund the amended trust. In
addition, the other three properties that were contributed were the
Crescent Bay, Railroad, and Manzanita properties in California that
also previously were used to fund the amended trust. After the initial
contributions were made, no additional property was transferred to the
partnership.
Decedent did not deed or transfer title to the seven LKHP properties to
the partnership. The partnership agreement provided that title to any
property that was contributed by a limited partner, and was deemed to
be owned by the partnership, would remain in the name of the limited
partner for the benefit of the partnership. The leases that encumbered
the LKHP properties were not formally assigned to LKHP prior to
decedent's death. The leases remained in the name of decedent, or in the
name of Sea Shell [a sole proprietorship of decedent], after LKHP was
formed. The title remained in the name of decedent or Sea Shell in
order to hide the change of ownership from the general public and from
the tenants of the properties. Under the partnership agreement, Hillgren
could conduct partnership business without disclosing the existence of
the partnership. The partnership was designed generally to be invisible
to the public and to persons with whom decedent and Hillgren did
business.
On May 27, 1997, decedent executed seven quitclaim deeds,
transferring her interest in the LKHP properties to the amended trust.
The deeds were unrecorded at the time of her death. Also on May 27,
1997, decedent assigned her partnership interest to the amended trust.
2. Operation ofLKHP
The partnership agreement provided that the general partner need not
open a bank account in the name of the partnership, but could instead
maintain the existing bank account that was used by Sea Shell and the
amended trust. As a result, LKHP did not have a dedicated bank
account during decedent's lifetime. Decedent held a bank account at
Wells Fargo Bank (Wells Fargo) that operated under the name of the
amended trust, doing business as Sea Shell. The Wells Fargo account
was used for operation of LKHP.
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LKHP's fmancial statement dated June 5, 1997, and its general ledger
from January 1 through June 30, 1997, included decedent's residence,
the mortgage on her residence, and the mortgage and property tax
payments that were made on the residence. Decedent's residence and
the expenses attributed to the residence were removed from the ledger
in a journal entry by an adjustment dated January 1, 1997. The adjusted
journal entry was not posted until after decedent's death. It was the
practice of decedent and Hillgren to post the opening entries on their
accounting books anywhere from 6 to 8 months after the start of the
year. As a result, the opening entries for LKHP were not made until
after decedent's death. Also, the balance sheets, ledgers, and check
registers that represented the fmancial information of LKHP were
actually maintained under the name of Sea Shell.

***
There were no recorded minutes of any meetings of partners of LKHP.
On May 13, 1999, after decedent's death, a certificate of limited
partnership was filed for LKHP with the California Secretary of State.
3. LKHP Distributions
The partnership agreement provided for distributions of cash at the sole
discretion of Hillgren, as the general partner. From January 1 through
June 5, 1997, decedent received distributions totaling $99,363. Hillgren
did not receive any distributions during this period. The distributions
that were received by decedent during 1997 were made specifically to
enable decedent to pay her living expenses, and she was dependent on
the cashflow of the partnership to cover her personal expenses.
LKHP also paid the costs of the estate. On March 5, 1998, distributions
in the amounts of $135,000 and $80,000 were made from the
partnership to the amended trust. The distributions were applied to pay
installments of decedent's estate taxes due to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and to the California State Treasurer. From 1998 until
2002, distributions were consistently made from LKHP to the amended
trust to continue payment of decedent's estate taxes to the IRS and to
the California Franchise Tax Board.
Judge Cohen concluded:
The estate claims that decedent was "in excellent physical health, on
new antidepressant medication, and not contemplating suicide" and
that, therefore, the partnership was not an alternate testamentary
vehicle. The evidence contradicts this claim. Shortly before her death,
decedent attempted suicide, was on various medications, was under the
care of a psychiatrist, and suffered from severe pain due to degenerative
disc disease. After her initial suicide attempt, LKHP was formed.
Decedent. and Hillgren started many businesses over the years and
disregarded entities as they saw fit, making various "situational
representations", i. e., statements about their property ownership and
values to support a then existing purpose, without regard to accuracy.
Even the stipulated facts contain inconsistencies regarding entity names
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and dates of creation and dissolution. The stipulations of the parties
were often contradicted by the documents that were provided by
Hillgren. Hillgren and the estate's representatives continued to disregard
the LKHP agreement both prior to and after decedent's death.
Interestingly, the taxpayer won on valuation using a different theory, namely that the decedent and her
brother had previously entered into a "business loan agreement ("BLA") which was respected and had business
purposes. Among other features, the decedent's brother's agreement was necessary if decedent wanted to sell any of
the properties. The IRS argued the partnership superseded the BLA but Judge Cohen held the partnership had zero
effect. The Form 706 had reported various discounts for different properties ranging from 35% to 50% which the
court allowed.
Hillgren points out the importance of considering, and arguing for, all possible discounts, and rationales for
discounts, on the Form 706 as well as in court. The Form 706 is treated a stipulation.
In Estate of Austin Korby v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo 2005-103, and Estate of Edna Korby v.
Commissioner, T. C. Memo 2005-102, the Tax Court included the value of assets transferred by Mr. and Mrs. Korby
into KPLP, a limited partnership, on account of section 2036. The opinions describe the circumstances leading to
this holding as follows:
We agree with respondent that an implied agreement existed between
Austin, on his own behalf and on behalf of Edna, and the four Korby
sons that after the assets were transferred to KPLP, income from the
assets would continue to be available to Austin and Edna for as long as
they needed income. 7 In 1995, when Austin and Edna transferred
$1,888,704 worth of assets to KPLP, Edna was living in a nursing home
and suffering from severe dementia. Edna's nursing home costs were
approximately $2,500 per month. Austin had experienced a stroke and
had been diagnosed with various ongoing ailments. It is reasonable to
believe that Austin and Edna expected to incur significant medical
expenses in the future. Austin and Edna reported medical expenses of
over $37,000, approximately double their Social Security income, in
each of the 4 years before they died. It was clear that the Korbys' Social
Security income would not cover their basic expenses in the future.
Despite their expected increased expenses, however, Austin and Edna
retained in their names or the name of their living trust only their house,
a vacant lot, bank accounts with a total balance of $7,428, a I-percent
interest in Crane Properties, a 2-percent interest in KPLP, and the right
to receive Social Security income. KPLP paid the Korbys' home
expenses after their assets were transferred to it. In order to pay the
Korbys' other basic living expenses, KPLP also distributed significant
percentages of its income to the living trust, ranging from 26.7 percent
of its income in 1996 to 50.1 percent of its income in 1998, which paid
their remaining expenses. These payments from KPLP to the living trust
totaled at least 52.6 percent of the Korbys' income in each of the 4 years
before they died.
The estate argues that the cash payments that KPLP made to the living
trust and the payments of the Korbys' home expenses were management

•
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fees paid for Austin's services as a money manager for the KPLP assets.
The estate further claims that Austin and Edna were fmancially able to
transfer their income-producing assets to KPLP because they expected
the living trust to receive management fees that would provide enough
income to them. We do not believe that the payments to the liying trust
were management fees. The purported fees amounted to $19,334 to
$38,750 in each of the 4 years before the Korbys died. The amounts
were used by the living trust to pay Edna's nursing home costs of over
$30,000 per year and the Korbys' taxes, medical expenses, and other
various expenses. The amounts were used entirely by Austin and Edna
and not by Dennis, who was cotrustee of the general partner and was
entitled to half of any management fees. While the living trust received
management fees totaling over $120,000 during the years at issue, the
limited partners (who owned 98 percent of KPLP) received only one
distribution totaling $12,061, for taxes in 1998.
Further, no management contract was executed, and the fees were paid
at varying times and amounts, as Austin requested them. The purported
fees were not based on any regular or prescribed method of payment or
computation. Dennis testified that he caused KPLP to make payments
to the living trust whenever Austin requested them because he was
raised not to say no to his father. He stated that he and his father
discussed the amounts of the management fees in 1995, and they wrote
down the amounts on "pieces of paper" at the kitchen table. These notes
regarding the purported fees were not produced by the estate at trial.
With respect to whether the transfer of assets into the partnership was a bona fide sale for full and adequate
consideration, the court said no:
Austin formed KPLP with the help of his estate lawyer but without the
involvement of his sons, who were each to be 24.5-percent owners through trusts
and who each signed the KPLP agreement. Austin alone decided which of his
and Edna's assets would be contributed to KPLP, the terms of the KPLP
agreement, that the living trust would receive management fees as general
partner, and whether the limited partners would receive any distributions. In his
testimony, Dennis was unfamiliar with the terms of the KPLP agreement. He
thought its terms were followed at all times but was unsure how the management
fees were to be determined. Gary Korby, one of Dennis's brothers, testified that
he was not aware that his father received management fees from KPLP, that he
was not represented in the formation of KPLP, and that he did not know how he
acquired his interest in KPLP, whether by gift or otherwise. He also testified that
although he signed the KPLP agreement in 1994, the first time his father
explained the partnership to him and gave him a chance to ask questions about it
was at a partnership meeting in February 1995. Dennis' other two brothers did
not testify at trial, but the parties stipulated that their testimony would echo
Gary's testimony. These facts indicate that none of Austin's and Edna's four sons
was involved in the formation of the partnership or the drafting of the KPLP
agreement. Austin essentially stood on all sides of the partnership's formation
and approved the provisions of the KPLP agreement without negotiation or input
from the limited partners.
The circumstances leading us to conclude above that the payments from KPLP to
the living trust were not management fees also weigh against a conclusion that
the sale of assets to KPLP was bona fide. The Korbys' use of KPLP income for
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basic living expenses is inconsistent with a finding of a bona fide transfer. By
drafting the KPLP agreement to allow the living trust to determine the amounts
of its purported fees as general partner and by ~king Dennis, with whom Austin
had an implied agreement, his cotrustee, Austin ensured that he and Edna would
be provided with sufficient income from the KPLP assets during their lifetimes.
The estate argues that the creation of KPLP was bona fide because Austin and
Edna created KPLP to protect the family from commercial and personal injury
liability resulting from their bridge- building business, as well as liability arising
from divorce. The estate points to provisions in the KPLP agreement that
prevented any partner from unilaterally forcing a distribution of partnership
property and restricted transfer of the limited partnership interests. However, the
estate has not shown that the terms of the KPLP agreement would prevent a
creditor of a partner from obtaining that partner's KPLP interest in an
involuntary transfer. The limited protection KPLP gave the family and the other
evidence in the record lead us to believe that credit protection was not a
significant reason for forming KPLP; rather, Austin and Edna formed KPLP in
order to make a testamentary transfer of their assets to their sons at a discounted
value while still having access to the income from those assets for their lifetime.
Instead of retaining assets sufficient to provide the income they would need as
their medical expenses grew, Austin and Edna used KPLP in an attempt to
insulate all of their income-producing assets from the estate tax. As a result, we
find that the transfer of Austin's and Edna's assets to KPLP was not a bona fide
sale for full and adequate consideration. Therefore, section 2036(a)(I) applies to
the KPLP assets that were contributed by Austin and Edna. Given this
conclusion, we need not address respondent's argument for inclusion under
sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038.
In Estate of Virginia A. Bigelow v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo 2005-65, the Tax Court had no difficulty
including the assets of a partnership in the decedent's estate when the primary asset was rental property, rents from
which were used by the decedent to make loan payments, and after the transfer of the property to the partnership the
decedent did not have enough income for living expenses absent the income from the partnership. The opinion
states:
1. Whether There Was an Implied Agreement That Decedent Would Retain the
Right to the Income From the Padaro Lane Property During Her Lifetime

The estate contends that there was no implied agreement for decedent to retain
the right to income from the Padaro Lane property. We disagree. The Padaro
Lane property was generating monthly rent of $3,500. The taxes and insurance
on the property totaled $1,350. After the partnership was formed, decedent used
$2,000 of the $2,150 net income from the rental of the Padaro Lane property to
make monthly payments on the Great Western loan. After the AARP/Prudential
residential care insurance policy expired in August 1995, decedent's expenses
exceeded her income by $2,700. The partnership continued to make the $2,000
payments on the Great Western loan, and Mr. Bigelow transferred partnership
funds to decedent's trust to support decedent. No distributions were made to any
other partner before decedent's death. Section 2036 applies if a decedent retains
the right to income from the property or if there was an implied agreement to that
effect. Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 153; Estate of Hillgren v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-46; see Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner,
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supra at 375. Decedent's use of partnership income to replace the income lost
because of the transfer of the Padaro Lane property to the partnership shows that
there was an implied agreement between decedent and her children that she
would retain the right to the income from the Padaro Lane property.
2. Whether There Was an Implied Agreement That Decedent Would Retain the
Enjoyment of the Padaro Lane Property During Her Lifetime
The estate contends that there was no express or implied agreement for decedent
to retain the enjoyment of the Padaro Lane property. We disagree. Enjoyment
includes present economic benefits. Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148,
1150 (4th Cir. 1971); Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 151. After
the transfer of the Padaro Lane property to Spindrift, the property continued to
secure decedent's legal obligation to pay the $350,000 Great Western Bank loan
and the $100,000 Union Bank line of credit. Thus, decedent retained the
economic benefit of ownership of the Padaro Lane property after it was
transferred to the partnership.
We conclude that there was an implied agreement between decedent and her
children that she would retain for her life the present economic benefit of the
Padaro Lane property
With respect to whether the transfer to the partnership was a bona fide sale for full and adequate
consideration the court placed great weight on the decedent's inability to pay her expenses after the transfer:
Before the Padaro· Lane property was transferred to the partnership, decedent
met her fmancial obligations.5 After the transfer, decedent no longer received
rent from the property, but she remained liable for both the Great Western Bank
loan and the Union Bank line of credit. The transfer of the Padaro Lane property
to the partnership left decedent unable to meet her financial obligations because
her reduced income of $5,800 was insufficient to pay her reduced expenses of
$7,000.

***
The estate points out that formalities to establish the partnership were met and
contends that any lapses in complying with partnership formalities after
formation were unimportant. We disagree. Spindrift did not properly maintain
records of partnership capital or the partners' capital accounts. The balance
sheets included in the 1995-97 returns incorrectly show the Great Western Bank
loan as a liability of the partnership. None of the partners' Schedules K-1
accurately reflect the partners' capital accounts; e.g., decedent's capital account
reported on the Schedules K-1 never reflects decedent's trust's contribution of the
Padaro Lane property. The Bigelows did not comply with all of the terms of the
partnership agreement. These facts suggest that the sale was not in good faith.
Judge Colvin rejected all arguments that the asset protection or continuity of management were real reasons
for the formation of the partnership. Further, the court stated that faciliating gifts was not sufficient in this context to
make a transfer bona fide for full and adequate consideration. The court specifically rejected the taxpayer's attempt
to rely on Kimbell.
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Kimbell v. U.S., 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004), is an important loss for the government. The Fifth Circuit
reversed the District Court directly on 2036 grounds. The District Court had held that section 2036(a)(1) would
apply to assets in a partnership where the decedent was a 99% limited partner and the partnership agreement allowed
a 70% partner to remove and replace the general partner. The opinion states:
Plaintiff argues that Decedent's transfer of assets to the Partnership was a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. The
Tax Court has explained, and this Court agrees, that "applicability of the [bona
fide sale] exception rests on two requirements: (1) [a] bona fide sale, meaning an
arm's-length transaction, and (2) adequate and full consideration." Harper,
T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-121, *21.
In the instant case, Decedent's transfer fails both requirements. Plaintiff has
produced no credible evidence that the formation of the Partnership was the
product of an arm's length transaction, i.e. a transaction "between two parties
who are not related or not on close terms and who are presumed to have roughly
equal bargaining power." Black's Law Dictionary 103 (7th ed. 1999). Indeed,
one cannot even find two parties, much less two parties conducting an arm's
length negotiation leading to a "bona fide sale". See Mollenberg's Estate v.
Commissioner, 173 F.2d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1949)(quoted in Harper, T.C.M.
(RIA) 2002-121, *21)(defming a 'sale' as "an exchange resulting from a
bargain"). Ownership interests in the Partnership are held by two entities: 99%
by the Trust which was wholly-owned by Decedent, and 1% by the LLC which
was 50% owned by the Trust. Therefore, Decedent not only "stood on both sides
of the transaction," but, for all intensive purposes, was both sides of the
transaction. Harper, T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-121, *21 (noting that "it would be an
oxymoron to say that one can engage in an arm's length transaction with
oneself').
Moreover, even if one assumes the Partnership was the result of "a bona fide
sale," Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Decedent received "adequate and
full consideration" for the sale. While "adequate and full consideration" is not
defmed in the Code, Wheeler v. U.S., 116 F.3d 749, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1997), this
Court agrees with the Tax Court that the meaning of "adequate and full
consideration" does not include paper transactions such as the one at issue in the
current case. The Decedent, through the Trust, contributed 99% of the capital for
the Partnership and in return received a 99% interest in the partnership.
Decedent received no consideration other than the interest in the Partnership.
Plaintiff, before becoming the general partner of the Partnership, was already
managing both the Trust, from where 99% of the assets of the Partnership came
and the LLC from where the other 1% came (of which 0.5% were from the
Trust). Nothing appears to have changed.
The taxpayer also argued that the fiduciary duty of the general partner precludes the application of section
2036:
Plaintiff contends that Decedent did not have the power to take over the
partnership because she had fiduciary duties. Plaintiff makes much of a Supreme
Court case, U.s. v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), in which the Court held that
§§2036 did not apply to a decedent who retained voting interest in several
corporations. However, !h'nm1 is not only distinguishable on its facts from our
case, but was expressly overruled by Congressional enactment of §§2036(b)
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which states that "the retention of the right to vote (directly or indirectly) shares
of stock of a controlled corporation shall be considered to be a retention of the
enjoyment of the transferred property." Moreover, section 2.95 of the
Partnership Agreement states: "The General Partner will not owe a fiduciary
duty to the Partnership or to any Partner."6 If Decedent, at any time, could
remove the general partner and herself become general partner, then, by the
terms of the Agreement, she would not owe a fiduciary duty to the other
Partners, who, in any case, own only a minuscule share of the Partnership.
Assuming such fiduciary duties exist, to whom does a party which owns 99.% of
the Partnership owe them? The fiduciary argument falls flat.
The Fifth Circuit approached the case differently, fmding that section 2036(a) did not apply ab initio. The
opinion summarizes section 2036(a) like this:
The statute provides two exceptions that will allow a transfer to escape the
operation of § 2036(a). First, if the transfer is a bona fide sale for full and
adequate consideration, then § 2036(a) does not apply. See Treas. Reg. §§
20.2036-1(a), 20.2043- l(l)(as amended in 1960). If the transfer is not a bona
fide sale for full and adequate consideration, then the transfer may still be
excluded from the estate of the decedent under the second exception, if the
decedent did not retain either the (1) possession, enjoyment or rights to the
transferred property, or (2) the right to designate the persons who would possess
or enjoy the transferred property. Estate of Stone v. Comrn'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH)
551,578 [TC Memo 2003-309] (T.C. 2003); 26 U.S.C. §'2036(a).
The Fifth Circuit found that the fIrst exception applied here. The opinion states:
In summary, what is required for the transfer by Mrs. Kimbell to the Partnership
to qualify as a bona fide sale is that it be a sale in which the decedent/transferor
actually parted with her interest in the assets transferred and the
partnership/transferee actually parted with the partnership interest issued in
exchange. In order for the sale to be for adequate and full consideration, the
exchange of assets for partnership interests must be roughly equivalent so the
transfer does not deplete the estate. In addition, when the transaction i~ between
family members, it is subject to heightened scrutiny to insure that the sale is not a
sham transaction or disguised gift. The scrutiny is limited to the examination of
objective facts that would confirm or deny the taxpayer's assertion that the
transaction is bona fide or genuine. We now turn to the application of these
principles to today's case.
The first question was whether the transfer was for "full and adequate consideration." The language quoted
above -- that a sale is for full and adequate consideration -- suggested a problem for the taxpayer. However, the
court applied a different test:
The district court found that the exchange of a limited partnership interest for the
assets Mrs. Kimbell transferred to the Partnership was not a bona fide sale for
adequate and full consideration. It did not separately analyze the two
requirements. Rather it concluded that Mrs. Kimbell's contribution of more than
99% of the assets into the Partnership to be managed (as they were before the
transfer) by her son was nothing more than a recycling of value and the interest
in the Partnership Mrs. Kimbell received not a transfer of consideration. The
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government adopted that position and argues in addition that it is inconsistent for
the estate to assert, on one hand, that the value of Mrs. Kimbell's interest in the
Partnership is worth only 50% of the assets she transferred (as discounted for
lack of control and marketability), and on the other hand claim that the
Partnership interest Mrs. Kimbell received in exchange for the assets transferred
was adequate and full consideration for the transfer.

***
We would only add to the Tax Court's rejection of the government's
inconsistency argument that it is a classic mixing of apples and oranges: The
government is attempting to equate the venerable "willing buyer-willing seller"
test of fair market value (which applies when calculating gift or estate tax) with
the proper test for adequate and full consideration under § 2036(a). This
conflation misses the mark: The business decision to exchange cash or other
assets for a transfer-restricted, non- managerial interest in a limited partnership
involves fmancial considerations other than the purchaser's ability to turn right
around and sell the newly acquired limited partnership interest for 100 cents on
the dollar. Investors who acquire such interests do so with the expectation of
realizing benefits such as management expertise, security and preservation of
assets, capital appreciation and avoidance of personal liability. Thus there is
nothing inconsistent in acknowledging, on the one hand, that the investor's
dollars have acquired a limited partnership interest at arm's length for adequate
and full consideration and, on the other hand, that the asset thus acquired has a
present fair market value, i.e., immediate sale potential, of substantially less than
the dollars just paid - a classic informed trade-off.
As this principle applies to wholly unrelated buyers and sellers of interests in
limited partnerships, it must be equally true of buyers and sellers of such
interests who happen to be related by blood or affinity, unless (1) the" evidence
demonstrates the absence of good faith, i.e., a sham transaction motivated solely
by tax avoidance, or (2) Congress or the courts are ready to change long-held
positions and establish a per se rule that related parties can never enter into armslength transactions for adequate and full consideration - positions that none has
shown any inclination to assume. Certainly, close scrutiny must be applied when
the parties are related, but close scrutiny is not synonymous with automatic
proscription or impossibility vel non.
The proper focus therefore on whether a transfer to a partnership is for adequate
and full consideration is: (1) whether the interests credited to each of the partners
was proportionate to the fair market value of the assets each partner contributed
to the partnership, (2) whether the assets contributed by each partner to the
partnership were properly credited to the respective capital accounts of the
partners, and (3) whether on termination or dissolution of the partnership the
partners were entitled to distributions from the partnership in amounts equal to
their respective capital accounts. Id. at 580. The answer to each of these
questions in this case is yes. Mrs. Kimbell received a partnership interest that
was proportionate· to the assets she contributed to the Partnership. There is no
question raised as to whether her partnership account was properly credited with
the assets she contributed. Also, on termination and liquidation of the
Partnership, the Partnership Agreement requires distribution to the Partners
according to their capital account balances.
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Thus the court is clear:

if a proper allocation to capital accounts is made there is full and adequate

consideration. The court next considered whether the creation of the partnership was a bona fide sale. Recall that it
was formed by her son as attorney-in-fact two months before the 96 year old decedent died. The opinion states:
Our review of the record reveals that the taxpayer established the following
objective facts (uncontroverted by the government) that would support their
position that the transfer to the Partnership was a bona fide sale:
( 1) Mrs. Kimbell retained sufficient assets outside the Partnership for
her own support and there was no· commingling of Partnership and her
personal assets. See Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. at 1338-39; Estate of
Harper, 83 T.C.M. at 1650.
(2) Partnership formalities were satisfied and the assets contributed to
the Partnership were actually assigned to the Partnership. Id.
(3) The assets contributed to the Partnership included working interests
in oil and gas properties which do require active management. A
working interest in an oil and gas lease is a cost-bearing operating
interest in the property. Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 40
(2003). The owners of the working interest have the exclusive right to
exploit the minerals on the land. Williams & Meyers, Manual of Oil and
Gas Terms 1207, 11th edition (2000). Nonoperating working interest
owners are called upon to pay their share of operating expenses and to
make elections whether to participate in drilling operations or various
phases thereof. Lowe at 387-92. A royalty interest, in contrast, is a
passive right to receive a share of production, if and when there is
production, free of costs. Manual of Oil & Gas Terms at 964. At
formation, $438,000 of approximately $2.5 million in assets were oil
and gas properties. Approximately 71 % of the oil and gas inte~ests were
working interests. Strangi, 85 T.C.M. at 1344; Thompson, 84 T.C.M at
388.
(4) David Kimbell and Michael Elyea advanced several credible and
unchallenged non-tax business reasons for the formation of the
Partnership that could not be accomplished via Mrs. Kimbell's Trust.
Harper, 83 T.C.M. at 1654; Thompson, 84 T.C.M. at 389.
Michael Elyea, Mrs. Kimbell's business advisor, testified as follows regarding
the business strategy for forming the Partnership. He stated that he and Mrs.
Kimbell fIrst discussed placing the assets in a limited partnership around the
same time the living trust was formed in the early 1990's. Although some
business strategies were accomplished by the trust, others were not. Specifically,
a living trust did not provide legal protection from creditors as a limited
partnership would. That protection was viewed as essential by Mr. Elyea and
Mrs. Kimbell because she was investing as a working interest owner in oil and
gas properties and could be personally liable for any environmental issues that
arose in the operation of those properties. Mr. Elyea also stated that Mrs.
Kimbell wanted the oil and gas operations to continue beyond her lifetime and
they felt that by putting the assets in a limited partnership, they could keep the
pool of capital together in one entity that would be enhanced over time rather
than subdivided by distributions to subsequent generations. Keeping the assets in
one pool, under one management would reduce administrative costs by keeping
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all accounting functions together. The partnership would also avoid costs of
recording transfers of oil and gas properties as the property was passed from
generation to generation. Mrs. Kimbell wanted to keep the asset in an entity that
would preserve the property as separate property of her descendants. The family
had faced that issue during the divorce of one of Mrs. Kimbell's grandsons. The
partnership also served the purpose of setting up the management of the assets if
something should happen to her son, which was a concern as he had experienced
some heart problems and had undergone a serious surgery. The partnership
agreement provided that all disputes be resolved through mediation or arbitration
to avoid interfamily litigation if disputes should arise. This statement of reasons
is supported by the recitation of purposes in the formation documents of the
Partnership (which the government and the district court selectively excerpt) and
the deposition testimony of Mrs. Kimbell's son. More to the point, the stated
reasons for the formation of the Partnership are confmned by objective facts,
many of which relate to the rights and responsibilities associated with
investments in oil and gas investments.
The partnership owned a substantial portion of the decedent's assets which would not be sheltered from
creditors created by the oil and gas interests, and, of course, the decedent had presumably lived with the liability for
many years already. Thus the true relevance of the oil and gas interest -- 11 % working interests, 4% royalty
interests, of the total partnership -- may be questioned.
The court rejected the need for others to make substantial contributions, or for investments to change after
the partnerships were formed:
The government contends that one fact pointing toward a conclusion that Mrs.
Kimbell's transfer to the Partnership was not a bona fide sale is the de minimis
contribution to the partnership made by the other partners. Mrs. Kimbell's son
and his wife contributed approximately $20,000 of the $2.4 million in assets in
the Partnership. This argument amounts to a restatement of the government's
recycling of value argument and does not justify treating the transaction as a
sham. In addition, we know of no principle of partnership law that would require
the minority partner to own a minimum percentage interest in the partnership for
the entity to be legitimate and its transfers bona fide. The government also points
out that the management of the Partnership assets did not change as a result of
the transaction. Prior to the formation of the Partnership, David Kimbell
managed Mrs. Kimbell's assets in the Trust. He continued to manage the assets
once they were transferred to the Partnership. However, the important fact is that
David Kimbell contributed his management expertise to the Partnership after its
formation. Given the business reasons established above for the change in
business form, the fact that David Kimbell performed the same services for the
assets in the Trust is irrelevant.
Interestingly, the court also rejected the direct inclusion of one-half of 1% of the underlying partnership
assets through the decedent's 50% ownership of an LLC which was the 1% general partner. In what would appear to
be a holding clearly contrary to Judge Cohen's opinion in Strangi, the court stated:
The district court's application of § 2036(a) to the LLC transfer was erroneous.
Even if the transfer did not constitute a bona fide sale for full and adequate
consideration, Mrs. Kimbell did not retain sufficient control of the assets
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transferred to the LLC to make her transfer subject to § 2036(a). Mrs. Kimbell's
interest in the LLC was only a 50% interest, and her son had sole management
powers over the LLC. Thus, Mrs. Kimbell did not retain the right to enjoy or
designate who would enjoy the LLC property. Accordingly, we vacate the ruling
of the district court on this issue.
The Third Circuit disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of "full and adequate consideration" in
Turner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 382 F.3d 367 (3 rd Cir. 2004) (was Estate of Theodore Thompson
below). The Tax Court had applied section 2036(a)(1) to include the partnership assets. The court agreed stating:
After reviewing the record evidence, we see no clear error in the Tax Court's finding
of an implied agreement between decedent and his family that decedent would
"continue[ ] to be the principal economic beneficiary of the contributed property"
and retain enjoyment of the transferred property sufficient to trigger § 2036(a)(1).
Thompson. 84 T.C.M. at 387. Decedent transferred 95% of his assets to the family
partnerships when he was ninety-five years old. As the Tax Court correctly found,
decedent did not retain sufficient assets to support himself for the remainder of his
life, as calculated at the time of transfer. [FN14] This fact supports the inference that
decedent had "an implied understanding that his children would agree to his requests
for money from the assets he contributed to the partnerships, and that they would do
so for as long as he lived." ld. at 387. The record reflects Betsy and George Turner
anticipated and prepared for this eventuality by seeking assurances from financial
advisors that decedent would be able to withdraw assets from the partnerships to
make cash gifts to the family. [FN15] Moreover, when decedent's remaining assets
eventually ran low, Betsy Turner secured approval from the limited partnership to
provide decedent with an "infusion" to cover his expenses.
The court rejected the exception for transfers which are bona fide sales for full and adequate consideration.
The court cited the Tax Court decisions in Harper and Strangi and agreed with the "recycling" theory. The opinion
states:
In the case of the Thompson Partnership, the only "active operations" claimed by the
estate involved leasing the Norwood, Colorado ranch back to its contributing partner
and former resident, Robert Thompson, for an annual fee of $12,000. The Norwood
ranch was not otherwise operated as an income producing business, either before or
after Robert Thompson contributed the property to the partnership. Robert
Thompson apparently generated some income from the sale of mules raised on the
property, but income from these sales went to Robert directly and not to the
partnership. Nevertheless, the Thompson Partnership paid an annual "management
fee" ranging between $23,625 and $47,500 to the Thompson Corporation, which in
turn paid Robert Thompson an annual salary of $32,001. We see no error in the Tax
Court's finding this putative business arrangement amounted to no more than a
contrivance, and did not constitute the type of legitimate business operations that
might provide a substantive non-tax benefit for transferring assets to the Thompson
Partnership.
The operations of the Turner Partnership were more extensive, but still fail to
provide sufficient objective indicia of a legitimate business operation. Although the
Turner Partnership made numerous loans to Betsy Turner's children and
grandchildren, this lending activity appears largely testamentary in practice. Loans
were not made to anyone outside the extended Turner family, interest payments were
often late or never paid, and the partnership took no enforcement action against
delinquent debtors. We agree with the Tax Court that these lending activities "lacked
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any semblance of business transactions," and were "testamentary in nature, using
decedent's money as a source of financing for the needs of individual family
members, not for business purposes." Thompson, 84 T.C.M. at 388. Furthermore,
the partners amended the Turner Partnership agreement, retroactive to April 23,
1993, to allocate all gains and losses from, and distribution of real estate contributed
to the partnership, to the individual contributing partner. Aside from decedent's
securities, the Turner Partnership consisted primarily of real estate assets. Directing
all income derived from the partnership's real estate assets to the contributing
partner-including any appreciation realized in the sale of such assets [FN21 ]-denied
decedent any non-tax benefit potentially derived from the assets collected in the
partnership.
The Turner Partnership's $186,000 investment in the Lewisville Properties gives us
some pause, but ultimately does not alter our conclusion. Unlike the other activities
of the Turner and Thompson Partnerships, this investment seems to qualify as a
legitimate business transaction with a third-party. [FN22] However, based on the
record evidence in this case, we conclude that any legitimizing effect of the Turner
Partnership's investment in the Lewisville Properties is overwhelmed by the
testamentary nature of the transfer and subsequent operation of the partnership.
In addition to the lack of legitimate business operations, the form of the transferred
assets-predominately marketable securities-is significant to our assessment of the
potential non-tax benefits available to decedent as a result of the transfer. Other than
favorable estate tax treatment resulting from the change in form, it is difficult to see
what benefit could be derived from holding an untraded portfolio of securities in this
family limited partnership with no ongoing business operations. Compare Church v.
United States, No. SA-97-CA-0774-0G, 2000 WL 206374,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
714 (W.D. Tex. Jan 18, 2000), affd without published opinion, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th
Cir.2001) (applying § 2036(a) exception to assets transferred to a limited partnership
that consolidated undivided ownership interests and administration of a family
ranching business); Estate of Stone v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2003- 309; 86 T.C.M.
(CCH) 551 (2003),2003 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 312, (applying § 2036(a) exception
to assets transferred to family partnerships operated as going concern businesses in
order to transfer management of businesses to children); Kimbell v. United States,
371 F.3d 257, 267-68 (5th Cir.2004) (applying § 2036(a) exception to working oil
and gas interests transferred to a family partnership to provide, among other things,
centralized management and protection from personal environmental liabilities). The
*381 form of assets transferred supports our conclusion there was no transfer for
consideration within the meaning of § 2036(a).
The Third Circuit also concluded that the transfers of assets to the partnership were not bona fide sales.
The court did not require an arms-length transaction between the transferor and transferee but did require that it be
made in good faith:
However, while a "bona fide sale" does not necessarily require an "arm's length
transaction," it still must be made in good faith. See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2043-1(a). A
"good faith" transfer to a family limited partnership must provide the transferor
some potential for benefit other than the potential estate tax advantages that might
result from holding assets in the partnership form. Even when all the "i's are dotted
and tIs are crossed," a transaction motivated solely by tax planning and with "no
business or corporate purpose ... is nothing more than a contrivance." Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 55 S.Ct. 266, 79 L.Ed. 596 (1935). "To hold
otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory
provision in question of all serious purpose." Id. As discussed in the context of
"adequate and full consideration," objective indicia that the partnership operates a
legitimate business may provide a sufficient factual basis for finding a good faith
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transfer. But if there is no discernable purpose or benefit for the transfer other than
estate tax savings, the sale is not "bona fide" within the meaning of § 2036. See, e.g.,
ide (ignoring a transaction for estate tax purposes after finding "no business or
corporate purpose" for the transaction); compare Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 267 (finding a
"bona fide sale" where the transaction was entered into for "substantial business and
other non-tax reasons").
On the precise question of whether a transferor received full and adequate consideration when transferring
assets to a partnership and receiving partnership interests which were discountable - - i.e. is allocation to the proper
capital accounts sufficient to constitute full and adequate consideration - - the majority opinion was not perfectly
clear stating:
In one sense, claiming an estate tax discount on assets received in exchange for an
inter vivos transfer should defeat the § 2036(a) exception outright. If assets are
transferred inter vivos in exchange for other assets of lesser value, it seems
reasonable to conclude there is no transfer for "adequate and full consideration"
because the decedent has not replenished the estate with other assets of equal value.
See Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 762 (5th Cir.1997) ("[U]nless a transfer
that depletes the transferor's estate is joined with a transfer that augments the estate
by a commensurate (monetary) amount, there is no 'adequate and full consideration'
for the purposes of either the estate or gift tax.").
That said, the Tax Court has held that the dissipation of value resulting from the
transfer of marketable assets to a closely-held entity will not automatically constitute
inadequate consideration for purposes of § 2036(a). See Harper, 83 T.C.M. at 1654
(noting partnership interests may constitute "adequate and full consideration" if there
is also a "potential [for] intangibles stemming from pooling for joint enterprise");
Stone, 86 T.C.M. at 581 (concluding the lack of marketability discount applied to
limited partnership interests does not, on its own, result in inadequate consideration
for purposes of § 2036).
Nonetheless, we believe this sort of dissipation of value in the estate tax context
should trigger heightened scrutiny into the actual substance of the transaction.
Where, as here, the transferee partnership does not operate a legitimate business, and
the record demonstrates the valuation discount provides the sole benefit for
converting liquid, marketable assets into illiquid partnership interests, there is no
transfer for consideration within the meaning of § 2036(a).
A concurrence was perfectly clear on the point:
The Commissioner correctly recognizes that Stone is inconsistent with his position
here and the estate understandably relies on Stone. I reject Stone on the quoted point
as the Commissioner's position in no way reads the exception out of section 2036(a)
and the Tax Court does not explain *387 why it does. [FN24] Rather, the
Commissioner seeks to apply the exception precisely as written as his position
should not be applied in ordinary commercial circumstances even though the
decedent may be said to have enjoyed the property until his death.
FN24. In Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 265-66 (5th Cir.2004),
the court quoted the above language from Stone with approval and went on
to point out that:
We would only add to the Tax Court's rejection of the
government's inconsistency argument that it is a classic mixing of
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apples and oranges: The government is attempting to equate the
venerable 'willing buyer-willing seller' test of fair market value
(which applies when calculating gift or estate tax) with the proper
test for adequate and full consideration under § 2036(a). This
conflation misses the mark: The business decision to exchange
cash or other assets for a transfer-restricted, non-managerial
interest in a limited partnership involves financial considerations
other than the purchaser's ability to tum right around and sell the
newly acquired limited partnership interest for 100 cents on the
dollar.
Investors who acquire such interests do so with the expectation of
realizing benefits such as management expertise, security and
preservation of assets, capital appreciation and avoidance of
personal liability. Thus there is nothing inconsistent in
acknowledging, on the one hand, that the investor's dollars have
acquired a limited partnership interest at arm's length for adequate
and full consideration and, on the other hand, that the asset thus
acquired has a present fair market value, i.e., immediate sale
potential, of substantially less than the dollars just paid--a classic
informed trade-off.
I believe, however, that Kimbell does not take into account that to avoid
the recapture provision of section 2036(a) the property transferred must be
"replaced by property of equal value that could be exposed to inclusion in
the decedent's gross estate" D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 313 (quoting
Frothingham, 60 T.e. at 216 (omitting emphasis», on a "money or money's
worth" basis.

In March, 2005 the Tax Court attempted to bring some order to its section 2036 jurisprudence in the family
partnership context, in Estate of Wayne C. Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T. C. No.8 (2005), a reviewed opinion.
Judge Goeke (who decided Korby above) authored the majority opinion signed by nine judges.

Two judges

concurred in a separate opinion, one wrote separately to concur and dissent, and three wrote separately to concur and
dissent.
Mr. Bongard transferred shares of stock in a closely-held company (Empak, Inc.) to an irrevocable trust
(ISA Trust) in 1986. He retained a power to persuade the trustees to follow his wishes, at least in part, because at
various times he suggested the trustees make certain stock distributions and those suggestions were followed. The
stock was subsequently redeemed by the company.
In the mid-1990s the family and advisors decided that all of the family's stock in Empak should be
combined so that Empak could sell stock publicly or privately in order to raise capital. So, Mr. Bongard and the
trust capitalized WCB Holdings, LLC by transferring to it their respective shares in Empak. In exchange, Mr.
Bongard and the trust received interests in each of four classes of stock: Class A governance, Class A financial, Class
B governance, and Class B fmancial. Mr. Bongard received 86.39% of each class and the trust received 13.61 % of
each class. The Class A governance units had effective control over the LLC.
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Within days of contributing the Empak stock to the LLC, Mr. Bongard contributed his Class B governance
and Class B financial units to Bongard Family Limited Partnership (BFLP) in exchange for a 99% limited
partnership interest. The trust received a 1% general partnership interest in BFLP. Mr. Bongard also gave portions
of his Class A governance interests to trusts for his descendants and to a lifetime QTIP for his wife.
In early 1998 Mr. Bongard wanted cash to go to his four children to see how they would handle the funds.
Empak redeemed some shares from the LLC and the LLC redeemed some units from the trust and the trustees of the
trust made distributions of $100,000 each to the four children. On November 16, 1998 Mr. Bongard, age 57, died
unexpectedly.
At issue before the Tax Court was whether the Empak stock should be included directly in Mr. Bongard's
estate, and whether the LLC interests should be included in Mr. Bongard's estate. Stated another way, did section
2036 apply to the transfers into the LLC or to the transfers into BFLP. The Tax Court applied section 2036 to the
transfers to the partnership but not to the LLC. In each analysis, the central question was whether the funding of the
entities avoided section 2036 by reason of being a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration.
First, with respect to the transfer of Empak stock to the WCB Holdings, LLC, the court stated that the
transfer was a bona fide sale because there were legitimate non-tax reasons for creating the LLC:
It is axiomatic that intrafamily transactions are subjected to a higher level of
scrutiny, but this heightened scrutiny is not tantamount to an absolute bar. In that
connection, we have already concluded that decedent and ISA Trust had mutual
legitimate and significant nontax reasons for forming WCB Holdings. In
addition, both decedent and ISA Trust received interests in WCB Holdings
proportionate to the number of shares transferred. We believe that had this
transaction occurred between two unrelated parties the majority interest holder in
Empak would have received similar powers to those the decedent received via
WCB Holdings's member control agreement. An important purpose for creating
WCB Holdings was to position Empak for a corporate liquidity event, and the
record does not contain any credible evidence that unrelated parties would not
have agreed to the same terms and conditions. Given these facts, we cannot hold
that the terms of the transaction differed from those of two unrelated parties
negotiating at arm's length.
Respondent's fmal argument is that the formation of WCB Holdings was not a
bona fide sale because there was not a true pooling of assets. WCB Holdings's
purpose was to pool the Bongard family's Empak stock within a single entity,
which decedent and ISA Trust satisfied through their respective contributions.
WCB Holdings's creation was part of a much grander plan, to attract potential
investors or to stimulate a corporate liquidity event to facilitate Empak's growth.
Moreover, when WCB Holdings was capitalized, the members' capital accounts
were properly credited and maintained, WCB Holdings's funds were not
commingled with decedent's, and all distributions during decedent's life were pro
rata. The amalgamation of these facts evinces that this transaction resulted in a
true pooling of assets.
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The majority also found that the transfer was for full and adequate consideration because Mr. Bongard's
ownership of 86.31 % of the Class A governance units gave him practical control over the LLC. Thus, there was no
reason Mr. Bongard should have received a "control premium" when he gave his Empak stock to the LLC.
On the other hand, the court found no legitimate, non-tax purpose for the limited partnership. The estate
argued that the partnership was needed to allow gifts to be made, including a gift to Mrs. Bongard, for asset
protection, as a trust substitute, and to help manage the partnership assets. The court found that Mr. Bongard made
gifts after he formed the partnership but did not give away partnership interests other than to Mrs. Bongard. The
estate argued that the gift of partnership units to her supported a general non-tax reason for the partnership but the
court found that the decedent needed to give some assets to Mrs. Bongard in connection with a postnuptial
agreement and he used the partnership interest because that is where the assets were. Further, Mr. Bongard made
gifts to trusts after the partnership was formed and the partnership never actually managed the LLC interests it owned
- - it did not try to diversify, for instance.
The court having failed to apply the bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration exception to section
2036 with respect to the transfer of LLC interests to the partnership, the next issue was whether Mr. Bongard
retained an interest in the partnership. The court found that because Mr. Bongard controlled whether the partnership
could sell its sole asset - - the LLC interests - - into something liquid he exercised "practical control" over the
partnership. The opinion states:
The decedent did not need the membership interest in WCB Holdings class B
shares to continue his lifestyle. However, decedent retained ownership of more
than 91 percent of his BFLP interest and did not make gifts of such interest prior
to his death. More importantly, decedent controlled whether BFLP could
transform its sole asset, the class B WCB Holdings membership units, into a
liquid asset. Decedent as CEO and sole member of Empak's board of directors
determined when Empak redeemed its stock in each of the seven instances of
redemptions prior to his death, including the last redemption of about $750,000
worth of Empak stock in 1998 after WCB Holdings was formed. None of the
seven redemptions reduced the membership units owned by BFLP. In order for
BFLP to be able to diversify or take any steps other than simply holding the class
B membership units, decedent would have had to cause the membership units
and the underlying Empak stock to be redeemed. He chose not to do this. By not
redeeming the WCB membership units held by BFLP, decedent ensured that
BFLP would not engage in asset management. Thereby, decedent exercised
practical control over BFLP and limited its function to simply holding title to the
class B membership units. Whether decedent caused the WCB membership units
held by BFLP and the underlying Empak stock to be redeemed or not, his ability
to decide whether that event would occur demonstrates the understanding of the
parties involved that decedent retained the right to control the units transferred to
BFLP.
The estate's argument that the general partner's fiduciary duties prevents a
fmding of an implied agreement is overcome by the lack of activity following
BFLP's formation and BFLP's failure to perform any meaningful functions as an
entity. 12 We conclude that decedent's transfer to BFLP for a 99-percent
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ownership interest in the partnership did not alter his control of the WCB
Holdings class B membership units transferred to BFLP. See Estate of
Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d at 376-377 (fmding "nothing beyond
formal title changed in decedent's relationship to his assets" where the practical
effect on his relationship to the transferred assets during decedent's life was
minimal).
Judge Laro wrote a concurrence (Judge Marvel joined) in which he argued that a transfer to a partnership
could not be for full and adequate consideration unless the value of the partnership units received on account of the
transfer were equal in value to the assets transferred to the partnership. That is, if the funding of the partnership
"depletes" the estate there is no full and adequate consideration. In short, the opinion would side with Thompson
over Kimbell with respect to the meaning of full and adequate consideration.
Judge Halpern concurred and dissented.

He disagreed with the majority to the extent the majority

considered the motive of the transferor. Further, he argued for a gift on formation the9ry if the interests received
back by the transferor were less than those transferred. Obviously, Judge Halpern would agree in substance with
Judge Laro's understanding of full and adequate consideration, although perhaps not with his reasoning, but in any
event would go further. He agreed with the result that the Empak stock should not be included directly in Mr.
Bongard's estate.
Judge Chiechi also concurred and dissented, joined by Judges Wells and Foley. These judges rejected the
notion that merely because there is no non-tax reason for the formation of the partnership that means Mr. Bongard
retained beneficial enjoyment of the assets transferred to the partnership. The opinion states:
The majority opinion's rationale is factually, logically, and legally flawed. 8
The majority opinion's rationale is factually flawed for various reasons. One
reason is that it concludes that decedent could have caused WCB Holdings to
redeem the WCB Holdings class B membership units owned by BFLP. That
conclusion is not supported by, and is contrary to, the following fmdings of fact
of the majority opinion regarding the circumstances under which the chief
manager of WCB Holdings (chief manager), who was decedent's son Mark
Bongard, was required to obtain the approval of a majority of the WCB
Holdings class A governance units before he could take certain actions on behalf
ofWCB Holdings:
the chief manager needed the approval of the members representing the
majority of the class A governance units before he could issue
additional membership units, lend, borrow, or commit WCB Holdings's
funds in excess of $25,000, authorize capital expenditures in excess of
$10,000, sell any ofWCB Holdings's assets, including its Empak stock,
worth over $10,000 in any twelve month period, or vote any securities,
including its Empak stock, owned by WCB Holdings.
Majority Ope p. 14; emphasis added.
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After decedent funded, by gift, on March 15, 1997, the Children's Trust, the
Grandchildren's Trust, and the QTIP Trust, each with certain class A governance
units and certain class A fmancial units in WCB Holdings, decedent no longer
owned a majority of the class A governance units in WCB Holdings, the only
voting units in WCB Holdings. Thus, decedent could not have approved, and
certainly could not have required, that the chief manager commit any of WCB
Holdings's funds in excess of $25,000 for the purpose of redeeming the WCB
Holdings class B membership interests owned by BFLP. In addition, decedent
could not have approved, and certainly could not have required, that the chief
manager sell to Empak, through a redemption by Empak, Empak stock owned by
WCB Holdings worth over $10,000 in any 12-month period.
Another factual flaw in the majority opinion's rationale relates to the conclusion
that decedent had the ability to cause Empak to redeem the Empak stock owned
by WCB Holdings. That conclusion disregards not only the implications of the
majority opinion's finding that decedent and ISA Trust transferred their
respective shares of Empak stock to WCB Holdings in order to position Empak
for a liquidity event9 but also decedent's fiduciary duties as Empak's CEO and
the sole member of its board of directors. Depleting Empak's assets by causing
Empak to redeem the Empak stock owned by WCB Holdings in order to be able
to diversify BFLP's assets through a redemption by WCB Holdings of the WCB
Holdings class B membership units owned by BFLP would not have been
consistent with the objective of positioning Empak for a liquidity event. Indeed,
given that objective, it would have been, at best, bad business judgment on the
part of decedent and a misconception by him of what was involved in positioning
Empak for a liquidity event if he had decided to cause Empak to redeem the
Empak stock owned by WCB Holdings in order to effect a diversification of
BFLP's assets. Moreover, irrespective of the objective to position Empak for a
liquidity event, any decision by decedent to deplete Empak's assets by causing
Empak to redeem the Empak stock owned by WCB Holdings in order to effect
such a diversification would have been, at worst, a breach by decedent of his
fiduciary duties as Empak's CEO and the sole member of its board of directors.
Any such decision by decedent might have been actionable by the stockholders
of Empak, which, as of March 7, 1997, were: (1) WCB Holdings, a 90-percent
stockholder whose class A governance unitholders, other than decedent, 10
owned in the aggregate on and after March 15, 1997, a majority of the voting
class A governance membership units in WCB Holdings; (2) Marubeni Corp.
(MC), a 6-percent stockholder and a Japanese trading entity which had more
than 700 subsidiaries and whose stock was listed on various international stock
exchanges; and (3) Marubeni America Corp., a 4- percent stockholder and the
u.s. sales and marketing subsidiary of MC. Cf. United States v. Byrum, 408
U.S. at 137-143. Thus, any ability of decedent to cause Empak to redeem the
Empak stock owned by WCB Holdings was not unconstrained. Instead, any such
ability was subject to the fiduciary duties imposed upon decedent as Empak's
CEO and the sole member of its board of directors and to business and economic
realities and variables over which he had little or no control and which he could
ignore, but only at his peril. Cf. ide
The majority opinion's rationale contains other factual flaws. According to that
rationale,
decedent controlled whether BFLP could transform its sole asset, the
class B WCB Holdings membership units, into a liquid asset. * * * In
order for BFLP to be able to diversify or take any steps other than
simply holding the class B membership units, decedent would have had
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to cause the membership units and the underlying Empak stock to be
redeemed. I I He chose not to do this. By not redeeming the WCB
membership units held by BFLP, decedent insured that BFLP would not
engage in asset management. Thereby, decedent exercised practical
control over BFLP and limited its function to simply holding title to the
class B membership units. Whether decedent caused the WCB
membership units held by BFLP and the underlying Empak stock to be
redeemed or not, his ability to decide if that event would occur
demonstrates the understanding of the parties involved that decedent
retained the right to control the units transferred to BFLP.

* * * decedent's transfer to BFLP for a 99-percent ownership interest in
the partnership did not alter his control of the WCB Holdings class B
membership units transferred to BFLP. * * *
Majority Ope pp. 57-59; emphasis added.
As is evident from the foregoing, the majority opinion establishes a "control"
standard in applying section 2036(a)(I). However, the majority opinion never
actually tells us what it means when it uses the terms "control" or "controlled"
four times in the above-quoted excerpt.I2 Nonetheless, under any commonly
accepted meaning of those terms, it is factually incorrect for the majority opinion
to conclude that "decedent controlled whether BFLP could transform its * * *
class B WCB Holdings membership units * * * into a liquid asset * * * [,]
exercised practical control over BFLP and * * * retained the right to control the
units transferred to BFLP" and that "decedent's transfer to BFLP * * * did not
alter his control of the WCB Holdings class B membership units transferred to
BFLP." Majority Ope pp. 57-58. After decedent and ISA Trust capitalized BFLP,
which the majority opinion acknowledges was a validly created and existing
partnership under Minnesota law, neither decedent nor ISA Trust had the same
relationship to the respective WCB Holdings class B membership units that they
transferred to BFLP. Decedent owned a limited partnership interest, and ISA
Trust owned a general partnership interest, in BFLP. BFLP, in turn, owned such
units transferred to it. Decedent, as a limited partner of BFLP, did not have, and
did not exercise, control over BFLP, its assets, its activities, or its general
partner, ISA Trust.
In addition to the factual flaws in the majority opinion's rationale, that rationale
is logically flawed. It is a non sequitur for the majority opinion to conclude that,
because of decedent's alleged ability to cause Empak to redeem the Empak stock
owned by WCB Holdings and to cause WCB Holdings to redeem the WCB
Holdings class B membership units owned by BFLP, "decedent controlled
whether BFLP could transform its * * * class B WCB Holdings membership
units * * * into a liquid asset * * * [and] exercised practical control over BFLP".
Majority Ope pp. 57-58. It also is a non sequitur for the majority opinion to
conclude that any such alleged ability "demonstrates the understanding of the
parties involved that decedent retained the right to control the units transferred to
BFLP" and that his transfer to BFLP of his WCB Holdings class B membership
units "did not alter his control" of such units. Majority Ope pp. 58-59. The
alleged ability of decedent to cause Empak to redeem the Empak stock owned by
WCB Holdings and to cause WCB Holdings to redeem the weB Holdings class
B membership units owned by BFLP does not logically lead to any of the
foregoing conclusions. Nor does any such alleged ability logically lead to the
majority opinion's holding that "an implied agreement existed that allowed
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decedent to retain the enjoyment of the property held by BFLP." Majority Ope p.
59.
The majority opinion's rationale is also legally flawed. The language of section
2036(a)( 1)13 "plainly contemplates retention of an attribute of the property
transferred -- such as a right to income, use of the property itself, or a power of
appointment with respect either to income or principal." United States v. Byrum,
408 U.S. at 149. Moreover, the term "enjoyment" used in section 2036(a)(l) is
not a term or art; it "connote[s] substantial present economic benefit". Id. at 145.
Decedent did not retain any attribute of the WCB Holdings class B membership
units that he transferred to BFLP. Nor was decedent's alleged ability to cause
Empak to redeem the Empak stock owned by WCB Holdings and to cause WCB
Holdings to redeem the WCB Holdings class B membership units owned by
BFLP a substantial present economic benefit of such units. Any such alleged
ability was not a present benefit at all; it was "a speculative and contingent
benefit which mayor may not * * * [have been] realized."14 Id. at 150. There
simply are no circumstances surrounding decedent's transfer of his WCB
Holdings class B membership units to BFLP and no subsequent use of such units
by decedent from which an implied agreement may be inferred that decedent
retained the enjoyment of such units. See Estate of Reichardt V. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 144, 151 (2000). Section 2036(a)(l) rejects the majority opinion's
holding that decedent retained the enjoyment of the WCB Holdings class B
membership units that he transferred to BFLP.
With respect to Ih:rnm the opinion states:
The Supreme Court teaches us in United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972),
that section 2036(a)(l) (and section 2036(a)(2)) does not apply to a ~ansfer by
an individual to an irrevocable trust of shares of stock in certain corporations in
which the transferor owned stock,17 where such ownership gave the transferor
the ability, inter alia, to liquidate or merge such corporations and where the
powers of the independent trustee of such trust were subject to the following
rights expressly reserved by the transferor: (1) To vote the shares of unlisted
stock held in the trust; (2) to disapprove the sale or transfer of any trust assets,
including the shares transferred to the trust; (3) to approve investments and
reinvestments; and (4) to remove the trustee and to designate another corporate
trustee to serve as successor trustee. Id. at 126- 127.
A fortiori, under the principles that the Supreme Court established in United
States v. Byrum, supra, even if in the instant case decedent had the ability to
cause Empak to redeem the Empak stock owned by WCB Holdings and to cause
WCB Holdings to redeem the WCB Holdings class B membership units owned
by BFLP, any such ability does not demonstrate, and did not result in, decedent's
retention of the enjoyment of the WCB Holdings class B membership units that
he transferred to BFLP within the meaning of section 2036(a)(l).18 In reaching
a contrary holding, the majority opinion loses sight of, or chooses to disregard,
the fact that any such ability is qualitatively different from the retention of the
enjoyment (i.e., substantial present economic benefit, ide at 145) of the WCB
Holdings class B units that he transferred to BFLP. See ide at 143, 145. In this
connection, assuming arguendo the propriety of the majority opinion's
conclusions that decedent had the ability to cause Empak to redeem the Empak
stock owned by WCB Holdings and to cause WCB Holdings to redeem the
WCB Holdings class B membership units owned by BFLP, any such ability does
not demonstrate, and did not result in, the retention by decedent of the right to
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compel BFLP or ISA Trust, the general partner of BFLP, to distribute such units
to or on behalf of decedent or otherwise to permit decedent to have substantial
present economic benefit of such units.
The majority opinion not only fails to apply section 2036(a)(l) and principles
under section 2036(a) that the Supreme Count established in United States v.
Byrum, supra, it also fails to apply principles established by Minnesota law
regarding the fiduciary duties of the partners of partnerships and the trustees of
trusts, which the majority opinion acknowledges exist.19 This is evidenced by
the following passage from the majority opinion's rationale:
The estate's argument that the general partner's fiduciary duties prevents
a fmding of an implied agreement is overcome by the lack of activity
following BFLP's formation and BFLP's failure to perform any
meaningful functions as an entity. We conclude that decedent's transfer
to BFLP for a 99-percent ownership interest in the partnership did not
alter his control of the WCB Holdings class B membership units
transferred to BFLP. * * *
Judge Wherry has written the fITst post-Bongard Tax Court opinion dealing with section 2036 (a)(l) in
Estate of Charles Porter Schutt v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo 2005-126. There two Delaware Business Trusts
(Schutt I and Schutt II) were formed using assets from the decedent's revocable trust and various irrevocable trusts
of which Wilmington Trust Company was trustee. Schutt I was funded with almost $68,000,000 in DuPont stock of
which almost $31,000,000 came from the decedent's revocable trust and Schutt II was funded with almost
$24,000,000 in Exxon stock of which about $11,000,000 was from the revocable trust. After the funding, the
decedent owned about $30,000,000 in other assets (residences, other land, tangible personal property, and other
investments). The decedent was trustee of the Delaware Business Trusts, and thus had effective control over the
assets, and the net cash flow of the trusts was required to be, and was, distributed pro rata through the decedent's
date of death.
The issue facing the court was whether the transfer of the stock to the Delaware Business Trusts was a bona
fide sale for full and adequate consideration, in which case the trust interests would be valued (presumably) at a
discount, or whether the DuPont and Exxon stock itself would be included in the decedent's estate. The court
reviewed many conversations, memoranda, and letters among Mr. Dinneen, a CPA in charge of the Schutt family
office, Mr. Sweeney, the Schutt's attorney in private practice, Mr. Howard, an officer of Wilmington Trust Company
(WTC), and others. The court summarized its fmdings as to the purposes of the Delaware Business Trusts as
follows:
The estate's position is that Schutt I and II were "formed primarily to put into
place an entity to perpetuate Mr. Schutt's buy and hold. investment philosophy
with respect to the DuPont and Exxon stock belonging both to Mr. Schutt and to
the Wilmington Trust Company Trusts." In service of this objective, Schutt I and
II were aimed at "the furtherance and protection of * * * [decedent's] family's
wealth by providing for the centralized management of his family's holdings in
duPont [sic] stock and Exxon stock during his lifetime and to prevent the
improvident disposition of this stock during his lifetime and to the extent
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possible after his death." The estate contends that the desired preservation of
decedent's investment policy "could not be accomplished without the creation of
Schutt I and Schutt II, as the WTC Trusts were scheduled to terminate at various
intervals and the assets of those trusts would be distributed, free of trust, to their
respective beneficiaries. "
Respondent's argument to the contrary is summarized as follows:
(1) it was not necessary to transfer stock from Mr. Schutt's revocable
trust to the business trusts to perpetuate his investment philosophy; (2)
the record establishes that obtaining valuation discounts for gift and
estate tax purposes was the dominant, if not the sole, reason for forming
the business trusts; and (3) in any event, Mr. Schutt's desire to
perpetuate his investment philosophy was itself a testamentary motive.

***
The totality of the record in this case, when viewed as a whole, supports the
estate's position that a significant motive for decedent's creation of Schutt I and
II was to perpetuate his buy and hold investment philosophy. That decedent was
in fact a committed adherent to the buy and hold approach is undisputed. His
longstanding concern with disposition of core stockholdings by his descendants
is also well attested. Mr. Sweeney testified that decedent "would raise, at least
annually and, quite often, more than annually, his concern about the ability of
children or grandchildren or whoever it might be to sell principal rather than
using the income from the principal". Mr. Dinneen likewise testified that
decedent expressed concern about Schutt family members' selling of stock from
"Back in the early seventies and on a regular basis from there on out."
The documentary record also furnishes at least a measure of objective support
for the decedent's willingness to act based on these worries. In 1994, decedent
declined to make annual exclusion gifts of limited partnership interests in the
Schutt Family Limited Partnership to his daughter Sarah S. Harrison and her
children. The estate attributes this decision to concern about the investment
philosophy of these individuals, and the limited evidence does reflect 13
occasions on which DuPont or Exxon stock was sold by Harrison grandchildren
from 1989 through 1997.
Further corroborating the bona fides of the professed intent underlying creation
of Schutt I and II is the fact that formation of the business trusts did serve to
advance this goal. Respondent's contention that the business trusts were
unnecessary to perpetuate decedent's investment philosophy unduly emphasizes
management of the assets held by the Revocable Trust and minimizes any focus
on the considerable assets held in the WTC trusts. Respondent points out that,
under the Revocable Trust indenture, decedent could control investment
decisions pertaining to the assets until his death, at which time various successor
trusts to be administered by his son and son-in-law would be funded. Respondent
argues that the situation under the business trusts was functionally equivalent,
with decedent as trustee setting investment philosophy during his lifetime,
followed by his son and son-in-law as successor trustees.
However, by only considering the Revocable Trust assets in isolation, this
analysis disregards more than half of the property involved in the business trusts.
Decedent in effect used the assets of the Revocable Trust10 to enhance his
ability to perpetuate a philosophy vis-a-vis the stock of the WTC trusts, such that
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none of the contributions should be disregarded in evaluating the practical
implications of Schutt I and II. Mr. Howard testified that he did not believe he
would have considered a proposal involving contribution only of the WTC trusts'
assets to entities structured as were Schutt. I and II, without decedent's
willingness to place his own property alongside. As Mr. Howard explained: "it
made real to me, certainly, when someone is willing to contribute that sum of
money and tie it up the same way we· were tying it up with respect to
distributions, if not with respect to management, that this was something that he
and the family, if they were willing to agree to it, felt strongly about." This
importance of decedent's contributions to those negotiating on behalf ofWTC, at
least on a psychological level, reflects a critical interconnectedness between
decedent's contributions and those of the WTC trusts.
The effect of Schutt I and lIon the assets of the WTC trusts shows that the
business trusts advanced decedent's objectives in a meaningful way.
Respondent's argument, however, to the extent that it takes into account the
WTC assets, seeks to counter this conclusion by once again placing unwarranted
emphasis on certain features or results of the structure to the exclusion of others.
In discussing the alleged motive for involving the WTC trusts in the transaction,
respondent states that "even if the decedent formed the business trusts to prevent
his heirs from dissipating the family's wealth, this is itself a testamentary
motive." More specifically, respondent dismisses the estate's contentions as
follows:
The decedent's testamentary motives are particularly evident in this case
as it is clear that he was concerned about the dissipation of the family's
wealth after his death as opposed to during his lifetime. While he was
alive, he controlled the sale of stock held by his revocable trust.
Similarly, as the direction or consent advisor to the bank trusts, none of
the stock held by those entities could be sold without his consent. The
only risk that assets held by the bank trusts could be sold without his
consent was if one of his children predeceased him, thereby causing a
distribution of a portion of the trust assets to that child's issue. Since his
surviving children were all in good health when the business trusts were
formed and the decedent was not, there is little doubt that the decedent
was concerned about what would happen to the family's wealth after his
death.
The Court disagrees that decedent's motives may properly be dismissed, in the
unique circumstances of this case, as merely testamentary. The record on the
whole supports that decedent's greatest worry with respect to wealth dissipation
centered on outright distribution of assets to the beneficiaries of the various
WTC trusts. It is clear from the structures of the WTC trusts involved that
outright distribution created the single largest risk to the perpetuation of a buy
and hold philosophy, and testimony confIrmed decedent's concern over a
termination situation. Because none of the events that would trigger such a
distribution turned on decedent's own death, to call the underlying motive
testamentary is inappropriate.
The court was clearly concerned about deciding that the "perpetuation of a buy and hold investment strategy
qualifies as a 'legitimate and significant non-tax reason'" within the meaning of Bongard. The opinion states:
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has in a similar vein suggested that
the mere holding of an untraded portfolio of marketable securities weighs
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negatively in the assessment of potential nontax benefits available as a result of a
transfer to a family entity. Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d at
380. As a general premise, this Court has agreed with the Court of Appeals,
particularly in cases where the securities are contributed almost exclusively by
one person. See Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-145;
Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121. In the unique
circumstances of this case, however, a key difference exists in that decedent's
primary concern was in perpetuating his philosophy vis-a-vis the stock of the
WTC trusts in the event of a termination of one of those trusts. Here, by
contributing stock in the Revocable Trust, decedent was able to achieve that aim
with respect to securities of the WTC trusts even exceeding the value of his own
contributions. In this unusual scenario, we cannot blindly apply the same
analysis appropriate in cases implicating nothing more than traditional
investment management considerations.
To summarize, the record reflects that decedent's desire to prevent sale of core
holdings in the WTC trusts in the event of a distribution to beneficiaries was
real, was a significant factor in motivating the creation of Schutt I and II, was
appreciably advanced by formation of the business trusts, and was unrelated to
tax ramifications. The Court is thus able to conclude in this case that Schutt I and
II were formed for a legitimate and significant nontax purpose without further
probing the parties' disagreement as to whether, in theory, an investment strategy
premised on buy and hold should offer just as much justification for an entity
premised thereon as a philosophy that focuses on active trading.
As regards other factors considered indicative of a bona fide sale, these too tend
to support the estate's position. The contributed property was actually transferred
to Schutt I and II in a timely manner. Entity and personal assets were not
commingled. Decedent was not fmancially dependent on distributions from
Schutt I and II, retaining sufficient assets outside of the business trusts amply to
support his needs and lifestyle. Nor was decedent effectively standing on both
sides of the transactions.
Concerning this latter point, it is respondent's position that "there were no 'arm'slength negotiations' between the decedent and the bank concerning any material
matters affecting the formation and operation of the business trusts." Respondent
maintains that WTC, while ostensibly an independent third party, simply
represented the interests of decedent's children and grandchildren and that
decedent dictated all material terms.
The Court, however, is unpersuaded by respondent's attempts to downplay the
give-and-take reflected in the record. As detailed in the facts recounted above
and the stipulated exhibits, WTC representatives thoroughly evaluated the
business trust proposals, raised questions, offered suggestions, and made
requests. Some of those suggestions or requests were accepted or acquiesced in;
others were not. Such a scenario bears the earmarks of considered negotiations,
not blind accommodation. There is no prerequisite that arm's-length bargaining
be strictly adversarial or acrimonious.
Once the court found a bona fide sale, it was not difficult for it to determine that the decedent received full
and adequate consideration for the transfer into the Trusts from the revocable trust because the capital accounts were
properly credited and maintained.

The court emphasized throughout the opinion what it termed the "unique

circumstances of the case.
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Where does that leave us with respect to family partnerships? Five general rules stand out.
First, the form of the partnership (or LLC) must be respected and the senior
generation (the primary transferor) should retain no, or as little as possible,
income from the partnership. If income flow is necessary requiring the payment
of an annuity from the partnership, not related to the amount of income, should
be considered.
Second, if possible, family members should pool assets rather than having the
senior generation make substantially all the contributions. Family trusts should
be considered as contributors in this regard. Nonetheless, the partnership
income tax rules relating to investment companies cannot be disregarded.
Third, if possible, assets other than or in addition to marketable securities should
be used. If a client has both marketable securities and other assets (e.g. actively
managed real estate interests), the investment company rules suggest keeping the
assets in separate entities for income tax purposes. May simultaneous creation
of two or more entities allow those entities to be treated, by the taxpayer, as if
they were akin to one entity for transfer tax purposes while maintaining separate
tax status for income tax purposes?
Fourth, because the Tax Court majority seems to have rejected a "gift on
formation" argument, the primary transferor should not have control of the entity
even at the beginning. An exception may be if the primary transferor is a QTIP
trust; will section 2519 apply if the surviving spouse consents to the transfer of
liquid assets into an illiquid investment, especially if there is no guaranteed
income flow from the entity? If that is a concern, may it be mitigated by leaving
sufficient assets in the QTIP after the entity is funded to allow the trustee to
make distributions (using principal) equivalent to the amount of income the trust
would have if the entity distributed all of its income?
Fifth, if section 2036 (a) (2) is a concern (based on the broad conclusions of
Judge Cohen in Strangi) then the primary transferor should retain no partnership
interests at all. Instead, the limited interests should be owned by a trust over
which a testamentary special power of appointment is retained. Ideally the
primary transferor would retain no significant rights over such a trust, including
no right to receive income.
A different issue was present in Estate of Threefoot, 316 F. Supp. 2d 636 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). The decedent
died before forming a limited partnership with her daughter ("Miller") in which she would own 99% and daughter
1%. The court noted the following facts:
Under the Partnership Agreement and a related Subscription Agreement,
Threefoot would have agreed to contribute to the Partnership all of her interest in
certain tracts of real estate in Perry County, Tennessee (the "Perry County real
estate") and in certain securities, bonds, and cash in her brokerage accounts. The
Certificate of Formation for the Partnership was signed by Miller and filed with
the Tennessee Secretary of State on September 16, 2002, and with the Shelby
County Register on September 23, 2002. The Partnership Agreement and
Subscription Materials for the Partnership were prepared by September 20,
2002, but they were not executed prior to Threefoot's death on September 23,
2002. Threefoot died testate.
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Miller alleges that she and Threefoot made a binding oral agreement to enter into
the Partnership Agreement and seeks to enforce that oral agreement. As
executrix, she requests that the court authorize the execution and consummation
of the transactions outlined in the Partnership Agreement and the Subscription
Agreement. Additionally, she states that there are insufficient liquid assets in
Threefoot's estate to fully fund the Partnership and satisfy all current expenses,
including estate taxes She requests that the court authorize the sale of an
apartment located at 585 South Greer in Memphis, Tennessee (the "Memphis
real estate") so that the proceeds can be used to satisfy those obligations.
The case began in Probate Court but was removed by the government to federal district court:
On August 27,2003, Anne W. Miller, as executrix of the estate of her mother,
Anne F. Threefoot, brought a petition in the Probate Court of Shelby County,
Tennessee. In that petition, Miller seeks to execute a Partnership Agreement on
behalf of the estate, to transfer certain property to the partnership, and to sell
certain real estate and fund the partnership with the proceeds. She also seeks a
determination that the lien for federal estate taxes arising under 26 U.S.C. §
6324(a)(I) applies to the partnership interest which is part of the decedent's
estate rather than to the property to be transferred to the partnership. Miller
joined the United States as a party under 28 U.S.C. § 2410. The United States
removed the case to this court on October 2, 2003, asserting that the court has
federal question jurisdiction. Miller filed a motion to remand to state court on
October 31, 2003, in which she also requests attorney's fees, and the United
States filed a brief in opposition to the motion to remand on November 18,2003.
For the following reasons, Miller's motion to remand is GRANTED, and her
request for attorney's fees is DENIED.
The issue before the court, then, was subject matter jurisdiction. The opinion states:
When a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over an action that has
been removed, it should remand the case to state court, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The
party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction
exists. Ahearn v. Charter Township of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 453-54 (6th
Cir. 1996). "Due regard for state governments' rightful independence requires
federal courts scrupulously to confme their own jurisdiction to precise statutory
limits." Id. at 454.
The government contends that this court has federal question jurisdiction under
the quiet title provision of the Judiciary Code, which provides in part:
[T]he United States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in
any district court, or in any State court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter -- (1) to quiet title to . . . real or personal property on which the
United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien.
28 U.S.C. § 2410(a). The government asserts that it has a federal estate tax lien
against the gross estate of Threefoot, which arose under 26 U.S.C. § 63241 on
the date of her death.
A related statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1444, provides:
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Any action brought under section 2410 of this title against the United
States in any State court may be removed by the United States to the
district court of the United States for the district and division in which
the action is pending.
Miller argues that her petition is not an action to quiet title within the meaning of
§ 2410, although her petition does state that the United States should be joined
as a party under § 2410 "for the purpose of quieting title to the property that the
decedent agreed to transfer to the Partnership." Rather, she seeks to determine
the property that is subject to the federal estate tax lien. In other words, among
other relief, she seeks to determine whether certain property is part of the gross
estate. The United States characterizes the action as follows: "the Court need
only determine if an alleged oral contract and a family limited partnership are
valid."
In support of her argument, Miller cites Walters v. Schmidt, 1979 WL 1376
(E.D. Mo. March 14, 1979). In Walters, the plaintiff brought suit in Missouri
state court to contest the probate of her husband's will. Id. at *1. She alleged that
a determination about the validity of the will would affect the amount due to the
United States under 26 U.S.C. § 6324. Id. The United States removed the case to
federal court. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, finding that" [i]n order for the United States to be a proper party to
this will contest under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a), the plaintiffs allegations must relate
to the legality of the procedures used by the United States to enforce the tax lien
and not to the validity of the tax assessment itself." Id. See also Aqua Bar &
Lounge, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Treasury Internal Rev. Serv., 539 F.2d
935, 939-40 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that § 2410 is a waiver of sovereign
immunity to a suit brought by a taxpayer against the United States which
challenges the validity of a federal tax lien and sale "so long as the taxpayer
refrains from contesting the merits of the underlying tax assessment itself.)"
In Walters, the court noted that the § 6324 lien attaches to all assets of the gross
estate, and that the lien would be valid regardless of the will contest. "The effect
of the will contest is only to determine which assets are includable in the gross
estate to which the lien attaches." 1979 WL 1376 at *1. Therefore, the court
dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
In a later case, Wieland v. Savetz, 734 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Mo. 1990), the court
reached a similar result. In Wieland, the plaintiffs filed suit in state court seeking
a declaration as to the proper construction of a testamentary trust. Id. at 409.
They joined as a defendant the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service,
who removed the case to federal court. Id. The plaintiffs sought no affirmative
relief from the Commissioner, but joined him as a defendant because Internal
Revenue Service agents had raised the controversy regarding the interpretation
of the trust by disallowing a marital deduction with respect to the trust estate. Id.
The court remanded the action to state court, stating:
Upon reviewing plaintiffs' complaint, the Court concludes that plaintiffs
seek a declaration of the proper construction of a testamel1:tary trust
under state law. Although this determination may have resulting tax
implications, plaintiffs do not seek a determination of federal tax
liability nor is such a determination necessary to their state law cause of
action. The mere fact that the Commissioner, a federal official, has been
named as a defendant herein does not provide a basis for the exercise of
federal question jurisdiction.
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Id. at 410.
Miller argues that hers is not an action to quiet title. Quiet title actions have been
defined as those seeking "a determination that a tax lien does not exist, has been
extinguished, or is inferior in rank." Estate of Johnson v. United States, 836 F.2d
940, 946 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation and emphasis omitted). Miller's action seeks
enforcement of an alleged oral agreement, authorization to sell certain property,
and a determination as to what property is subject to the § 6324 lien. Although
Miller stated in her petition that she sought to quiet title to certain property, that
statement does not give rise to federal jurisdiction if § 2410 does not in fact
apply to her action. See Walters, 1979 WL 1376, at *1 (fmding that no subject
matter jurisdiction existed although the plaintiff cited § 6324 and joined the
United States as a party pursuant to § 2410). This case does not involve the types
of actions described in Johnson. Rather, in this case, as in Walters and Wieland,
the resolution of the state law issues will determine whether certain property is
included in the gross estate, which in turn affects the amount of federal estate
tax, if any, owed. Miller seeks no affmnative relief from the United States. The
United States has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating that federal subject
matter jurisdiction exists.
Even if the court had found subject matter jurisdiction it would have remanded the case because of the
probate exception, which the court discussed as follows:
Alternatively, even assuming that Millers probate court petition did raise a
federal question, it would be inappropriate for this court to consider the case
because of the probate exception to federal jurisdiction, which extends to matters
that would require a federal court to interfere with the probate of an estate. See,
e.g., Bedo v. McGuire. 767 F.2d 305, 306 (6th Cir. 1985) ("It is well settled that
federal courts have no probate jurisdiction."); Mangieri v. Mangieri. 226 F.3d 1,
2-3 (1st Cir. 2000) ("As a general matter, courts tend to view the probate
exception as extending to all suits 'ancillary' to the probate of a will. ") (internal
quotation omitted). In Markham v. Allen the Supreme Court stated that "a
federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate, the
reason being that the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 .
. . did not extend to probate matters." 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946). "[F]ederal
courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain suits in favor of creditors, legatees
and heirs and other claimants against a decedent's estate to establish their claims
so long as the federal court does not interfere with the probate proceedings or
assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in the
custody of the state court." Id. (internal quotations omitted, citing Waterman v.
Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43 (1909».
There are several policy reasons underlying the probate exception to federal
jurisdiction. See Dragan v. Miller. 679 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1982). First, it
promotes legal certainty by limiting probate matters to one court system.
"Certainty is desirable in every area of the law but has been thought especially so
with regard to the transfer of property at death." Id. Second, it promotes judicial
economy. The disposition of a decedent's assets normally begins in state court,
and the probate exception "serves to preserve the resources of both the federal
and state judicial systems and avoids the piecemeal or haphazard resolution of
all matters surrounding the disposition of the decedent's wishes." Storm v.
~ 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2003). Third, the state probate courts have
more expertise in deciding probate questions. "Because state courts have nearly
exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters, state judges vested with probate
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jurisdiction develop a greater familiarity with such legal issues. " Id. A final,
related reason for the probate exception is to avoid unnecessary interference with
state courts: "if state courts have the exclusive task of probating a will, and thus
develop the relative expertise to do so (including the expertise to deal with all
matters ancillary to probate), then federal court resolution of such matters is ...
an unnecessary interference with the state system." Id.

***
A two-part inquiry·governs whether the probate exception applies to bar Miller's
suit from federal court. The fust question is whether the court is being asked to
probate a will or administer an estate. The second question is whether
entertaining the action would cause the court to interfere with the probate
proceedings or assume general jurisdiction or control of property in custody of
the state court. Moser v. Pollin, 294 F.3d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 2002). If the answer
to either question is yes, the case should be remanded for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The "interference prong" is "the workhorse of the probate
exception." Id.
The Moser court stated that the first question, whether the court is being asked to
probate a will or an [sic] administer an estate directly, is rarely answered
affirmatively, "since few practitioners would be so misdirected as to seek, for
example, letters testamentary or letters of administration from a federal judge.
Id. The same is true here; the fust test is not met because Miller's action is not a
"purely probate" matter.
The second question is whether the court is being asked to interfere with the
probate proceedings, to assume general jurisdiction of the probate, or to assume
control of property in the custody of the state court. If any of those three
situations exists, the probate exception applies and the action should be
remanded.
Miller's petition seeks resolution of three questions: (1) whether the alleged oral
agreement between Threefoot and Miller is enforceable, (2) whether Miller may
sell the Memphis real estate in order to satisfy the estate's obligations, and (3)
whether the property Threefoot allegedly agreed to transfer to the Partnership is
part of her gross estate. The first question is a contract question that merely
involves an estate, and it is the sort of question that federal courts can answer
despite the probate exception where jurisdiction exists. See Markham, 326 U.S.
at 494 (noting that federal courts can entertain suits in favor of claimants against
an estate to establish their claims). The second question presented by Miller's
petition, however, is much more closely related to the probate proceeding in that
it asks the court to order the sale of an asset of the estate. In requesting that the
court authorize the sale of the Memphis real estate, Miller does not seek to
determine the rights of a specific creditor, legatee, or heir. Rather, she asks that
the court authorize the transfer of that property in order that its proceeds be used
to pay "all costs of administration, including attorneys, fees and all just and
lawful claims against the decedent's estate." Deciding whether to authorize the
sale of real estate in Threefoot's estate would require the court to interfere with
the probate proceedings, in the sense that this court would be directing
disposition of the estate's assets. See Torelli v. Torelli, 941 F. Supp. 36, 39
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that probate exception applied to bar suit seeking to
clear title to real estate and arrange for its sale); cf. Ashton v. Josephine Bay
Paul and C. Michael Paul Found., Inc., 918 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir. 1990)
("[T]he Supreme Court has regularly rebuked the few efforts of lower federal
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courts to take over, generally, the administration of a decedent's estate, including
the exercise of otherwise proper jurisdiction over the accounting of an estate.")
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, as an alternate ground for
remanding the suit the probate exception applies to bar this court from exercising
jurisdiction.
The government argues that the issues presented by Miller will not interfere with
the probate of Threefoot's estate. (Govt.'s Opp'n at 6-7.) It states that "[n]o party
is contesting the will itself or any bequest made pursuant to the will. Moreover,
Miller alleges that the real property at issue is not even part of the decedent's
estate. To the contrary: she alleges that the decedent transferred the property
before her death into a family limited partnership." (Id.) However, Miller does
seek to sell real property in Threefoot's estate (the Memphis real estate), which is
separate from the real property she contends Threefoot agreed to transfer to the
Partnership (the Perry County real estate).
The government also argues that the probate exception does not apply to
disputes over will substitutes, such as trusts. That argument is not supported by
case law. See Macken ex reI. Macken v. Jensen, 333 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir.
2003) ("the probate exception applies to disputes about trusts used in lieu of
wills, if the parties present an issue that would be resolved in probate had a will
been used, or the issue is ancillary to such a dispute"); Storm, 328 F.3d at 947
("Given the growth in recent years of various 'will substitutes,' we are loath to
throw open the doors of the federal courts to disputes over testamentary intent
simply because a decedent chose to use a will substitute rather than a traditional
will to dispose of his or her estate."); Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971,974 n. 2
(7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that probate exception was inapplicable
because the action related to an inter vivos trust rather than a will). The single
case cited by the government in support of its argument, Beattie v. J.M. Tull
Foundation, 941 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D.S.C. 1996), is distinguishable. In Beattie, a
trustee brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the terms of a
testamentary trust permitted him to distribute the entire capital gain of the trust
to the life tenant. Id. at 958. The court acknowledged that the distribution of the
trust's assets was tangentially related to administration of the estate, but the court
held that the action was not barred by the probate exception because it did not
require the court "to disturb possession of an estate properly in the hands of a
state probate court. Presumably, after thirty years, the estate has already been
administrated and closed." Id. at 959. In this case, by contrast, the probate estate
remains open and its assets are subject to the jurisdiction of the Shelby County
Probate Court. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand at 5.) Considering the facts of
this case and the case law applying the probate exception, the court finds that the
exception applies here and warrants remand of the action to the Shelby County
Probate Court.
2.

How Long Is Three Years? Section 2035(b) includes in a decedent's gross estate the amount of

gift tax paid on gifts made during the three years immediately preceding the decedent's death. What if the time is
exactly three years? In TAM 200432016 the IRS answered that for purposes of section 2035 the time begins running
on the day of the gift. For instance, if decedent made gifts on January 1 of 2000 and died on January 1, 2003 the
gifts were made three years and one day before death.
3.

Retained Interest in a Residence. In Estate of Timothy J. Tehan v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo

2005-128, the decedent and his children had an agreement which allowed the decedent to continue living in his
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residence until his death and required him to pay all expenses. The court found that the children never paid any
expenses, used the residence, or attempted to exercise control over the residence. Thus section 2036(a)(l) applied to
include the residence in the decedent's estate.

J.

SECTIONS 2041 AND 2514 - GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
1.

Inadvertent Exercise of Power of Appointment. The danger of inadvertently exercising a power

of appointment is evident in Estate of Sarah W. Grove v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-91. In 1933, Sarah S.
Wright, decedent's grandmother created a general power in decedent. Decedent never knew about the power, which
would have excluded the assets from her estate because the power was created before October 21, 1942, but under
Pennsylvania law her residuary clause exercised it!
K.

SECTIONS 61, 83, 2042 AND 7872 - LIFE INSURANCE
1.

Policy Transferred to LLC Within Three Years of Death Included in Gross Estate. In PLR

200432015 the decedent transferred an insurance policy and cash to an LLC, and the decedent's wife contributed
cash, in year one. In year two decedent and spouse contributed bonds and cash to the LLC. The assets were credited
to the decedent's and spouse's capital accounts equally. Decedent continued to make the premium payments on the
insurance policy after the transfer to the LLC although the LLC had sufficient assets to make them. Sometime in
year one, decedent and spouse gave their interests in the LLC to their children. Decedent died within 60 days of the
gift of the LLC interests to the children and within 16 months of the initial transfer of the insurance to the LLC.
At issue was whether the transfer to the LLC was a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration. If
not, then the policy would be included in decedent's estate through section 2035 and 2042; if it were, then there
would be no inclusion. Relying upon Estate of Harper the IRS determined that the purpose of the transfer was not to
contribute to the activities of an "ongoing business enterprise" but rather to remove assets from the decedent's estate.
Thus, the increase in the decedent's capital account on account of the transfer to the LLC was not a bona fide sale for
full and adequate consideration. Thus, the policy would be included in the decedent's gross estate. Because the
proceeds were paid to the LLC there was no marital deduction for them even though the spouse owned a percentage
of the LLC.
This private letter ruling agrees with the Services' litigating position in the family limited partnership cases.
2.

Transfer Between Grantor Trusts Not a Transfer for Value. Section 101 provides that if an

insurance policy is transferred for a valuable consideration prior to the death of the insured the usual rule that the
insurance proceeds are income tax free does not apply. A transfer of value that is nonetheless to the insured is not a
transfer for value. The IRS ruling position is that a transfer of a policy to a trust of which the insured is the grantor,
and the trust is a wholly grantor trust, i_s a transfer to the insured and hence there is no transfer for value. See PLRs
200518061, 200514001, 200514002, 200247006, 200228019, 200120007. A transfer from one life insurance to
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another, where the trusts are grantor trusts, is a useful way to avoid the three-year inclusion rule of sections 2042 and
2035. Care must be taken to ensure that the recipient trust, in particular, is a grantor trust for all purposes.

3.

Life Insurance Owned In Fiduciary Capacity. In Rev. Rul. 84-179 the decedent purchased an

insurance policy on his life and transferred all incidents of ownership to his wife. She subsequently died and the
policy passed into a residuary trust for the benefit of the decedent's child. Decedent was trustee of the trust and
controlled investments and distributions of the trust assets including the policy but the decedent as trustee could not
exercise the powers of trustee for his own benefit. He used trust assets to pay the premiums and died as trustee with
the trust owning the policy. The proceeds were not included in the decedent's estate. However, if the powers over
the policy could have been used for the decedent's benefit there would have been inclusion, citing Estate of Fruehauf
v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).

In PLR 200518005 this issue arose where the taxpayer was a co-

trustee and income beneficiary of two trusts. Prior to the purchase of life insurance by the trusts, the co-trustee
renounced her powers as co-trustee solely in connection with the insurance on her life and after the purchase
resigned as trustee entirely. The IRS determined that she never had any incidents of ownership in the policies so
long as no income from the trusts were used to pay the insurance premiums.
4.

Insurable Interest Rules. In Chawla ex reI. Giesinger v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance

Company, Slip Copy, 2005 WL 405405 (E.D. Va. 2005), the court held that a trust which was the owner and
beneficiary of a life insurance policy did not, under applicable state law (Maryland) have an insurable interest in the
decedent thus the policy was void. Under Maryland law, in order to have an insurable interest the trust must have
had "a lawful and substantial economic interest in the continuation of the life, health, bodily safety of the individual"
which the court determined the trust did not have because the trust was worth more after the death of the insured than
it was before the death and suffered no fmancialloss on account of the death. On the particular facts, the insurance
company contested the policy claiming that the insured did not make various required medical disclosures, such as
recent brain surgery and that the decedent abused alcohol; the insured died less than two years after applying for the
policy.
The issue of "insurable interests" has arisen recently in other contexts, particularly "corporate owned life
insurance and insurance owned by charities. Congress is considering action in these areas.
L.

SECTION 2053 and 2054 - DEBTS AND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES

1.

Income Taxes on IRA.

Section 2053(c)(I)(B) provides that income taxes paid on income

received after a decedent's death are not deductible under section 2053. In TAM 200444021 the IRS considered
whether that provision could be avoided where an estate was required to withdraw funds from an IRA to pay estate
taxes. The estate analogized the income tax to expenses of selling an asset in a "forced sale." The IRS rejected the
claim reading section 2053 to allow taxes to be deducted only as direct claims against an estate not in any other way.
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2.

Deductibility of Interest On Funds Borrowed to Pay Estate Tax. Revenue Ruling 84-75 states

that interest on a loan obtained by the executor of an estate to pay estate tax is deductible if it was reasonably and
necessarily incurred. There the loan was necessary to avoid a forced sale of assets. However, the interest was
deductible only as it was paid because the loan could be prepaid and the interest avoided. In Estate of Graegin v.
Commissioner, T. C. Memo 1988-477, the court allowed an estate to deduct on the Form 706 interest which would
be payable over the lifetime of a loan because the loan was structured in such a way as to require the interest to be
paid even if the loan were prepaid. The estate was illiquid because it owned an interest in a business. In PLR
200449031 the IRS allowed a section 2053 deduction where a closely-held business was involved and the funds were
borrowed from a ban1e
If a substantial part of an estate consists of limited partnership interests over which the executor has no
control the estate may be thought of as illiquid. If the estate borrows funds to pay the estate tax does that make the
interest on the borrowing deductible on the Form 706 if it is structured as a Graegin type loan? Stated another way,
is the borrowing reasonable and necessary to administer the estate? Predictably the IRS will argue that it is not.
In TAM 200513028 the Service confronted this situation.

The residue of the estate was primarily

decedent's 99% interest in a partnership, of which 57.6% of the assets were cash and marketable securities and the
remainder either real estate or notes held by the partnership as a result of real estate sales. Child was general partner
of the partnership and was co-executor with an accountant. The partnership loaned money to the estate on a 10 year
Graegin type loan with the limited partnership interests as security. The TAM notes that on the date the note was
signed the prime interest rate was 1% less than the interest rate on the note and the average interest rate for 15 year
mortgage loans was 3% less.
The IRS disallowed the interest as an administration expense because it did not think the borrowing was
really necessary but also because it doubted that the loan would really be repaid and even if it were it would have no
economic effect on the parties. With respect to the first issue, the TAM states:
First, we do not believe the transaction whereby the Estate purportedly borrowed
$m from Partnership can properly be viewed as necessary to the administration
of the estate. As the case law and revenue rulings noted above indicate, the
interest deduction has been allowed where the loan was necessary to preserve the
asset value of the estate; for example, where the estate is illiquid, cash is needed
to pay the federal and/or state estate tax liability, and the loan supplies this cash
while avoiding the .need to sell a family business or otherwise dispose of estate
property at distressed or reduced prices.
In this case, Partnership held substantial liquid assets totaling $n, or 57.6% of
the partnership assets. On his death, the Estate succeeded to Decedent's 99%
partnership interest. Child A, the co-executor of the Estate, was the remaining
general partner. Further, the partnership was not engaged in any active business
that would necessitate the retention of liquid assets. In addition, in view of the
Estate's 99% ownership interest in the partnership and Child A's 1% interest,
there was clearly no fiduciary restraint on Child A's ability to access the funds.
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It may be argued that the Estate could not require the Partnership to distribute
the funds, since the Estate possessed only a 99% "assignee" interest (as
characterized by the Estate) and Child A, in her individual capacity, was the
remaining general partner. However, the situation presented here is very
different from the situations presented in Estate of Todd v. Commissioner, Estate
of Graegin v. Commissioner and the other cases and revenue rulings cited above.
In this case:
(i) the Estate owned 99% of the partnership,
(ii) Child A was the co-executor of the Estate and held the remaining
1% partnership interest as a general partner,
(iii) residuary trusts for Child A and Child B were to receive the Estate's
99% Partnership interest, and 99% of Partnership income was payable
or would be credited to the trusts;
(iv) Child A and Child B are each to receive (for support, maintenance,
health, and other amounts as appropriate) the income and principal paid
to the partnership and then distributed by the partnership to the trusts;
and
(v) Child A and Child B each hold a testamentary general power to
appoint a respective half of 99% of Partnership along with any income
and principal either retained by Partnership or paid by Partnership to
the trusts but not distributed.
It seems clear that the same parties (closely related family members whose
proportionate interests in the Estate are virtually identical to their proportionate
interests in the partnership) stood on all sides of this transaction. Thus, the assets
held in Partnership were readily available for the purposes of paying the federal
estate tax. Rather, we believe that in view of the availability of the liquid assets
to the Estate and its beneficiaries, and in view of the structure of the loan (10year term with prepayment prohibited), the only reason the loan transaction was
entered into was to obtain an "upfront" estate tax deduction for the interest
expense (an expense, which, as discussed below, is largely illusory.) However,
as indicated above, in order for the interest expense to be deductible under §
2053, the loan must be necessary for the administration of the estate. The interest
deduction can not be the justification for an otherwise unnecessary loan. Thus,
we do not believe the loan can properly be characterized as necessary to the
administration of the estate.
With respect to the second and third, the IRS' argument is that the circular flow of funds cannot generate a
deduction, relying for that conclusion on a number of income tax cases. The IRS cites one transfer tax case, Geftman
v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 61 (3 rd Cir. 1998), for the proposition that where the same individuals control both the
transferor and transferee the true economic intent of the transaction must be determined objectively regardless of
appearance. That case could as easily be read as noting that where the relevant documentation is not that of a loan
there is no loan.
In an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeals approved a loan to pay estate taxes. Klein v.
Hughes, 2004 WL 838198 (Ca1.App. 1 Dist.). Mark Hughes, the founder of Herbalife, Inc., died with a $300 million
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estate. The IRS and the estate settled with respect to the estate taxes and then negotiated how they were to be paid.
The transaction as finally structured, and approved by the court, was for the estate's tax counsel and his family to
form a partnership, for an LLC owned by the decedent's revocable trust to make a loan to the new partnership, with
interest and principal due in 2027, and for the partnership in turn to make a loan to the trust for the taxes. The
partnership intermediary received a loan fee up front and pocketed a 0.15% spread between the interest rate it was
charged and it charged, a profit of about $12 million over the term of the loan. The LLC from which the funds came
would owe income tax on the interest. The net savings to the estate was almost $167 million. Apparently the IRS
agreed to this arrangement so long as the intermediary was not controlled by the estate or revocable trust or any
entity controlled by either. Presumably having the third party to profit ensured that the transaction would not simply
be collapsed after the audit and the presence of an operating business rather than a securities partnership made the
IRS more amenable to acceptance of the arrangement.
In Dorothy L. Rupert v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 421 (M.D. Pa. 2004), the issue was payment of
estate tax on unpaid lottery winnings. Mrs. Rupert won in 1991 at age 79 and died in 1997 with $630,000 per year
to be paid for the balance of the term. Her estate was worth almost $7,000,000 of which almost $5,600,000 were
unpaid lottery proceeds. To pay the estate tax funds were borrowed for 14 years at a fixed rate with the proceeds as
the only collateral. The IRS argued that the annuity stream could have been sold and thus the loan unnecessary. The
court disagreed and held that the estate should be given the opportunity to show the reasonableness and necessity of
a loan. The court noted that it believed the estate considered the sale of annuity payments the equivalent of a forced
sale of stock but there was no evidence in the record of that. The estate has the burden of proof at trial.

M.

SECTIONS 2056, 2056A AND 2519- MARITAL DEDUCTION
1.

Omitted Assets Qualify for QTIP..

In PLR 200430002 the estate omitted securities from

Schedule B. On Schedule M the estate had QTIPed all assets of the estate other than various Schedule E joint assets.
Because Schedule M included 100% of the estate assets other than joint property the additional assets were deemed
part of the QTIP election too.
2.

Restriction on Income. The following clause was found not to give the surviving spouse "all the

income" for purposes of section 2056 by the Tax Court in Estate of Ralph H. Davis, et al. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 2003-55, affIrmed by the Ninth Circuit at 394 F. 3d 1294 (2005):
After the death of trustor survived by his spouse and during the lifetime of his
surviving spouse, the trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the surviving
spouse, in quarter annual or more frequent installments, all of the net income
from the trust estate as the trustee, in the trustee's reasonable discretion, shall
determine to be proper for the health, education, or support, maintenance,
comfort and welfare of grantor's surviving spouse in accordance with the
surviving spouse's accustomed manner of living.
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Both courts held that Mrs. Davis, the surviving spouse, did not have an unrestricted right to receive the
income from the trust. That Mrs. Davis was the sole trustee of the trust was irrelevant because she might not always
hold that position.

The courts also rejected the application of a California statute which would have reformed the

trust to meet the qualifications of a QTIP trust because they found no evidence from the document that Mr. Davis
intended the trust to qualify for the marital deduction.
At issue in Estate of Zorn v. Zorn Farms, Inc., 62 P.3d 854 (Or. Ct. App. 2003), was the extent of a
spouse's right to make unproductive property "productive" in a marital trust. The Court held that where it was clear
a settlor intended for land to be retained, unproductive land could be sold only to meet "present or immediately
foreseeable" income needs.

Whether such a limited reading violates section 2056(b)(5) is unclear.

In TAM

200339003, the IRS allowed a marital deduction for non-dividend paying stock passing to a QTIP because of the
spouse's power to make the property productive.
In TAM 200444023 the IRS agreed that where a spouse could withdraw all the assets of a trust she was
entitled to all the income and thus the trust would qualify for QTIP even though she could also direct trustee to
distribute income to others under the trust agreement. Wife's power of withdrawal did not terminate in the event of
her incapacity.
In TAM 200505022 trustee was to "distribute the net income of the Trust created hereby to my wife in such
amounts and at such times as my wife, in her sole discretion but in consultation with the Trustee, shall desire for her
maintenance, education, health or support commensurate with her station in life." The trust also authorized principal
distributions for similar standards (omitting the reference to her station in life) and provided that undistributed
income would be added to principal. The instrument contained no reference to the marital deduction but the estate
did submit two letters from the drafting attorney written to the decedent stating that the spouse would receive all the
income if she asked trustee for it. The IRS declined to find any ambiguity in the language and denied the marital
deduction.
3.

Surviving Spouse's Disclaimer Creates Overfunding and Tax. Estate of David Katz, T. C.

Memo 2004-166, dealt with odd facts. Article 3 of Mr. Katz's will provid~d for an amount equal to the exemption
equivalent to be held in trust. The amount so set aside was not to be reduced on account of any disclaimer by Mrs.
Katz. Article 4 disposed of the residue of the estate, bequeathing it in fee to Mrs. Katz. If Mrs. Katz disclaimed any
interest in the residue it was to pass to the Article 3 trust. Mrs. Katz disclaimed various securities and any interest
she had in the Article 3 trust, apparently thinking that she was disclaiming specific property only. The IRS argued,
and the Tax Court agreed, that the disclaimed securities were added to the Article 3 trust by her disclaimer such that
it was overfunded creating a taxable estate.
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4.

Obtaining Step-Up In Basis. PLR 200403094 is important. Husband created a trust and funded

it with his own assets. The trust allowed him to revoke or amend it during his lifetime and to withdraw income and
principal. The trust also gave his wife a testamentary general power of appointment if she died fust:
At my wife's death, if I am still living, I give to my wife a testamentary general
power of appointment, exercisable alone and in all events to appoint part of the
assets of the Trust Estate, having a value equal to (i) the amount of my wife's
remaining applicable exclusion amount less (ii) the value of my wife's taxable
estate determined by excluding the amount of those assets subject to this power,
free of trust to my deceased wife's estate or to or for the benefit of one or more
persons or entities, in such proportions,- outright, in trust, or otherwise as my
wife may direct in her Will.
If husband died fust a traditional marital/exemption equivalent plan would be implemented with the marital
share passing outright to wife, and the exemption equivalent share being held in a Family Trust for wife and for
husband's descendants, subject to ascertainable standards.

Wife also had a testamentary special power of

appointment among husband's descendants.
The ruling states that wife intends to execute a Will which was described as follows:
Wife plans to execute Will. Article 2.1 of Will makes gifts of Wife's tangible
personality.
Article 2.2 of Will provides:
I exercise in favor of my estate the power of appointment given to me
by Section 4.5 of the Trust created by [Husband] dated L], and direct
that assets having a value equal to (i) the amount of my remaining
applicable exclusion amount less (ii) the value of my taxable estate,
determined by excluding the amount of those assets subject to this
power, be distributed to my estate as soon after my death as possible.
Article 2.3 of Will provides that if Husband survives Wife, Husband will receive
a fraction of Wife's residuary estate, after the payment of estate taxes, debts, and
expenses, determined as follows:
The numerator of the fraction will be the smallest pecuniary amount
that, if given outright to [Husband], would eliminate or reduce to the
lowest possible sum the state and federal estate tax liability of [Wife's]
estate. This amount will be calculated by taking into account [Wife's]
applicable exclusion amount and all other tax credits, deductions, and
other preferences allowed to [Wife's] estate.
The balance of the residuary estate will be held as a separate trust (Wife's Family
Trust). If Husband does not survive Wife, the entire residuary estate will be held
as the Family Trust. Under Article 3 of Will, any part of the gift to Husband that
he disclaims will become part of Wife's Family Trust.
The Family Trust is parallel to the Family Trust described above.
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The Service granted four rulings:
1. On the death of Wife during Husband's lifetime, if Wife exercises the power
of appointment granted her under article 4.5 of Trust, Husband will be treated as
making a gift that qualifies for the federal gift tax marital deduction to Wife with
respect to that portion of Trust appointed by Wife.
2. If Wife predeceases Husband, of the assets in Trust, the value of Trust assets
over which Wife holds a power of appointment under article 4.5 of Trust will be
included in Wife's gross estate.
3. Any assets that originated in Trust and that pass to or from Wife's Family
Trust established under Will will not constitute a gift from Husband to the other
beneficiaries of Wife's Family Trust.
4. Any assets that originated in Trust and that pass to Wife's Family Trust
established under Will will not be included in Husband's gross estate.
Presumably the point of this exercise was for the assets in the trust passing into the Family Trust at the fIrst
death to receive a step-up in bases by reason of being included in the estate of the fITst to die. No income tax ruling
is mentioned which suggests the Service was not prepared to rule (or to rule favorably) on the basis issue.
Assets which pass back to a donee surviving spouse from a donor deceased spouse where the gift occurred
within one year are denied a basis step-up. Thus, the question is, would these assets pass from husband to wife to
husband if wife died fITst and, of course, that depends on the status of husband and the Family Trust.
Also see PLR 200413011 where husband retained a special power of appointment over assets in an
irrevocable trust, which passed into a QTIP if the power were released.

5.

Effect of Disability Clause. In Estate of Merle A. Whiting, Jr. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo

2004-68, the court applied Arkansas law to determine that a clause allowing trustee to accumulate income instead of
distributing it to a disabled beneficiary would not apply to the marital deduction QTIP trust.
The opinion states:
Decedent manifested his intent to qualify for the marital deduction in numerous
ways. First, the trust agreement named two of the trusts in reference to the
marital deduction: The "Marital Deduction Trust" and the "Non-Marital
Deduction Trust". The name of a trust is evidence of decedent's intent.
Second, it is evident from the trust agreement that decedent intended to minimize
Federal estate taxes through the use of the marital deduction. See Estate of Todd
v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 288, 294 (1971) (references to the marital deduction
and citations to section 2056 clearly establish that the trust's purpose was to
secure the marital deduction). In valuing the assets to be placed in the marital
deduction trust, the trust agreement states that decedent intended to "have the
result of qualifying the marital deduction for estate tax purposes". Only assets
which qualify for the marital deduction may be placed in the marital deduction
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trust. The amount of the distribution to the marital deduction trust is "the excess
* * * of the decedent's taxable estate * * * over the exemption equivalent of the *
* * unified credit". Additionally, the terms "marital deduction", "gross estate",
and others are defined in the trust agreement as having the same meaning as the
definitions found in the Internal Revenue Code.
Third, the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the trust indicate that
decedent intended to qualify for the marital deduction. Decedent knew that he
was terminally ill and hired specialized tax attorneys to draft the trust: Two are
Arkansas board recognized specialists in tax law, one is a certified public
accountant, and two have a master of laws in taxation. The intent of the
draftsman of the marital deduction trust was to create a trust which qualified for
the marital deduction.

6.

Revocation of QTIP Election. In PLR 200422050 the executor needed only to make a partial

QTIP election to zero-out decedent's estate tax but instead made a QTIP election for the entire marital trust. The
IRS refused to allow the executor to revoke part of the election. Rev. Proc. 2001-38 allows for a QTIP election to be
disregarded when unnecessary to reduce the estate tax liability to zero. However, the Rev. Proc. specifically notes
that it will not apply where a partial QTIP election was required to eliminate the estate tax but the executor QTIPed
too much. The policy reasoning behind the distinction remains puzzling. What if the trustee had divided the trust
such that no QTIP election at all would have been required for one of the new trusts? Would that have changed the
result given that it would have occurred after death?

7.

No Relief For Excessive QTIP Election. In PLR 200422050 a QTIP election was made for more

of a marital trust than was necessary to produce zero estate tax and the IRS held that all of the trust for which the
election was made would be included in the surviving spouse's estate under section 2044. The ruling denies all
relief to the taxpayer:
In the instant case, the taxpayer is not seeking an extension of time to make the
QTIP election. Rather, the taxpayer is in effect seeking to partially revoke a
QTIP election previously made, that, pursuant to § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) is
irrevocable. See Estate of Cavenaugh v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 407 at 421
(1993). Accordingly, § 301.9100 is not applicable in this case.
Furthermore, the situation presented is not within the purview of Rev. Proc.
2001-38, 2001-1 C.B. 1335. Pursuant to this revenue procedure, under certain
circumstances, the Service will treat a QTIP election as null and void for
purposes of §§ 2044(a), 2056(b)(7), 2519(a) and 2652. Rev. Proc. 2001-38
applies where the election was not necessary to reduce the estate tax liability to
zero, based on values as fmally determined for federal estate tax purposes. The
revenue procedure does not apply in situations where a partial QTIP election was
required with respect to a trust to reduce the estate tax liability and the executor
made the election with respect to more trust property than was necessary to
reduce the estate tax liability to zero.
In this case, a QTIP election was required with respect to the marital trust to
reduce Decedent's estate tax liability to zero. However, the election was made
for more marital trust property than was necessary in order to reduce Decedent's
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estate tax liability to zero. This situation is specifically excluded from the
purview of Rev. Proc. 2001-38. Accordingly, the QTIP election with respect to
the entire marital trust is valid and effective for estate tax purposes. Therefore,
100 percent of the value of the marital trust on the applicable valuation date will
be includible in Spouse's gross estate under § 2044.

N.

SECTIONS 2501 TO 2524 - GIFTS
1.

Tax Payments in Grantor Trust Context. Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-27, considers the gift tax

consequences when a grantor pays the income tax on income attributable to assets in a grantor trust, and the estate
tax consequences if the grantor may be reimbursed by the trust for such income tax payments under the instrument or
applicable state law.
The fact situations contemplated are:
During Year 1, Trust receives taxable income of $10x. Pursuant to § 671, A
includes the $10x in A's taxable income. As a result, A's personal income tax
liability for Year 1 increases by $2.5x. A dies in Year 3. As of the date of A's
death, the fair market value of Trust's assets is $150x.
Situation 1: Neither State law nor the governing instrument of Trust contains any
provision requiring or permitting the trustee to distribute to A amounts sufficient
to satisfy A's income tax liability attributable to the inclusion of Trust's income in
A's taxable income. Accordingly, A pays the additional $2.5x liability from A's
own funds.
Situation 2: The governing instrument of Trust provides that if A is treated as the
owner of any portion of Trust pursuant to the provisions of subpart E for any
taxable year, the trustee shall distribute to A for the taxable year, income or
principal sufficient to satisfy A's personal income tax liability attributable to the
inclusion of all or part of Trust's income in A's taxable income. Accordingly, the
trustee distributes $2.5x to A to reimburse A for the $2.5x income tax liability.
Situation 3: The governing instrument of Trust provides that if A is treated as the
owner of any portion of Trust pursuant to the provisions of subpart E for any
taxable year, the trustee may, in the trustee's discretion, distribute to A for the
taxable year, income or principal sufficient to satisfy A's personal income tax
liability attributable to the inclusion of all or part of Trust's income in A's taxable
income. Pursuant to the exercise of the trustee's discretionary power, the trustee
distributes $2.5x toA to reimburse A for the $2.5x income tax liability.

The Ruling is favorable as to Situation 1: no gift tax when the income tax is paid and no estate inclusion
because no rights were retained.
With respect to Situation 2, the IRS was less favorable:
In Situation 2, the governing instrument of Trust requires the trustee to
reimburse A from Trust's assets for the amount of income tax A pays that is
attributable to Trust's income. A's payment of the $2.5x income tax liability does
not constitute a gift by A, because A is liable for the tax. The trustee's
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distribution of $2.5x to A as reimbursement for the income tax payment by A is
not a gift by the trust beneficiaries to A, because the distribution from Trust is
mandated by the terms of the trust instrument.
However, A has retained the right to have trust property expended in discharge
of A's legal obligation. A's retained right to receive reimbursement attributable to
Trust's income causes the full value of Trust's assets at A's death ($150x) to be
included in A's gross estate under § 2036(a)(1). The result would be the same if,
under applicable state law, the trustee must, unless the governing instrument
provides otherwise, reimburse A for A's personal income tax liability attributable
to the inclusion of all or part of the Trust's income in A's taxable income, and the
governing instrument does not provide otherwise.
With respect to Trustee's discretion, Situation 3, the IRS was generally favorable assuming no express or
implied understanding between grantor and beneficiary:
In Situation 3, the governing instrument of Trust provides the trustee with the
discretion to reimburse A from Trust's assets for the amount of income tax A
pays that is attributable to Trust's income. As is the case in Situation 1 and
Situation 2, A's payment of the $2.5x income tax liability does not constitute a
gift by A because A is liable for the income tax. Further, the $2.5x paid to A from
Trust as reimbursement for A's income tax payment was distributed pursuant to
the exercise of the trustee's discretionary authority granted under the terms of the
trust instrument. Accordingly, this payment is not a gift by the trust beneficiaries
to A. In addition, assuming there is no understanding, express or implied,
between A and the trustee regarding the trustee's exercise of discretion, the
trustee's discretion to satisfy A's obligation would not alone cause the inclusion
of the trust in A's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. This is the case
regardless of whether or not the trustee actually reimburses A from Trust assets
for the amount of income tax A pays that is attributable to Trust's income. The
result would be the same if the trustee's discretion to reimburse A for this income
tax is granted under applicable state law rather than under the governing
instrument. However, such discretion combined with other facts (including but
not limited to: an understanding or pre-existing arrangement between A and the
trustee regarding the trustee's exercise of this discretion; a power retained by A
to remove the trustee and name A as successor trustee; or applicable local law
subjecting the trust assets to the claims of A's creditors) may cause inclusion of
Trust's assets in A's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
Trusts created before October 4, 2004 are grandfathered for Situation 2 but not Situation 3. Suppose a
Situation 3 trust exists where the trustee has reimbursed the grantor or other facts suggest an understanding? May
the trust be reformed prior to October 4, 2004 to be a Situation 2 trust and thereby protected? The application of the
Ruling to Crummey trusts must be considered as well.
2.

Indirect Gift to Partners Through Partnership Contributions. In Mark W. Senda, T.C. Memo.

2004-160, Judge Cohen found that parents' contributions to family partnerships were in fact gifts to the children who
were other partners. The partnerships were funded with marketable securities contributed by parents and on the
same day partnership units were given to the children. The court found the transfer "to the partnership" to be
illusory, citing the Shepherd case.
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Section 25.2511-1(h)(I), Gift Tax Regs., provides that a transfer of property by a
taxpayer to a corporation represents a gift by the taxpayer to the other
shareholders of the corporation to the extent of their proportionate interests in
the corporation. In Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 376, 389 (2000), affd.
283 F.3d 1258 (11 th Cir. 2002), we applied the principle that, like a transfer of
property to a corporation, a transfer of property to a partnership for less than full
and adequate consideration may represent a gift to the other partners.
In Shepherd, the taxpayer transferred real property and stock to a newly formed
family partnership in which he was a 50- percent owner and his two sons were
each 25-percent owners. Id. at 380-381. Rather than allocating contributions to
the capital account of the contributing partner, the partnership agreement
provided that any contributions would be allocated pro rata to the capital
accounts of each partner according to ownership. Id. at 380. Because the
contributions were reflected partially in the capital accounts of the
noncontributing partners, the value of the noncontributing partners' interests was
enhanced by the contributions of the taxpayer. Accordingly, we held that the
transfers to the partnership were indirect gifts by the taxpayer to his sons of
undivided 25-percent interests in the real property and stock. Id. at 389. The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affmned our decision for the reasons
stated in our Opinion.
Petitioners' transfers of stock in the instant case are similar to the transfer of
property in Shepherd . In both cases, the value of the children's partnership
interests was enhanced by their parents' contributions to the partnerships.
Petitioners attempt to distinguish Shepherd by referring to our statement in that
case that "not every capital contribution to a partnership results in a gift to the
other partners, particularly where the contributing partner's capital account is
increased by the amount of his contribution". Id. at 389. Petitioners argue that, in
the instant case, petitioners' capital accounts were increased by the amount of
their contributions. Petitioners further argue that, under Estate of Jones v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 121 (2001), it is irrelevant that the contributions of the
stock to the partnerships and the transfers of the partnership interests to the
children occurred on the same day.
In Estate of Jones, the taxpayer contributed property to the partnerships and
received continuing limited partnership interests in return. All of the
contributions of property were properly reflected in the capital accounts of the
taxpayer. Id. at 128. In the instant case, however, it is unclear whether
petitioners' contributions of stock were ever reflected in their capital accounts.
On cross-examination, petitioner testified with respect to SFLP I as follows:

Q
And, at that same time, certainly the same day, you transferred
the partnership interests, limited partnership interests from yourself and
Michele to the children, correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And when did you do that? On December 28?

*******
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A
Well, keep in mind that these things have been weeks in the
making. So the fact that they triggered at a particular day or on a
particular day mayor may not be relevant.
The fact that that happened during that day, I couldn't tell you if it
happened at 1:00,3:00 or 5:00. If that's what you're asking me.

Q
That was what I was asking you. The transfer of the limited
partnership interests, how did that occur on December 28, 1998?
A

How did that occur? Tell me where you're going. I'm not sure.

*******
Q

So how did you transfer it from yourself to the children?

A
How did I transfer? I'm not certain what the right, what you're
looking for here.
It is apparent from petitioner's evasive testimony and from the total record that
petitioners were more concerned with ensuring that the beneficial ownership of
the stock was transferred to the children in tax-advantaged form than they were
with the formalities of FLPs. Indeed, petitioner, as general partner, did not
maintain any books or records for the partnerships other than brokerage account
statements and partnership tax returns. Those tax returns were prepared months
after the transfers of the partnership interests. Thus, they are unreliable in
deciding whether petitioners transferred the partnership interests to the children
before or after they contributed the stock to the partnerships. The same is true of
the certificates of ownership reflecting the transfers of the partnership interests,
which were not prepared until at least several weeks after the transfers. The
informality is not surprising, inasmuch as petitioners alone, individually, or on
behalf of their minor children were united in purpose and acted without restraint
by any adverse interest. As a result, however, petitioners have presented no
reliable evidence that they contributed the stock to the partnerships before they
transferred the partnership interests to the children. At best, the transactions were
integrated (as asserted by respondent) and, in effect, simultaneous.
Interestingly, the government stipulated that partnership unit transfers after the day of funding (13 months
and one month, respectively) were transfers of partnership units.

Further, with respect to those transfers, the

stipulated valuation discounts were between 39% and 46%.

O.

SECTION 2518 - DISCLAIMERS
1.

Vow of Poverty Does Not Equal Disclaimer. In TAM 200438042 the decedent bequeathed an

apartment, its furnishings, plus cash and securities to his brother who was a priest who had taken a vow of poverty.
The priest took the assets and gave them to the order and claimed a section 2055 deduction on the decedent's estate
tax return on the theory that the transfer constituted a disclaimer. The IRS refused to treat the vow of poverty as a
disclaimer because it was not a qualified disclaimer under applicable state law and because the vow would not have
treated the brother as predeceasing as is the case with a disclaimer. A valid disclaimer could have been executed by
brother but was not.
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2.

Acceptance of Benefits. In PLR 200503024 the surviving spouse transferred a joint brokerage

account to her sole name, directed various sales and purchases within the account, and withdrew certain amounts of
cash from the account, during the fIrst eight months following husband's death. Wife then executed a disclaimer.
The IRS allowed the disclaimer, for the most part, stating that transfer of title is ministerial and is not acceptance of
assets and that the cash withdrawn may be severed and attributed to the wife's portion of the account prior to
husband's death. However, wife may not disclaim the assets which were purchased after death (or, presumably the
cash proceeds from sales).
P.

SECTIONS 2601-2654 - GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX
1.

Modification of GST Exempt Trusts. Many rulings continue to be issued approving various

kinds of modifications to GST exempt trusts. In PLR 200430009 the trust required that a specified bank be trustee
for each separate trust created under the pre-September 25, 1985 agreement. The bank resigned and the trusts were
modified by court order to allow separate trustees for each trust.

The modification did not affect the trusts

grandfathered status. In PLR 200507002 a settlement which was the product of true arms-length negotiation was
allowed to divide and modify a grandfathered trust and change the advisor and trustee. In PLR 200507010 a
grandfathered trust was allowed to convert to a unitrust; the applicable state statute allowed a trustee to convert
absent a beneficiary's objection. In PLRs 200502031 and 200502032 approval was granted to a trust division and
unitrust conversion.
2.

Transfer of Remainder Interest.

PLR 200442020 and PLR 200443023 allowed court

reformation of GST exempt trusts in order to permit the sale of remainder interests in the trusts. In particular, court
approval lifting spendthrift provisions were at issue. The sales were of remainder interests in grandfathered trusts
and the sales prices were set using the actuarial factors of section 7520.
3.

Section 2038 Produces ETIP. In PLR 200419011the taxpayer spouses created trusts and were

advisors with the power to approve principal distributions by trustee.

As originally drafted the trust lacked

ascertainable standards. Subsequently:
Donor and all other interested parties, including Child 1, Child 2, and Child 3 in
their capacities as trustees and beneficiaries, and the grandchildren as
beneficiaries, obtained a court order that retroactively reformed Article
VII(A)(2) and Article VIII(A)(2) of each of the seven trusts to include certain
language that the parties contended had been omitted from the trust documents.
Pursuant to the court order, Article VII(A)(2) and Article VIII(A)(2) were each
reformed to read as follows:
2. The Trustee is authorized and empowered in the Trustee's sole and
absolute discretion at any time and from time to time, during the
lifetime of said beneficiary, to disburse from the principal of the trust
estate created under this Article (even to the point of completely
exhausting same), such amounts as the Trustee may deem advisable to
provide adequately and properly for the support and maintenance of the
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said beneficiary thereof, including but not by way of limitation,
expenses incurred by reason of illness, disability and education. In
determining the amount of principal to be so disbursed, the Trustee
shall take into consideration any other income or property which such
beneficiary may have from any other source; and the Trustee's
discretion shall be conclusive as to the advisability of any such
disbursement and the same shall not be questioned by anyone. For all
sums so disbursed, the Trustee shall have full acquittance. [Emphasis
added].
The parties contended that the italicized language was contained in early drafts
of the trusts, but had been inadvertently deleted from the final versions that were
executed by Spouse and Donor. In conjunction with a civil law suit, the parties
involved had been deposed on issues concerning the creation of the trusts,
including the deletion of the language at issue, (hereinafter referred to as
ascertainable standard language). These depositions formed part of the record in
the reformation action.
The IRS did not give effect to the reformation:
Section 30-4-3-25 of Ind. Code Ann. (Michie 2002) provides:
Rescission and reformation. -- Upon petition by an interested party, the
court may rescind or reform a trust according to the same general rules
applying to rescission or reformation of nontrust transfers of property.
In Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County, Indiana, 635 N.E. 2d 153 (Ind. 1994), the
Indiana Supreme Court noted that written instruments are presumed to reflect the
intentions of the parties to those instruments. Accordingly, ". . . to succeed in a
reformation action a party must show either mutual mistake or fraud by clear and
convincing evidence ... [and] a party seeking reformation must also show the
original intent or agreement of the parties by clear and convincing evidence.
"Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County, Indiana, 635 N.E. 2d at 160. See also,
Heavenridge v. Mondy, 49 Ind. 434 (Ind. 1875) ("It is settled law, that to entitle
a party to the reformation of a written instrument, it must be clearly and
satisfactorily shown that there was a mistake of fact, and not of law. It must be
shown that words were inserted that were intended to be left out, or that words
were omitted which were intended to be inserted."); Seufert v. Mulzer, 2000
U.S. Dist. Lexis 13665 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (Indiana law is in accord with the
principle enunciated in Bogert & Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, 991
(2d ed. rev. 1983) to the effect that reformation will not be granted where the
mistake was as to the legal effect of the wording of the instrument.)
In the instant case, we do not believe the record provides clear and convincing
evidence that a mistake of fact was made, as required under Indiana law. On the
contrary, in the depositions noted above, Attorney testified that he had no
recollection of why the ascertainable standard language was removed. On the
other hand, there is specific testimony from Accountant that Spouse intended to
delete the ascertainable standard language and that Spouse and Donor intended
to make the invasion power very broad, and that Attorney had to be aware of the
changes. Further, as discussed above, the actions of the trustees in managing the
assets of the trusts. have been consistent with the absence of any limitation that
would have been imposed by the ascertainable standard language. Thus, our
review of the record does not indicate that there was "clear and convincing
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evidence" of a mutual mistake or clear and convincing evidence that the terms of
the executed instrument were contrary to the original intent of the grantors, the
standard for reformation under Indiana law. Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County,
Indiana, cited above. Thus, we conclude the reformation should not be given
retroactive effect for transfer tax purposes.
Thus, section 2038 applied to created an ETIP:
Donor and Spouse were members of the Advisory Committee from the creation
of the trusts on Date 1, until their resignations on Date 4. Article XIII requires
that the trustee consult with the Advisory Committee on all important matters,
including discretionary payments of principal. Under the Article, the,trustee is
prohibited from taking any action involving discretionary payments of income
and of principal without the unanimous consent or approval of the Advisory
Committee. Only if the Advisory Committee fails to act within the time
prescribed, may the trustee act in its own discretion "as if no Advisory
Committee had been appointed." In addition, the Advisory Committee, acting
unanimously and at its own discretion, may remove and replace an acting trustee
and/or select a successor trustee, at any time and upon the death, incapacity, or
resignation of a current trustee.
As discussed above, we have concluded that the trustee's power to distribute
corpus was not limited by an ascertainable standard. Accordingly, if this power
was held directly by Donor and Spouse, as trustees, the corpus of each trust
would be subject to inclusion in their respective gross estates under § 2038, to
the extent of their contributions to the trusts. Rev. Rul. 73-143, cited above. In
this case, although neither Donor nor Spouse were trustees, as members of the
Advisory Committee, their consent was required before the trustee could make
any distribution. The fact that this consent or veto power could be exercised only
after the trustees initiated action does not alter the nature of the power as a
power exercisable by Donor or Spouse in conjunction with others, within the
purview of § 2038. Rev. Rul. 70-513, 1970-2 C.B. 194, citing Estate of
Grossman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 707 (1957).1
Because Donor and Spouse initially retained a power over the trusts that would
cause trust property to be included in their gross estates under § 2038, the
transfers by Donor and Spouse to the trusts were subject to an "estate tax
inclusion period" under § 2642(f)(3), for purposes of the generation-skipping
transfer tax. The estate tax inclusion period did not terminate until Date 4, the
date that Donor and Spouse resigned from the Advisory Committee with respect
to each of the trusts.
Accordingly, for purposes of the generation-skipping transfer tax, an estate tax
inclusion period did exist with respect to the transfers made by Donor and
Spouse to the trusts.

4.

Proposed Regulations on Making Qualified Severances. EGTRRA added in 2001 section 2642

(a) (3) to the Code which provides that a trust (for instance, with an inclusion ration of between one and zero)
divided into two or more separate trusts by means of a "qualified severance" will be recognized as separate trusts for
GST purposes. A trust may be severed at any time prior to its termination - - thus, a severance cannot affect a
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taxable tennination or taxable distribution which has occurred.

The IRS issued Proposed Regulations on the

meaning of qualified severance on August 23, 2004. REG-145987-03.
A qualified severance must occur pursuant to the terms of the governing instrument or applicable state law
and must be effective under applicable state law.

The trust must be severed on a fractional basis which may by

formula (e.g. the numerator of the fraction may be equal to the transferor's unused GST exemption and the
denominator may be the fair market value of the trust on the date of severance) but may not be a pecuniary formula
($1,500,000 to one new trust, the balance to the other new trust). The severance need not be pro rata but if funded
on a non pro rata basis each new trust must be funded by multiplying the relevant fraction by the total fair market
value of the old trust on the date of funding.
Further, the new trusts must provide, looked at together, for the same "succession of interests" as in the
original trust. If the trusts are discretionary such that distributions may be made from one new trust to a certain
beneficiary or beneficiaries (e.g. children) and distributions from another trust may be made to another beneficiary or
beneficiaries (e.g. grandchildren), the requirement will still be met if the terms of the new trusts are the same as the
terms of the original trust (including if a permissible beneficiary of the old trust is a beneficiary of only one of the
new trusts), the severance does not shift an interest to a lower beneficiary than those with an interest in the original
trust, and the severance does not extend the vesting period beyond that of the original trust.
If the original trust has had GST exemption allocated to it, the initial division must be into one new trust
with an inclusion ratio of one and another with an inclusion ratio of zero. Subsequent qualified severances may then
occur.
For purposes of section 1001 - - gain on the exchange of property - - the qualified severance of a trust will
not be a taxable transaction. However, the applicable state statute or governing instrument must allow a non pro rata
funding, otherwise the funding must be pro rata to avoid an exchange.
Taxpayers use Form 706-GS(T) to report a qualified severance by attaching a Notice of Severance and
writing at the top, in red, "Qualified Severance." The Notice must describe how the trusts were funded including the
fraction and must identify the new trusts. The return must be filed by April 15 following the year in which the
severance occurred.
The proposed regulations contain various examples:
Example 1. Formula severance. T's will establishes a testamentary marital trust
(Trust) that qualifies as qualified tenninable interest property (QTIP) under
section 2056(b)(7). Trust provides that all trust income is to be paid to T's
spouse for life. On the spouse's death, the trust corpus is to be held in further
trust for the benefit of T's then-living descendants. On T's date of death in
January of 2004, T's unused GST tax exemption is $1,200,000, $200,000 of
which T's executor will allocate to bequests to T's grandchildren. Prior to the due
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date for filing the Form 706, "United States Estate (and Generation-Skipping
Transfer) Tax Return," for T's estate, and thus, prior to the allocation of any GST
tax exemption with respect to Trust, T's executor, pursuant to applicable state
law, divides Trust into two separate trusts, Trust 1 and Trust 2. Trust 1 is to be
funded with that fraction of the Trust assets, the numerator of which is
$1,000,000, and the denominator of which is the value of the Trust assets as
finally determined for federal estate tax purposes. Trust 2 is to be funded with
the balance of the Trust assets. On the Form 706 filed for the estate, T's executor
makes a QTIP election under section 2056(b)(7) with respect to Trust 1 and
Trust 2 and a reverse QTIP election under section 2652(a)(3) with respect to
Trust 1. Further, T's executor allocates T's available GST tax exemption to Trust
1. If the requirements of section 2642(a)(3) are otherwise satisfied, the severance
constitutes a qualified severance. Accordingly, Trust 1 and Trust 2 are treated as
separate trusts, and the GST tax elections and GST tax exemption allocation are
recognized and effective for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.
Example 2. Severance of single trust with one income beneficiary. T's will
establishes a testamentary trust providing that income is to be paid to T's sister,
S, for her life. On S's death, one-half of the corpus is to be paid to T's child, C, or
to C's estate if C fails to survive S and one-half of the corpus is to be paid to T's
grandchild, GC, or to GC's estate if GC fails to survive S. Prior to the due date
for filing the Form 706, T's executor, pursuant to applicable state law, divides
the testamentary trust into two separate trusts, Trust 1 and Trust 2, with each
trust receiving 50 percent of the current value of the assets of the original trust.
Trust 1 provides that trust income is to be paid to S for life with remainder to C
or C's estate, and Trust 2 provides that trust income is to be paid to S for life
with remainder to GC or GC's estate. Because Trust 1 and Trust 2 provide for
the same succession of interests in the aggregate as provided in the original trust,
the severance will constitute a qualified severance if the requirements of section
2642(a)(3) are otherwise satisfied. On the Form 706, T's executor may allocate
T's available GST tax exemption to Trust 2.
Example 3. Severance of discretionary trust. T's will establishes a testamentary
trust (Trust) providing that income is to be paid from time to time in such
amounts as the trustee deems advisable to T's children, A and B, and to their
respective descendants. In addition, the trustee may distribute corpus to any trust
beneficiary in such amounts as the trustee deems advisable. On the death of the
last to die of A and B, the trust is to terminate and the corpus is to be distributed
in two equal shares, one share to the descendants of each child, per stirpes. Prior
to the due date for filing the Form 706, T's executor, pursuant to applicable state
law, divides Trust into two separate trusts, Trust 1 and Trust 2. Trust 1 provides
that income is to be paid in such amounts as the trustee deems advisable to A and
A's descendants. In addition, the trustee may distribute corpus to any trust
beneficiary in such amounts as the trustee deems advisable. On the death of A.
Trust 1 is to terminate and the corpus is to be distributed to the descendants of A,
per stirpes, but if A dies with no living descendants, the principal will be added
to Trust 2. Trust 2 contains identical provisions, except that Band B's
descendants are the trust beneficiaries and, if B dies with no living descendants,
the principal will be added to Trust 1. Because Trust 1 and Trust 2 provide for
the same beneficiaries and the same succession of interests in the aggregate as
provided in Trust, and because the severance does not shift any beneficial
interest in the trust to a beneficiary who occupies a lower generation than the
person or persons who held the beneficial interest in Trust, the severance
constitutes a qualified severance if the requirements of section 2642(a)(3) are
otherwise satisfied.
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Example 4. Severance of single trust with two income beneficiaries. T's will
establishes a testamentary trust (Trust) providing that Trust income is to be paid
to T's children, A and B, for their joint lives. Upon the death of the first to die of
A and B, the income will be paid to the survivor. At the death of the survivor of
A and B, the corpus is to be distributed equally to T's grandchildren, Wand X
(with any then-deceased grandchild's share being paid to that grandchild's
estate). W is A's child and X is B's child. Prior to the due date for filing Form
706, T's executor divides the testamentary trust equally into two separate trusts,
Trust 1 and Trust 2. Trust 1 provides that trust income is to be paid to A for life
and, on A's death, the remainder is to pass to W. Trust 2 provides that trust
income is to be paid to B for life and the remainder on B's death to X. Because
Trust 1 and Trust 2 do not provide A and B with contingent survivor income
interests as provided under the terms of the original trust, Trust 1 and Trust 2 do
not provide for the same succession of interests in the aggregate as provided in
Trust. Therefore, the division is not a qualified severance, and Trust 1 and Trust
2 are treated as one trust. If, however, in this example, Trust 1 instead provides
that trust income is to be paid to A for life and then to B (ifB survives A), with
remainder to W, and if Trust 2 instead provides that trust income is to be paid to
B for life and then to A (if A survives B), with remainder to X, then Trust 1 and
Trust 2 would provide for the same succession of interests in the aggregate as
provided in Trust, and the severance would constitute a qualified severance.
Example 5. Severance of a trust with a 50% inclusion ratio. On September 1,
2004, T transfers $100,000 to a trust for the benefit ofT's grandchild, GC. On a
timely filed Form 709, "United States Gift (and Generation-Skipping Transfer)
Tax Return," reporting the transfer, T allocates all of T's remaining GST tax
exemption ($50,000) to the trust. As a result of the allocation, the applicable
fraction with respect to the trust is .50 [$50,000 (the amount of GST tax
exemption allocated to the trust) divided by $100,000 (the value of the property
transferred to the trust)]. The inclusion ratio with respect to the trust is .50[1 -.50]. In 2006, pursuant to authority granted under applicable state law, the
trustee severs the trust into two trusts, Trust 1 and Trust 2, each of which
receives a 50 percent fractional share of the total value of all trust assets at that
time. Because the applicable traction with respect to the original trust is .50 and
the trust was severed into two equal trusts, the trustee may designate which trust
has an inclusion ratio of one, and which trust has an inclusion ratio of zero.
Accordingly, in the Notice of Qualified Severance reporting the severance, the
trustee designates Trust 1 as having an inclusion ratio 9f zero, and Trust 2 as
having an inclusion ratio of one.
Example 6. Funding of severed trusts on a non pro rata basis. T's will establishes
a testamentary trust (Trust) for the benefit of T's descendants, to be funded with
T's stock in Corporation A and Corporation B. T dies on May 1, 2004, at which
time the Corporation A stock included in T's gross estate has a fair market value
of $100,000 and the stock of Corporation B included in T's gross estate has a fair
market value of $200,000. On a timely filed Form 706, T's executor allocates all
of T's remaining GST tax exemption ($270,000) to Trust. As a result of the
allocation, the applicable fraction with respect to Trust is .90 [$270,000 (the
amount of GST tax exemption allocated to the trust) divided by $300,000 (the
value of the property transferred to the trust)]. The inclusion ratio with respect to
Trust is .10 [1 - .90]. On August 1, 2008, when the value of the Trust assets
totals $500,000, consisting of Corporation A stock worth $450,000 and
Corporation B stock worth $50,000, the trustee severs Trust into two identical
trusts, Trust 1 and Trust 2. The terms of the instrument severing Trust provides
that Trust 1 is to be funded on a non pro rata basis with assets having a fair
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market value on the date of funding equal to 90% of the value of the Trust assets
on that date, and Trust 2 is to be funded with assets having a fair market value on
the date of funding equal to 10% of the value of the Trust assets on that date.
Also on August 1, 2008, the trustee funds Trust 1 with all of the Corporation A
stock and funds Trust 2 with all of the Corporation B stock. Accordingly, Trust 1
is funded with assets having a value equal to 90% of the value of Trust as of the
date of funding, August 1, 2008, and Trust 2 is funded with assets having a value
equal to 10% of the value of Trust as of the date of funding. Therefore, if the
requirements of section 2642(a)(3) are otherwise satisfied, the severance
constitutes a qualified severance. Trust 1 will have an inclusion ratio of zero and
Trust 2 will have an inclusion ratio of one.
Example 7. Severance of a trust along family lines. T dies on October 1, 2004.
T's will establishes a testamentary trust (Trust) to be funded with $1,000,000.
Trust income is to be paid to T's child, S, for S's life. On S's death, Trust is to
terminate and the assets are to be divided equally among T's three grandchildren,
GC1, GC2, and GC3 (or their respective descendants, per stirpes). On a timely
filed Form 706, T's executor allocates all of T's remaining GST tax exemption
($300,000) to Trust. As a result of the allocation, the applicable fraction with
respect to the trust is .30 [$300,000 (the amount ofGST tax exemption allocated
to the trust) divided by $1,000,000 (the value of the property transferred to the
trust)]. The inclusion ratio with respect to the trust is .70 [1 - .30]. On June 1,
2007, the trustee determines that it is in the best interest of the bene~ciaries to
sever Trust to provide a separate trust for each of T's three grandchildren and
their respective families. The trustee severs Trust into two identical trusts, Trust
1 and Trust 2, each trust providing that trust income is to be paid to S, for life,
and on S's death, the trust is to terminate and the assets are to be divided equally
among GC1, GC2, and GC3 (or their respective descendants, per stirpes). The
terms of the instrument severing Trust provide that Trust 1 is to receive 30% of
the Trust assets and Trust 2 is to receive 70% of the Trust assets. Further, each
trust is to be funded with a pro rata portion of each asset held in Trust. The
trustee then severs Trust 1 into three equal trusts, Trust GC1, Trust GC2, and
Trust GC3. Each trust is named for a grandchild of T and provides 'that trust
income is to be paid to S for life, and on S's death, the trust is to terminate and
the trust proceeds distributed to the respective grandchild for whom the trust is
named. If that grandchild has predeceased the termination date, the trust
proceeds are to be distributed to that grandchild's then-living descendants, per
stirpes, or, if none, to the other grandchildren (or their respective then-living
descendants, per stirpes). Each trust is to be funded with a pro rata portion of
each Trust 1 asset. The trustee also severs Trust 2 in a similar manner, into Trust
GC1 (2), Trust GC2(2), and Trust GC3(2). If the requirements of section
2642(a)(3) are otherwise satisfied, the severance of Trust into Trust 1 and Trust
2, the severance of Trust 1 into Trust GC1, Trust GC2, Trust GC3, and the
severance of Trust 2 into Trust GC1(2), Trust GC2(2) and Trust GC3(2),
constitute qualified severances. Trust GC1, Trust GC2, Trust GC3 will each
have an inclusion ratio of zero and Trust GC1(2), Trust GC2(2), and Trust
GC3(2) will each have an inclusion ratio of one.
5.

Proposed Regulations on the Predeceased Parent Rule. Section 2561(e) of the Code (enacted

in 1997) contains the predeceased parent exception. If an individual is a descendant of a parent of the transferor (or
the transferor's spouse or former spouse), and the individual's parent (who is also such a descendant), died prior to
the time the transferor is subject to estate or gift tax on the transfer from which the individual's interest is derived,
then the individual is treated as ifhe or she is one generation below the lower of either the transferor's generation or
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the generation of the individual's youngest living lineal ancestor who is also a descendant of the parent of the
transferor (or spouse or former spouse). But the exception does not apply to a transfer to an individual who is not a
lineal descendant of the transferor (or spouse or former spouse) IF the transferor (or spouse or former spouse) has
any living lineal descendant at the time of the transfer.
On September 2, 2004 the IRS issued proposed regulations dealing with this exception. REG-145988-03.
The proposed regulations deal with several issues. First, an individual's interest in property or a trust is derived
when the transferor is subject to transfer tax or, if there are multiple transfer taxes, at the first such occasion.
However, a remainder interest in a QTIP is deemed to have been derived as of the death of the transferor's spouse
rather than the death of the transferor. Second, although in general adoption cannot affect an individual's generation
assignment (e.g. adoption by grandparent of an adult grandchild does not affect the grandchild's generation
assignment because the rule is that an individual is assigned to the lowest generation where multiple assignments are
possible), if an adopting parent adopts an individual who is a descendant of a parent of adopting parent (or the
adopting parent's spouse or former spouse) who is under the age of 18 at the time of adoption then the adopted
individual will be treated as a member of the generation that is one generation below the adopting parent when
determining whether a transfer from the adopting parent (or spouse or former spouse or lineal descendant of a
grandparent of the adopting parent) to the adopted individual is subject to GST tax. Further, an adjustment to such
individual's generation assignment causes a corresponding adjustment to the assignment of the individual's spouse,
former spouse, descendants, and spouses and former spouses of descendants.
The 90 day rule continues to apply.

Further, if a transferor adds property to a trust assignments with

respect to which are affected by this exception, the addition is treated as held in a separate trust for application of
these rules.
The proposed regulations provide these examples:
Example 1. T establishes an irrevocable trust, Trust, providing that trust income
is to be paid to T's grandchild, GC, for 5 years, At the end of the 5-year period or
on GC's prior death, Trust is to terminate and the principal is to be distributed to
GC if GC is living or to GC's children if GC has died. The transfer that occurred
on the creation of the trust is subject to the tax imposed by chapter 12 of the
Internal Revenue Code and, at the time of the transfer, T's child, C, who is a
parent of GC, is deceased. GC is treated as a member of the generation that is
one generation below T's generation. As a result, GC is not a skip person and
Trust is not a skip person. Therefore, the transfer to Trust is not a direct skip.
Similarly, distributions to GC during the term of Trust and at the termination of
Trust will not be GSTs.
Example 2. On January 1, 2004,T transfers $100,000 to an inter vivos trust that
provides T with an annuity payable for four years or until T's prior death. The
annuity satisfies the definition of a qualified interest under section 2702(b).
When the trust terminates, the corpus is to be paid to T's grandchild, GC. The
transfer is subject to the tax imposed by chapter 12 of the Internal Revenue Code
and, at the time of the transfer, T's child, C, who is a parent of GC, is living. C
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dies in 2006. In this case, C was alive at the time the transfer by T is subject to
the tax imposed by chapter 12 of the Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, section
2651(e) and paragraph (a)(I) of this section do not apply. When the trust
subsequently terminates, the distribution to GC is a taxable termination.
Example 3. T dies testate in 2002, survived by T's spouse, S, their children, Cl
and C2, and Cl's child, GC. Under the terms ofT's will, a trust is established for
the benefit of S and their descendants. Under the terms of the trust, all income is
payable to S during S's lifetime and the trustee may distribute trust corpus for S's
health, support and maintenance. At S's death, the corpus is to be distributed,
outright, to Cl and C2. If either Cl or C2 has predeceased S, the deceased
child's share of the corpus is to be distributed to that child's descendants, per
stirpes. The executor ofT's estate makes the election under section 2056(b)(7) to
treat the trust property as qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) but does
not make the election under section 2652(a)(3) (reverse QTIP election). In 2003,
Cl dies survived by Sand GC. In 2004, S dies, and the trust terminates. The full
fair market value of the trust is includible in S's gross estate under section 2044
and S becomes the transferor of the trust under section 2652(a)(I)(A). Under the
rule in paragraph (a)(3) of this section, GC's interest is considered established or
derived at S's death, and because Cl is deceased at that time, GC is treated as a
member of the generation that is one generation below the generation of the
transferor, S. As a result, GC is not a skip person and the transfer to GC is not a
direct skip.
Example 4. The facts are the same as in Example 3. However, the executor ofT's
estate makes the election under section 2652(a)(3) (reverse QTIP election) for
the entire trust. Therefore, T remains the transferor because, for purposes of
chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code, the election to be treated as qualified
terminable interest property is treated as if it had not been made. In this case, the
rule in paragraph (a)(3) of this section does not apply, so GC's interest is
established or derived on T's death in 2002. Because Cl was living at the time of
T's death, the predeceased parent rule under section 2651(e) does not apply,
even though Cl was deceased at the time the transfer from S to GC is subject to
the tax under chapter 11 of the Internal Revenue Code. When the trust
terminates, the distribution to GC is a taxable termination that is subject to the
GST tax to the extent the trust has an inclusion ratio greater than zero. See
section 2642(a).
Example 5. T establishes an irrevocable trust providing that trust income is to be
paid to T's grandniece, GN, for 5 years or until GN's prior death. At the end of
the 5-year period or on GN's prior death, the trust is to terminate and the
principal is to be distributed to GN if living, or if GN has died, to GN's
descendants, per stirpes. S is a sibling of T and the parent of N. N is the parent
ofGN. At the time of the transfer, T has no living lineal descendant, S is living,
N is deceased, and the transfer is subject to the gift tax imposed by chapter 12 of
the Internal Revenue Code. GN is treated as a member of the generation that is
one generation below T's generation because S, GN's youngest living lineal
ancestor who is also a descendant of T's parent, is in T's generation. As a result,
GN is not a skip person and the transfer to the trust is not a direct skip. In
addition, distributions to GN during the term of the trust and at the termination
of the trust will not be GSTs.
Example 6. On January 1, 2004, T transfers $50,000 to the great grandchild,
GGC, ofB, a brother ofT. At the time of the transfer, B's grandchild, GC, who
is a parent of GGC and a child of B's living child, C, is deceased. GGC will be
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treated as a member of the generation that is one generation below the lower of
T's generation or the generation assignment of GGC's youngest living lineal
ancestor who is also a descendant of the parent of the transferor. In this case, C
is GGC's youngest living lineal ancestor who is also a descendant of the parent
of T. Because C's generation assignment is lower than T's generation, GGC will
be treated as a member of the generation that is one generation below C's
generation assignment (i.e., GGC will be treated as a member of GC's
generation). As a result, GGC remains a skip person and the transfer to GGC is a
direct skip.
6.

Alternate Method. for Making Late Allocations of GST Exemption. Rev. Proc. 2004-46,2004-

31 IRB 142, provides a simplified method for obtaining an extension to make a late allocation of GST exemption,
effective August 2, 2004. The taxpayer may file a Form 709 for the year of the transfer to the trust for which the late
allocation is being made, with a statement at the top of the Form that it is "FILED PURSUANT TO REV. PROC.
2004-46." The Form 709 should report the property transferred and contain a Notice of Allocation with the trust
identified, the value of the property given (as of the date of the transfer), the amount of the taxpayer's unused GST
exemption, the amount allocated to this transfer, the inclusion ratio of the trust after the transfer and a statement that
the taxpayer was eligible to make a late allocation.
Only certain taxpayers are eligible. The transfer must have been made prior to December 31, 2000. No
taxable distributions nor terminations must have occurred prior to the request to make a late allocation. The transfer
must have qualified for the annual exclusion and the total gifts to that donee must not have exceeded the amount of
the annual exclusion. No GST exemption must have been allocated to the transfer and the taxpayer must have
unused GST exemption available to allocate.
If a taxpayer does not qualify the taxpayer may still ask for relief but must do so by letter ruling request
under Ss 301.9100-3 (as described in Rev. Proc. 2004-1).
7.

Alternate Method to Make Late Reverse QTIP Election. Rev. Proc. 2004-47, 2004-32 IRB

169 (August 5, 2004)

sets forth a simplified method of electing reverse QTIP treatment late. Normally the

transferor's spouse (the surviving spouse) will be the transferor of a QTIP trust for GST purposes with the result that
any allocation of GST exemption made to the QTIP at the fIrst spouse's death will be wasted. Section 2652(a)(3)
provides that the executor may elect for GST purposes to treat the decedent as the transferor and that is called a
"reverse QTIP election." That election allows the decedent's GST exemption to be allocated to the QTIP or a part
of the QTIP. The reverse QTIP election must be made on a timely filed Form 706 (including extensions). If the
election is not timely made, then the IRS may grant relief under section 9100. Previously the request for relief has
come in the form of a private letter ruling.
The Revenue Procedure allows a simplified method but may be used only if: (1) a valid QTIP election was
made, (2) no reverse QTIP election was made, (3) the decedent has sufficient GST exemption remaining to result in
a zero-inclusion ratio for the trust; (4) there is no automatic six month extension available; (5) the surviving spouse
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· has not disposed of all or a part of the QTIP income interest; and (6) the surviving spouse is alive or not more than
six months have passed since his or her death.
The request will contain copies of Parts 1 - 5 and Schedule M of the original Form 706, a completed
Schedule R, and a statement describing why the election was not made on the Form 706 as filed. A cover sheet will
be provided which has at the top "REQUEST FOR EXTENSION Filed Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2004-47." In
addition, the there must be a signed statement from the qualified tax professional on whom the taxpayer relied when
preparing the original Form 706, and a signed statement from the executor, attesting to the accuracy of the filing,
including, of course, the explanation.
The Revenue Procedure does not allow retroactive allocations of exemption or trust severances. If the relief
sought is not granted the taxpayer may file a ruling request.

Such a request approving a severance is PLR

200502036 (pro rata division of assets).

8.

Election Out of GST Deemed Allocations; § 2632 Proposed Regulations.

Section 2632

provides for allocations of GST exemption, including certain automatic allocations. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations dealing with those allocations. REG-153841-02. The Background to the proposed regulations described
the automatic allocation rules as follows:
Section 2632 also provides deemed allocation rules pursuant to which an
individual's available GST exemption is automatically allocated to certain kinds
of transfers, without any action on the part of the transferor. Under section
2632(b), an individual's unused GST exemption is automatically allocated to
transfers made during that individual's lifetime that are direct skips as defined in
section 2612(c), to the extent necessary to make the inclusion ratio zero for the
property transferred. Under section 2632(c), in the case of a lifetime transfer
made after December 31, 2000 that is an indirect skip, the transferor's available
GST exemption is automatically allocated to the transfer to the extent necessary
to make the inclusion ratio zero for the property transferred. Section
2632(c)(3)(A) defines an indirect skip as a transfer of property (other than a
direct skip) subject to gift tax that is made to a GST trust. A GST trust is dermed
in section 2632(c)(3)(B), in general, as any trust that could have a generationskipping transfer. However, no trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B)(i)
through (vi) is treated as a GST trust, because a sufficient possibility exists
(based on the statutory criteria) that the trust corpus will not be distributed to
lower generations. A transfer to any trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B)(i)
through (vi) will not be subject to the automatic allocation of the GST
exemption. The automatic allocation under section 2632(c) also applies to an
indirect skip occurring upon the post-2000 termination of an estate tax inclusion
period.
Under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(i)(I), an individual may elect out of the deemed
allocation rules so that GST exemption will not be allocated automatically to a
particular transfer that is an indirect skip. Under section 2632(c)(5)(B)(i), this
election out with regard to a particular indirect skip shall be deemed timely if
made on a timely filed gift tax return for the calendar year in which the transfer
was made, or deemed to have been made under section 2632(c)(4) with regard to
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trusts subject to an estate tax inclusion period, or on such later dates as may be
prescribed in regulations.
Under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(i)(II), an individual may elect out of the deemed
allocation rules for indirect skips so that GST exemption will not be allocated
automatically to any or all transfers made to the trust by that individual,
regardless of when a transfer is, or may in the future be, made. Under section
2632(c)(5)(B)(ii), this election out with regard to any or all transfers to the trust
by that individual may be made on a timely filed gift tax return for the calendar
year for which the election is to become effective.
Alternatively, under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(ii), an individual may elect to treat
any trust as a GST trust with regard to any or all transfers made by that
individual to the trust. If this election is made, the rules for the automatic
allocation of the GST exemption will apply with regard to that individual's
transfers to the trust, notwithstanding that the trust is described in section
2632(c)(3)(B)(i) through (vi). Under section 2632(c)(5)(B)(ii), the election to
treat a trust as a GST trust may be made on a timely filed gift tax return for the
calendar year for which the election is to become effective.
The proposed regulations were summarized by the Background:
Under the proposed regulations, the election out of the automatic allocation rules
for indirect skips and the election to treat any trust as a GST trust are to be made
on a timely filed federal gift tax return.
Under the proposed regulations, a transferor who wants to elect out of the
automatic allocation rules for indirect skips has the option of electing out for the
specific transfer to· the GST trust, or making a single election with regard to the
trust that applies to the current transfer and all subsequent transfers made by that
transferor to the trust. Under the second option, once the election is made with
regard to a trust, the election remains effective for all subsequent transfers to that
trust by the electing transferor, until that transferor's election is terminated.
Practitioners have commented that in many cases, particularly situations in which
trust corpus consists of primarily insurance contracts, the transferor may not be
required to file a Federal gift tax return reporting annual transfers to a GST trust
because the transfers qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion under section
2503(b). If under the terms of the trust instrument distributions to skip persons
are unlikely, the transferor may choose not to allocate GST exemption to the
trust. The rule in the proposed regulation is intended to alleviate the need to
repeatedly file a gift tax return to elect out of the automatic allocation rules for
transfers that would not otherwise require a Federal gift tax return to be filed.
Thus, once the transferor "elects out" of the automatic allocation rule for indirect
skips with regard to any or all transfers made by that transferor to the trust, the
election out, until terminated, remains effective for all subsequent transfers made
by that transferor to the trust, without any further reporting requirement on the
part of the transferor. A similar rule applies with regard to the election to treat a
trust as a GST trust.
The proposed regulations contain five examples:
Example 1. Modification of allocation of GST exemption. On December 1,
2003, T transfers $1 00,000 to an irrevocable GST trust described in section
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2632(c)(3)(B). The transfer to the trust is not a direct skip. The date prescribed
for filing the gift tax return reporting the taxable gift is April 15, 2004. On
February 10, 2004, T files a Form 709 on which T properly elects out of the
automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) with respect to the
transfer in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, and allocates
$50,000 of GST exemption to the trust. On April 13th of the same year, T files
an additional Form 709 on which T confrrms the election out of the automatic
allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(I) and allocates $100,000 of GST
exemption to the trust in a manner that clearly indicates the intention to modify
and supersede the prior allocation with respect to the 2003 transfer. The
allocation made on the April 13 return supersedes the prior allocation because it
is made on a timely-filed Form 709 that clearly identifies the trust and the nature
and extent of the modification of GST exemption allocation. The allocation of
$100,000 of GST exemption to the trust is effective as of December 1, 2003.
The result would be the same if the amended Form 709 decreased the amount of
the GST exemption allocated to the trust.
Example 2. Modification of allocation of GST exemption. The facts are the same
as in Example 1, except on July 8, 2004, T files a Form 709 attempting to reduce
the earlier allocation. The return is not a timely filed return. The $100,000 GST
exemption allocated to the trust, as amended on April 13, 2004, remains in effect
because an allocation, once made, is irrevocable and may not be modified after
the last date on which a timely filed Form 709 can be filed.
Example 3. Effective date of late allocation ofGST exemption. On December 1,
2003, T transfers $100,000 to an irrevocable GST trust described in section
2632(c)(3)(B). The transfer to the trust is not a direct skip. The date prescribed
for filing the gift tax return reporting the taxable gift is April 15, 2004. On
February 10, 2004, T files a Form 709 on which T properly elects out of the
automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)( 1) in accordance with
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section with respect to that transfer. On December 1,
2004, T files a Form 709 and allocates $50,000 to the trust. The allocation is
effective as of December 1, 2004.
Example 4. Effective date of late allocation of GST exemption. T transfers
$100,000 to a GST trust on December 1, 2003, in a transfer that is not a direct
skip. On April 15, 2004, T files a Form 709 on which T properly elects out of
the automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)( 1) with respect to the
entire transfer in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section and T does
not make an allocation of any GST exemption on the Form 709. On September
1, 2004, the trustee makes a taxable distribution from the trust to T's grandchild
in the amount of $30,000. Immediately prior to the distribution, the value of the
trust assets was $150,000. On the same date, T allocates GST exemption to the
trust in the amount of $50,000. The allocation of GST exemption on the date of
the transfer is treated as preceding in point of time the taxable distribution. At
the time of the GST, the trust has an inclusion ratio of .6667 (1(50,000/150,000)).
Example 5. Automatic allocation to split-gift. On December 1, 2003, T transfers
$50,000 to an irrevocable GST Trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B). The
transfer to the trust is not a direct skip. On April 30, 2004, T and T's spouse, S,
each files an initial gift tax return for 2003, on which they consent, pursuant to
section 2513, to have the gift treated as if one-half had been made by each.
Previously, neither T nor S filed a timely gift tax return electing out of the
automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1). As a result of the
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election under section 2513, which is retroactive to the date ofT's transfer, T and
S are each treated as the transferor of one-half of the property transferred in the
indirect skip. Thus, $25,000 of T's unused GST exemption and $25,000 of S's
unused GST exemption is automatically allocated to the trust. Both allocations
are effective on and after the date that T made the transfer. The result would be
the same if T's transfer constituted a direct skip subject to the automatic
allocation rules contained in section 2632(b).
PLR 200512003 is a ruling under the proposed regulations. The trust in question provided for a child to
receive the income from the child's share of the trust upon the child reaching age 35 and receive the principal
outright at age 50. The donors intended to elect out of the automatic allocation but the accountant failed to realize
that a written election out was required.
In PLR 200510026 the IRS determined that a late allocation could be made to a trust which was to last for
21 years beyond the lifetimes of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, and the taxpayer's then living descendants. The
Form 709 was filed with Schedule C left blank. The trust contained language indicating the trust was to be a
generation-skipping trust.
Q.

SECTIONS 2701-2704 - SPECIAL VALUATION RULES
1.

Family Limited Partnerships. Taxpayers have won arguments that neither section 2703 nor

2704(b) apply (but see the section 2036 discussion above).
2.

Final Regulations Describing Qualified Unitrust or Annuity Trust Interest. The IRS has

issued fmal regulations under section 2702 describing a qualified annuity or unitrust interest. T. D. 9181 (February
25, 2005). The new regulations conform to the Walton decision and allow a GRAT to be zeroed-out by having
annuity payments made to the grantor/annuitant's estate if he or she dies during the stated term. However, the
regulations were changed to limit the usefulness of a revocable spousal interest as described in the Schott and Cook
decisions; this change is primarily of retrospective interest because of the availability of Walton type GRATs.

3.

Effect on Buy-Sell Agreement. The Tax Court disregarded a buy-sell agreement in Estate of

George C. Blount v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-116, in determining the value of closely-held stock (BBC).
The court found that the agreement allowed the decedent to amend it unilaterally, thus the agreement's restrictions on
lifetime transfers could have been eliminated and under pre-section 2703 law the buy-sell was ineffective to set the
price of shares subject to it.

Further, in 1996 the agreement was amended, thus blowing the section 2703

grandfather.
The court also addressed the effect of life insurance payable to the company and the corporate obligation to
redeem stock from the decedent's estate:
We turn next to the question of how to account for the $3,146,134 million in life
insurance proceeds BCC was due to receive on decedent's death and BCC's $4
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million obligation to redeem decedent's shares, as set forth in the Modified 1981
Agreement. Mr. Fodor excluded both the insurance proceeds and the redemption
obligation when determining BCC's value on the theory that the insurance
proceeds were offset by the redemption obligation. In contrast, Mr. Hitchner
included the insurance proceeds in valuing BCC, adding their value to his $7
million "concluded" value for BCC, while disregarding the redemption
obligation.
Respondent argues that the insurance proceeds must be included in BCC's value
as a nonoperating asset, relying on section 20.2031-2(f), Estate Tax Regs., and
Estate of Huntsman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 861 (1976). In contrast, the estate
argues that, while insurance proceeds might be a nonoperating asset, under
Estate of Cartwright v. Commissioner, 183 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1999), affg. in
part and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1996-286, they must be offset by BCC's
obligation to redeem decedent's shares, and therefore do not affect BCC's value.
Estate of Huntsman makes clear that insurance proceeds are treated like any
other nonoperating asset when determining a closely held corporation's value.
Estate of Huntsman v. Commissioner, supra at 874; see also sec. 20.2031-2(f),
Estate Tax Regs. (" consideration shall also be given to nonoperating assets,
including proceeds of life insurance policies payable to or for the benefit of the
company, to the extent such nonoperating assets have not been taken into
account in the determination of net worth, prospective earning power and
dividend-earning capacity"). Whether BCC's $4 million obligation to redeem
decedent's shares offsets the life insurance proceeds, as the estate argues, is
another question. In Estate of Huntsman, we reasoned that, because life
insurance proceeds should be treated like any other nonoperating asset, to the
extent such assets were considered in valuing a company, they were subject to
offset by corporate liabilities. However, we were not presented in that case with
the question of whether a corporation's obligation to redeem the very shares that
are to be valued should be treated as a liability, offsetting corporate assets.34
The estate here urges that we treat BCC's enforceable $4 million obligation to
redeem the shares whose value is at issue as a liability offsetting BCC's assets
(i.e., the $3,146,134 life insurance proceeds plus almost $1 million in other
assets) in arriving at the value of the same shares.
We decline to do so for two reasons. First, we have concluded that the agreement
under which BCC was obligated to redeem decedent's shares for $4 million must
be disregarded under both section 20.2031-2(h), Estate Tax Regs., and section
2703. In such circumstances, the terms of the disregarded agreement are
generally not taken into account in determining the fair market value of the
shares subject to the agreement. Estate of True v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2001-167; Estate of Lauder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-527; see also
Estate of Godley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-242, affd. 286 F.3d 210
(4th Cir. 2002). As we noted in Estate of Lauder, under these circumstances, the
willing buyer/seller analysis would be distorted if we disregarded the buy-sell
agreement for purposes of fixing the value of the subject stock, yet allowed
provisions in the agreement to be taken into account when determining the
stock's fair market value. Thus, it would be improper here to consider the
redemption obligation in the disregarded buy-sell agreement when determining
the fair market value of the stock covered by that agreement.
Second, even if the impact of the redemption obligation on BCC's value were not
disregarded under the principles of Estate of Lauder and like cases, the
redemption obligation should not be treated as a value-depressing corporate
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liability when the very shares that are the subject of the redemption obligation
are being valued. To do so would be to value BCC in its postredemption
configuration; namely, after decedent's shares had been redeemed and BCC's
assets had been contracted by the $4 million redemption payment. Valuing
decedent's 43,080 shares by means of the hypothetical willing buyer/seller
construct necessarily requires that the corporation's actual obligation to redeem
the shares be ignored; such a stance is inherent in the fiction that the shares are
being sold to a hypothetical third-party buyer on the valuation date rather than
being redeemed by the corporation. To the hypothetical willing buyer, decedent's
43,080 BCC shares constituted an 83.2-percent interest in all of the assets and
income-generating potential of BCC on the valuation date, including any assets
that might be used to satisfy the actual redemption obligation. To treat the
corporation's obligation to redeem the very shares that are being valued as a
liability that reduces the value of the corporate entity thus distorts the nature of
the ownership interest represented by those shares.
By contrast, a hypothetical willing buyer of BCC shares other than decedent's
would treat the redemption obligation, on the valuation date, as a corporate
liability of BCC, but only in connection with a simultaneous accounting of the
impact of the redemption of decedent's shares on the ownership interest inherent
in the other shares not being redeemed.
A simplified example will illustrate the fallacy behind the estate's contention that
BCC's obligation to redeem decedent's shares should be treated as a liability
offsetting a corresponding amount of corporate assets. Assume corporation X
has 100 shares outstanding and two shareholders, A and B, each holding 50
shares. X's sole asset is $1 million in cash. X has entered into an agreement
obligating it to purchase B's shares at his death for $500,000. If, at B's death, X's
$500,000 redemption obligation is treated as a liability of X for purposes of
valuing B's shares, then X's value becomes $500,000 ($1 million cash less a
$500,000 redemption obligation). It would follow that the value of B's shares
(and A's shares) is $250,000 (i.e., one half of the corporation's $500,000
value35) upon B's death. Yet if B's shares are then redeemed for $500,000, A's
shares are then worth $500,000 -- that is, A's 50 shares constitute 100-percent
ownership of a corporation with $500,000 in cash.
It cannot be correct either that B's one-half interest in $1 million in cash is worth
only $250,000 or that A's one-half interest in the remainder shifts from a value of
$250,000 preredemption to a value of $500,000 postredemption.
The error with respect to B's shares in the example lies in the treatment of X's
redemption obligation as a claim on corporate assets when valuing the very
shares that would be redeemed with those assets. With respect to A's shares, a
willing buyer would pay $500,000 upon B's death (not $250,000) because he
would take account of both the liability arising from X's redemption obligation
and the shift in the proportionate ownership interest of A's shares occasioned by
the redemption -- but never the former without the latter.36
The estate's reliance on Estate of Cartwright v. Commissioner, 183 F.3d 1034
(9th Cir. 1999), is misplaced, as that case is distinguishable. Estate of Cartwright
involved a law fIrm (organized as a C corporation) that entered into a buy-sell
agreement with its majority shareholder. The parties agreed that the firm would
purchase from the shareholder's estate his shares and his interest in the fees for
the fIrm'S work in progress at his death. The consideration for this purchase was
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designated as the proceeds from two $2.5 million life insurance policies on the
shareholder's life that the firm was required to obtain under the agreement.
Upon the shareholder's death, the fIrm paid the $5,062,02937 insurance proceeds
to the shareholder's estate. The taxpayer took the position that the entire
$5,062,029 was paid for the shareholder's stock, whereas the Commissioner
determined that approximately $4 million was paid for the shareholder's interest
in work in progress (and, therefore, was income in respect of a decedent).
Concluding that the insurance proceeds were consideration for both the stock
and the shareholder's interest in work in progress, this Court undertook to
allocate the consideration between the two by determining the stock's fair market
value at the shareholder's death, and treating the insurance proceeds in excess of
that fair market value as consideration paid for the shareholder's interest in work
in progress. In determining the fair market value of the stock, we rejected the
taxpayer's argument that the $5 million in insurance proceeds should be treated
as a nonoperating asset of the firm, augmenting the value of its stock, on the
grounds that the insurance proceeds were offset by the fIrm'S obligation to pay
them over to the estate. In so concluding, we relied on Estate of Huntsman v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 861 (1976), as follows: "We said in Estate of Huntsman
that a buyer would not pay more for stock based on the corporation's ownership
of life insurance if the proceeds would be largely offset by the corporation's
liabilities. That is the case here." Estate of Cartwright v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-286 (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed our position that the life insurance proceeds would not be considered by
a hypothetical willing buyer in these circumstances. Estate of Cartwright v.
Commissioner, 183 F.3d at 1038.
Estate of Cartwright is distinguishable. The lion's share of the corporate
liabilities in that case which were found to offset the insurance proceeds were not
obligations of the corporation to redeem its own stock. Rather, we determined
that approximately $4 million of the $5 million liability of the corporation was to
compensate the decedent shareholder for services; i.e., for his interest in work in
progress. Thus, a substantial portion of the liability was no different from any
third-party liability of the corporation that would be netted against assets,
including insurance proceeds, to ascertain net assets.
Concededly, a portion of the liability in Estate of Cartwright constituted an
obligation to redeem stock being valued. Nonetheless, in contrast to the instant
case, the buy-sell agreement in Estate of Cartwright had not been disregarded
pursuant to section 20.2031-2(h), Estate Tax Regs., or section 2703; indeed, our
principal task in Estate of Cartwright was to construe the terms of the buy-sell
agreement, which was fully respected. Given the disregarded status of the buysell agreement at issue here, Estate of Cartwright has no application.
Accordingly, we conclude that the $3,146,134 in insurance proceeds due BCC
upon decedent's death should be treated as a nonoperating asset of BCC and is
not offset by BCC's $4 million obligation to redeem decedent's shares.
Not decided under section 2703, but having great relevance to it, is Estate of H. A. True, Jr. v.
Commissioner, 390 F. 3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004) which dealt with the application of buy-sell agreements to value
under section 2031 in a pre-2703 context. The court noted that section 2703 essentially codified the rules it applied.
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The decedent, his wife, and three sons owned six companies, four were involved in oil and gas exploration,
marketing, and transportation and the other two were ranches. Over a long period of time interests in the businesses
were transferred and each were subject to essentially the same kind of buy-sell arrangement which set a purchase
price of book value (sometimes excluding particular assets). The court found that a buy-sell would set the value of
assets for estate and gift tax purposes if the price is determinable from the agreement, the agreement is binding
through life and at death, the agreement is legally binding and enforceable, and was entered into for bona fide
business reasons and not as a testamentary substitute. It was the fmal test which was at issue.
The court held that the buy-sells were testamentary substitutes.
As we have pointed out, where the price term in a buy-sell agreement is reached
in an arbitrary manner, is not based on an appraisal of the subject interest, or is
done without professional guidance or consultation, courts draw an inference
that the buy-sell agreement is a testamentary substitute. See Cameron W.
Bommer Revocable Trust, T.C.M. (RIA) 97380 at 2425 (inference of
testamentary device where decedent failed to obtain professional appraisal for
properties and did nothing more than consult attorney who came up with price
term in one day for interests listed in buy- sell agreement); Lauder II, T.C.M.
(RIA) 92736 at 3732 (price term reached after only informal consultation with
close family fmancial advisor and without any formal appraisals of company); cf
Estate of Gloeckner, 152 F.3d at 216 (inference of testamentary intent
diminished, in part, by fact that decedent hired independent accountant to value
stock listed in buy-sell agreement). Here, Dave True sought only a limited
amount of professional advice in determining to use the tax book value for the
price terms in the buy-sell agreements, and he did not substantially rely on any
independent appraisals in doing so.
Cloyd Harris, a long time friend and accountant of the True family and their
companies, testified that Dave wanted to pick a value that "was easily
determined, without having to hire appraisers and oil field engineers and so on to
come up with a valuation." Rec., vol. II at 233. In discussions with Dave about
the manner in which he might bring his children into the family businesses, ide at
228, Mr. Harris said he did not object to the use of tax book value in the buy-sell
agreements. Id. at 232. Nevertheless, he did express some concern that when
valuing the different True companies as stand-alone operations, "it would be
very hard to justify book value or income tax basis value as fair market value...
. If [one] were looking at a liquidating situation, then it would not have been a
true value, but [the True companies were] an ongoing operating situation." Id. at
233-34. Mr. Harris believed "book value was not out of line," ide at 234, as a
method of pricing the interests in the buy-sell agreements.
Dave True did obtain one appraisal in connection with his 1973 gift of True Oil
to his children. See Estate of True, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 40; rec., vol. II at 20506. However, the record indicates that at most the appraisal of True Oil was
obtained and reviewed for litigation purposes during the 1973 gift tax case, rec.,
vol. II at 206, and was not relied upon by the children when entering into the
agreements with their father. Id. at 328. Nor do taxpayers present evidence of
any other appraisals obtained in connection with the children's subsequent entry
into buy-sell agreements with their parents for the other True companies.
Therefore, for the majority of interests at issue here, there were no outside
evaluations of the value of the companies for the purpose of determining whether
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their fair market value was adequately represented by the price terms in the buysell agreements. In similar fashion to the courts in Cameron W. Bommer
Revocable Trust and Lauder II, which expressed concern regarding experienced
businessmen setting price terms in buy-sell agreements with only the most
limited of professional advice, Cameron W. Bommer Revocable Trust, T.C.M.
(RIA) 97380 at 2425; Lauder II, T.C.M. (RIA) 92736 at 3732, we agree with the
tax court's determination that the manner by which Dave True selected the price
terms for the buy-sell agreements contributes to a finding that the agreements
were testamentary substitutes.
The court in Lauder II also noted that where the price term in a buy-sell
agreement excluded the value of intangible assets, a further inference could be
drawn that the agreement in question served a testamentary purpose. Id. Here,
the nature of tax book value accounting for True Oil allowed the company's
proven oil and gas reserves to be omitted "because the reserves were essentially
purchased with earnings from the other True companies and their value likely
would be dissipated in the unsuccessful search for replacement reserves." Estate
of True, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 69; see also ide at 63,70-71; rec., vol. II at 234-43.
Hence,
while we appreciate that an adjusted book value formula may provide a
simple and inexpensive means for evaluating shares in a company, we
cannot passively accept such a formula where, as here, it appears to
have been adopted in order to minimize or mask the true value of the
[interests] in question.
Lauder II, T.C.M. (RIA) 92736 at 3732.
Another factor considered by the tax court in making its testamentary purpose
determination was that the buy-sell agreements did not contain within their
provisions a mechanism by which to reevaluate the price terms listed therein.
See, e.g., Cameron W. Bommer Revocable Trust, T.C.M. (RIA) 97380 at 2424,
2426 (lack of periodic revaluation of price term one factor contributing to
conclusion that buy-sell agreement was testamentary substitute). The tax court
concluded, and we agree, that unrelated parties negotiating at arm's length would
likely have required a periodic reevaluation of the use of tax book accounting to
value the interests in the buy-sell agreements. As Mr. Harris testified, keeping
True Oil's books on a tax value accounting method and employing the
accelerated depreciation methods permitted thereunder took into account the
company's practice of expending the value of proven oil and gas reserves to
fmance the costly search for new reserves. Rec., vol. II at 234-43. If the
company were to cease operating in such a manner, however, the tax book value
accounting method would not be the best manner by which to value the company
because the values of its reserves would not be considered. One would thus
expect arm's length parties to require a regular reevaluation of True Oil's pricing
formula, especially to the extent it took into account or omitted the company's
proven reserves. Similarly, Eighty-Eight Oil, which was labeled as one of the
True companies which generated "large sums of cash," ide at 242, was
nonetheless reported at a negative tax book value upon Tamrna's sale of her
interests in that company to her brothers and parents. Rec., ex. 154-J, attachment
D. Parties operating at arm's length would have certainly required the buy-sell
agreements to include within their terms a method by which to reevaluate the
price terms of the company in light of such a disparity.
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Additionally, when the True children entered into the buy-sell agreements, there
was no negotiation between the children and their father as to the terms of the
agreements. The parties discussed the agreements and the reasons for the
restrictions contained therein, rec., vol. II at 81, 84, 97, 303, 321-22; id., vol. III
at 432, but the children did not engage in any bargaining with their father about
the terms, rec., vol. II at 303. They did not seek outside counsel to represent their
interests when entering or exiting the agreements, ide at 102, 298, 299, 361-62,
nor did they have any knowledge as to who drafted the agreements, ide at 362;
id., vol. III at 471. Rather, they were presented with a business opportunity
crafted by their father which they could accept or reject. Id. at 83-84, 132, 304;
id., vol. III at 432. In Lauder II, the tax court expressed concern about a buy-sell
agreement in which the family patriarch appeared to decide unilaterally the
formula price for the exchanged interests. Lauder II, T.C.M. (RIA) 92736 at
3732. Similarly, in Cameron W. Bommer Revocable Trust, the tax court viewed
with suspicion a buy-sell agreement that was not reached by bona fide
negotiations with respect to the price terms, and in which all the parties to the
agreement were represented by the same lawyer. Cameron W. Bommer
Revocable Trust, T.C.M. (RIA) 97380 at 2425.
Finally, what we deem most telling are the facts surrounding Tamma's departure
from the True companies. Prior thereto, her father's will generally provided that
the residue of his estate would pass to Jean, with the remainder passing to his
four children in equal shares upon Jean's death. Rec., ex. 14-J at 1-2. After
Tamma's departure from the businesses, she was wholly excluded from any
interest in her father's estate. Tamma was removed from Dave's will, ide at ex.
11-J, and was no longer listed as a beneficiary under his living trust agreement,
ide at ex. 12-J, 13-J. In a document exercising a power of appointment in favor of
his living trust, Dave specifically noted that Tamma's potential inheritance had
been fully satisfied when she severed her financial ties with the True companies.
Id. at 13-J at 4. At trial, Diemer testified he was aware his father excluded
Tamma from his will after she sold her interests in the companies. He stated he
and his father talked about the issue and that Dave "was very committed to
keeping the businesses together, and he felt, on his death, that the cash [from the
estate] would be necessary to keep-to stay in the business. And so, it was a
conscious decision, I believe, since he made that comment, to make that
decision." Rec., vol. II at 123.
Taxpayers also reported that at the time of his death, Dave's total estate was
worth just over $120 million, forty-four percent of which represented the
reported value attributable to Dave's interests in the True companies. Aplt. supp.
br. at 2, 7.11 If, as taxpayers contend, the buy-sell agreements were not
testamentary substitutes, Tamma likely would have been excluded only from that
percentage of her father's estate relating to his interests in the True companies.
Instead, she garnered no benefit from her father's estate, not even from the
portion not directly associated with the True companies.
Like the court deciding Estate of Godley, in which the decedent indicated in a
deposition prior to his death that the transfer of certain interests to his son was a
gift executed for the purpose of circumventing estate tax liability, Estate of
Godley, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) at 161, we have trouble ignoring Dave's own
statement in exercising his power of appointment that Tamma's inheritance had
been satisfied by the sale of her interests in the True companies. Diemer's
testimony supporting the same position, as well as Tamma's exclusion from the
large percentage of her father's reported estate values not associated with the
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True companies, clearly support an inference that the buy-sell agreements served
as testamentary substitutes for Dave True.
The court noted that there were factors to the contrary but obviously gave little weight to them. Footnote 10
states:
We acknowledge that factors such as the decedent's health, the consistent
enforcement of the agreements, and the binding of all parties equally regardless
of who died fITst, weigh in favor of taxpayers' argument that the buy-sell
agreements were not testamentary devices. Dave True was in good health in
1971 and 1973 when he entered into the buy-sell agreements with his children
for True Oil and Belle Fourche Pipeline, and there is no indication Dave's health
was in jeopardy as the children gained interests in the other family businesses.
Similarly, the tax court found the True family was generally quite consistent in
complying with the terms of the buy-sell agreements and executed formal
waivers where deviation from the agreements' terms was appropriate. Estate of
True, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 61. Finally, taxpayers are correct to note that the buysell agreements bound all the parties equally, regardless of who died fITst. See,
e.g., Estate of Bischoff v. C.I.R., 69 T.C. 32, 41 (1977) (buy-sell agreement not
testamentary device where all provisions equally applicable to all partners);
Estate of Littick, 31 T.C. at 187 (where agreement equally binding on all family
members regardless of who died fITst, no testamentary intent found). But we are
not persuaded that these factors outweigh the many other indicators that the buysell agreements served as testamentary substitutes for Dave True. See, e.g.,
Lauder II, T.C.M. (RIA) 92736 at 3731-32 (court acknowledged that good
health of decedent at time of entering into agreements, long period of time
between execution of agreements and decedent's death, the parties' consistent
adherence to the agreements, and fact that any bound party could have
predeceased the others, all supported taxpayers' argument that buy-sell
agreements were not testamentary substitutes; however, other factors compelled
court to conclude otherwise).
R.

SECTION 6166 - EXTENSION OF TIME TO PAY TAX
1.

Ten-Year Statute of Limitations. In United States v. Askegard, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (D. Minn.

2005) the estate disposed of various parcels of land, used in the family farm which was a closely held business,
before 1991 and had the liens released on them. The value of those added to between 31 % and 32% of the amount
for which the election was made, rather than 33%. Thus the 10 year statute of limitations did not begin to run and
the government could sue in 2001 to collect unpaid taxes and interest.
S.

TAX ADMINISTRATION
1.

Circular 230. On December 20, 2004 the.IRS issued fmal regulations governing practice before

the Internal Revenue Service, Circular 230. T. D. 9165. Additional final regulations were issued on May 19, 2005.
T. D. 9201. The new rules are effective June 20, 2005 and mean that all written tax advice must be reviewed
carefully for compliance.
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2.

Simultaneous Work for the IRS Did Not Mean Estate Improperly Represented. In L. Sexton,

2005-1, USTC P60,499, the attorney for an estate was also an expert for the IRS in an unrelated real estate valuation
matter. Before trial in the Tax Court the judge indicated it was unlikely the estate would win; the estate's attorney
advised the executor to accept a settlement and the executor agreed.

Subsequently new counsel on behalf of the

estate claimed that the settlement should be set aside on account of the estate attorney's conflict of interest. The Tax
Court found there was no credible evidence that the attorney's employment by the IRS harmed the estate and the
Ninth Circuit affIrmed.

3.

Providing Tax Return to Heirs at Law. Rev. Rul. 2004-68, 2004-31 IRB 118, provides that the

income tax return of an intestate decedent for the calendar year prior to decedent's death shall be open to inspection
or disclosure to any heir at law or next of kin who is a distributee of the decedent's probate estate. Further, other
income tax returns may be disclosed to any heir at law or next of kin who can show he or she has a material interest
which will be affected by the information in the requested return. A "material interest" is an important interest that is
financial in nature.
4.

Duty of Consistency. In Estate of Rose B. Posner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-112, the

court determined that a trust was not included in a surviving spouse's estate because she had no general power of
appointment. However, when the first spouse had died, in 1975, the IRS had allowed a marital deduction thinking
she did.
One of the issues was the duty of consistency, which the opinion described as follows:
As developed in caselaw, the duty of consistency (sometimes called quasiestoppel) prevents a taxpayer from benefiting in a later year from an error or
omission in an earlier year that cannot be corrected because the time to assess
tax for the earlier year has expired. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C.
290, 296 (1997), affd. without published opinion 212 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2000).
The duty of consistency may apply if: (1) The taxpayer made a representation of
fact or reported an item for tax purposes in one tax year; (2) the Commissioner
acquiesced in or relied on that fact for that. year; and (3) the taxpayer desires to
change the representation previously made in a later tax year after the earlier
year has been closed by the statute of limitations. Id. at 297; LeFever v.
Commissioner, 103 T. C. 525, 543 (1994), affd. 100 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1996).
Spouses, as well as their estates, may have sufficient identity of interests so that
one may be estopped under the duty of consistency by a prior representation of
the other. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, supra at 298; Cluck v. Commissioner,
105 T.C. 324, 333-336 (1995). Respondent contends that Mr. Posner's estate and
decedent's estate have sufficient identity of interests that the duty of consistency
is applicable. For purposes of this discussion, we assume, without deciding, that
there was privity of interest between Mr. Posner's estate and decedent's estate.
On brief, respondent acknowledges that the duty of consistency applies "if the
inconsistency is a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law. It does
not apply to mutual mistake on the part of a taxpayer and the Service concerning
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a pure question of law." See LeFever v. Commissioner, 100 F.3d at 788;
Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d" 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75
T.C. 497, 560 (1980); Unvert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 807, 816 (1979), affd.
656 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1981). With little elaboration, respondent contends on
brief that the inconsistency in question here is a "mixed question of fact and
law", so that the duty of consistency applies. We disagree.
In Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1956), the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that the duty of consistency "is probably
applicable in cases where the factual situation is such as to justify the taxpayer in
taking either of two possible positions" but generally does not apply "when the
error is one of law arising out of a definite factual situation". In the instant case,
the inconsistency arose because of a mutual mistake in deciding how Mr.
Posner's will should be construed under Maryland law -- a purely legal issue. See
McIntyre v. Byrne, 141 A. 2d 692, 695 (Md. 1958) ("The construction of a will
is a matter of law for the court to determine"). Mr. Posner's estate did not
misrepresent the property or type of property that Mr. Posner had devised to
decedent. Respondent has not alleged any facts to show that the estate has been
inconsistent with respect to any factual positions or to suggest that the
inconsistency in question arose from anything other than a purely legal error in
the context of "a definite factual situation". Crosley Corp. v. United States, supra
at 380.
The interpretation of the Will was at issue in prolonged litigation in state court. The executor ultimately
lost the argument, which the court found important:
Moreover, the duty of consistency "does not apply where all pertinent facts are
known to both the Commissioner and the taxpayer", especially if "the crucial
facts are known to both parties and the erroneous deductions are due to a mutual
mistake of law." S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 560; cf.
Interlochen Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1956), affg. 24 T.C.
1000 (1955); Hull v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1937) (stating
that "a party either knowing the facts, or in a position to know them, cannot
claim the benefit of estoppel"), revg. 33 B.T.A. 178 (1935). In the instant case,
respondent had reason to know all the relevant facts. When Mr. Posner's estate
filed its estate tax return, it adequately disclosed the relevant facts and
documents, attaching a copy of Mr. Posner's will.15 Respondent audited the
estate tax return of Mr. Posner's estate and allowed the marital deduction.16
Respondent has not alleged any facts to suggest that this audit was insufficient in
any regard other than in the failure to apply the law correctly. Under these
circumstances, respondent cannot be viewed as justifiably relying on the legal
representation on the estate tax return of Mr. Posner's estate.
The executor of Mr. Posner's estate and the executor of decedent's estate, as well
as respondent's agents upon audit of Mr. Posner's estate's estate tax return, all
acted in accordance with the mutual mistake of law that Mr. Posner's will gave
decedent a general power of appointment. Indeed, when he filed the estate tax
return of decedent's estate, decedent's executor included the marital trust
property in decedent's gross estate and paid the resulting estate tax. He
steadfastly maintained in the State court litigation that decedent possessed a
testamentary power of appointment over the marital trust property. Only after the
court of special appeals rejected this position and the Maryland Court of Appeals
declined to hear the appeal did he file the refund claim. Respondent has not
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carried his burden to show that the duty of consistency should apply in these
circumstances.
The IRS applied the duty of consistency in TAM 200407018. The facts are interesting; oil paintings passed
in a life estate to decedent's spouse for which no QTIP election was made, and other paintings passed into a QTIP
trust. A pastel painting was allocated to the QTIP trust. The surviving spouse died and the painting was sold, and
determined actually to be an oil painting. The surviving spouse's estate excluded the proceeds of the sale. The IRS
disagreed, stating:
As described above, the doctrine applies where the same taxpayer makes
conflicting representations. However, the duty of consistency can also be applied
to bind one person to a representation made by another where the two are
deemed to be in privity. Whether there is sufficient identity of interests between
the parties to warrant the application of the duty of consistency depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C.
290 (1997); Cluck v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. at 333-336 (concluding that a
husband and wife can have interests so closely aligned that one spouse may be
estopped under the duty of consistency doctrine by the prior representations of
the other spouse). See also, Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211 (8th Cir.
1973) (estate beneficiary was bound by representation of value made by the
executor-beneficiary of the estate); Griffith v. United States, 27 AFTR 2d 754
(N.D. Tex. 1971); McMillan v. United States, 14 AFTR 2d 5704 (S.D. W. Va.
1964); Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Ford v. United States,
276 F.2d 17 (Ct. CI. 1960) (estate beneficiaries who were minors at the time the
estate was administered were not bound by estate representations as to the value
of inherited property).
In Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, cited above, the decedent's husband's will
created a marital trust for the benefit of the decedent that was intended to qualify
as QTIP property, for purposes of the federal estate tax marital deduction.
Decedent's only interests in the trust were a right to receive all trust income, a
right to withdraw up to $40,000 per year and a right to receive at the trustee's
discretion, distributions of principal for her comfort maintenance and support. In
preparing Schedule M of the estate tax return, the executors of husband's estate
checked the "no" box, utilized to signify that a QTIP election was not being
made. However, the executors claimed a marital deduction for the value of the
property passing to the marital trust. Upon the decedent's death, the decedent's
estate contended that the marital trust was not includible in the Decedent's gross
estate under section 2044, or any other Code section, on the basis that the
husband's estate, by checking the "no" box, had not treated the property as QTIP
property. Further, other than the power to withdraw $40,000 annually, the
decedent had no general power of appointment over the property justifying
inclusion under section 2041. The taxpayer further argued that a duty of
consistency did not apply between the decedent's estate and the estate of her
husband.
However, the Tax Court disagreed and found that there was a sufficient identity
of interests between the husband's estate and decedent's estate such that the duty
of consistency would apply. Initially, the Tax Court noted that, "[i]t is a basic
policy of the marital deduction that property that passes untaxed from a
predeceasing spouse to a surviving spouse is included in the gross estate of the
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surviving spouse." Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 295. The court
then concluded:
There is a sufficient identity of interests between the Estates of James
Letts, Jr., and of decedent to trigger the duty of consistency. Decedent
and James Letts, Jr. were married. Their estates were a single economic
unit. Decedent's husband left his estate to decedent, James P. Letts III,
and Joanne Magbee [husband and decedent's children]. Decedent was
an executrix of her husband's estate. James P. Letts III signed both
returns. JoAnne Magbee is also a co-executor of, signed the estate tax
return for, decedent's estate.
Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 298.
In the instant case, we believe that the duty of consistency does apply to bind the
Decedent's estate to the representations made by H's estate regarding the
qualification of Painting for the marital deduction. Initially, we note that all three
elements required for application of the duty of consistency have been satisfied.
For purposes of the duty of consistency, a taxpayer's treatment of an item on a
return can be a representation that facts exist which are consistent with how the
taxpayer reports the item on the return. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109
T.C. at 299. Several representations were made by H's estate on the estate tax
return, regarding the treatment of the Painting for estate tax purposes. An
appraisal attached to the federal estate tax return, identified Painting as a
"pastel". H's estate represented that Painting passed under Section V of H's will.
Further, by identifying the property as passing under Section V and claiming a
marital deduction for Painting, the estate represented that Decedent possessed a
life estate coupled with a general power of appointment with respect to Painting,
that qualified Painting for the marital deduction under section 2056(b)(5). Thus,
the fIrst element has been met. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 300.
Further, the Service relied on the representations that Painting passed under
Section V of the will, that Decedent had a general power of appointment with
respect to Painting, and therefore that the Painting qualified for the marital
deduction. The Service relies on a fact if a taxpayer files a return that contains an
inadequately disclosed item of which the Service was not otherwise aware, the
Service accepts the return, and the time to assess tax expires without an audit of
that return. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 300. In the instant case,
there was nothing on the estate tax return to alert the IRS as to any issue
presented regarding the treatment of Painting, nor did H's estate provide any
facts to show that Painting should have passed under Section IV and was not
subject to the marital deduction. Thus, based on the representations made on the
estate tax return, the Service allowed the marital deduction with respect to
Painting. The Service may rely on a presumption of correctness of a return that is
given to the Service under the penalties of perjury. Hughes & Luce, L.L.P. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-559. Further, the time to make an adjustment
and assess tax with respect to H's estate has expired. Thus, the second element of
the duty of consistency has been satisfied.

***
Although H's estate and Decedent's estate are different taxpayers, there is
sufficient privity between H's estate and Decedent's estate such that Decedent's
estate is bound by the representations made by H's estate under the duty of
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consistency doctrine. Specifically, H and Decedent were married. As the court
noted in Estate of Letts, the basic policy rationale underlying the allowance of
the estate tax marital deduction is that the property for which a deduction is
allowed in the estate of the frrst spouse to die will be included in the gross estate
of the second spouse to die. Thus, H's estate derived a specific tax benefit, a
marital deduction, presumptively conditioned on consistent treatment of the
assets for which a deduction was allowed in Decedent's estate. Accordingly, for
transfer tax purposes, the two estates are treated as a single economic unit. Next,
as a practical matter, H's estate and Decedent's estate functioned as a single
economic unit, pursuant to which H's estate's property was to be available to the
spouse during her lifetime and then pass to Son 1 and Son 2 when she died. Son
1 and Son 2 are the remainder beneficiaries of the interests created under Section
IV and Section V of H's will, and the marital trust created under the residuary
clause of H's will. The Section V property and the residuary marital trust are also
included in Decedent's gross estate. Moreover, Decedent was a co-executor of
H's estate. As co-executor, Decedent signed the Form 706 declaring, under the
penalties of perjury, that she had examined the return, including accompanying
schedules and statements, and to the best of her knowledge and belief, the return
was true, correct and complete. Thus, as was the case in Estate of Letts, H's
estate and Decedent's estate were in privity, both for purposes of disposing ofH's
property and for transfer tax purposes.
However, Decedent's estate contends that H's estate and Decedent's estate were
not in privity, and therefore, the duty of consistency does not apply. In this
regard, the estate notes that Decedent had little involvement with the preparation
of H's estate's Form 706, and relied on the other co-executors to make all
decisions regarding the Form 706, including the decision to characterize Painting
as Section V property.
It has been clearly established by several courts that a co-executor's lack of
participation does not preclude the application of the duty of consistency. In
Beltzer v. United States, the taxpayer, a co-executor of his father's estate,
inherited stock that had been reported on the estate tax return as having a fair
market value of $59,713. After the statute of limitations on assessments against
the estate expired, the taxpayer sold his shares for $140,000. For purposes of
determining gain on the sale of the stock, the taxpayer asserted that the stock had
a fair market value of $118,020 on the date of his father's death, despite the fact
that he had signed the estate tax return and had received the benefit of the lower
reported estate tax value. The taxpayer argued that he should not be bound by
the estate's representation of value, because he relied on his co-executor to
prepare the estate tax return. The court rejected this argument stating: "A
taxpayer, in this situation, innocent or otherwise, who has already had the
advantages of a past alleged misstatement -- such advantage now beyond
recoupment -- may not change his posture, and by claiming he should have
properly paid more tax before, avoid the present levy." Beltzer v. United States,
495 F.2d at 212-13. See also, Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 298299; McMillan v. United States, 14 AFTR 2d at 5704.
In Conrad Janis, et ux. et at v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-117, the issue was whether the taxpayer
could calculate a gallery's cost of goods sold using the undiscounted value of the gallery's collection of artwork
rather than the discounted value used for federal estate tax purposes. The court applied the duty of consistency:
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Respondent has established that all three elements of the duty of consistency are
present in this. case. Conrad and Carroll agreed that the discounted value of the
collection was $14,500,000, and the Commissioner relied upon that value in
assessing the estate tax owed by Sidney's estate. Once the period for assessment
against Sidney's estate had closed, however, petitioners claimed that the
collection's undiscounted value should be used to calculate the gallery's COGS.
Because all three elements of the duty of consistency are satisfied, we hold that
petitioners are bound to use the collection's discounted value as their basis for
purposes of calculating the gallery's COGS for 1990 through 1997.

T.

MISCELLANEOUS
1.

Application of Florida Stamp Tax to Transfers Between Grantor and Wholly-Owned

Grantee. In Crescent Miami Center, LLC v. Florida Department of Revenue, _

So. 2d _ , 2005 WL 1176053,

(FI. S.Ct. 2005), the Court determined that a transfer of property between a grantor and its wholly-owned grantee,
absent exchange of value, is without consideration and not subject to the stamp tax imposed by section 201.02(1) of
the Florida Statutes. Here, Crescent Real Estate Equities, LP was the sole owner of CRE Management IX, LLC,
which was in turn the sole general partner of Crescent Real Estate Funding IX, LP. Crescent Real Estate Equities,
LP was also the sole limited partner of Crescent Real Estate Funding IX, LP. Crescent Real Estate Equities, LP
formed Crescent Miami Center, LLC, with 99.9% owned by Crescent Real Estate Funding IX, LP and 0.1 % owned
by CRE Management IX, LLC. Crescent Real Estate Equities, LP then transferred a parcel of real property to
Crescent Miami Center, LLC. If, on the other hand, a transfer is not among sole owners - - for instance, real estate
transferred by two of three partners to a partnership - - the tax would apply. See Muben~Lamar, L.P. v. Department
of Revenue, 763 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), review granted but subsequently dismissed, 789 So. 2d 337 (Fla.
2001).

2.

ERISA Pre-Empts State Slayer Statute. Most states have a statute which limit the ability of a

person who murders another from receiving benefits on account of the murder - -e.g. intestate shares, joint account
proceeds, life insurance proceeds.

In Ahmed v. Ahmed, Slip Cop, 2005 WL 858176 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), the

Ohio Court of Appeals held that ERISA preempted the Ohio statute with respect to group term insurance provided
under a plan covered by ERISA.

3.

Lawyer Retained by Testator to Disinherit Beneficiary Whom Lawyer Represents on

Unrelated Matters. ABA Formal Opinion 05-434 states that there is normally no conflict of interest when a lawyer
is engaged by a testator to disinherit a beneficiary whom the lawyer represents on unrelated matters, unless doing so
would violate a legal obligation of the testator to the beneficiary or unless there is a significant risk that the lawyer's
representation of the testator will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to the beneficiary. The
opinion states:
The preparation of an instrument disinheriting a beneficiary ordinarily is a
simple, straightforward, almost ministerial task, without call for the lawyer to
consider alternative courses of action, and it is difficult to imagine a
circumstance in which a responsibility of the lawyer to her other client (even a
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client who is a presumptive beneficiary of the testator's bounty) would pose a
significant risk of limiting the lawyer's ability to discharge her professional
obligations to the testator. The lawyer's representation of a testator does not, of
itself, create responsibilities owed by the lawyer to prospective beneficiaries
(even one who is the lawyer's client as to an unrelated matter), other than the
duty to effect the testator's intent as expressed explicitly or implicitly in the
instrument. If, however, because of her relationship with the other client, the
lawyer finds it repugnant or distasteful to carry out the assignment, or has good
faith doubts as to whether there is a significant risk that she will be able to
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the testator, then the
lawyer may decline the engagement.
4.

Statute of Limitations Inapplicable to Trustee's Refund Claim. Wachovia Bank erroneously

filed income tax returns in 1997 and 1998 for a charitable remainder trust. Wachovia sought a refund more than
three years after the returns were filed and the IRS denied the claim citing section 6511 (a). A U. S. District Court
disagreed with the IRS holding that the clear language of section 6511 (a) states that claims for refunds "in respect of
which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return
was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid" whichever is later. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. United States, 95
A.F.T.R. 2d 2005-1939 (M.D. Fla. 2005). The Court held that because Wachovia was not required to file a return
section 6511 does not apply.
5.

Publication 559: Survivors, Executors, and Administrators for Use in Preparing 2004

Returns. The publication is designed to help those in charge of estates complete and file federal income tax returns.

6.

Bankruptcy of an LLC Member. In Movitz v. Fiesta, 319 B. R. 200 (2005), the Bankruptcy

Court held that if a member of an LLC, other than the manager, files a Chapter 7 petition, the bankruptcy trustee
acquires all of the member's rights and interests, rather than is only a judgment creditor, unless the operating
agreement of an LLC imposes obligations on its members and is, therefore, an executory contract. In order to be an
executory contract the operating agreement must impose obligations on the members which is "so material that if the
member did not perform it, Fiesta would owe no further obligations to that member."
The LLC had been created for estate planning purposes: to remove assets from parents' estates and to
accumulate assets for the benefit of children. The court found no obligation assumed by the members in that plan
nor any as part of the operating agreement itself. Indeed the closest the court came to finding an obligation on the
part of a member was an obligation not to withdraw but because the member would receive $1.00 if he or she did
withdraw the court characterized refraining from withdrawal as an option rather than an obligation. Where partners
or members had capital requirements or were obligated to participate in management it is likely that an agreement
would be executory.
The bankruptcy trustee was in court complaining about loans to other members, redemptions of other
members' interests. The court held that the trustee could pursue any action which a member could pursue.
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A similar issue was addressed by Vice-Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court in Milford Power
Company, LLC v. PDC Milford Power, LLC, 866 A.2d 738 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004). There the parties agreed that the
LLC agreement was an executory contract because the member in question (PDC) had an important managerial role
in the LLC. The LLC agreement provided that upon a member's filing for bankruptcy the member will automatically
be deemed to have withdrawn from the agreement and assigned its interest to the remaining members (referred to as
an Ipso Facto clause). The opinion extensively reviews case-law and commentator opinion with respect to Ipso
Facto clauses and reaches an idiosyncratic result, declining to hold that the Bankruptcy Code entirely preempts Ipso
Facto clauses nor to hold that there is no preemption at all. Instead, the court allowed the member to remain in the
LLC for economic purposes but not governance purposes. The case may be profitably read for its discussion of the
issue.

7.

Medicaid Support Trusts. To ensure that a trust is not considered an available resource to the

creditors of a beneficiary, particularly, Medicaid, the safest path continues to be for the trust to be purely
discretionary, ideally with other beneficiaries as well. In In re Barkema Trust, 690 N. W. 2d 50 (Iowa, 2004), the
court included the assets of a trust for the support of a beneficiary in the beneficiary's estate for purposes of a
Medicaid claim. In Estate of DeMartine v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services, 861 A. 2d 138 (N.J.
2004), the decedent's wife died six months before he did leaving a trust, still unfunded at his death, which would pay
the income to the decedent for his lifetime and principal for his "nonsupport needs." The court concluded this was
an arrangement for the conveyance of the assets of a Medicaid beneficiary and thus were properly part of the
decedent's estate for Medicaid claim purposes. For comparison see Corcoran v. Department of Social Services, 859
A.2d 533 (Conn. 2004) (distributions subject to an ascertainable standard created a support trust) and Zeoli v.
Commissioner of Social Services, 425 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1979) (distributions in trustee's discretion with precatory
guidance as to intent did not create a support trust).
8.

Tax Apportionment. In Seegel v. Miller, 820 N.E. 2d 809 (Mass. 2005) the decedent's Will and

Revocable Trust provided for estate taxes to be paid from residue in a normal marital deduction, exemption
equivalent situation. However, subsequent to executing his estate plan, Mr. Miller made numerous large inter vivos
gifts which substantially depleted his exemption equivalent. The estate asked that the court reform Mr. Miller's Will
and Trust to provide for estate tax apportionment among the transfers which caused the estate tax, so as to protect the
marital trust from bearing any share of the tax (and thus creating "tax on tax"). The court agreed.
In Estate of Smith v. Smith, 891 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 2005), Mr. Smith died without a Will but with three life
insurance policies: a $2,000,000 policy payable to his father; a $125,000 policy payable to his former wife; and a
$30,000 policy payable to his current wife. The total estate was about $9,400,000 of which only the insurance
created any estate tax liability. At issue was whether the tax was apportioned on the amount of the taxable estate or
gross estate. The trial court had apportioned the tax based on the gross estate with the result that the recipient of the
non-insurance assets paid substantial tax. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and held that apportionment was
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based on the taxable estate, because the Mississippi apportionment statute directs that if there is a federal
apportionment it will be the state rule. Thus section 2206 of the Code controls.
The Alabama apportionment statute is pay taxes from residue. In Hollis v. Forrester, _
WL 2415923 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), af!'d by Exparte Forrester, _

So. 2d _ , 2004

So. 2d. _ , 2005 WL 797405 (Ala. 2005), at

husband's death a QTIP trust was created (called the "Non-Exempt Marital Trust"). Wife's Will did not contain any
direction about the payment of estate taxes. Section 2207A apportioned the federal estate taxes due on account of
the trust to the trust but the Alabama apportionment statute apportioned Alabama estate taxes to the residue.
9.

Recovery for Premature OPRT Termination is Allowed in Wrongful Death Action. A New

York trial court has allowed recovery in a wrongful death case for the early termination of a Qualified Personal
Residence Trust. Del Broccolo v. Torres, 780 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. 2004). The grantor of a QPRT was killed in a car
accident eight months before the QPRT term ended, thus losing the tax advantages of the QPRT. The court allowed
the future tax benefit to be considered in awarding damages holding that the law with respect to the QPRT was not
speculative or subject to change on these facts.

10.

Application of Bankruptcy Act to Domestic Asset Protection Trusts. The Bankruptcy Abuse

Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 adds a new "clawback" provision which affects transfers to
domestic asset protection trusts. The Bankruptcy Trustee may include as part of the debtor's estate transfers made
by a debtor to a self-settled trust within 10 years of the bankruptcy filing if the transfer was made with the actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud present or future creditors. The provision also includes transfers to any "similar
device" within the clawback provision. For instance, will a transfer to a qualified plan, which would be exempt
otherwise from claims in bankruptcy, within 10 years be subject to the provision? An amendment to the Act which
would have clarified that such was not the case was defeated.
The requirement that "actual intent" be proven may be helpful if bona fide reasons other than asset
protection can be shown for the creation of a trust in a jurisdiction which exempts self-settled trusts from the claims
of creditors. Income tax planning and long-term or perpetual trust periods would seem to be potential such reasons.
Suppose a trust is created for the benefit of transferor's spouse and children without standards. Transferor retains a
testamentary special power of appointment so that there is no completed gift to the trust when it is funded. Suppose
further than the transferor's spouse is also given a testamentary special power of appointment and exercises that
power by Will to appoint the trust assets to a trust for the transferor's benefit. What is the effect of such a trust upon
the transferor's bankruptcy if the transferor's spouse is still alive?
Transfers to charity are protected if they do not exceed 15% of the debtor's gross annual income (or, if they
do, if such transfers were consistent with the prior practices of the debtor in making charitable contributions).
Transfers to section 529 plans and education IRAs are protected to some extent but not entirely.
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The best way to ensure that an asset is not subject to the claims of a person's creditors remains for the
person never to have had an interest in the asset. Trusts created by parents for children, for instance.
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I.

Introduction
A.

On Dece~ber 20, 2004, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the Treasury
published final amendments to Circular 230 dealing with tax shelter opinions
(now referred to as "covered opinions"), required procedures that must be
followed by firms that issue such opinions to ensure compliance with the new
rules, and so-called "best practices" that tax professionals should follow to
preserve public confidence in the tax system. In addition, the IRS issued a
proposed amendment to Circular 230 dealing with state and local bond opinions.

B.

In response to numerous comments from a number of professional organizations,
the IRS and Treasury issued modifications to the final regulations of May 18,
2005, adding a definition of a principal purpose transaction, liberalizing the
disclosure requirements, and adding three kinds of written advice to the kinds of
advice that are not subject to the covered opinion requirements: post return
advice, advice given to an employer by an employee, and so-called negative
advice.

c.

Circular 230, found in 31 CFR part 10, was initially issued in 1921. It contains
rules governing the recognition of attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled
agents, and other persons representing taxpayers before the IRS (practitioners)
and prescribes the duties and restrictions relating to practice before the IRS and
sanctions for violating the regulations, as well as providing rules applicable to
disciplinary proceedings.

D.

The IRS and the Treasury had published proposed regulations dealing with lnost
of the issues covered in the final amendments on December 30, 2003. Notably,
the proposed amendments referred to "tax shelter opinions," while the final
amendments refer to "covered opinions." This subtle change in terminology is
accompanied with what many perceive as a broadening of the kinds of opinions
subject to detailed requirements.
1.

It is arguable that the final regulations do not significantly expand the
scope of the types of opinion that must satisfy the covered opinion
requirements.

2.

Under the proposed regulations, a practitioner providing a more likely
than not tax shelter opinion or a marketed tax shelter opinion had to

comply with requirements similar to those contained in the final
regulations for covered opinions.

II.

a.

A tax shelter opinion was defined as written advice by a
practitioner concerning the federal tax aspects of any federal tax
issue relating to a tax shelter item or items.

b.'

A tax shelter item was defined as an item of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit, the existence or absence of a taxable transfer
of property, or the value of property.

c.

A tax shelter was defined as any partnership or other entity, any
investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement,
a significant purpose of which was the avoidance or evasion of any
tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code..

3.

As 'will be discussed below, under the final regulations, a reliance opinion
or a marketed opinion would have been treated as a tax shelter opinion
under the proposed regulations and, therefore, would have been subject to
the requirements for a tax shelter opinion.

4.

Perhaps the significant change under the final regulations is the addition of
the requirements dealing with "other written advice."

E.

In addition to sanctions, suspension, and disbarment, the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004 authorizes the Treasury and IRS to impose penalties against
practitioners who violate any provision of Circular 230 and authorizes injunctions
to prevent violations of Circular 230.

F.

A practitioner may be censured, suspended or disbarred from practice before the
IRS for willfully violating Circular 230 (except the best practices provisions) or
recklessly or through gross incompetence violating the covered opinion
requirements, the other writing requirements or the compliance provisions.

Covered Opinions
A.

Introduction.
1.

A practitioner rendering a covered opinion must satisfy specific
requirements to avoid being sanctioned, suspended or disbarred from
practice before the IRS.
a.

Formerly referred to as a tax shelter opinion, a covered opinion is
written advice, including electronic communications, by a
practitioner concerning one or more federal tax issues.

b.

For this purpose, a practitioner includes an attorney, an accountant,
and an enrolled agent.

2

B.

Definition of a Covered Opinion.
1.

2.

Only written advice, including an email and, perhaps, a cell phone text
message, on the following is treated as a covered opinion:
a.

A transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to a
transaction that, at the time the advice is rendered, the IRS has
determined to be a listed tax avoidance transaction and identified
by published guidance as a listed transaction under Treas. Reg. §
1.60 11-4(b)(2) (referred to hereinafter as a "listed transaction
opinion");

b.

Any partnership or other entity, any investment plan or
arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, the principal
purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any tax imposed
by the Internal Revenue Code (referred to hereinafter a "tax
avoidance transaction" and written advice concerning the
transaction is referred to hereinafter as a "tax avoidance opinion");
and

c.

Any partnership or other entity, any investment plan or
arrangem~nt, or any other plan or arrangement, a significant
purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any tax imposed
by the Internal Revenue Code, if the written advice is:
(1)

A reliance opinion;

(2)

A marketed opinion;

(3)

Subject to conditions of confidentiality; or

(4)

Subject to contractual protection.

Excluded Advice. A covered opinion does not include:
a.

Preliminary advice, which is written advice provided to a client
during the course of an engagement if a practitioner is reasonably
expected to provide subsequent written advice to the client that
will satisfy the requirements of § 10.35.

b.

Written advice that is not a listed transaction opinion or a tax
avoidance opinion if it:
(1)

Concerns a qualified plan;

(2)

Is a state or local bond opinion; or
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(3)

Is included in documents required to be filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
(a)

c.

Written advice prepared for and provided to a taxpayer, solely for
use by that taxpayer, after the taxpayer has filed a tax return with
the IRS reflecting the tax benefits of the transaction (a post return
opinion).
(1)

d.

This exclusion does not apply if the practitioner knows or
has reason to know that the written advice will be relied
upon by the taxpayer to take a position on a tax return
(including for these purposes an amended return that claims
tax benefits on a previously filed return) filed after the date
on which the advice is provided to the taxpayer.

Written advice provided to an employer by a practitioner in that
practitioner's capacity as an employee of that employer solely for
purposes of determining the tax liability of the employer.
(1)

e.

It is unclear whether written advice contained in
documents referred to or summarized in such filings
is included in this exception.

Hopefully, this exclusion will be expanded to cover
employees of related entities and other relationships, such
as a partner in a partnership, a member of a limited liability
company, and fiduciaries and beneficiaries in the case of
trusts and estates.

Written advice that does not resolve a federal tax issue in the
taxpayer's favor, unless the advice reaches a conclusion favorable to
the taxpayer at any confidence level (e.g., not frivolous, realistic
possibility of success, reasonable basis or substantial authority) with
respect to that issue (a negative opinion).
(1)

If the written advice concerns more than one federal tax
issue, the advice must satisfy the covered opinion
requirements with respect to any other federal tax issue that
does not fall under this exclusion.

3.

Principal Purpose.
a.

The modifications provided the following definition of principal
purpose:
For purposes of [§ 10.35] the principal purpose of a partnership or
other entity, investrnent plan or arrangement, or other plan or
arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of any tax imposed by the
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Internal Revenue Code if that purpose exceeds any other purpose.
The principal purpose of a partnership or other entity, investment
plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement is not to avoid
or evade federal tax if that partnership, entity, plan or arrangement
has as its purpose the claiming of tax benefits in a manner
consistent with the statute and Congressional purpose.
A
partnership, entity, plan or arrangement may have a significant
purpose of avoidance or evasion even though it does not the have
the principal purpose of avoidance or evasion [as defined for
purposes of § 10.35].
b.

Despite the addition of a definition of principal purpose, in many
cases it will be difficult to determine whether a transaction has as
its principal purpose tax avoidance, and the' conservative
practitioner may decide to err on the side of caution by treating any
transaction that involves significant tax savings as a tax avoidance
transaction.
(1)

4.

c.

This will be a heavy price to pay if the transaction turns out
not to have been a tax avoidance transaction.

Whether written advice constitutes a covered opinion is significant for two
reasons:
a.

The detailed covered opinion requirements set forth below must be
satisfied; and

b.

The compliance procedures discussed below only refer to covered
opinions.

Reliance Opinion.
1.

Written advice is a reliance opinion if the advice concludes at a confidence
level of more likely than not (a greater than 50% likelihood) that one or
more significant federal tax issues would be resolved in the taxpayer's
favor.
a.

A federal tax issue is a question concerning the federal tax
treatment of an item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit; the
existence or absence of a taxable transfer of property; or the value
of property.

b.

An issue is only significant if the IRS has a reasonable basis for a
successful challenge an~ the resolution of the challenge could have
a significant itnpact, whether beneficial or adverse and under any
reasonably foreseeable circumstances, on the overall federal tax
treatrnent of the transactions or matters addressed in the opinion.
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c.

D.

Consequently, written advice dealing with federal tax issues that
are not significant will not be treated as covered opinions, unless
they are listed transaction opinions, tax avoidance opinions,
marketed opinions, or opinions subject to conditions of
confidentiality or contractual protection.

2.

An opinion, other than ~ listed transaction opinion or tax avoidance
opinion, will not be treated as a reliance opinion if the practitioner
prominently discloses that the advice was not intended to be used and
cannot be used by the taxpayer to avoid penalties that may be imposed on
the taxpayer.

3.

Prominently disclosed. An item is prominently disclosed if it is readily
apparent to a reader of the written advice.
a.

Whether an item is readily apparent will depend on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the written advice, including, but not
limited to, the sophistication of the taxpayer and the length of the
written advice.

b..

At a minimum, to be prominently displayed an item must be set
forth in a separate section (and not in a footnote) in a typeface that
is the same size or larger than the typeface in any discussion of the
facts or law in the written advice.

Other Types of Advice Treated as Covered Opinions.
1.

2.

A marketed opinion is advice that will be used by someone other than the
practitioner, or a member or employee of the practjtioner's firm, in
promoting, marketing, or recommending the transaction to one or more
taxpayers unless the advice prominently discloses that it was not intended
to be used and cannot be used to avoid penalties and was written to
support the promotion or marketing of the transaction and that the
taxpayer should seek independent tax advice.
a.

Hopefully, a marketed opinion will not include a situation where
the practitioner is providing advice to an entity and the entity
forwards the tax advice to its owners.

b.

See the suggestion below for clarification about what constitutes a
marketed opinion.

Written advice is subject to conditions of confidentiality if the practitioner
imposes on one or more recipients of the advice a limitation on disclosure
to protect the confidentiality of the practitioner's tax strategies, but not if
the practitioner simply claims that the transaction is proprietary or
exclusive.
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a.

3.

E.

Hopefully, advice will not be treated as subject to confidentiality
conditions simply because it contains a statement that the recipient
is not to disclose the opinion to a third party, when the purpose of
the restriction is to prevent the recipient from disclosing the
opinion itself: not the strategy.

Written advice is subject to contractual protection if the taxpayer has the
rig4t to a full or partial refund of fees paid to the practitioner if al.1 or a part
of ·the intended tax consequences are not sustained or the fees paid are
contingent on the taxpayer's realization of tax benefits.

Requirements for Covered Opinions. A practitioner providing a covered opinion
must comply with each of the following requirements.
1.

Factual matters.
a.

The practitioner must use reasonable efforts to identify and
ascertain the facts, which may relate to future events if a
transaction is prospective or proposed, and to determine which
facts are relevant.
(1)

b.

The opinion .ffiust identify and consider all facts that the
practitioner determines to be relevant.

The practitioner must not base the opinion on any unreasonable
factual assumptions (including assumptions as to future events).
(1)

An unreasonable factual assumption includes a factual
assumption that the practitioner knows or should know is
incorrect or incomplete.
(a)

(2)

For example, it is unreasonable to assume that a
transaction has a business purpose or that a
transaction is potentially profitable apart from tax
benefits.

A factual assumption includes reliance on a projection,
financial forecast or appraisaL
(a)

It is unreasonable for a practitioner to rely on a
projection, financial forecast or appraisal if the
practitioner knows or should know that the
projection, financial forecast or appraisal is
incorrect or incomplete or was prepared by a person
lacking the skills or qualifications necessary to
prepare such projection, financial forecast or
appraisal.
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(3)
c.

The opinion must identify in a separate section all factual
assumptions relied upon by the practitioner.

The practitioner must not base the opinion on any unreasonable
factual representations, statements or findings of the taxpayer or
any other person.
(1)

An unreasonable factual representation includes a factual
representation that the practitioner knows or should know is
incorrect or incomplete.
(a)

(2)

2.

3.

For example, a practitioner may not rely on a
factual representation that a transaction has a
business purpose if the representation does not
include a specific description of the business
purpose or the practitioner knows or should know
that the representation is incorrect or incomplete.

The opinion must identify in a separate section all factual
representations, statements or findings of the taxpayer
relied upon by the practitioner.

Relate law to facts.
a.

The opinion must relate the applicable law (including potentially
applicable judicial doctrines) to the relevant facts.

b.

The practitioner must not assume the favorable resolution of any
significant federal tax issue except in the case of a limited scope
opinion or if the practitioner relied on the opinion of another
practitioner.

c.

.The opinion must not contain internally inconsistent legal analyses
or conclusions.

Evaluation of significant federal tax issues.
a.

In general. The opinion must consider all significant federal tax
issues except in the case of a limited scope opinion or if the
practitioner relied on the opinion of another practitioner.

b.

Conclusion as to each significant federal tax issue.
(1)

The opinion must provide the practitioner's conclusion as
to the likelihood that the taxpayer will prevail on the merits
with respect to each significant federal tax issue considered
in the opinion.
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c.

d.

e.

(2)

If the practitioner is unable to reach a conclusion with
respect to one or· more of those issues, the opinion must
state that the practitioner is unable to reach a conclusion
with respect to those issues.

(3)

The opinion must describe the reasons for the conclusions,
including the facts and analysis supporting the conclusions,
or describe the reasons that the practitioner is unable to
reach a conclusion as to one or more issues.

(4)

If the practitioner fails to reach a conclusion at a confidence
level of at least more likely than not with respect to one or
more significant federal tax issues considered, the opinion
must include the appropriate disclosures required.

Evaluation based on chances of success on the merits. In
evaluating the significant federal tax issues addressed in the
opinion, the practitioner must not take into account the possibility
that:
(1)

A tax return will not be audited;

(2)

An issue will not be raised on audit; or

(3)

An issue will be resolved through settlement if raised.

Marketed opinions.
(1)

In the case of a marketed opinion, the opinion must provide
the practitioner's conclusion that the taxpayer will prevail
on the merits at a confidence level of at least more likely
than not with respect to each significant federal tax issue.

(2)

If the practitioner is unable to reach a more likely than not
conclusion with respect to each significant federal tax
issue, the practitioner must not provide the marketed
opinion, but may provide written advice if it contains the
appropriate disclosure.

Limited scope opinions.
(1)

The practitioner may provide an opinion that considers less
than all of the significant federal tax issues if:
(a)

The practitioner and the taxpayer agree that the
scope of the opinion and the taxpayer's potential
reliance on the opinion for purposes of avoiding
penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer are
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limited to the federal tax issues addressed in the
opinion;

(2)

(b)

The opinion is not a listed transaction opinion, a tax
avoidance opinion, or a marketed opinion; and

(c)

The opinion includes the appropriate disclosure.

A.practitioner may make reasonable assumptions regarding
the favorable resolution of a federal tax issue (an assumed
issue) for purposes of providing an opinion on less than all
of the significant federal tax issues in a limited scope
opinion.
(a)

4.

5.

The opinion must identify in a separate section all
issues for which the practitioner assumed a
favorable resolution.

Overall conclusion.

a.

The opinion must provide the practitioner's overall conclusion as
to the likelihood that the federal tax treatment of the transaction or
matter that is the subject of the opinion is the proper treatment and
the reasons for that conclusion.

b.

If the practitioner is unable to reach an overall conclusion, the
opinion must state that the practitioner is unable to reach an overall
conclusion and describe the reasons for the practitioner's inability
to reach a conclusion.

c.

In the case of a marketed opinion, the opinion must provide the
practitioner's overall conclusion that the federal tax treatment of
the transaction or matter that is the subject of the opinion is the
proper treatment at a confidence level of at least more likely than
not.

Cot:llpetence to provide opinion; reliance on opinions of others.
a.

The practitioner must be knowledgeable in all of the aspects of
federal tax law relevant to the opinion being rendered, except that
the practitioner may rely on the opinion of another practitioner
with respect to one or more significant federal tax issues, unless
the practitioner knows or should know that the opinion of the other
practitioner should not be relied on.

b.

If a practitioner relies on the opinion of another practitioner, the
relying practitioner's opinion must identify the other opinion and
set forth the conclusions reached in the other opinion.
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c.

6.

The practitioner must be satisfied that the combined analysis of the
opinions, taken as a whole, and the overall conclusion, if any,
satisfy the requirements of this section.

Required disclosures. A covered opinion must contain all of the following
disclosures that apply:
a.

b.

Relationship between promoter and practitioner. An opinion must
prominently disclose the existence of:
(1)

Any compensation arrangement, such as a referral fee or a
fee-sharing arrangement, between the practitioner (or the
practitioner's firm or any peFson who is a member of,
associated with, or employed by the practitionerts firm) and
any person (other than the client for whom the opinion is
prepared) with respect to promoting, marketing or
recommending the entity, plan, or arrangement (or a
substantially similar arrangement) that is the subject of the
opinion; or

(2)

Any referral agreement between the practitioner (or the
practitioner's firm or any person who is a member ot:
associated with, or employed by the practitioner's firm) and
a person (other than the client for whom the opinion is
prepared) engaged in promoting, marketing or
recommending the entity, plan, or arrangem~nt (or a
substantially similar arrangement) that is the subject of the
opinion.

Marketed opinions.
disclose that:

A marketed opinion must prominently

(1) - The opinion was written to support the promotion or
marketing of the transactions or matters addressed in the
opinion; and
(2)

c.

The taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer's
particular circumstances from an independent tax advisor.

Limited scope opinions.
prominently disclose that:

A limited scope opinion must

(1)

The opinion is limited to the one or more federal tax issues
addressed in the opinion;

(2)

Additional issues may exist that could affect the federal tax
treatment of the transaction or matter that is the subject of
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the opinion and the opinion does not consider or provide a
conclusion with respect to any additional issues; and
(3)

d.

e.

Opinions that fail to reach a more likely than not conclusion. An
opinion that does not reach a conclusion at a confidence level of at
least more likely than not with respect to a significant federal tax
issue must prominently disclose that:
(1)

The opinion does not reach a conclusion at a confidence
level of at least more likely than not with respect to one or
more significant federal tax issues addressed by the
opinion; and

(2)

With respect to those significant federal tax issues, the
opinion was not written, and cannot be used by the
taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be
imposed on the taxpayer.

Advice regarding required disclosures.
In the case of any
disclosure required under this section, the practitioner may not
provide advice to any person that is contrary to or inconsistent with
the required disclosure.
(1)

7.

III.

With resPect to any significant federal tax issues outside
. the limited scope of the opinion, the opinion was not
written, and cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the purpose
of avoiding penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer.

In this case, advice presumably includes oral advice.

Effect of opinion that meets these standards. An opinion that meets these
requirements satisfies the practitioner's responsibilities under Circular
- 230, but the persuasiveness of the opinion with regard to the tax issues in
question and the taxpayer's good faith reliance on the opinion will be
detennined separately under applicable provisions of the law and
regulations.

Other Written Advice and Compliance
A.

A practitioner who provides written advice that is not a covered opinion is subject
to the following requirements:
1.

A practitioner must not give written advice (including electronic
communications) concerning one or more federal tax issues if the
practitioner bases the written advice on unreasonable factual or legal
assumptions (including assumptions as to future events), unreasonably
relies upon representations, statements, findings or agreements of the
taxpayer or any other person, does not consider all relevant facts that the
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pract~tioner knows or should know, or, in evaluating a federal tax issue,
takes into account the possibility that a tax return will not be audited, that
an issue will not be raised on audit, or that an issue will be resolved
.
through settlement if raised.

. 2.

All facts and circumstances, including the scope of the engagement and
the type and specificity of the advice sought by the client will be
considered in determining whether a practitioner has failed to comply with
this section.

3.

In the case of an opinion the practitioner knows or has reason to know will
be used or referred to by a person other than the practitioner (or a person
who is a member of, associated with, or employed by the practitioner's
firm) in promoting, marketing or recommending to one or more taxpayers
a partnership or other entity, investment plan or arrangement a significant
purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any tax imposed by the
Internal Revenue Code, the determination of whether a practitioner has
failed to comply with this requirement will be made on the basis of a
heightened standard of care because of the greater risk caused by the
practitioner's lack of knowledge of the taxpayer's particular
circumstances.
a.

B.

This should be an indication that the final amendments contemplate
written advice may be relied on by others without it being treated as
a marketed opinion (and therefore a covered opinion), where, for
example, an employer provides tax information prepared by a
practitioner to its employees with regard to the tax treatment of
certain employee benefits.

Compliance.
1..

The amendments retain the procedu.res in the proposed regulations
designed to ensure compliance.

2.

Any practitioner who has or shares principal authority or responsibility for
overseeing a firm's practice of providing advice concerning federal tax
issues must take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has adequate
procedures in effect for all members, associates, and employees for
purposes of complying with the requirements for covered opinions.

3.

A practitioner will be subject to discipline for failing to comply with these
requirements if:
a.

The practitioner through willfulness, recklessness or gross
incompetence does not take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm
has adequate procedures to comply with the requirements for
covered opinions, and one or more individuals who are members
of, associated with, or employed by, the firln are, or have, engaged
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in a pattern or practice, in connection with their practice with the
firm, of failing to comply with those requirements; or
b.

IV.

The practitioner knows or should know that one or more
individuals who are members ot: associated with, or employed by,
the firm are, or have, engaged in a pattern or practice, in
connection with their practice with the firm, that does not comply
with the requirements for covered opinions and the practitioner,
through willfulness, recklessness or gross incompetence, fails to
take prompt action to correct the non-compliance.

Best Practices
A.

Best Practices for Tax Advisors.
1.

Tax advisors (a broader term than practitioners) should provide clients
with the highest quality of representation concerning federal tax issues by
adhering to best practices in providing advice and in preparing or assisting
in the preparation of a submission to the IRS.

2.

In addition to compliance with the standards of practice provided
elsewhere in the final amendments, best practices include the following:
a.

Communicating clearly with the client regarding the terms of the
engagement.
(1)

B.

For example, the advisor should determine the client's
expected purpose for and use of the advice and should have
a clear understanding with the client regarding the form and
scope of advice or assistance to be rendered.

b.

Establishing the facts, determining which facts are relevant,
evaluating the reasonableness of any assumption"s or
representations, relating the applicable law (including potentially
applicable judicial doctrines) to the relevant facts and arriving at a
conclusion supported by the law and the facts.

c.

Advising the client regarding the import of the conclusions
reached, including, for example, whether a taxpayer may avoid
accuracy-related penalties under the Internal Revenue Code if a
taxpayer acts in reliance on the advice.

d.

Acting fairly and with integrity in practice before the IRS.

Procedures to Ensure Best Practices for Tax Advisors.
1.

Tax advisors with responsibility for overseeing a finn's practice of
providing advice concerning federal tax issues or preparing or assisting in
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the ·preparation of submissions to the IRS should take reasonable steps to
ensure that the firm's procedures for all members, associates, and
employees are consistent with the best practices set forth above.
V.

Effective Dates and Creation of Advisory Committees
A.

Effective Dates.
1.

B.

VI.

The effective date for the amendments to Circular 230 is 180 days after
the publication of the amendments in the Federal Register (June 20, 2005),
except for the creation of advisory committees, which is effective as of the
date of publication (December 20,2004).

Advisory Committees.
1.

To promote and maintain the public's confidence in tax advisors, the
Director of the Office of Professional Responsibility is authorized to
establish one or more advisory committees composed of at least five
individuals authorized to practice before the IRS.

2.

The Director should ensure that membership of an advisory committee is
balanced among those who practice as attorneys, accountants, and enrolled
agents.

3.

Under procedures prescribed by the Director, an advisory committee may
review and make general recommendations regarding professional
standards or best practices for tax advisors, including whether hypothetical
conduct would give rise to a violation of the requirements for covered
opinions and the compliance provisions.

Need for Additional Clarification
A.

In General.
1.

The amendments to Circular 230 dealing with covered opinions and other
written tax advice, as well as compliance procedures and best practices,
are unnecessary with regard to the practices of the vast majority of
practitioners to achieve the purposes expressed in the preamble to the final
amendments.

2.

However, all responsible tax professionals would agree that, because of
the abuses of a small minority, rules regarding certain types of tax advice
have become necessary to preserve the integrity of the system.

3.

Nevertheless, it is equally important that the new rules do not stifle needed
tax advice required by taxpayers on a daily basis with regard to a myriad
of issues, particularly when such advice is not meant to protect the
taxpayer from any penalties.
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4.

B.

a.

For example, an overly-broad reading of the definition of a tax
avoidance opinion, requiring written tax advice to satisfy the
covered opinion requirements and precluding any ability to opt out
with appropriate disclosure, would considerably increase the cost
of providing every-day written tax advice.

b.

In addition, a restrictive definition of preliminary advice, requiring
for many types of every-day written tax advice either a
comprehensive discussion of all significant federal tax issues or a
disclosure, would also add considerable cost Of, in the case of the
disclosure, confusion on the part of the recipient of the advice.

c.

Finally, an overly-broad definition of a tax avoidance opinion
coupled with a restrictive definition of preliminary tax advice
would encourage practitioners to return to giving oral advice rather
than using emails, a result that would be inefficient and, because
the recipient would not have the advice in writing, could lead to
misinterpretation of the advice.

It is with these goals in mind that the following additional clarifications to
the rules should be made in some form that practitioners and the
government can both rely on.

Covered Opinions.
1.

A tax avoidance transaction (the primary purpose of the transaction is tax
avoidance) should be limited to a transaction in which the intended result
of the transaction is the reduction in the tax liability of one or more
taxpayers without any substantial change in the economic circumstances
of the taxpayer or taxpayers other than the reduction in tax liability. Tax
liability includes liability for income, gift, estate, and generation skipping
taxes. Economic circumstances include changes to the net worth of the
taxpayer before and after the transaction, disregarding any reduction in tax
liability as a result of the transaction, and transfers of assets between or
among family members and trusts or business entities owned by family
members.

2.

A tax avoidance transaction does not include structuring a transaction in a
form that results in a lower tax liability for one or more participants in the
transaction than would occur if another form were used that would
acc~mplish the same non-tax economic results.

3.

.In determining whether written tax advice concerning a transaction is
subject to the covered opinion requirements, all components of the
transaction should be considered as a whole and not individually.

4.

A marketed opinion is \vritten tax advice that the practitioner knows or has
reason to knO\V \vill be used by the recipient to solicit participation in the
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transaction discussed in the written advice by one or more persons who
have no relationship with the recipient The relationship described in the
previous sentence includes an employer-employee relationship and an
owner and entity relationship. In addition, the relationship includes parties
involved in the transaction other than a person whose only involvement is
investing in the transaction as new passive investor (as opposed to an
.existing passive investor).

c.

D.

VII.

Preliminary Advice.
1.

Preliminary advice includes written advice in response to an inquiry about
one or more tax issues that does not include a discussion of the overall tax
consequences of the proposed or hypothetical transaction. A response to
an inquiry will be treated as preliminary advice if (1) the response clearly
states that the response only covers the specific question or questions
raised in the inquiry and is not advice as to the overall tax consequences of
the proposed or hypothetical transaction or (2) it is clear from the context
of the response that it is not advice as to the overall tax consequences of
the .proposed or hypothetical transaction

2.

If a practitioner gives written advice that would be treated as preliminary
advice if a covered opinion were to be rendered at a later date and the
transaction does not take place, the earlier written advice need not satisfy
the requirements of a covered opinion or other written tax advice.

Other Issues.
1.

Although a practitioner may not assume a business purpose with respect to
a transaction, the practitioner may point out that a business purpose is
required to achieve the intended tax benefits regardless of the existence of
evidence that there is, in fact, a business purpose for the transaction.

2.

Although a statement in written tax advice is prohibited if it addresses the
likelihood that the return disclosing the transaction would be audited or
that the tax issues involved would be raised on such an audit, the
practitioner may discuss the likelihood of a favorable result if the issue is
raised on audit.

Issues for Estate Planning Practitioners
A.

Observations Regarding Covered Opinions and Other Written Advice.
1.

Preliminary advice is not treated as a covered opinion if the practitioner is
reasonably expected to provide subsequent written advice to the client that
will satisfy the requirements of a covered opinion.

2.

The \vritten advice required for a covered opinion must deal \vith a federal
tax issue - defined as a question concerning the federal tax treatnlent of an
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item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit; the existence or absence of
a taxable transfer of property; or the value of prop~rty for federal tax
purposes. Does this mean advice apout the tax status of an entity such as
an S corporation is not a covered opinion but could be other written
advice?
3.

Not all, written advice dealing with federal tax issues will be treated as
covered opinions, except for listed transaction opinions and tax avoidance
opinions, as well as marketed opinions and opinions subject to conditions
of confidentiality or contractual protections. For example, the IRS may
not have a reasonable basis for a successful challenge or the resolution of
a challenge may not have a significant impact on the overall federal tax
treatment of the transactions or matters addressed in the opinion.

. 4.

Standard written communication with clients, not just formal legal
opinions, may be subject to some of the requirements. Email falls within
the written advice definition. Many IT formatting and other issues arise
with email communications.

5.

Malpractice concerns may dictate compliance with the best practice
standards even though they are not mandatory.

6.

Because most estate planning work typically involves a principal purpose
other than tax avoidance, practitioners may inadvertently overlook the
Circular 230 rules when advising on intrafamily transactions and
aggressive techniques.

7.

Most written communications not involving a listed or tax avoidance
transaction will not be treated as covered opinions because the
communications likely will not rise to the level of a reliance opinion.

8.

Avoiding covered opinion status is important if the advice will not include
a complete' analysis of all significant tax issues.

9.

A limited scope opinion may be appropriate in many situations.
a.

For example, in the case of an FLP, the opinion may exclude any
advice as to valuation discounts or the possible application of
I.R.e. § 2036.

10.

Compliance with best practices should reduce the likelihood of a violation
of the mandatory provisions of Circular 230.

11.

Best practices should be followed by paralegals and other staff.as well as
by the lawyers.
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B.

12.

Oral advice is not subject to the covered opinion rules, but cell phone text
messages may be. What about written advice after a transaction or tax
reporting that was based on oral advice?

13.

All should be familiar with the 30 or so listed transactions in order to
avoid advising on a transaction that is substantially similar to a listed one.

14.

Non lawyers in the firm can create problems. For example, a paralegal or
fiduciary accountant may be sending an email to a trust or estate
beneficiary regarding the lawyer's determination of how to handle a
difficult issue.

15.

The final regulations to Circular 230 may be to our practice what
Sarbanes-Oxley is to the practice of our corporate partners.

Estate Planning Techniques Potentially Affected. Most estate planning and estate
administration techniques, elections, and transactions involve tax advice.
Depending- on the facts and circumstances, advice regarding many of the
following, as well as other standard transactions, could be subject to some portion
of Circular 230 after the effective date of the final regulations:

1.

Creation of Crummey life insurance trust

2.

Formation ofFLP or LLC

3.

S election or check-the-boxtax status

4.

Creation of "defective" grantor trust

5.

Sale to grantor trust

6.

Allocation of GST exemption

7.

GRATs and QPRTs

8.

Ch~ritable

9.

529 plans

10.

Intrafamily sales

11.

AFR loans

12.

Stock redemptions in family corporations

13.

Assets included and excluded from the gross estate

14.

2032 alternate valuation

remainder trusts
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VIII.

15.

QTIP election

16.

Iss~ance

17.

Determination of basis

18.

Mellinger discount

19.

Treating capital gains as part ofDNI

of Graegin note

Analyzing a Transaction under Circular 230
A.

B.

Introduction.
1.

The following list of questions is designed to assist the practitioner in
determining whether written tax advice is subject to the covered opinion
requirements under the final amendments to Circular 230.

2.

Keep in mind that how certain terms are defined will have an impact on
whether written advice will be subject to the covered opinion
requirements.

3.

As mentioned above, it is hoped that the IRS will issue additional
guidance on the definitions of a tax avoidance transaction, marketed
opinion, and preliminary advice.

ouestions.
I.

Answer the following questions to determine whether or not advice is
subject to the required opinion requirements.

2.

Questions:
a.

Is the advice in writing, including an email and, perhaps, a cell
phone text message? If the answer is no, the advice is not subject
to the covered opinion requirements. If the answer is yes, go to
question b.

b.

Is the written advice preliminary advice? If the answer is yes, the
written advice is not subject to the covered opinion requirements.
If the answer is no, go to question c.

c.

Does the written advice concern a federal tax issue, which is a
question concerning the federal tax treatment of an item of income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit, the existence or absence of a
taxable transfer of property, or the value of property for federal tax
purposes? [f the ans\ver is no, the written advice is not subject to
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the covered opinion requirements.
question d.

If the answer is yes, go to

d.

Does the written advice concern a listed transaction as defined
under Treas. Reg. Section 1.6011-4(b)(2) (or a substantially similar
transaction)? If the answer is yes, the written advice must satisfy
the covered opinion requirements. If the answer is "no, go to
question e.

e.

Does the written advice concern any partnership or other entity,
any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or
arrangement, the principal purpose of which is the avoidance or
evasion of any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (a tax
avoidance transaction)? If the answer is yes, the written advice
must satisfy the covered opinion requirements. If the answer is no,
go to question f.

f.

Does the written advice concern a qualified plan? If the answer is
yes, the written advice is not subject to the covered opinion
requirements. If the answer is no, go to question g.

g.

Is the written advice a state or local bond opinion? If the answer is
yes, the written advice will be subject to requirements similar to
those that apply to a covered opinion once the proposed regulations
are finalized. If the answer is no, go to question h.

h.

Is the written advice included in documents required to be filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission? If the answer is
yes, the written advice is not subject to the covered opinion
requirements. If the answer is no, go to question i..

l.

Is the written advice post return advice? If the answer is yes, the
written advice is not subject to the covered opinion requirements.
If the answer is no, go to questionj.

j.

Is the written advice given by an employee to an employer with
respect to the employer's tax liability? If the answer is yes, the
written advice is not subject to the covered opinion requirements.
If the answer is no, go to question k.

k.

Is the \vritten advice a negative opinion? If the answer is yes, the
\vritten advice is not subject to the covered opinion requirements.
{fthe ans\ver is no, go to question l.

l.

Does the written advice concern any partnership or other entity,
any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or
arrangement, a significant purpose of which is the avoidance or
evasion of any tax inlposed by the Internal Revenue Code? If the
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answer is no, the written advice is not subject to the covered
opinion requirements. If the answer is yes, go to question m.
m.

·Is the written advice a marketed opinion? If the answer is yes, the
written advice must satisfy the covered opinion requirements
unless there is a disclosure. If the answer. is no, go to question n~

n.

Is the written advice an opinion subject to conditions of
confidentiality or contractual protection? If the answer is yes, the
written advice must satisfy the covered opinion requirements. If
the answer is no, go to question o.

o.

Does the written advice conclude at a confidence level of more
likely than not (a greater than 50% likelihood) that one or more
significant federal tax issues would be resolved in the taxpayer's
favor? If the answer is no, the written advice is not subject to the
covered opinion requirements. If the answer is yes, the written
advice is a reliance opinion and must satisfy the covered opinion
requirements unless there is a disclosure.
(1)

3.
C.

D.

A federal tax issue is only significant if the IRS has a
reasonable basis for a successful challenge and the
resolution of the challenge could have a significant impact,
whether beneficial or adverse and under any reasonably
foreseeable circumstances, on the overall federal tax
treatment of the transactions or matters addressed in the
opinion.

Written tax advice that is not subject to the covered opinion requirements
must satisfy the other written advice requirements.

Limited Scope Opinions.
1.

A limited scope opinion, which requires a disclosure, is one way to reduce
the cost of providing tax advice.

2.

However, under the Regulations, a limited scope OptnlOn may not be
provided with regard to a listed transaction opinion, a tax avoidance
opinion, or a marketed opinion.

Permitted and Required Disclosures.
1.

A reliance opinion is not subject to the covered opinion requirements if it
discloses that the written advice is not intended or written by the
practitioner to be used, and that it cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the
purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer.
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2.

A marketed opinion that does not concern a listed transaction or a tax
avoidance transaction is not subject to the covered opinion requirements if
it discloses that:
a.

The advice was not intended or written by the practitioner to be
used, and that it cannot be used by any taxpayer, for the purpose of
avoiding penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer;

b.

The advice was written to support the promotion or marketing of
the transaction(s) or matter(s) addressed by the written advice; and

c.

The taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer's particular
circumstances from an independent tax advisor.

3.

A covered opinion must disclose the existence of any compensation
arrangement or any referral agreement between the practitioner and a
promoter of the transaction.

4.

A marketed opinion that is subject to the covered opinion requirements
must disclose that:

5.

6.

a.

The opinion' was written to support the promotion or the marketing
of the transaction(s) or matter(s) addressed in the opinion; and

b.'

The taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer's particular
circumstances from an independent tax 'adviser.

A limited scope opinion subject to the covered opinion requirements must
disclose that:
a.

The opinion is limited to one or more federal tax issues addressed
in the opinion;

b..

Additional issues may exist that could affect the federal tax
treatment of the transaction or a matter that is the subject to the
opinion and the opinion does not consider or provide a conclusion
with respect to any addition issues; and

c.

With respect to any significant federal tax issues outside the
limited scope of the opinion, the opinion was not written, and
cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding
penalties which may be imposed by-the taxpayer.

A covered opinion that fails to reach a more likely than not conclusion
with respect to one or more significant federal tax issues must disclose
that:
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E.

a.

The opinion does not reach a conclusion at a confidence level of at
least more likely than not with respect to one or more significant
federal tax issues addressed by the opinion; and

b.

With respect to those significant tax issues, the opinion was not
written, and cannot be used· by the taxpayer for the purpose of
avoiding penalties that may be imposed by the taxpayer.

Covered Opinion Requirements.
1.

Factual Matters.
a.

The practitioner must identify in separate sections all factual
assumptions and all factual representations, statements, or findings
of the taxpayer, relied on by the practitioner.

b.

The practitioner may not rely on either unreasonable factual
assumptions or unreasonable factual representations, statements, or
findings of the taxpayer.

2.

The practitioner must relate the law to the facts.

3.

The opinion must consider all significant federal tax issues unless the
practitioner is providing a limited scope opinion or is relying on the
opinion of others.

4.

The opinion must provide the practitioner's conclusion as to the likelihood
that the taxpayer will prevail on the merits with respect to each significant
federal tax issue considered in the opinion.

5.

a.

If the practitioner is unable to reach a conclusion with respect to
one ore more of those issues, the opinion must state that the
practitioner is unable to reach a conclusion with respect to those
issues.

b.

The reasons for the conclusion must be stated.

The opinion must provide the practitioner's overall conclusion as to the
likelihood that the federal tax treatment of the transaction or matter that is
the subject of the opinion is the proper treatment and the reasons for that
conclusion.
a.

If the opinion is a marketed opinion, the opinion must reach a more
likely than not conclusion.

b.

If the practitioner is unable to reach an overall conclusion, the
opinion must so state and describe the reason.
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IX.

Estate Planning Hypothetical

1.

You receive a telephone call from an existing client inquiring about the tax benefits of
using a family limited partnership ("FLP"). You spend one-half hour discussing the
transfer tax savings that may be achieved through a FLP because of the lack of control,
lack of marketability, and other discounts that may apply to the valuation of an interest in
such entities.

2.

The client calls ·you the next day and asks that you send him a letter spelling out the tax
benefits of an FLP that you discussed with him on the telephone the day before. The
client has not expressed any specific intention of creating an FLP.

3.

After receiving the letter, the client calls you back and tells you that he has several
parcels of undeveloped property that he is thinking about transferring to an FLP. He
intends to have the property developed for residential use in the near future. He asks you
for your advice concerning the tax consequences of transferring the real estate to the FLP.

4.

The client calls you back the next day and asks you to send him a letter concerning your
discussion the day before about the tax consequences of transferring the property to the
FLP.

5.

The client calls you the next day and tells you that he would like to have his wife as a
general partner and his three· children as initial limited partners in the FLP and asks you
the tax consequences if they each contribute a small amount of cash to the FLP in
exchange for limited partnership interests. You discuss with him the investment
company rules under Internal Revenue Code (ItIRC") § 721 and other issues that may
arise in connection with the formation of the proposed limited partnership.

6.

The client calls you back the next day and asks you to send him a letter describing all of
the potential tax consequences with respect to the formation of the FLP and possible gifts
of limited partnership interests to his three children.

7.

The client calls you a week later and asks you to prepare the limited partnership
agreement for theOFLP, the deeds transferring the unimproved property to the FLP, and
any other documents you feel necessary to form the partnership. You prepare a draft of a
limited partnership agreement and send it to him.

8.

Several days later he calls you and tells you that the agreement is satisfactory, whereupon
you prepare a final partnership agreement, a certificate of limited partnership, and deeds
transferring the property to the limited partnership. Note that the limited partnership
agreement you drafted reflects the fact that his wife and children are putting up small
amounts of cash ~nd that his wife is receiving a 1%. general partnership interest and his
children are each receiving a 1% limited partnership interest. You also advise him to
obtain an appraisal of the real estate and of an interest in the entity. He tells you he will
use the current assessed value for the real estate and will assume a 45% discount for
valuing a limited partnership interest in the partnership.
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9.

After the limited partnership agreement has been signed by all five of the initial partners,
the certificate of limited partnership has been recorded, and the deeds transferring the
property to the FLP have been recorded, you prepare a binder that contains all of the
relevant documents, including your earlier letters to the client and you send it to the client
for his records.

10.

A month later, the client calls you and tells you he is now ready to make gifts of interests
in the FLP to his three children and asks you to prepare the deeds of gift to carry out his
intentions.

11.

Several months later the client calls you and tells you that he wishes to transfer additional
interests in the FLP to his children, but does not want to make any more taxable gifts and
asks you if you have any suggestions. You discuss with him the possibility of using a
sale to a grantor trust or a transfer to a grantor retained annuity trust (nGRAT") as a way
of avoiding additional taxable gifts and as a way of retaining income from the transferred
assets for a limited period of time.

12.

The client calls you back the next day and asks you to send him a letter describing the tax
consequences ofa GRAT.

13.

A week later the client calls and asks you to prepare a trust agreement for the GRAT and
the deeds of gift necessary to transfer interests in the FLP to the GRAT.

14.

A month later the client calls and asks you to send him a letter describing the tax
consequences of a sale to a grantor trust.

15.

Two weeks after you send the letter describing the sale to a grantor trust technique, the
client calls you and asks you to prepare three grantor trusts, one for each of his children,
and the other documents necessary to carry out the sales, including the purchase
agreements and installment notes.

16.

Several months later, the client calls you and tells you that he and his wife would like to
come in to review their current estate plan. In preparation for the meeting, he asks you to
send him a letter detailing his current estate plan, which includes the transactions
described above as well as several other items that you have prepared for him in the past.
These include an irrevocable life insurance trust that was set up several years ago to hold
a last-to-die policy insuring him and his wife, trusts set up for each of his five
grandchildren to take advantage of the generation skipping transfer tax annual exclusion,
and wills and trusts for him and his wife that take advantage of the maximum marital
deduction when the first spouse dies and provides for the funding of a generation
skipping transfer trust at the death of the survivor using the generation skipping transfer
tax exemptions of both spouses through the use of a reverse QTIP trust. .

X.

Suggested Disclos.ure Statement for Preliminary Advice
The following is a suggested statement that would be inserted as a separate paragraph in
emails and letters that a practitioner intended to be preliminary advice:
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Please note that the information contained in this [email/letter] is not intended to
be advice that can be relied on to avoid any penalties that the Internal Revenue
Service may assert because of a successful challenge to the tax treatment
suggested.. If it is later determined that a covered opinion, as that term is defined
in Treasury Regulations dealing with written tax advice, is required, or is desired
to avoid penalties, a more comprehensive discussion of the relevant facts and
federal tax issues will be provided.
Note that the statement refers to "information" rather than "advice" and contemplates that
there will be one of seven possible results, assuming the opinion is not a marketed
opinion or an opinion subject to conditions of confidentiality or contractual protection:
1.

The contemplated transaction does not occur and there is no need to
determine whether a covered opinion is necessary.

2.

It is determined that the transaction is either a listed transaction or a tax
avoidance transaction and a covered opinion is required.

3.

It is determined that the transaction is a significant purpose transaction and
there is at least one significant federal tax issue involved, and a morelikely-than-not opinion is desired by the client; therefore a covered
opinion is required.
a.

A limited scope opinion may be appropriate.

4.

It is determined that the transaction is a significant purpose transaction and
there is at least one significant federal tax issue involved, and a morelikely-than-not opinion is not desired by the client; therefore a covered
opinion is not required, but a disclosure statement is required if the
opinion would be a more-likely-than-not opinion.

5

It is determined that the transaction is a significant purpose transaction and
there is at least one significant federal tax issue involved, and a morelikely-than-not opinion is not desired by the client and the opinion is not a
more-likely-than-not opinion; therefore a covered opinion is not required
and no disclosure statement is necessary.

6.

It is determined that the transaction is a significant purpose transaction and
there is no significant federal tax issue involved; therefore a covered
opinion is not required and no disclosure statement is necessary.

7.

It is determined that the transaction is not a significant purpose
transaction; therefore a covered opinion is not required and no disclosure
statement is necessary.
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I.

Privity
Cave v. O'Bryan
Not to be Published, No. 2002-CA-002601-MR
Rendered: 4/23/2004
Discretionary Review Granted, No. 2004-SC-407-DG, 2/9/2005
Cross-Motion Granted, No. 2005-SC-118-DG, 4/23/2005
Plaintiff-appellant's uncle went to a lawyer for an estate plan. Unfortunately, that lawyer
became the appellee. Uncle, childless owner of approximately $80,000 in realty and
$112,000 in personalty, wanted to leave realty to wife of 15 years (his second wife) and
to split personal property between his sisters and nephews (including plaintiff-appellant).
Appellee-lawyer prepared deed conveying realty to uncle and wife jointly with right of
survivorship and will leaving personalty to sisters and nephews. Wife renounced will
thereby cutting other beneficiaries' interests by about one-half. Appellant sued alleging
appellee failed to advise uncle of effect of renunciation; appellee said he was just doing
what client directed.
The Circuit Court dismissed action, finding no apparent evidence of legal negligence and
that appellant-beneficiary lacked standing. The Court of Appeals reversed. Focusing on
standing, it held that the plaintiff-appellant-beneficiary's lack of privity with the appelleelawyer did not bar his legal malpractice action. The estate planning attorney "owed a
duty of care to the direct, intended, and specifically identifiable beneficiaries of the estate
planning client, notwithstanding a lack of privity." (Emphasis added.)

II.

Constitutionality of Living Will Directive
Woods v. Commonwealth
442 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2004)
In this 69-age opinion, including a concurrence and a dissent, the Supreme Court held
that KRS 311.631 is constitutional and requires that for an adult patient without
decisional capacity who has not executed an advance directive, "the withdrawal of life
support from a patient is prohibited absent clear and convincing evidence that the patient
is permanently unconscious or in a persistent vegetative state and that withdrawing life
support is in the patient's best interest." The Court's opinion includes a detailed review of
the 1990 Living Will Directive legislation, the DeGrella case, and the 1994 amendments
to the Living Will Directive statutes.

1 Mike Stevens, Esq. of Louisville deserves credit for publishing the Louisville Law Wire, available online at
www.LouisvilleLaw.com. a weekly e-mail newsletter reporting published and unpublished opinions of the Kentucky
courts. In addition, Mr. Stevens contributed to the digests of the following cases that appear in this manuscript:
Cave v. 0 'Bryan, Gee v. Brown, Hart v. Hart, and Oyler v. Thomas.
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Note: The 2004 General Assembly amended KRS 311.631 to specify that the
detennination of decisional capacity is made by the patient's physician and that the
person's attorney-in-fact (assuming the power of attorney includes authority with respect
to health care) is next in line after the guardian to make the withdrawal decision.

III.

Fiduciary Duty
A.

Godfrey v. PNC Bank ofKentucky
Not to be Published, No. 2002-CA-002213-MR
Rendered: 5/28/2004
During her lifetime, Opal Godfrey Brennan amassed significant wealth and set up
an inter vivos trust with Citizens Fidelity Bank, the predecessor to PNC. She
executed what proved to be her final Will in 1991. That Will eliminated all
bequests to individuals and left well over five million dollars to charity. A group
of her relatives brought a will contest action, which they settled with PNC as
Executor for $1.43 million. As part of that settlement, PNC as Executor assigned
any claims the Executor might have against any third party to the group of
relatives. PNC as Executor made no warranty or representation about the validity
of that assignment. After the settlement, the group of relatives pursued a claim
against PNC in its individual capacity for permitting "Mrs. Brennan to dispose of
a portion of her income to various people" during her lifetime. PNC, in its
individual capacity, defended that claim by arguing that a breach of fiduciary duty
claim was similar to a legal malpractice claim and that an assignment of such a
claim was therefore void as against public policy. The Circuit Court agreed and
entered summary judgment. PNC, in its individual capacity, also argued that the
assignment violated "the anti-champerty provisions ofKRS 372.060." The Court
of Appeals disagreed and held that the appellants had standing to pursue claims
against PNC in its individual capacity. The Court remanded the case to the trial
court to consider the merits of the claim.

B.

Longmeyer v. Bank One, Kentucky, N.A.
Not to be Published, No. 2004-CA-000458-MR
Date: 3/25/2005
This case concerns a trustee's fiduciary duty to various parties to a trust
agreement. In 1984, Ollie Skonberg made a revocable trust with the bank as
trustee. She amended it in 1987 and named certain charities as remainder
beneficiaries. In 1997, she exercised her right to revoke it and made a new trust
with an attorney as trustee; in that new trust, she did not name the charities as
remainder beneficiaries. The bank served as the new trustee's investment agent
for a brief period. After Ms. Skonberg died, the trustee informed the charities
about its concerns that the new trust was the result of undue influence. A will
contest followed, and it was settled for a substantial sum of money. The new
trustee then brought a claim against the former trustee, alleging a breach of its
fiduciary duty. The trustee won a summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals is
sending it back.
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The Court of Appeals held that the trustee could have challenged the revocation,
but once it accepted the revocation and served as the new trustee's agent, it could
no longer provide confidential information to the charities that had been named as
remainder beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals remanded the case. Judge Knopf
added a concurrence criticizing the majority for seeming to hold that the trustee
had breached its duty as a matter of law and indicating the factual issues for trial.

Note: The facts are sketchy but it appears that only two months or so passed
between Ms. Skonberg's revocation of the trust and her death. Under the Court's
holding, could a trustee that learned of the undue influence after accepting the
revocation not act on that knowledge? If the trustee had intended to challenge the
revocation and to defend the trust, it would have been faced with using the
Settlor's own money to argue that the Settlor was under undue influence. Since
that's not realistic, it seems like the Court's opinion furthers the cause of those
who want to cover up undue influence.

IV.

Claims Against Estates
A.

Estate v. River Downs Investment Co.
159 S.W.3d 820 (Ky. App. 2005)
This case proves that the Kentucky claims procedure continues to vex attorneys.
Here, a telephone betting company obtained a promissory note for payment of
gambling debts. KRS 372.010 makes such notes void. After the bettor died and a
claim was filed, the Executor sent a letter asking for more information. That letter
stated that it was not rejecting the claim. The creditor didn't respond and the
Executor didn't disallow the claim until two years and nine months after
appointment. The Campbell District Court held that the Executor allowed the
claim by not rejecting it, and this was upheld on appeal to the Campbell Circuit
Court. The Court of Appeals held the same way and distinguished Patterson v.
Estate ofBoone, Ky. App., 150 S.W.3d 58 (2003). In that case the delayed
disallowance resulted from the complexity of the claim; in the River Downs case,
there was no explanation. The Court of Appeals also held that the claim was
collectible even though it was void under KRS 372.010. Thus, "void" does not
always mean "void."

B.

Gregoire v. Estate ofHeick
Not To Be Published, No. 2003-CA-000299-MR
Rendered: 6/11/2004
The executor of wife's estate made two claims against husband's estate. The
executor of husband's estate did not deny the claims within the 60-day statutory
period. The Executor moved the District Court to allow for a late denial of the
claims, but the District Court denied the motion. He appealed to the Circuit
Court, which affirmed. Proving his persistence, he then filed an original action in
Circuit Court, arguing that it had exclusive jurisdiction of this contested probate
matter. The Circuit Court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon
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which relief could be granted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that
allowing an original action as an end run would make the 60-day limitations
period ofKRS 396.055 meaningless.
C.

Quackenbush Estate v. Ruf
Not to be Published, No. 2002-CA-001445-MR
Rendered: March 12, 2004
During Mr. Quackenbush's lifetime, Mr. Rufworked on his farm equipment.
After Mr. Quackenbush passed away, Mr. Ruftried to collect from the widow.
When she did not pay him, he filed a proof of claim in Mr. Quackenbush's estate.
The widow-executrix did nothing, and Mr. Rufbrought a circuit court action.
After a trial before the Court, Mr. Ruf obtained a judgment for part of his claim.
The widow-executrix brought this appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the
circuit court did not have jurisdiction because the executrix's failure to respond to
the claim meant that she allowed it. The District Court has exclusive jurisdiction
over non-adversarial probate matters, KRS 24A.120(2), and the Court of Appeals
may raise subject matter jurisdiction on its own initiative even though none of the
parties had done so. The Court of Appeals vacated the Circuit Court's judgment
and dismissed the action.
Query: Since the claim is deemed allowed, it looks like the widow-executrix's
appeal results in a worse result. The Circuit Court judgment was for only part of
the claim. Now that the claim is allowed, it must be paid in full. Try explaining
to your client how an appeal leaves her worse off.

v.

Beneficiary Designations
A.

Childers v. Childers
Not to be Published, No. 2002-CA-001826-MR
Rendered: 6/18/2004

An ex-wife, a live-in romantic roommate, and a current wife 'all claimed to be the
beneficiary of the decedent's life insurance policies. In their property settlement
agreement, the ex-wife and decedent had waived interest in each other's life
insurance policies and reserved the right to change the beneficiaries. The Court of
Appeals upheld the Jefferson Circuit Court in following the plain language of the
beneficiary designations that left the ex-wife the winner. The Court of Appeals
noted that the decedent had over 15 years to exercise his right to make the
changes. This type of bright-line rule has the traditional advantage of certainty
and the corresponding disadvantage of at least seeming inequity.
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B.

Hart v. Hart
Not To Be Published, No. 2002-CA-002338-MR
Rendered: June 11, 2004
Before his death, the appellant's husband signed new beneficiary forms for his
annuities. He did this to remove his wife as a beneficiary. Although he did not
mail the forms to the insurer, the signed forms were found among his papers after
his death. Noting that "[t]he substantial compliance doctrine has been interpreted
more liberally in Kentucky than in other· states," the Court held that the decedent
has successfully changed the beneficiary of his annuity contract. "Indeed, the
attitude of Kentucky courts toward beneficiary changes has even been described
as 'very liberal.' Pikeville Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 158, 135
S.W.2d 431,433 (1939)." Substantial compliance has been found to exist when
"'the insured had done all he could do under the circumstances'; 'all he believed
necessary to effect the change' or 'what the ordinary layman would believe was
all that was necessary to accomplish the change'." Hill v. Union. Central Life
Insurance Co., Ky., 513 S.W.2d 808, 808-09 (1974) (citations omitted)."

VI.

Contract to Make Will
A.

Gibson v. Fite
Not To Be Published, No. 2004-CA-000014-MR
Rendered: Jan. 21,2005
Decedent's children brought a circuit court action alleging a contract to make a
will and undue influence. In support of that claim, they sought to compel their
stepmother to produce the will so they could petition for its probate. The
stepmother objected because all of the assets passed to her by right of
survivorship (which was why her step kids were suing her) and thus probate was
not necessary. The district court ordered the will probated and appointed the
stepmother as executrix. The action resumed in the circuit court, which awarded
summary judgment to the stepmother on the contract to make a will claim because
the contract was not in writing or expressed in the now probated will. The court
also ruled against the children on the undue influence claim because they had
offered the will for probate and the court held that they were thus estopped from
arguing that it was void. The Court of Appeals distinguished cases decided prior
to the new Rules of Civil Procedure and held that the alternate pleading rule of
CR 8.05(2) allowed the children to both probate the will and argue that it was
procured by undue influence.
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B.

Nation v. Kelien
Not to be Published, No. 2003-CA-000782-MR
Rendered: June 11, 2004
Collis and Martha Frazier made a contract to make a will and signed a joint will
giving the survivor a life estate in their farm with the remainder to be divided
evenly between their two children, Rita Nation and Marvin Kelien. After Martha
died, Collis sold the farm to Rita and her husband. After Collis died, Marvin
brought this action to rescind that deed. Both the Circuit Court and the Court of
Appeals held that the contract to make a will satisfied the requirements ofKRS
394.540 and prevented Collis Frazier from conveying the property to one of the
remainder beneficiaries at the expense of the other.

Note: The dissent by Chief Judge Emberton expresses concern that undoing a fee
simple deed will throw title searches into question. It would be useful to know
whether the joint will was recorded after the death of the first spouse, in which
case it would provide record notice of the limitation on the surviving spouse's
tenancy.
VII.

Statutes of Limitation
Blackerby v. Skaggs
Not to be Published, No. 2003-CA-000051-MR
Rendered: April 30, 2004
In this case, the appellant brought a negligence claim against the executor and an
attorney. The Court of Appeals held that the claim was barred by various statutes of
limitations, including the one-year statute found in KRS 413.245 for claims alleging
negligence in providing professional services.

VIII.

Bank's Liability for Deposits
A.

Bradley v. National City Bank ofKentucky
Not to be Published, No. 2003-CA-002711-MR
Rendered: Dec. 30, 2004
The decedent's daughter, as successor executrix, deposited tax refund checks
totaling $58,716 into her personal account at National City Bank of Kentucky in
October 1998. She was removed and replaced by the Public Administrator in
August 2001. In January 2003, he brought an action against the bank, seeking a
return of the $58,176. The bank defended on the three-year statute of limitations
under KRS 355.3-118(7)(a) and won summary judgment. The Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court, declining to adopt a discovery rule absent fraudulent
concealment. (KRS 386.120, regarding a bank's duty for fiduciary accounts, was
not before the Court.)
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Practice Point: The real interest in this case for an estate planning or probate
attorney is that the Public Administrator argued that he could not have discovered
the cause of action until he was appointed. Nevertheless, the clock had started
ticking. So, think twice before becoming a successor fiduciary or waiving the
obligation of an accounting from one fiduciary to a successor. And, think twice
before automatically waiving surety on the bond because the prior fiduciary may
not be able to make the beneficiaries whole.
B.

Gibson v. Citizen's National Corp.
Not to be Published, No. 2003-CA-000243-MR
Rendered: July 2, 2004
The decedent's wife was appointed as administratrix and deposited a check
belonging to the estate in her own account. She promised to pay it to the
decedent's only daughter but did not do so. After a substantial payment to the
daughter (somewhat less than half the amount of the deposit in question), she filed
a final settlement of the estate. The daughter did not object to the settlement.
After the administratrix died, the daughter filed a claim against her estate-but
after the six-month bar on claims. Proving her persistence, the daughter then
brought claims against the administrator of the widow/administratix's estate and
the bank at which that derelict deposit was made. It should come as no surprise,
that her suit failed.
The case does include a brief discussion ofKRS 386.120, which protects a bank
that allows a fiduciary to deposit estate funds into a personal account unless the
bank has actual knowledge or acts in bad faith.

IX.

Procedure
A.

Henderson v. Thomas
129 S.W.3d 852 (Ky. App. 2004)
At first, it looked like this case would require the Court of Appeals to squarely
address fraud on the dower, but the Court based its decision on a procedural fault.
Here, the estranged but not divorced husband of the decedent filed a complaint in
Circuit Court alleging that his wife and stepdaughter had committed fraud on the
dower by transferring personal property out of the wife's estate prior to her death
but after she was diagnosed with a terminal condition. On the morning of trial,
the Circuit Court dismissed the action based on the husband's failure to renounce
the will. The Court of Appeals upheld that dismissal and noted that a spouse who
wants to claim a dower right must renounce the will. Because the husband had
never renounced the will, he had no dower right and therefore had no standing to
allege that his right was fraudulently reduced by the transfers. In response to the
husband's argument that his Circuit Court complaint tolled the requirement, the
Court of Appeals held that this argument was not presented to the Circuit Court.
Even if it had been, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the only way to
renounce a will was the prescriptive procedure specified in KRS 392.080(1).
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Comment: The reason for the estrangement was the husband's admitted marital
infidelity. Thus, one of the issues for the trial would have been whether the
husband had voluntarily left his wife and lived in adultery, which would have
barred his dower claim. KRS 392.090(2).
B.

Hahn v. Hahn
Not to be Published, No. 2003-CA-001612-MR
Rendered: July 30, 2004
In this case, the appellants and the appellees are all nieces, nephews, grandnieces,
and grandnephews of William Hahn. Mr. Hahn had left his farm to the appellees.
However, prior to death, he sold the farm to one of the appellees. After his death,
the appellees sought a determination that the sale did not constitute an ademption.
The court also addressed the issue of whether to use the sale price or date of death
value if there was not an ademption and whether to trace the proceeds. The court
ruled on the latter issues and included the magic language that its order was final
and appealable and that there was no just reason for delay. Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals held that the Order was truly interlocutory because the court
never ruled on the ademption questions. Thus, it did not resolve the parties'
claims and was not subject to appeal.

Note: Although more of an appellate procedure than estate administration case,
this case does have particular relevance when a fiduciary petitions the court for
instruction.
C.

Keenan v. Estate of Glada Ethel Johnson
Not to be Published, No. 2002-CA-000056-MR
Rendered: June 18, 2004
In an unremarkable case, the beneficiaries disagreed whether to sell or divide real
property, had a successful settlement conference in Circuit Court, and then
disagreed about the settlement. The case was transferred from one Circuit Court
division to another so the.firstjudge could be a witness ifneeded. The second
judge entered an order settling the case on different terms than the original
proposed settlement order. The Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary
hearing about whether there had been a settlement and to what the parties had
agreed.

D.

Oyler v. Thomas
Not to be Published, No. 2003-CA-000893-DG
Rendered: Sept. 24, 2004
In this discretionary review from a Circuit Court order on appeal from the District
Court, the attorney for the former administrator of an estate argued that he had
standing to appeal from a district court order denying his request for fees paid by
the estate, and that he was entitled to fees as a matter of law. The executor of the
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estate argued that the district court had been without jurisdiction to appoint the
administrator and therefore had no authority to award any costs or fees to the
former administrator or his attorney. The Court of Appeals agreed with the
attorney that he had standing to appeal from the district court's order and
therefore reversed the Circuit Court's order dismissing his appeal. Although the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the Circuit Court's reasoning resolving the
remaining issues, the three judges held that the district court had properly denied
attorneys fees but did allow the former administrator to recover some costs
incurred during his administration of the estate.
The Court's discussion of the District Court's jurisdiction is interesting. The
Court seems to hold that testamentary capacity and undue influence are inherently
adversarial and the District Court does not have jurisdiction over them. However,
the District Court retains jurisdiction until a Circuit Court action is filed. Thus,
the mere mention of those issues doesn't deprive the District Court ofjurisdiction.
E.

Utterback v. Perry
Not to be Published, No. 2003-CA-001847-MR
Rendered: March 25,2005
Two brothers, as co-administrators of their mother's estate, obtained a District
Court order requiring their sister to tum property over to the estate. She had
owned it jointly with their mother. The District Court entered the order. After
her appeal to Circuit Court was dismissed as not being from a final order and a
2002 trip to the Court of Appeals on the discretionary review road to nowhere
highway, she went back to Circuit Court and obtained a writ of prohibition. The
co-administrators then went to the Court of Appeals, which vacated the order
issuing the writ and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. The Court
noted that writs of prohibition are not favored because they "disrupt the orderly,
even if erroneous, proceedings of a trial court." This writ did not satisfy either
requirement for the issuance of a writ: (1) that the court acted outside its
jurisdiction, or (2) that the court committed error and there was no adequate
remedy by appeal or otherwise. The property involved here was a bank account
and a CD and the Court noted that financial injury does not generally constitute
irreparable injury.

Note: The CD was worth $30,000, but the value of the bank account was not
stated. One does wonder what the net gain is after the cost of two trips to the
Court of Appeals and the numerous District Court and Circuit Court hearings.
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X.

Document Interpretation
A.

Richardson v. Richardson
Not to be Published, No. 2003-CA-001818-MR
Date: May 6, 2005
This case held that a qualified disclaimer may not be amended after it is made.
Although that result may seem logical (how can one modify one's rights to
property if one had disclaimed ever having such rights?), it would have been
useful for the Court of Appeals to publish this opinion so we could add that
principle to the scant case law about disclaimers in Kentucky.
The case may also be interesting to the estate planner, however, because the Court
of Appeals appears to have understood a fairly complicated sequence of events. It
is worth a read just to see how to explain that in a logical, concise way.

B.

Truax v. Trumbo
Not To Be Published, No. 2004-CA-000084-MR
Rendered: Feb. 11, 2005
An inter vivos trust included conflicting language about the ultimate disposition
of the trust assets. In one part, it left everything to "my children" in equal shares;

in another, it stated that the "failure to provide for distribution" to the named
children was intentional. Those named children became the plaintiffs, but the
Court of Appeals held that their interpretation was untenable. In order to give
effect to all of the documents' provisions, and recognizing that specific terms
trump general ones, the Court held that the settlor's "clear intent" was not to
provide for those named children.
Although unremarkable in result, this case provides a good primer on the rules for
interpreting trusts.
XI.

Life Estate
Gee v. 'Brown
144 S.W.3d 844 (Ky. App. 2004)
Appellant, the Executrix of Ms. Pinchum's estate, argued that she had the power to
convey fee simple title to a piece of property in which the decedent had been granted a
life estate. The decedent had filed a 1967 Affidavit of Descent purportedly renouncing
her life estate and putting the remainder beneficiaries on constructive notice that she was
claiming ownership of the fee by adverse possession.
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Appellant relied heavily on selected passages from Superior Oil Corp. v. Alcorn, 242 Ky.
814,47 S.W.2d 973 (1931), in support of her argument that a life tenant may acquire the
fee by clearly renouncing all claims as life tenant to the knowledge of the remaindermen,
and by taking possession under a claim of absolute ownership with recorded evidence of
his or her title to that effect. The Court's careful reading of Superior Oil, however,
supported the decision of the trial court. The court in Superior Oil plainly stated "[w]e
have found no case, in this state, where one having nothing but a life estate has been able
by any act or declaration of his own to enlarge that life estate to a fee." 242 Ky. at 826,
47 S.W.2d at 980 (emphasis added by Gee).
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'''Charitable contributions ofnoncash items, especially art objects, have
been increasing. The main problem here centers around highly inflated
excessive valuations." (from The American Way In Taxation: Internal
Revenue, 1862-1963, edited by Lillian Doris, Prentice-Hall, 1963, at page
101)

I.

A Long History of Distrust

Early in the life of the US Income Tax, in 1917, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
was faced wit~ a technical issue. When property (e.g., stock or artworks) was contributed
to charity, was the donor~s deduction based upon the value of the property or the donor's
cost? Their answer - the current market value would be deductible. [See Giving in
America: Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector, Report of the Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs (1975) at page 143-4 for a discussion of this unidentified
ruling.] By the time regulations were promulgated under the Revenue .Act of 1918, this
rule was incorporated therein. See Article 251 of Regulations 45.
Thus, the donor of appreciated property received a double benefit - the gain
accruing in the property escaped capital gains tax, while the allowable deduction was
based on the appreciated value. When tax rates were as high as 70% (91 % before 1964),
the donor's tax benefit could exceed the after-tax proceeds remaining if the property had
been sold. Critics pointed out that two identically situated donors 'giving the same amount
to charity were treated differently if one gave cash while the other gave appreciated
property, even though the donee charity received the same benefit.
When Congress set about revising the basic tax rules governing charitable
contributions in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, one of the major concerns addressed was
prevention of abuses involving propert~ contributions. A major goal was to eliminate the
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possibility that a donor could "make money by giving it away," coming out ahead
financially by making a charitable contribution. The deduction limitations described
below were designed in part to help prevent this.
A parallel concern that has plagued tax administrators for years is the problem of
ascertaining the true value of contributed property. Because the donor's deduction is
based upon the fair market value of the contributed property, there is a natural human
tendency to exaggerate such values. A major change in this area was the introduction of
a comprehensive system of appraisal requirements for contributions of noncash property
under the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. That Act directed the IRS to promulgate
regulations incorporating appraisal requirements for contributions of property exceeding
certain dollar limits (generally $5,000, but $10,000 for closely-held securities).
Simultaneously, Congress encouraged the IRS to utilize fully existing penalties, (e.g.,
negligence and fraud penalties) to further discourage valuation abuses. Five years later,
in the Revenue Reconciliation Budget Act of 1989, the penalty and interest provisions
were consolidated and coordinated.
The effect of the 1984 changes was to increase the likelihood that excessive
valuations of contributed property would be detected by IRS and to increase the cost to
donors who claim excessive deductions based on overvaluations. In 1993, as part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, the substantiation requirements were
further strengthened by the enactment of §170(t)(8), requiring receipts
("contemporaneous written acknowledgments") for all contributions over $250.
Despite this network of statutory and regulatory requirements, the problem of
overvalued property contributions has not diminished over the years. In June of 2004, in
connection with hearings reviewing a variety of tax and nontax problems involving
nonprofit organizations, the Senate Finance Committee staff released a laundry list of
legislative proposals, including a proposed new system for resolving disputed valuations.
Subsequently, in January of 2005, the Joint Committee on Taxation listed overvalued
charitable contributions of property as a major source of lost tax revenue and forwarded
several proposals to curtail this abuse. This will be discussed below in Part V of this
outline.

II.

Property Contributions Are Treated Less Favorably Than Cash Contributions
A.

Percentage· Limitations
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B.

1.

Cash contributions by individuals - Deductible up to 50% of the
donor's "contribution base" (genreally equal to adjusted gross
income ("AGI")

2.

Appreciated property contributions by individuals - Deductible at
fair market value (subject to the reduction rules described below) to
the extent they do not exceed the following:
a.

Contributions of appreciated capital gain property to a public
charity are deductible up to 30% of adjusted gross income.
[§ 170(b)( 1)(C)]

b.

Contributions of appreciated property to a private foundation
or "for the use of" any charity are deductible up to the lesser
of (1) 20% of adjusted gross income, or (2) the excess of30%
of AGI over all contributions to which the 30% limitation of
section 170(b)(1)(C) applies. [§170(b)(I)(D)]

3.

A donor may elect to reduce the amount of property contributions to
his or her basis in the contributed property, and thereby render such
reduced deduction allowable under the higher 50%-of-AGI rule.
[§ 170(b)(1 )(C)(iii)]

4.

Contributions in excess of the percentage limitations carryover for
the following five taxable years, and are treated as the same type of
contribution, subject to the same percentage limitation, in the
carryover years.

Deductions Are Reduced for Certain Property Contributions
In general, the amount deductible for a charitable contribution of property
is the fair market value of the property on the date of the gift.
Many people (both practitioners and civilians) have the misconception that
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 limited all property contributions to the
donor's basis. This is not true, although there are several important
exceptions.
1.

Non-capital gain property
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a.

General rule - The amount of the donor's deduction is
reduced by any amount which would not have been taxed as
long-term capital gain if the property had been sold at its fair
market value on the date of the contribution. See section
170(e)(1)(A). Examples of the types of gifts affected by this
rule would be inventory property, short-term capital gain
property, property subject to recapture under section 1245 or
1250, and section 306 stock. This rule applies without regard
to the nature of the donee organization. In effect, deductions
for gifts of such property are limited to the donor's basis in
the property.

b.

Exceptions for certain gifts of inventory property by
corporations, if such gifts are:
(i)

For the care of the ill, the needy or infants
[§170(e)(3)]; or

(ii)

"Qualified Research Contributions" [§ 170(e)(4)].

In each instance, there are highly detailed tests for
qualification. If either of these exceptions applies, the
deduction is equal to the smaller of:
The donor's basis plus half of the appreciation, or
Two times the donor's basis.
2.

Capital Gain Property
a.

Tangible property/unrelated use rule- If tangtble personal
property is contributed, and the donee organization's use of
the donated property is not related to its charitable function
(~, construction equipment donated to a symphony
orchestra organization), the donor's deduction is limited to the
donor's basis in the property. [§170(e)(1)(B)(i)]

b.

Property gifts to private foundations
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(i).

General rule - In general, deductions for gifts of
appreciated property to a private foundation are limited
to the donor's basis in the property. [§170(e)(I)(B)(ii)]

(ii).

Exception - Contributions of capital gain property to
the following types of private foundation (described in
§170(b)(1)(E)) are deductible on the same basis as
contributions to public charities:

(iii)

•

(c)

3.

(1)

Private operating foundations (described in
§4942G)(3));

(2)

Foundations which distribute all of the
contributions received for a given year by the
15th day of the third month of the following
year [the so-called "conduit" or "pass-thru"
foundation, described in §170(b)( 1)(E)(ii)]; and

(3)

"pooled fund" foundations described in
§170(b)(1)(E)(iii).

Publicly-traded stock - Contributions of publiclytraded stock to a private foundation are now deductible
at full fair market value. Anyone donor may deduct
only 10% of the stock of anyone corporation in this
fashion. This was originally enacted as a temporary
rule applicable only to contributions made from 1984
through 1994. It was revived (not extended) for
contributions made from July 1, 1996, through May
31, 1997, and after many efforts, it was made
permanent in 1998.

Partial Interest Rule - No deduction for a contribution of less
than the donor's entire interest in the property, with important
exceptions (discussed below). See section 170(f)(3).

Bargain Sale Rules - If property is sold to a charity (i.e., if a
charitable deduction is allowable by reason of a sale) the donor must
allocate his/her basis in the property between the sale portion and the
gift portion. [§ 1011(b)]
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C.

Special Rules For Certain Types Of Property - Congress, in the Jumpstart
Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act passed last year, took a new approach to
the ubiquitous problem of overvalued charitable contributions by imposing
special rules for certain categories of property.
1.

Patents and copyrights --- The JOBS Act, added new section I70(m)
to the Code, allowing a multi-year deduction for donations of
intellectual property. In the year the contribution is made, the
donor's deduction is equal to basis; this result is reached by reducing
the deduction by any long-term capital gain inherent in the property,
under new §170(e)(I)(B)(iii). Over the next twelve years the donor
would be allowed to claim additional deductions based on a
percentage of the royalty income received by the donee from the
transferred property. This deduction would gradually decline from
100% of such income in the next two years to 10% in years 11 and
12. The donor's additional deductions don't begin until after the
percentage income amounts exceed the initial deduction (basis).
Note that new §170(e)(I)(B)(iii) achieves a parity between
contributions of patents (which are capital assets, and hence were
formerly deductible at fair market value) and copyrights (which are
not, and thus produced - and still do - a deduction equal to the
donor's cost basis).

2.

Used Cars - The JOBS Bill also enacted new §170(f)(12), which
imposes new rules for contributions of motor vehicles, including
boats and airplanes. Deductions in excess of $500 for such
c~ntributions are limited to the gross proceeds received by the donee
charitable organization upon subsequent sale of the vehicle. The
proposal would require the charity to report to the donor the amount
of the sale proceeds within 30 days of the date of sale.
The new rules also require the charity to furnish certain information
to the IRS, including the donor's name and tax ID number, the
vehicle identification number, a certification that the vehicle was
sold in an arm's length transaction between independent parties, and
the sales price received. If the charity retains the vehicle for use, the
taxpayer is eligible for a fair market value deduction provided that
the charity and the donor provide the IRS with certifications
regarding the proposed use. Charities are subject to a new penalty
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for providing fraudulent declarations to donors. This penalty is
generally equal to the greater of the tax benefit to the donor or gross
sales receipts from the vehicle.

III.

3.

More? - Might this fonnat (donor's deduction somehow determined
by what the donee realizes, rather than value) be a model for all noncash property contributions? As Congress reviews the basic
approach to these contributions, the JOBS Act changes could
provide a model for charitable contributions of property generally.

4.

Other New Rules for Property Contributions - In addition to the
rules described above for specific types of property, the JOBS Act
also amended some of the basic rules affecting property
contributions in general. The qualified appraisal requirements were
extended to all taxpayers, including C corporations. [Formerly, the
qualified appraisal requirements applied only to individuals,
partnerships and S corporations.] In addition, taxpayers must now
attach a copy of the qualified appraisal to Form 8283 whenever the
claimed deduction exceeds $500,000. These dollar limitations are
indexed for inflation.

The Partial Interest Rule and the Charitable Deduction
to

The discussion above demonstrates how certain contributions of property produce
an income tax deduction that is less than fair market value. In the discussion that follows,
we will review rules that have a more drastic effect; under these rules, certain property
contributions are entirely nondeductible. The existence of these rules requires the
planner to be aware of their effect and to structure affected contributions in such a
manner as to qualify for a deduction wherever feasible. Such planning utilizes non-trust
techniques.
A.

General Rule of Nondeductibility

The starting point for most of these non-trust techniques is the basic set of
rules governing the income tax charitable contribution deduction. Obviously, an
outright transfer of cash or property to charity will produce a deduction for the
donor, but effective gift planning normally calls for a set of alternatives more
creative and less obvious than that.
The essence of a planned giving technique is the availability of a
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simultaneous benefit of one sort or another to the donor (or hislher noncharitable
beneficiary) from a charitable transfer. The Internal Revenue
Code provides a general rule disallowing the donor's charitable deduction for such
a transfer, but there are exceptions provided and these are the foundation for the
entire field of planned giving.
In the case of transfers in trust, section 170(f)(2) requires that the transfer of
a remainder interest be in the form of a charitable remainder annuity trust or a
charitable remainder unitrust (described in section 664), or a pooled income fund
(described in section 642(c)(5)) if a deduction is to be available. For nontrust
charitable techniques, the statutory point of reference is the split interest limitation
in section 170(f)(3)(A). Under that provision, no deduction is allowable for a
nontrust transfer of an interest in property which consists of less than the
taxpayer's entire interest in such property (unless it meets the requirements for
deductibility of a trust transfer). A transfer of the right to use property (e.g., a
week's use of a vacation home) is nondeductible under this rule.
B.

Exceptions - The Key To Partial Interest Transfers

For planning purposes, the key to the partial interest limitation lies in the
exceptions set forth in section 170(f)(3)(B). Those exceptions set the ground rules
for the very common planning situation presented by the client who wants to
accomplish simultaneously a personal objective and a charitable objective.
Indeed, the standards in section 170(f)(3)(B) often define the planning parameters.
Obviously, section 170 (where these rules are set forth) is an income tax
provision. However, these rules are adopted by cross-reference in the gift tax and
estate tax charitable deduction provisions. Each of these exceptions is described
and discussed in detail in Part IV below.

IV.

Deductible Split Interests Define Nontrust Planning Techniques

The types of split interest transfers discussed below are deductible notwithstanding
the general prohibition on deductions for charitable transfers which also provide benefits
for the donor or another beneficiary.
A.

Remainder Interest in a Personal Residence or Farm
A contribution of a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm
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qualifies for income tax, estate tax, and gift tax charitable deductions under
sections 170(f)(3)(B)(i), 2055(e)(2), and 2522(c)(2), respectively.
[Note: Computation of the deduction for income tax purposes is quite
complex, and straight line depreciation must be taken into account. See
section 170(t)(4) and Treas. Reg. §1-170A-I2. While the examples there
are sufficiently complicated to confuse many readers, note that the situation
is further complicated by the current actuarial system mandated by section
7520 and the monthly rate adjustments required thereunder. Most
practitioners prefer to rely upon a computer program for such
computations.]
The requirements for qualification are fairly simple:
1.

The interest conveyed to charity must be a legal remainder interest;
it may follow either a life interest or a term of years.
a.

A remainder interest in trust will not qualify; see Rev. Rul.
76-357, 1976-2 C.B. 285.

b. It is generally not sufficient for the property to be sold at the
termination of the life or term-of-years interest, and the proceeds
given to the charitable donee. [Exception - Such an approach will
produce a deduction if under state law the charitable remainderman
may compel the life tenant's executor to distribute the property
instead of selling it. See Estate of Eliza W. Blackford v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1246 (1981), acq. in result, 1983-2 C.B. 1,
involving West Virginia law, and Rev. RuL 83-158, 1983-2 C.B. 159.
c. A fraction of the remainder may be given to charity with the balance
held either by other charities (Rev. RuL 83-158, 1983-2 C.B. 159) or
by individuals (Rev. Rul. 87-37,1987-1 C.B. 295).

d. Can the donation of the remainder interest be contingent? The
answer is a clear "It depends.,., Although a remainder interest in
the residence or farm must vest in the donee charity, it may be
subject to a contingent subsequent that would cause title to vest
in another charity. See Private Letter Ruling No. 9436039,
approving a deed of transfer providing that the initial Donee's
interest would terminate and vest unconditionally in another
qualified Donee if the initial Donee should attempt to sell or
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encumber the residence, lease it to any entity for any use other
than historic preservation, or change the configuration of the
first floor of the residence.
2. The residence in question need not be a principal residence. A vacation
home or similar temporary residence may be used; this is often a
convenient way to provide for the ultimate disposition of such a
property and at the same time obtain a current income tax deduction. A
cooperative apartment or condominium will also qualify.
3. A farm will qualify in its totality. That is, the deductible interest will
include the improvements and acreage, and not merely the living
quarters. A farm is defined in Regs. sec. 1.170A-7(b)(4) as any land
used by the taxpayer or his tenant for the production of crops, fruits, or
other agricultural products or for the sustenance of livestock (including
cattle, hogs, horses, mules, donkeys, sheep, goats, captive fur-bearing
animals, chickens, turkeys, pigeons, and other poultry).
4. The donee may be a private foundation, although this may require a
reduction of the allowable income tax deduction under section
170(e)(1)(B)(ii); see Private Letter Rulings No. 9714017 and 9538040.
5. If a remainder interest is given to charity under this rule, the donor will be
entitled to additional deductions upon making subsequent capital
improvements (e.g., installation of a new heating and air conditioning
system): see Private Letter Ruling No. 8529014.

B. Undivided Portion of Taxpayer's Entire Interest
A contribution of a undivided portion of the taxpayer's entire interest in property
likewise qualifies for income tax, estate tax, and gift tax charitable deductions
under sections 170(f)(3)(B)(ii), 2055(e)(2), and 2522(c)(2), respectively.
To qualify, the charitable donee must receive a fractional or percentage of each
and every substantial interest or right owned by the donor, and must extend over
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the entire term of the donor's interest in the property and in any other property into
which the property is converted. The charity is thus made a co-tenant or co-owner
of the property.
Examples:
1) Donor's father bequeaths to him a life estate in an office building.
Subsequently, Donor contributes to his university a 25% undivided interest in
his life estate in the office building. Donor's contribution is deductible.
2) Donor contributes to his university a life estate in an office building owned
by him. This contribution is not deductible, since it is not an undivided
portion of the Donor's entire interest in the building.
Allocation of possession (based on time) is generally necessary; see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-7(b)(1 )(i) and Private Letter Ruling No. 7733075.
This is sometimes used as a means of sharing artworks or other similar property
by a donor and a charitable institution on a deductible basis.
EXAMPLE: Collector gives a university museum an undivided 25% interest
in a sculpture valued at $200,000. This will normally produce a $50,000
deduction and the museum will be entitled to the unrestricted use and
possession of the sculpture for 25% (i.e., three months) of each year. Two
points should be noted:
1) In Winokur v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 733 (1988), acq. 1989-1
C.B. 1, the Tax Court held that the donee's right to possession of
contributed artwork during its proportionate period of ownership is
sufficient, even if it doesn't actually take possession.
2) Even though the IRS has acquiesced in the Winokur case, a
donor should not undertake such an arrangement unless it is contemplated
that the parties will conduct themselves in accordance with the terms of
their shared ownership arrangement.
3) As a practical matter, this should be undertaken only where the
donee actually desires eventually to own the works in question o~tright,
and the donor contemplates contributing them in their entirety eventually.
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Note also that Treas. Reg. §1.170A-5(a)(2) requires that the donee's initial period
of possession begin within one year, lest the gift be classified as one of a future
interest (and hence potentially giving rise to a delayed deduction under
§170(a)(3)).

c.

Qualified Conservation Contributions

The final type of deductible split-interest transfer is the qualified conservation
contribution, which is defined in section 170(h). The qualifications are quite
technical, but may be summarized as follows:
1. There must be a contribution of a "qualified real property interest":
a. The most familiar of these is the so-called "conservation easement"
(also sometimes called a facade easement or preservation easement). This
is not a traditional easement, but rather consists of a restriction (in
perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the subject property.
b. A remainder interest may also qualify.
c. Also, the donor may contribute his or her entire interest in the property
other than a "qualified mineral interest" (defined in section 170(h)(6) as
subsurface oil, gas, or other minerals, and the right of access to them).
2. The contribution must be made to a "qualified organization" basically, a
governmental unit or a publicly-supported charitable organization). See
section 170(h)(3) for the full definition.
3. The contribution must be made "exclusively for conservation purposes."
See sections 170(h)(4) and (5) and the extensive regulations thereunder for the
very technical list of requirements for qualification.
4. Some special planning considerations:
a. The conservation purpose must be "protected in perpetuity." Hence,
any mortgage or other indebtedness must be subordinated to the rights of
the donee organization. See Satullo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1993614, disallowing a deduction for the value of an eas.ement which was not
recorded until after a subsequent mortgage had been entered into and
recorded; the court found that the mortgage lien took priority over the
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easement, such that the easement was not protected in perpetuity.
b. The amount of the donor's deduction for a conservation easement is
generally determined by a before-and-after approach (i.e., the value of the
property before the easement is imposed, less the value of the property
with the easement in place).
c. Any enhancement in the value of other nearby property held by the
donor as a result of the conservation contribution will reduce the deduction
otherwise available. For example, by contributing an easement which
obligates him to preserve the unspoiled nature of a wooded lakesite, the
donor may increase the value of an adjacent cottage also owned by him.
The deduction for the easement is reduced by the amount of this increase
in value, and it would not be unheard of for the IRS to allege that such an
increase (which is often hard to value) is sufficient to eliminate the
deduction.

v.

5.

Caution! - As described below, the conservation easement is the
subject of several adverse legislative proposals, and the planner should not
ignore the possibility that the law could change with retroactive effect.
The Chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Finance
Committee announced in December of 2004 that they would introduce
legislation to block abusive conservation easement contributions and that
such legislation would be effective as of the date of their press release
(December 17, 2004). Earlier, the IRS issued a public warning of abuses
in contributions of conservation easements (largely resulting from abusive
valuations); see Notice 2004-41.

6.

Although the conservation contribution usually thought of in terms
of the familiar restrictive easement, note that it may also be utilized by a
donor wishing to transfer the bulk of the subject property and retain
subsurface oil, gas and other mineral rights. See Private Letter Ruling No.
9318027.

Winds of Change - Proposals, Warnings and·Pending Legislation - Fears of
overvalued charitable contributions are once more prompting proposed legislative
solutions. Some of these solutions would affect specific types of property
contributions, while others would be generally applicable.
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A. Joint Committee on Taxation Proposals
In January 2004, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (RIowa) and Ranking Minority Member Max Baucus (D-Montana) asked the
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation to prepare a report detailing
various ways Congress might reduce the widening gap between taxes actually
paid and taxpayers' true tax liability - a gap of about $311 billion as of2001.
The report was to address ways to improve compliance by curtailing tax
shelters, closing unintended loopholes and addressing other noncompliance
issues. The request was diligently worked upon by the committee staff and it
culminated in a massive collection of proposals on an extremely broad range
of topics - 435 pages - released on January 27, 2005.
The Joint Committee Proposals include three items are aimed directly at
property valuation abuses. -, The first two would modify charitable deductions
for contributions of particular categories of property - specifically
conservation and facade easements, and clothing and household items. A third
proposal would reform the general rules governing all charitable contributions
of property.
Conservation and Facade Easements
The Joint Committee characterized the process for valuing these as
"highly speculative, considering that, in general, there is no market and thus
no comparable sales data for such easements." To limit abuses, the proposal
would make several changes, First, no deduction would be allowed for an
easement on a personal residence where the donor or a member of the donor's
family uses or expects to use the property as a residence. For other properties,
the deduction for contribution of a facade easement would be limited to the
lesser of (1) five percent of the fair market value of the structure (determined
without regard to the facade easement); or (2) 33 percent of the value of the
facade easement. And second, the proposal would imposes new standards on
appraisals and appraisers regarding the valuation of conservation easements
for contribution purposes.
Used Clothing and Household Items
To prevent abuses, de<:iuctions for contributions of used clothing and
household goods would be limited to $500 per year. Household items for this
purpose would not include antiques, jewelry, or collections.
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Contributions of Appreciated Property
The Joint Committee suggests several altemativeapproaches for dealing
with the perpetual problem of overvalued charitable contributions of non-cash
property.
Option 1 is the simplest - deductions for contributions of most property
other than marketable securities would be limited to the donor's tax basis
in the property (or its fair market value if less). Some categories of
property that are dealt with specifically in the Internal Revenue Code
would not be subject to this rule. Examples would include used cars (plus
boats and plane's), intellectual property, and contributions eligible for an
enhanced deduction under sections 170(e)(3), (e)(4), or (e)(6).
Option 2 would be the same, with one additional wrinkle contributions of property to be used to substantially further the donee's
exempt purposes ("exempt use" property) would continue to produce
deductions equal to fair market value. If, however, the donee disposed of
the property within three years, the donor's deduction would be scaled
back to basis. If such disposition occurred in a subsequent taxable year
(after the donor had already claimed a deduction for the value of the
property, the donor would realize income in that year equal to the excess of
his/her deduction taken over the basis limitation. Expanded reporting
requirements would be added to enforce this rule.
In addition to these principal options, which the Joint Committee admits
"is likely to reduce the amount of contributions of hard-to-value pr<?perty,"
several other alternatives are also thrown out. For example, the present-law
system of appraiser and appraisal rules could be strengthened to prevent
overvaluations. Another approach suggested would be to allow the donor an
initial deduction equal to hislher basis (or if less, fair market value), and the
donor would be eligible for an additional charitable contribution deduction in
the year the contributed property is disposed of by the donee. And finally, the
report acknowledges that it might be simpler just to eliminate, in whole or in
part, the charitable contribution deduction for property. The report notes,
however, that "This approach would discourage much systematic and
institutionatized fundraising."
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The full text of the Joint Committee report is available from the House of
Representatives website at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf.
B.

Senate Finance Committee "Discussion Draft" of June 19, 2004 - This
document, issued in connection with Hearings held on June 22, sets forth a
series of sweeping changes in the tax and non-tax rules governing charities and
other nonprofit organizations. The full document is available on the Internet at
http://jinance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf Two
of the proposals in the draft would specifically affect property contributions:
1. Contributions to a donor-advised fund ("OAF") other than cash or publicly
traded securities would have to be sold within one year of contribution and a
plan for sale must exist at the time of gift. Alternatively, a DAF might be
permitted to accept only cash or publicly traded securities
2. Baseball Arbitration Rule - The Finance Committee discussion draft
would impose new rules for dealing with audit controversies arising from such
disputed valuations. Because they parallel the approach used to resolve pay
disputes between professional baseball players and team owners, this is
referred to as the "baseball arbitration" rule. Under these rules, donors would
be bound by the values claimed on a return when they receive notice that the
return is to be audited. If the parties are unable to agree on a mutually
acceptable settlement, the IRS auditor and the donor/taxpayer would each
submit a proposed value to the IRS Appeals officer, who would be required to
select one figure or the other, rather than reaching an independent conclusion.
If litigation ensues, the court would likewise be limited to one of these two
values. In appropriate circumstances, the court could require the losing party
to pay the appraisal costs incurred by the prevailing party.

VI. Don't Forget! - FMV Remains the Basic Rule for Property Contributions
Given the decades of controversy, legislative change and the current proposals,
planners must not lose sight of the basic rule that applies to these contributions. As in
the 1917 ruling described at the beginning of this outline, the donor's charitable
deduction for a contribution of capital gain property (i.e., most property) is still based
upon the value of the property. There are plenty of exceptions, and it is easy to
becqme so entranced by the elegant complexity of the exceptions that one forgets that
these ARE only exceptions to the familiar old general rule. Most donors and most
gifts are still unaffected.
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VII.

Special Considerations for Special Assets

A. Art Objects
1. Consider a gift of a partial interest, as described above.
EXAMPLE: R owns a Picasso painting (value $300,000) which he desires
(ultimately) to contribute to Museum M, and which M very much desires. R
lives in New York, but spends three months each winter in Florida. R may
contribute to M a 25% undivided interest in the painting, entitling M to
unrestricted use and possession of it for 25% (three months) of each year - the
period when R is in Florida. R is entitled to a deduction of $75,000, or 25% of
the value of the painting, and his enjoyment of the painting is virtually
unaffected.
2. Loans and pledges of artworks may pose gift tax problems, primarily
because they are often difficult to distinguish. For example, consider the donor
who intends to give a valuable art object to charity, but wants to keep it for his or
her life.
If the donor is viewed as giving the donee a future interest in the subject work
and retaining a life estate, this is a transfer for ~hich no gift tax charitable
deduction is available. The result could be a gift tax.
Compare the effect if the transaction is a loan, followed by a testamentary
transfer; under section 2503(g), "any loan of a qualified work of art" will not be
treated as a transfer for gift tax purposes.
The moral is to try to arrange such a deferred gift of artwork whenever
possible in such a manner that it will be characterized as a loan.
See Private Letter Ruling No. 9152036 for a loan/gift arrangement whereby a
donor transferred her artwork to a museum over time, subject to a detailed
agreement. This ruling offers a good model for such an arrangement, although it
may be a good idea for a donor wishing to create a similar arrangement to seek a
ruling of hislher own.
3. Consider a private operating foundation for the art collector who regularly
contributes or loans artworks to museums, universities, etc.
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4. Copyrighted artworks presented a unique problem under the split interest
rules discussed above, but that problem was corrected by legislation in 1981.
Sections 2055(e)(4) and 2522(c)(3) provide that for estate and gift taxes (but not
the income tax), a work of art and a copyright on such work will be treated as
separate properties; this result follows only if the donee is a public charity and its
use of the property is related to its charitable purpose.
5. Artists and Collectors - All contributions of art are necessarily property
contributions and as such are fully subject to the rules described above. Artists
sometimes complain that they are singled out for discriminatory treatment, since
their deductions for contributions of their own works are limited to· the. cost of
materials (Why? - Because a sale of the work would produce ordinary income),
while upon their death, they are subject to estate tax on the full value. This is not
a result intended, but only the rsult of applying general rules to a particular factual
setting.
6. Commissioner's Art Advisory Panel- The Art Advisory Panel assists
the Internal Revenue Service by reviewing and evaluating tlJ.c acceptabilit)T o£
property appraisals submitted by taxpayers in support of fair market value claims
on works of art for income tax (i.e., charitable contribution) purposes and estate
tax purposes. All taxpayer audits which include art work or cultural property with
a claimed value of $20,000 or more are referred to the Art Advisory Panel. The
Panel meets in Washington, DC usually once or twice a year in each specialty
area. Approximately 250-300 items are reviewed at each one-day meeting. Prior
to the meetings, the staff appraisers send photographs and written materials to the
Panelists concerning the works of art to be reviewed. The written materials
include information from the taxpayer's appraisal, such as size, medium, physical
condition and provenance, as well as the staffs own market research, including
information on public and private sales of relevant art work.
7. IRS Ruling on Value - As a general matter, the IRS will not issue
advance rulings on the value of property for any purpose, since this is a factual
issue. See §4.02(1) of Rev. Proc. 2004-3,2004-1 I.R.B. 114. However, Revenue
Procedure 96-15,1996-3 I.R.B. 41, establishes procedures whereby a taxpayer
may request a Statement of Value from the Service for a transfer of art that has
been appraised for at least $50,000. Taxpayers may then rely upon this Statement
of Value for tax return purposes. This is not often used by taxpayers because it is
available only after the transfer has taken place, and the "user fee" to IRS is
$2,500.
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B. Life Insurance
1. A contribution (i.e., transfer of ownership) of a policy is deductible, but
mere payment of premiums on a policy payable to charity is not deductible if the
donor/payor still has the right to change the beneficiary.
2. Note that, due to the ordinary income rule of section 170(e)(I)(A), the
donor's income tax charitable deduction for such a contribution will be limited to
basis (i.e., the total premiums paid), even if the cash surrender value is higher.
3. Many "split dollar" life insurance plans involve a division of a policy into
several portions, with the cash value typically being separated from the pure life
insurance portion. Remember that such gifts are subject to the partial interest
rules discussed above. Thus, where the donor transfers a policy to charity but
retains the right to designate the beneficiary of a portion of the proceeds, or to
receive the proceeds in excess of the cash surrender value, the transfer of the
policy (or payment of the premium) has been held not to qualify for the income
tax charitable deduction of the gift tax charitable deduction. See Rev. Rul. 76143, 1976-1 C.B. 63, and Rev. Rul. 76-200, 1976-1 C.B. 57, respectively.
4. Private "Letter Ruling 9110016 held no charitable deduction allowable for
the transfer of a newly-issued policy as a result of the interplay of two rules of
New York insurance law: (1) a charity does not have an insurable interest in a
donor's life; and (2) the insured's estate may be able to recover proceeds paid to a
beneficiary who lacked an insurable interest. According to I.R.S., the lack of an
insurable interest cannot be cured merely by having the insured take out the policy
and immediately transfer it to the charity, based upon a substance-over-form
analysis. This is a controversial holding, and if upheld it would invalidate many
long-established life insurance contribution programs. Although it may be based
upon a strained reading of New York law, note that several other states have
parallel law which raises the same issues.
5. "Wealth replacement" insurance is often used in conjunction with other
charitable gifts, to make up for the reduction in property otherwise passing to the
family after the donor's death. Typically, a donor who creates a charitable
remainder trust will use either the distributions from the trust or the income tax
savings from the charitable deduction produced upon its creation to pay premiums
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on a policy insuring the donor's life; such a policy may be purchased in an
insurance trust to avoid estate tax thereon.
Note that, while this technique is often considered a standard option for
a donor creating a charitable remainder unitrust, it works equally well with any
life income gift vehicle.

VIII.

Combining Non-trust Techniques

Often the planner will find that the donor's needs and desires are best met not by a
single gift vehicle ("Do you want a charitable gift annuity or a conservation easement?)
but by a combination of several· seemingly unrelated tools. What follows is one
example of this principle. Others will be discussed in the closing session of this program.
A. Charitable Home Equity Plan
With the baby boom generation lurching toward middle age, estate planners and
financial planners are increasingly seeking ways to provide financial security for the
elderly. Often, the major asset owned by such an individual is his/her home.
Financial institutions often offer "reverse mortgages" or "reverse annuity mortgages"
to permit such persons to realize on the equity built up in their homes. Under the
traditional home mortgage arrangement, the lender transfers the entire amount to the
borrower, who immediately begins repaying the loan in monthly installments. With a
reverse mortgage, however, the loan is paid out in monthly installments over the term
of the loan; at the end of the term, the entire balance, principal and interest, is due and
payable. Obviously, the borrower who may have become infirm physically or
financially (or both) faces a problem at this point.
Some charitable institutions are offering a comparable result by combining two
standard charitable gift arrangements - the gift of a remainder interest and the
charitable gift annuity.
While not a panacea, the resultant plan can be a worthwhile alternative for some
donors.
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Example: Assume Mrs. A, a 76-year-old widow, owns her house free of any
indebtedness. She and her husband paid $50,000 for the house many years ago
and it is now worth $250,000. She would like to remain in the house for the rest
of her life, but cannot do so without some additional income.
Suggested Solution: Mrs. A may wish to consider retaining a life interest in her
house, transferring the remainder interest in the house to charity in exchange for
an annuity.
Results: Assuming the following facts, the remainder interest is worth $130,608:
Land value of$100,000, Building value of$150,000 (with
salvage value of $30,000, and a useful life of 45 years)
If Mrs. A simply contributed the remainder interest to charity, she would be
entitled to a charitable deduction of$130,608. Instead, however, we are assuming
that she will use the remainder value to fund a charitable gift annuity.
Upon deeding a remainder interest in the property to charity, she will receive (at
standard American Council on Gift Annuity recommended rates for a person her
age), Mrs. A will receive quarterly annuity payments totaling $10,841 per year
(i.e., 8.3% of$130,608 for the balance of her life.
Mrs. A will also be entitled to a charitable deduction of $54,103 for this transfer,
which she may claim (up to 30% of her adjusted gross income) on her federal
income tax return for the year of the transfer, plus a five-year carryover period.
Each annual payment 0[$10,841 is taxed approximately as follows:
Ordinary income

$ 4,358

Capital gain

$ 5,185

Tax-free (basis)

$ 1,298

TOTAL.

$ 10,841

After Mrs. A outlives her life expectancy of 11.8 years, the annuity payments are
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taxed in full as ordinary income. Thus, Mrs. A receives the right to remain in the
house for life, plus $10,841 per year for life and an immediate deduction of
$54,103. [Note: All of the foregoing computations use a section 7520 discount
rate of 5.80. Obviously, the important aspect is the underlying principle rather
than the numbers.]
Potential Problem Areas: Like any possible course of action, this plan cannot be
adopted blindly without careful consideration of all of the ramifications, including
the following:
1. Is the charity willing (and legally able) to accept a future interest? Will
this comply with any local law regulating issuance of annuities? [For
example, under New York State law, real estate may not be used to fund a
charitable gift annuity. Note also that the New York view is that a charity
that is subject to New York law on this point for whatever reason must
comply with New York law as to ALL of its annuity contracts, even those
entered into with residents of other states.]
2. Where will the charity get the funds to pay the annuity, since the
transferred property will not be available to finance the annuity?
3. An agreement may be necessary, providing for what happens if the
property is destroyed or the donorlbeneficiary must move to a nursing
home or hospital, and specifying which party will pay for maintenance,
taxes, insurance, expenses, and the like.
4. If the donor has a spouse or other secondary income beneficiary, the
income and deduction benefits will be reduced accordingly.
5. The donor's heirs may object to the transaction. In an appropriate situation,
such objections may be ameliorated by means of insurance or gifts to the
heirs.
B. Other Combinations Provide Flexibility
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· While it is hard enough to master the various rules governing charitable
transfers, the true key to their use is in learning how to use them to accomplish the
aims of the donor in actual applications. The foregoing example shows how this
may be accomplished in just one, very specific situation. The point is not to
memorize a single application, but rather to view the various gift vehicles as
specialized tools to be used thoughtfully and selectively to achieve the desired
result.
Jerry J. McCoy
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
P.O. Box 66491
Washington, D.C. 20035-6491
202/466-6941 [fax 202/466-6942]
E-mail: mccoylaw@ao1.com
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I.

Definition & Types of Grantor Trusts
A. Grantor Trusts are defined and discussed in IRC §671 through §678, and I
refer herein to such trusts as "Grantor Trusts" or a "Grantor Trust". These
code sections outline the circumstances in which a trust will be treated as
owned, and thus taxed, to the grantor (or sometimes a beneficiary) of the trust
rather than the trust being taxed as its own separate taxable entity. When
these sections are applicable, the trust will be ignored for income tax
purposes and thus be treated as a Grantor Trust.

B. These Grantor Trust rules were first enacted as a part of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code ('54 Code) to deal with the IRS's concerns over the shifting of
income to taxpayers in lower tax brackets. These rules have changed little
since their enactment. When these Grantor Trust rules were put in place,
trusts were being used to shift taxable income either to the trust itself, where
the income tax rates were once lower than individual rates, or to individual
beneficiaries of such trusts that might be in lower income tax brackets. It had
become a common practice to use trusts to shift income with ease to a lower
bracket. The '54 Code, however, ushered in a dramatic change.

c.

Even though these Grantor Trust rules have been around a long time, many
tax professionals are only now beginning to fully understand all of the
intricacies of these rules as a result of a tremendous increase in the number of
irrevocable trusts being created. Unfortunately, many accountants are not
fully informed by the drafting attorneys of irrevocable trusts as to the type of
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trust that was created or that is being administered. This leaves the accountant
with the all-important role of determining the tax status of a particular trust.

D. Many would argue that the Grantor Trust rules of §671 through §678 are
now out of date and became out of date once the trust rates went to their
current flattened state. Nonetheless, whether they are out of date or not, they
still remain and are an important part of the analysis required of any trust.

E. It should be noted that §671 through §678 are only applicable to income
taxes and have no impact on whether the assets in a trust are includable in the
grantor's estate for gift and estate tax purposes.

F. This writing will focus on irrevocable trusts being treated as Grantor Trusts.
It seems that most professionals are comfortable with treating a revocable
trust (i.e., a Revocable Living Trust) as a Grantor Trust. The confusion
arises, however, when irrevocable trusts are treated as Grantor Trusts. It
seems unnatural that an irrevocable trust that is designed to be outside the
grantor's estate for gift and estate tax purposes could possibly be effectively
ignored for income tax purposes under these Grantor Trust rules.

G. Having a trust be treated as "Grantor" under §671 through §678 can either be
a good thing or a bad thing. For example, if there is an irrevocable trust that
holds assets and is being taxed as a complex trust l ., the trust nlay be triggering

A complex trust, in very general terms, is a trust that does not require the annual distribution of
income to the trust beneficiaries. The fact that income can be distributed is not determinative. That is,
even though the income of the trust can be distributed (i.e., for health., education., support and maintenance
or maybe as a solely discretionary distribution by the Trustee), this does not keep a trust from being a
cOluplex trust for income tax purposes. A complex trust \vill generally be taxed on the incolne generated
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income tax at the highest levels while the grantor of such trust may be in a
lower income tax bracket.

In that situation, it is important to look at the

terms of the trust and see if it is possibly a Grantor Trust so the income can
then be taxed back to the grantor at the grantor's lower rates rather than being
taxed inside the trust at the top income tax rates. Consequently, in this fact
situation, having the trust treated as a Grantor Trust can be a good thing.

But a trust treated as a Grantor Trust can also be a bad thing. For example,
assume that a parent sets up a trust as a simple trust2 to pass income down to
children (age 14 or older) in an attempt to have such income taxed to younger
beneficiaries at their lower rates. If the trust turns out to be a Grantor Trust,
then that means the income will not be taxed to the children as trust
beneficiaries of a simple trust and at their lower rates, but instead will be
taxed to the parent as the grantor of the Grantor Trust. Consequently, in this
fact situation, having the trust treated as a Grantor Trust can be a bad thing.

H. This writer has little doubt that many trusts that are being treated as separate

legal tax entities (i.e., generally a simple or complex trust) should really be
taxed as Grantor Trusts. As an example., and as discussed further below,
when a trust is drafted to allow the grantor to retain certain control over or
possibly to benefit a spouse, then such trust may be taxed as a Grantor Trust
and, consequently, the grantor or settlor of the trust may be taxed on the trust

by the trust unless such income is distributed and then., of course, if it is distributed, the income distributed
will be taxed to the distributeelbeneficiary with the complex trust getting a corresponding deduction.
A sinlple trust, in very general ternls, is a trust that requires the annual distribution of income to
the trust beneficiaries. In a silnple trust, the incorue ",ust be distributed each year to the trust beneficiaries.
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activity rather than the trust being its own taxable entity. It is very easy to
create a Grantor Trust, but more difficult for a trust to have non-grantor
status. Many approach trusts with the assumption they are a separate taxable
entity and that the Grantor Trust is the exception. The best approach is
probably to assume a trust is a Grantor Trust unless it can be shown to meet
the statutory tests for a non-grantor trust. The term "intentionally defective"
has led both the legal and accounting professions to somehow believe that
unless one "intentionally" creates a Grantor Trust, such trust will be a nongrantor trust. Such is not the case.

I.

The Code uses the reference "owner" in describing an individual or someone
else that is going to "own" and thus be taxed on the activity within the trust.
"Where... the grantor or another shall be treated as the owner of any
portion of a trust, there shall then be included in computing the taxable
income and credits of the grantor or the other person those items of
income, deductions, and credits against tax of the trust which are
attributable to that portion of the trust to the extent that such items would
be taken into account under this chapter in computing taxable income or
credits against the tax of an individual." IRC §671

J.

It is clear that it is only §671 through §679 that trigger these rules. A
grantor's retention of "dominion and control over the trust" under §61 or
"any other provision" does not automatically trigger the Grantor Trust rules
unless §671 through §679 specifically provide for such treatment.
"No items of a trust shall be included in computing the taxable income and
credits of the grantor or of any other person solely on the grounds of his
dominion and control over the trust under section 61 (relating to definition
of gross income) or any other provision of this title, except as specified in
this subpart." IRC ,§671
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K. The definition sections under IRC §672 are criticaL It is particularly

important to point out that any powers or rights that a grantor's spouse is
granted under the trust will be treated as those of the grantor. The heading
for IRC §672(e) is "GRANTOR TREATED AS HOLDING ANY POWER
OR INTEREST OF GRANTOR'S SPOUSE", and it goes on to state as
follows:
"(1)

In general--for purposes of this subpart, a grantor shall be
treated as holding any power or interest held by(A) any individual who was the spouse of the grantor at the
time of the creation of such power or interest, or
(B) any individual who became the spouse of the grantor
after the creation of such power or interest, but only with
respect to periods after such individual became the spouse
of the grantor." IRe §672(e) (1)

L. The types of Grantor Trusts are best defined as follows:

1. Reversionary Interests: If the grantor [or the grantor's spouse under

§672(e)] retains a reversionary interest in the trust, then the grantor is
going to be treated as the owner of the assets in the trust.
"(a)

General rule--The grantor shall be treated as the owner of
any portion of a trust in which he has a reversionary
interest in either the corpus or the income therefrom, if, as
of the inception of that portion of the trust, the value of
such interest exceeds 5 percent of the value of such
portion." IRe §673 (a)

Note: This section would not be troublesome if it weren't for the
definition of "grantor" including the "grantor's spouse". Under this
section, if an irrevocable trust is established to provide benefits for the
grantor's spouse, that trust may be a Grantor Trust.
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2.

Power to Control Beneficial Enjoyment (General Rule): If the grantor [or

the grantor's spouse under §672(e)] retains a power to control the
beneficial enjoyment of the trust assets, the trust will be treated as a
Grantor Trust.
"The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust
in respect of which the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the
income therefrom is subject to a power of disposition, exercisable
by the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, without the approval
or consent of any adverse party." IRe §674(a)
This section gives the greatest guidance on what powers can and cannot be
in a trust and still have the trust be non-grantor.

3. Power to Control Beneficial Enjoyment (Exceptions): Exceptions to IRC
§674(a) powers and, consequently, powers that are allowed in the trust and
that still allow the trust to be non-grantor are found in §674(b) and are as
follows:

a) Power to apply income to support of a dependent: as a general
rule, it is acceptable to have a power to support a dependant of the
grantor (or the grantor's spouse) under IRC §674(b)(1); provided,
however, any income actually used for such support will be treated
as the income of the grantor. IRe §677(b);
Note: As mentioned above, it is certainly acceptable to have
provisions in the trust that will allow the trust to be used for the
support of a minor child without triggering the Grantor Trust rules
on the entire trust, but only to the extent that the income of the
trust is used to satisfy a support obligation is such income (and
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only such income) subject to the Grantor Trust rules. However, it
should be noted that inclusion of such a power in the grantor might
trigger an IRe §2036 inclusion problem for estate and gift tax
purposes.
b) Power affecting beneficial enjoyment only after occurrence of
event: Simply having a power that is otherwise prohibited in the
trust that is to become applicable in the future is not a problem
under the Grantor Trust rules unless and until such event or
condition occurs, at which time the trust would then be subject to
the Grantor Trust rules. For Grantor Trust purposes, however, this
gives the grantor a right to relinquish such power and avoid the
Grantor Trust rules.
"A power, the exercise of which can only affect the
beneficial enjoyment of the income for a period
commencing after the occurrence of an event such that a
grantor would not be treated as the owner under section 673
if the power were a reversionary interest; but the grantor
may be treated as the owner after the occurrence of the
event unless the power is relinquished.~' IRe §674 (b) (2)
c) Power exercisable only by will: A power to appoint income

after the grantor's death does not trigger the Grantor Trust rules
unless the power is a power to appoint income that has
accumulated during the grantor's lifetime.
"A power exercisable only by will, other than a power in
the grantor to appoint by will the income of the trust where
the income is accumulated for such disposition by the
grantor or may be so accumulated in the discretion of the
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grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, without the approval
or consent of any adverse party." IRC §674(b) (3)
Note: This type of power, however, could be a problem under IRe
§2036 from an estate inclusion standpoint.

d) Power to allocate among charitable beneficiaries: Certain
powers can be retained to allocate among charitable beneficiaries.
"A power to determine the beneficial enjoyment of the
corpus or the income therefrom if the corpus or income is
irrevocably payable for a purpose specified in section
170(c) (relating to definition of charitable contributions) or
to an employee stock ownership plan (as defined in section
4975(e)(7)) in a qualified gratuitous transfer (as defined in
section 664(g)(1))." IRC §674(b) (4)

e) Power to distribute corpus: As long as a power to distribute
corpus is limited by an ascertainable standard, such power does not
trigger the Grantor Trust rules.
"A power to distribute corpus either(A) to or for a beneficiary or beneficiaries or to or for a
class ofbeneficiaries.(whether or not income beneficiaries)
provided that the power is limited by a reasonably definite
standard which is set forth in the trust instrument; or
(B) to or for any current income beneficiary, provided that
the distribution of corpus must be chargeable against the
proportionate share of corpus held in trust for the payment
of income to the beneficiary as if the corpus constituted a
separate trust.
A power does not fall within the powers described in this
paragraph if any person has a power to add to the
beneficiary or beneficiaries or to a class of beneficiaries
designated to receive the income or corpus, except where
such action is to provide for after-born or after-adopted
children." IRe §674(b) (5)
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1) Power to withhold income temporarily: This provision

effectively allows for the grantor to have a discretionary power to
either distribute or retain income to or for the benefit of a
beneficiary. Such income, however, must be strictly allocated to
such beneficiary, whether during the grantor's lifetime or after the
grantor's death. That is, the grantor's power cannot result in the
grantor being able to shift the income from one beneficiary to
another. As long as this is only a "timing of income" issue for
such beneficiary, and in no way affects whether the beneficiary
will ever benefit from the income, then the power is an acceptable
power that a grantor can have and not trigger the Grantor Trust
rules.
"A power to distribute or apply income to or for any
current income beneficiary or to accumulate the income for
him, provided that any accumulated income must
ultimately be payable-(A) to the beneficiary from whom distribution or
application is withheld, to his estate, or to his appointees
(or persons named as alternate takers in default of
appointment) provided that such beneficiary possesses a
power of appointment which does not exclude from the
class of possible appointees any person other than the
beneficiary, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his
estate, or
(B) on termination of the trust, or in conjunction with a
distribution of corpus which is augmented by such
accumulated income, to the current income beneficiaries in
shares which have been irrevocably specified in the trust
instrument.
Accumulated income shall be considered so payable
although it is provided that if any beneficiary does not
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survive a date of distribution which could reasonably have
been expected to occur within the beneficiary's lifetime, the
share of the deceased beneficiary is to be paid to his
appointees or to one or more designated alternate takers
(other than the grantor or the grantor's estate) whose shares
have been irrevocably specified. A power does not fall
within the powers described in this paragraph if any person
has a power to add to the beneficiary or beneficiaries or to a
class of beneficiaries designated to receive the income or
corpus except where such action is to provide for after-born
or after-adopted children." IRe §674(b) (6)
g) Power to withhold income during disability of a beneficiary:
This is a similar exception to the preceding section [IRC
§674(b)(6)], but allows for a broader power as long as the
beneficiary is legally disabled or under the age of 21. It should be
noted, however, that if the minor (under age 21) beneficiary is also
a person toward whom the Grantor has a legal support obligation,
then IRC §678(c) will still be applicable to cause the income

actually distributed to such minor to be considered Grantor Trust
income and thus taxed to the grantor.

"A power exercisable only during(A) the existence of a legal disability of any current
income beneficiary, or
(B) the period during which any income
beneficiary shall be under the age of 21 years,
to distribute or apply income to or for such beneficiary or
to accumulate and add the income to corpus. A power does
not fall within the powers described in this paragraph if any
person has a power to add to the beneficiary or
beneficiaries or to a class of beneficiaries designated to
receive the income or corpus, except where such action is
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to provide for after-born or after-adopted children."
IRC §674(b) (7)

h) Power to

allo~ate

between corpus and income: A retention by

the grantor of the power to allocate between corpus and income is
not a prohibited power under the Grantor Trust rules.
"A power to allocate receipts and disbursements as between
corpus and income, even though expressed in broad
language." IRC §674(b) (8)

4. Power to Control Beneficial Enjoyment (Independent Trustees):
Where independent trustees are utilized, the trust can grant such trustees
much broader powers without running afoul of the Grantor Trust rules.
"Subsection (a) shall not apply toa power solely exercisable
(without the approval or consent of any other person) by a trustee or
trustees, none of whom is the grantor, and no more than half of
whom are related or subordinate parties who are subservient to the
wishes of the grantor-(1) to distribute, apportion, or accumulate income to or for a
beneficiary or beneficiaries, or to, for, or within a class of
beneficiaries; or
(2) to payout corpus to or for a beneficiary or beneficiaries or to or for a
class of beneficiaries (whether or not income beneficiaries).
A power does not fall within the powers described in this
subsection if any person has a power to add to the beneficiary or
beneficiaries or to a class of beneficiaries designated to receive
the income or corpus, except where such action is to provide for
after-born or after-adopted children. For periods during which an
individual is the spouse of the grantor (within the meaning of
section 672(e)(2», any reference in this subsection to the grantor
shall be treated as including a reference to such individual.""
IRe §674(c)
5. Power to Control Beneficial Enjoyment (Ascertainable Standard):
This provision is similar to the previous provision [IRe §674(c)], where
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an ascertainable standard is utilized in the trust by a trustee other than the
grantor (or the grantor's wife). The trust can grant such trustee a power
subject to an ascertainable standard.
"Subsection (a) shall not apply to a power solely exercisable
(without the approval or consent of any other person) by a trustee
or trustees, none of whom is the grantor or spouse living with the
grantor, to distribute, apportion, or accumulate income to or for a
beneficiary or beneficiaries, or to, for, or within a class of
beneficiaries, whether or not the conditions of paragraph (6) or (7)
of subsection (b) are satisfied, if such power is limited by a
reasonably definite external standard which is set forth in the trust
instrument. A power does not fall within the powers described in
this subsection if any person has a power to add to the beneficiary
or beneficiaries or to a class of beneficiaries designated to receive
the income or corpus except where such action is to provide for
after-born or after-adopted children." IRC §674(d)
6. Administrative Powers: Certain administrative powers retained by the
grantor (or the grantor's spouse) can trigger the Grantor Trust rules.

It is

this section [i.e. IRe §675(4)(C)] that is often used to create an
"intentionally defective grantor trust". That provision provides that if the
grantor retains a power to "reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other
property of an equivalent value" then such trust will be a Grantor Trust.
IRe §675(4} (C). The reason this provision commonly triggers the

"intentionally defective" planning is because this language has been held
to not create a power that causes any inclusion for estate and gift tax
purposes.

Other administrative powers that will trigger the Grantor Trust rules are
powers that allow the grantor 1) to deal with the trust for less than
adequate and full consideration., 2) the power to borrow without adequate
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interest or security, or 3) to borrow (even if adequately secured) when the
grantor is the trustee and such loan is not paid off by the beginning of the
year following the loan.
"The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in
respect of which-(1) Power To Deal For Less Than Adequate And Full
Consideration
A power exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse party, or
both, without the approval or consent of'any adverse party
enables the grantor or any person to purchase, exchange, or
otherwise deal with or dispose of the corpus or the income
therefrom for less than an adequate consideration in money or
money's worth.
(2) Power To Borro\v Without Adeqllate Interest Or Security
A power exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse party, or
both, enables the grantor to borrow the corpus or income, directly
or indirectly, without adequate interest or without adequate
security except where a trustee (other than the grantor) is
authorized under a general lending power to make loans to any
person without regard to interest or security.
(3)

B011 0wil1g
4

Of The rrrustFunds

The grantor has directly or indirectly borrowed the corpus or
income and has not completely repaid the loan, including any
interest, before the beginning of the taxable year. The preceding
sentence shall not apply to a loan which provides for adequate
interest and adequate se·curity, if such loan is made by a trustee
other than the grantor and other than a related or subordinate
trustee subservient to the grantor. For periods during which an
individual is the spouse of the grantor (within the meaning of
section 672(e)(2)), any reference in this paragraph to the grantor
shall be treated as including a reference to such individual.
(4) General Po\vers Of Administration

A power of administration is exercisable in a nonfiduciary
capacity by any person without the approval or consent of any
person in a fiduciary capacity. For purposes of this paragraph, the

term "power of administration" means anyone or more of the
following powers: (A) a power to vote or direct the voting of
sto k or other securities of a corporation in which the holdings of
the grantor and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of
vot ng control; (B) a power to control the investment of the trust
fun s either by directing investments or reinvestments, or by
vet ing proposed investments or reinvestments, to the extent that
the rust funds consist of stocks or securities of corporations in
wh·ch the holdings of the grantor and the trust are significant
fro the viewpoint of voting control; or (C) a power to reacquire
the rust corpus by substituting other property of an equivalent
val e." IRe §675

7. Power to Revoke: If the grantor has a power to revest the property
back to the rantor unless such power is exercisable by an adverse party.
eneral Rule
The rantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust,
whet er or not he is treated as such owner under any other
provi ion of this part, where at any time the power to revest in the
grant r title to such portion is exercisable by the grantor or a nonadve se party, or both.
(b) ower Affecting Belleficial Enjoynlent Only Aft.er Occurrence
OfE ent
Sub ection (a) shall not apply to a power the exercise of which
can 0 ly affect the beneficial enjoyment of the income for a period
co
encing after the occurrence of an event such that a grantor
woul not be treated as the owner under section 673 if the power
were a reversionary interest. But the grantor may be treated as the
owne after the occurrence of such event unless the power is
relin uished." IRe §676

8. Income D r benefit of Grantor: If the grantor has access to the income
for the grant r's benefit or the grantor's spouse's benefit, including the
right to use t ust income for the payment of premiums on insurance that
insures the Ii e of the grantor's spouse or the grantor, then the trust will be
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a Grantor Trust; provided, however, such right to the income is not
exercisable solely by an adverse party.
"(a) General Rule
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust,
whether or not he is treated as such owner under section 674,
whose income without the approval or consent of any adverse
party is, or, in the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party,
or both, may be-(1) distributed to the grantor or the grantor's spouse;
(2) held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor or
the grantor's spouse; or
(3) applied to the payment of premiums on policies of
insurance on the life of the grantor or the g~antor's spouse
(except policies of insurance irrevocably payable for a purpose
specified in section 170(c) (relating to definition of charitable
contributions».
This subsection shall not apply to a power the exercise of
which can only affect the beneficial enjoyment of the income
for a period commencing after the occurrence of an event such
that the grantor would not be treated as the owner under section
673 if the power were a reversionary interest; but the grantor
may be treated as the owner after the occurrence of the event
unless the power is relinquished.
(b) Obligations Of Support
Income of a trust shall not be considered taxable to the grantor
under subsection (a) or any other provision of this chapter merely
because such income in the discretion of another person, the
trustee, or the grantor acting as trustee or co-trustee, may be
applied or distributed for the support or maintenance of a
beneficiary (other than the grantor's spouse) whom the grantor is
legally obligated to support or maintain, except to the extent that
such income is so applied or distributed. In cases where the
amounts so applied or distributed are paid out of corpus or out of
other than income for the taxable year, such amounts shall be
considered to be an amount paid or credited within the meaning of
paragraph (2) of section 661(a) and shall be taxed to the grantor
under section 662.~~ IRe §676
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9. Persons other than the Grantor treated as owner: The "owner" of the
trust assets for income tax purposes does not have to be the grantor/settlor
of the trust. In two different instances this rule can be used to shift the
"grantor" status away from the original grantor to another person, usually
a beneficiary of the trust.
"(a) General Rule
A person other than the grantor shall be treated as the owner of
any portion of a trust with respect to which:
(1) such person has a power exercisable solely by himself to
vest the corpus or the income therefrom in himself, or
r

(2) such person has previously partially released or otherwise
modified such a power and after the release or modification
retains such control as would, within the principles of sections
671 to 677, inclusive, subject to grantor ofa trust to treatment
as the owner thereof.
(b) Exceptioll Where Grantor Is Taxable
Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a power over
income, as originally granted or thereafter modified, if the grantor
of the trust or a transferor (to whom section 679 applies) is
otherwise treated as the owner under the provisions of this subpart
other than this section.
(c) ObligatiollS Of Support
Subsection (a) shall not apply to a power which enables such
person, in the capacity of trustee or co-trustee, merely to apply the
income of the trust to the support or maintenance of a person
whom the holder of the power is obligated to support or maintain
except to the extent that such income is so applied. In cases where
the amounts so applied or distributed are paid out of corpus or out
of other than income of the taxable year, such amounts shall be
considered to be an amount paid or credited within the meaning of
paragraph (2) of section 661(a) and shall be taxed to the holder of
the power under section 662.
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(d) Effect Of Renunciation Or Disclaim.er
Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a power which has
been renounced or disclaimed within a reasonable time after the
holder of the power first became aware of its existence.
(e) Cross Reference
For provision under which beneficiary of trust is treated as owner
of the portion of the trust which consists of stock in an S
corporation, see section 1361(d)." IRe 678(a)(1).

The two triggers under §678(a)(I) and (2) are as follows:

a) If a beneficiary of a trust is granted a "Crummey" withdrawal
right, then the release of such right can trigger a §678 Grantor
Trust power with such "beneficiary" being treated as the owner of
the trust assets. §678(a)(1) & (2). Such a trust is commonly
known as a "Crummey" Trust. The terms of a Crummey Trust
grant to one or more beneficiaries the right to withdraw some
portion or all of the gifts contributed into the trust. Generally, the
withdrawal rights granted are limited to the annual exclusion
available to each Crummey beneficiary (generally $11,000 for an
individual gift or $22,000, if a gift is "split" with a spouse).
If the trust names only one Crummey beneficiary for the Crummey
Trust and the Crummey beneficiary releases the withdrawal right,
then pursuant to IRC §678 when the Crummey beneficiary releases
the withdrawal right, the income tax treatment of the trust changes.
Generally, the gift, and thus the right of withdrawal, is limited to a
$5,000 one-time gift. This will keep the entire trust corpus as
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Grantor Trust income. The IRS has on several occasions ruled 3
that the Crummey beneficiary is to be treated as the owner of the
portion of trust assets that the amount of the "release" bears to the
value of the assets held in the trust. Effectively, the rulings
provide that upon such a release, the Crummey beneficiary is
treated as the "grantor" of the released right of withdrawal for
income tax purposes. The rationale is that the release of the
withdrawal right is treated as if the Crummey beneficiary withdrew
the gift from the trust, pursuant to the withdrawal right, and
immediately re-contributed it to the trust. As a result, the income
attributed to the beneficiary/grantor is a fractional share of the
Trust income, the numerator of which is the value of the gifted
assets and the denominator of which is all the trust assets.
The beneficiary of the trust, in addition to the Crummey power,
may be given an IRe §675(4)(C) power (i.e., the power to
reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other property of an
equivalent value). This provision meets the test of §678(a)(2) that
requires a beneficiary, after a release of a power, to be treated as
the "grantor'" pursuant to sections §671 through §677.

b) If a beneficiary who is not the grantor of the trust has a
testamentary power to appoint the income of the trust, this also
triggers the Grantor Trust rules. §678(a)(2). This is seen where the

3

See PLR 8142061, PLR 8521060, and Rev. Rut 81-6,1981-1 C.B. 385.
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grantor/settlor of a trust gives the beneficiary a power that falls
within the general definition of a general power of appointment.
See, 2041 (a)(2). Note, however, that this general power is limited

to the income of the trust. Further, the beneficiary's decision not
to exercise his/her right to access the income through the exercise
of the power of appointment (i.e., a lapse) will constitute a release
of a general power of appointment. Since the general power,
however, is limited to the income of the trust and not the trust
corpus, the corpus is not included in the beneficiary's estate.

10. Foreign Trusts having one or more U.S. beneficiaries: As a very

general overview, if a trust has a foreign trustee, then it is a foreign trust
and therefore a Grantor Trust.
~'(a)

Tral1sferor Treated As OWl1er

(1) In General--

A United States person who directly or indirectly transfers
property to a foreign trust (other than a trust described in section
6048(a)(3)(B)(ii)) shall be treated as the owner for his taxable year
of the portion of such trust attributable to such property if for such
year there is a United States beneficiary of any portion of such
trust.
(2) Exceptions-Paragraph (1) shall not apply-(A) Transfers by reason of death-To any transfer by reason of the death of the transferor.
(B) Transfers At Fair Market Value-To any transfer of property to a trust in exchange for consideration
of at least the fair market value of the transferred property. For
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purposes of the preceding sentence, consideration other than cash
shall be taken into account at its fair market value.
(3) Certaill Obligations Not Taken Into ACCOUl1t Ul1der Fair
Market Value Exception-(A) In General-In determining whether paragraph (2)(B) applies to any transfer by
a person described in clause (ii) or (iii) of subparagraph (C), there
shall not be taken into account-(i) except as provided in regulations, any obligation of a person
described in subparagraph (C), and
(ii) to the extent provided in regulations, any obligation which is
guaranteed by a person described in subparagraph (C).
(B) Treatment Of Principal Paynlents On Obligation-Principal payments by the trust on any obligation referred to in
subparagraph (A) shall be taken into account on and after the date
of the payment in determining the portion of the trust attributable
to the property transferred.

(C) PerSOllS Described-The persons described in this subparagraph are-(i) the trust,

(ii) any grantor, owner, or beneficiary of the trust, and
(iii) any person who is related (within_ the meaning of section
643(i)(2)(B» to any grantor, owner, or beneficiary of the trust.
(4) Special Rules Applicable To Foreign Grantor Who Later
Becomes A United States Person--

(A) In General-If a nonresident alien individual has a ~esidency starting date
within 5 years after directly or indirectly transferring property to a
foreign trust, this section and section 6048 shall be applied as if
such individual transferred to such trust on the residency starting
date an amount equal to the portion of such trust attributable to the
property transferred by such individual to such trust in such
transfer.
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(B) Treatmel1t Of Undistributed Ine-o:meFor purposes of this section, undistributed net income for periods
before such individual's residency starting date shall be taken into
account in determining the portion of the trust which is attributable
to property transferred by such individual to such trust but shall not
otherwise be taken into account.
(C) Residency Starting Date-For purposes of this paragraph, an individual's residency starting
date is the residency starting date determined under section
7701 (b)(2)(A).

(5) Outbound Trust Migrations-If-(A) an individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States
transferred property to a trust which was not a foreign trust, and
(B) such trust becomes a foreign trust while such individual is
alive,
then this section and section 6048 shall be applied as if such
individual transferred to such trust on the date such trust becomes a
foreign trust an amount equal to the portion of such trust
attributable to the property previously transferred by such
individual to such trust. A rule similar to the rule of paragraph
(4)(8) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.

(b) Trusts Acquiring United States Beneficiaries-If-(1) subsection (a) applies to a trust for the transferor's taxable
year, and
(2) subsection (a) would have applied to the trust for his
immediately preceding taxable year but for the fact that for such
preceding taxable year there was no United States beneficiary for
any portion of the trust,
then, for purposes of this subtitle, the transferor shall be treated as
having income for the taxable year (in addition to his other income
for such year) equal to the undistributed net income (at the close of
such immediately preceding taxable year) attributable to the
portion of the trust referred to in subsee-tion (a).
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(c) Trusts Treated As Having A United States Beneficiar:y-(1) In General-For purposes of this section, a trust shall be treated as having a
United States beneficiary for the taxable year unless-(A) under the terms of the trust, no part of the income or corpus of
the trust may be paid or accumulated during the taxable year to or
for the benefit of a United States person, and
(B) if the trust were terminated at any time during the taxable
year, no part of the income or corpus of such trust could be paid to
or for the benefit of a United States person.
(2) Attribution Of Ownership-For purposes of paragraph (1), an amount shall be treated as paid
or accumulated to or for the benefit of a United States person if
such amount is paid to or accumulated for a foreign corporation,
foreign partnership, or foreign trust or estate, and-(A) in the case of a foreign corporation, such corporation is a
controlled foreign corporation (as defined in section 957(a),
(B) in the case of a foreign partnership, a United States person is a
partner of such partnership, or
(C) in the case of a foreign trust or estate, such trust or estate has a
United.States beneficiary (within the meaning of paragraph (1».
(3) Certain United States Ben.efici.aries Disregarded-A beneficiary shall not be treated a"s a United States person in
applying this section with respect to any transfer of property to
foreign trust if such beneficiary first became a United States person
more than 5 years after the date of such transfer.
(d) Regulations-The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary
or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section." IRe §"679
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II.

Sales to Grantor Trusts
A. The Structure
1. The basic structure of a "sale to a grantor trust" is for the grantor to
sell discounted assets to his or her Grantor Trust. Since the grantor is
treated as the "owner" of such trust under IRC §671 through §679, the
sale is ignored for income tax purposes.
2. The goal is often to move assets that have a great likelihood for
appreciation out of the estate of the grantor for gift and estate tax purposes
without actually "gifting" them away in a traditional irrevocable Crummey
gifting trust.
3. Examples of assets often used for this planning are as follows:
a) non-voting interests in closely held companies,
b) non-voting interests in a real estate Family Limited Liability
Company (FLLC) or limited partnership interests in a real estate
Family Limited Partnership (FLP).
c) non-voting interests in a securities-only FLLC or FLP.
4. As mentioned above, the structure of the irrevocable trust as a Grantor
Trust will allow the grantor to sell assets that he or she currently owns to
the trust without triggering an income-taxable event. While the sale is
recognized for gift and estate tax purposes, the sale is ignored for income
tax purposes. Again, this allows for there to be a "freeze" of any or all
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assets that are sold to the Grantor Trust at what may be a very
conservative appraisal or valuation. This technique allows for taking
advantage of the significant valuation discounting opportunities that exist.
All future appreciation on such asset or assets that are sold will be
removed from the taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes. In a
leveraged sale (discussed further below), the assets sold will be replaced
with a promissory note equal to the conservative appraisal/valuation and
fixed at an interest rate that today may be as low as 5%.

B. The Leveraged Sale
1. A leveraged sale to a Grantor Trust involves the Grantor Trust giving a
promissory note ("Note") as part of the payment for the purchase. The
Note should be secured with the assets of the trust, including a security
interest in the asset just purchased.
2. Exhibit A is a chart that illustrates a Sale to a Grantor Trust plan.

3. The interest rate used on the Note should be the rate prescribed under
§7872(f)(2)(A) for term notes. See Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.e. 554
(1992), wherein the court allowed the §7872 rate. Effectively,
§7872 (f)(2)(A) authorizes the use of the "Applicable Federal Rate" under
§1274(d), which divides the monthly issued rates into short-term,
mid-term and long-term rates. A revenue ruling is issued each month with
the new rates for that particular month. The rate for demand notes should
be a floating short-term rate.
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4. The interest on the Note is non-taxable interest to the grantor and is
non-deductible by the Trust when accrued or paid. Since the sales
transaction is between the grantor and his or her Grantor Trust, not only is
the initial sales transaction ignored, but the resulting Note is also ignored.
Of course for estate and gift tax purposes, the Note is not ignored and
should be strictly adhered to as to all payments due thereon.

5. The sales transaction should be structured, if possible, to avoid an
argument that the transaction is too thinly capitalized and thus in risk of a
§2036 argument. It i~ best to "capitalize" the Grantor Trust initially with a
gift of assets so as to give the Grantor Trust sufficient assets to then make
a reasonably commercial transaction (i.e., the purchase of assets with a
Note). It has been suggested that there should be a minimum of 10%
capital/equity in the Grantor Trust before the sales transaction is
consummated. This" 10% equity test" seems to have its roots in Letter
Ruling 9535026 where the IRS required the taxpayer to contribute 10% of
the value of the installment purchase. The 10% equity test is not well
defined and many believe that such equity is not required to defend a
§2036 challenge.

6. There are several ways to secure equity in the trust. Some examples
are:

a) Guarantees: One technique used to secure additional equity is
through the use of guarantees. A beneficiary or other third party
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may be able to enter into a guaranty agreement as a replacement of
real equity in the trust. The argument is that even thinly
capitalized business entities can enter into commercial purchase
transactions if the owner or someone else can provide adequate
security for the transaction through personal guarantees. If
guarantees are utilized, consideration should be given to a payment
to the guarantor for his or her guarantee. Otherwise, there may be
an argument that the guarantor has made a gift into the trust equal
to the value of the guarantee.

b) Grow Equity: Start the planning a little slower. so that the first
transaction of a new trust is not the "sale to the Grantor Trust"
transaction~

Once established, use the trust to look for leveraged

purchase opportunities of new business and or real estate from
third parties. For example, if the initial gift is $5,000, then
contribute $5,000 into a new Limited Liability Company (LLC)
and then lend to the new LLC sufficient capital to enable it to
purchase the real estate or business assets. Generally, the grantor
is probably going to have to guarantee the third-party loan to the
LLC and, consequently, the LLC should pay the grantor for such
guarantee. If the purchase of the real estate or business assets is at
a bargain, then a later valuation (i.e., one year or later) might
reflect sufficient equity in the new LLC to meet the 10% equity
test.
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c) Use of a Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT): Since a
GRAT is a statutory vehicle, the equity that can build up in a
GRAT can be dumped into the Grantor Trust to allow for added
equity.

C. Sale of Non-Qualified Stock Options (NQSOs) to Grantor Trust
1. For clients holding NQSOs, a sale to a Grantor Trust can be
considered. In doing so, however, securities regulations must be
addressed.

2. While the Grantor Trust is ignored by the IRS, it will not be ignored

by the SEC. However, the Grantor Trust should be able to be structured to
satisfy issues that would otherwise be addressed by the SEC.

D. Grantor Trusts as S Corporation owners
1. The Grantor Trust qualifies as a shareholder of S Corporation stock
under IRC §1361(c)(2). Under this section, the grantor must be the sole
grantor under the Grantor Trust rules and be grantor of 100% of the
income and principal of the Grantor Trust. Unlike with QSST and
Electing Small Business Trusts, a Grantor Trust need not file any election
to be treated as an approved S Corporation shareholder.

2. While the Grantor Trust qualifies to hold S Corporation stock, the
other entities that might be created to complement the Grantor Trust
planning (i.e., FLLCs and FLPs) of course do not qualify to hold the
S Corporation stock. Consequently, if an FLLC or FLP is created and
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discounted interests are sold, the S Corporation stock must be treated as a
separate sales transaction directly to the Grantor Trust.

3. Even though an S Corporation can only have one class of stock, it can
have voting and non-voting stock as long as the only difference in the two
classes of stock is the voting rights. IRC §1361(c)(4). Consequently,
consideration should be given to recapitalizing the S Corporation to create
non-voting stock so that the lower-valued non-voting stock can be sold to
the Grantor Trust.

E. The "Grantor pays the tax" benefit

1. Since the Grantor Trust is effectively ignored for income tax purposes,
the grantor will be paying the taxes for the income generated by the
Grantor Trust. For many years, there has been continuous battle,
speculation and argument over whether such payment of the tax by the
grantor was effectively a

"gift'~

to the Grantor Trust equal to the value of

the taxes paid by the grantor. The further argument was that if such
payment of taxes by the grantor was in fact a gift, then did such a gift in
any way create a retained right that caused estate inclusion of the Grantor
Trust.

2. These two issues have now been resolved. In July of this year, the IRS
ruled that such tax payment by the grantor was not a gift by

t~e

grantor to

the Grantor Trust, and further, that such payment by the grantor did not
create any type of povver causing estate inclusion. Rev. Rul. 2004-64.
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3. The ruling stated as follows:
"A's payment of the $2.5x income tax liability does not
constitute a gift by A to Trust's beneficiaries for federal
gift tax purposes because A, not Trust, is liable for the
taxes. In contrast, in the situation presented in Doerr v.
United States, cited above, the donor's payment was for
the donee's tax liability and, as a result, the payment
constituted an additional gift to the donee. In addition, no
portion of Trust is includible in A's gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes under § 2036, because A has not
retained the right to have trust property expended in
discharge of A's legal obligation." Rev. Rul. 2004-64

4. This creates a huge opportunity for Grantor Trust planning and for
sales to Grantor Trust planning. Even if an asset that is sold is not
significantly discounted at the time of the sale, with the grantor paying the
taxes on such asset sold (assuming the asset sold is a pass-through entity),
the estate of the grantor is going to be reduced by the payment of taxes on
an asset that for estate and gift tax purposes is not in the grantor's estate.
This creates a pension-fund type growth opportunity for the Grantor Trust.
That is, the Grantor Trust will be set to grow without any income tax
obligation, and like a pension fund, will grow at a much quicker rate. Of
course, the Grantor Trust is not avoiding any income tax since the grantor
pays the tax, but what it does is allow for significant appreciation
opportunities that are outside the estate and gift tax reach while at the
same time causing the Grantor to have a continuing reduction in his or her
estate as a result of the payment of the Grantor Trust's taxes.
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F. Income Tax Consequences of Termination of Grantor Trust
1. A Grantor Trust will lose its status either upon the death of the grantor

(Rev. RuI57-51), or alternatively during the lifetime of the grantor if the
grantor releases or otherwise relinquishes the right or power that created
the Grantor Trust status in the first place.

2. Once a Grantor Trust's status as "grantor" is terminated, the trust will
then be treated as its own separate taxable entity and taxed as a simple or
complex trust, depending on the terms of the trust.

3. If the termination is triggered by the grantor's death, there may be an
income tax planning opportunity to trigger some postmortem tax
deductions through the use of a §645 election to allow the previous
Grantor Trust to then be taxed, again for income tax purposes, as part of
the estate of the grantor.

G. Impact of Unpaid Note Upon Death of Grantor
1. There is an issue of whether one or more events subsequent to the
original "sale to the Grantor Trust" could trigger a taxable event. The
biggest of these issues is whether a taxable event occurs at the time of the
death of the grantor to the extent the Note is still in existence.

2. There are two competing analyses of this issue. One argument is that
under Reg § 1.100 1-2(c), example 5, that a taxable event will be triggered
upon the Grantor Trust losing its Grantor Trust status. See Reg.
§ 1.671-1 (t), \vhich states as follows, "For rules relating to the treatment of

D· 30

liabilities resulting on the sale or other disposition of encumbered trust
property due to a renunciation of powers by the grantor or other owner,
see Sec. 1.1001-2". Then, when we examine example 5 of Reg §1.10012(c), we see the following:
UReg § 1.1001-2 Discharge ofliabilities.
1.1001-2(c) Examples.
(c) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated
by the following examples. In each example assume the
taxpayer uses the cash receipts and disbursements method of
accounting, makes a return on the basis of the calendar year,
and sells or disposes of all property which is security for a given
liability.
Example (5)
In 1975 C, an individual, creates T, an irrevocable trust. Due to
certain powers expressly retained by C, T is a "grantor trust" for
purposes of Subpart E of Part 1 of Subchapter J of the Code and
therefore C is treated as the owner of the entire trust. T
purchases an interest in P, a partnership. C, as owner ofT,
deducts the distributive share of partnership losses attributable
to the partnership interest held by T. In 1978, when the adjusted
basis of the partnership interest held by T is $1,200, C
renounces the powers previously and expressly retained that
initially resulted in T being classified as a grantor trust.
Consequently, T ceases to be a grantor trust and C is no longer
considered to be the owner of the trust. At the time of the
renunciation all of P's liabilities are liabilities on which none of
the partners have assumed any personal liability and the
proportionate share of which of the interest held by T is
$11,000. Since prior to the renunciation C was the owner of the
entire trust, C was considered the owner of all the trust property
for Federal income tax purposes, including the partnership
interest. Since C was considered to be the owner of the
partnership interest, C not T, was considered to be the partner in
P during the time T was a "grantor trust". However, at the time
C renounced the powers that gave rise to T's classification as a
grantor trust, T no longer qualified as a grantor trust with the
result that C was no longer considered to be the owner of the
trust and trust property for Federal income tax purposes.
Consequently, at that time, C is considered to have transferred
ownership of the interest in P to T, now a separate taxable
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entity, independent of its grantor C. On the transfer, CIS share of
partnership liabilities ($11,000) is treated as money received.
Accordingly, CIS amount realized is $11,000 and CIS gain
realized is $9,800 ($11,000 - $1,200)."
3. The counter argument (that the Note is not taxable upon the
, termination of the Grantor Trust status) looks at an analysis of Rev. Rul.
85-13. This ruling would seem to support the analysis that there is no
transfer of the underlying property to the Grantor Trust (for income tax
purposes) as long as the trust is treated as a Grantor Trust since such trust
is effectively non-existent for income tax purposes. The entire basis of the
Grantor Trust rules under §671 through §679 is that the grantor is treated
as the "owner" of the trust assets. If the grantor owns them, then there has
not been a transfer during his or her lifetime. If there has not been a
transfer during the grantor's lifetime, a transfer triggered by the death of
the grantor should not create a taxable event. It is well founded that a
transfer of assets that may have a lien attached does not in and of itself
trigger a taxable event. For example, in Rev. Rul. 73-183 the IRS ruled
that the transfer of corporate stock upon the taxpayer's death did not
constitute a disposition of the stock under §1.001(a). Consequently, there
can be no gain or loss on property in the Grantor Trust at the grantor's
death. The further argument is that it would not seem logical that if the
debt were paid off the moment before the taxpayer's death that such
. payoff would not result in a taxable event, yet could somehow be taxable
if not paid off at the time of the taxpayer's death.
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4. As a precaution, we advise our clients to plan to repay the Note
sometime after the first three or four years of the original sale, and
certainly before death. Of course, an unexpected death could create a
situation where this issue arises due to the Note not being paid off prior to
the grantor's death. This writer believes that there is good support for the
Note not triggering a tax at such event.

H. Upper Generation-Skipping Dynasty Trust
1. The use of IRC §678 to create a trust with someone other than the

grantor/settlor is a significant opportunity. For purposes of the outline, the
term "Dynasty Trust" will be used to describe the Upper GenerationSkipping Dynasty Trust.

2. Exhibit B is a chart that illustrates a Dynasty Trust plan. Exhibit C is a
sample plan for the Dynasty Trust combined with other asset-protection
planning.

3. The Dynasty Trust grants withdrawal rights to only one beneficiary

(the "Crummey beneficiary"). Upon the creation of the Dynasty Trust, the
settlor of the Trust will limit his or her contribution to the trust to a onetime gift, usually valued at $5,000 or less. No other gifts will be made to
the Dynasty Trust.

4. In conjunction with this gift, the Crummey beneficiary will have a
right to withdraw the entire gift from the trust. The settlor's gift, followed
by the release by the Crummey beneficiary of his or her corresponding
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withdrawal right, will result in the Crummey beneficiary being deemed the
Grantor for income tax purposes· of 100% of all assets contributed to the
trust. Accordingly, 100% of the income generated by the trust will be
taxed to the grantor (in this case, the

~rummey

beneficiary).

5. There may be situations where an individual does not want to be taxed
automatically on the Dynasty Trust income. In those situations, the settlor
may direct the trustee of the trust not to invoke the Crummey withdrawal
right of the Crummey beneficiary in conjunction with the one-time gift. If
the Crummey right is not invoked, then the amount of the settlor's gift is
not limited by the annual exclusion or the $5,000 target. Of course, the gift
will not qualify for the $11,000 annual exclusion from gift tax.
6. If the Crummey withdrawal right is not invoked, the Crummey
beneficiary will not be the grantor of the Dynasty Trust. Instead the
Dynasty Trust will be a separate taxable entity taxed as either a simple
trust or complex trust. As a complex trust, the Dynasty Trust will pay
income taxes on the trust's annual income unless such income is
distributed to one or more beneficiaries. Income distributed from the trust
to a beneficiary is reported on Form K-l and must be reported as income
by the beneficiary on such beneficiary's annual individual income tax
return.
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Exhibit C

BUSINESS AND TAX PLAN FOR
John Q. Client

The proposed plan is as follows:
•

An Upper Generation Dynasty Trust ("Dynasty Trust") will be established by one of your

parents with $5,000. The Dynasty Trust will be set up as a "Beneficiary-Grantor" Trust and
possibly as a Delaware Asset Protection Trust.
•

A "Backup" Dynasty Trust will be established by one of your parents with $5,000. This
backup Dynasty Trust will be set up as a "non-Grantor" Trust and possibly as a Delaware
Asset Protection Trust.

•

A Grantor Retained Annuity Trust ("GRAT") will be established but remain unfunded.

•

A Family Limited Liability Company ("FLLC") will be established to hold marketable
securities and your interests in certain existing companies ("Companies").

You will fund the FLLC with interests in the Companies, stocks, bonds and cash accounts. In
exchange for the funding, you will receive both voting (2%) and non-voting (98%) membership
interests in the FLLC. This not only puts the principal assets in an asset-protected/favored entity,
but also will allow for the removal of these assets from your taxable estate at a significant discount.
At the same time the FLLC is being established and funded, we will set up the Dynasty Trust. It will
be funded by one of your parents with a one-time gift of $5,000. The trust will be designed to be
treated as a "Beneficiary Grantor Trust" for income tax purposes. This will allow for sales
transactions between the Dynasty Trust and you to be ignored for income tax purposes.
Once the FLLC and Dynasty Trust are established and funded, we will then proceed to have your
98% non-voting interest in the FLLC valued by an independent accounting firm. The independent
valuation is expected to reflect a value for the non-voting membership units that is approximately
60% in value (i.e., 40% discount) of the assets held in the FLLHC. For example, if the assets in the
FLLC are valued at $10 million, then the value of the 98% non-voting interest will only be
$5,940,000 ($10,000,000 * 60% * 98%).

Privileged and Confidential
James E. Hargrove, Atty, CPA
Stoll, Keenon & Park, LLP
November 19,2004
Pagel

PROPOSAL

D - 39

Exhibit C
BUSINESS AND TAX PLAN FOR
John Q. Client
There may be an opportunity to value some of your interests in the Companies at less than the value
of the interests as currently carried on your financial statement. By transferring these Company
interests to the FLLC, we will effectively get a second discount on such interests. With this two-tier
discounting, these Company interests could be moved out of your estate at possibly 30-50 cents on
the dollar of current value. Plus 100% of future appreciation (whether due to debt reduction or true
asset appreciation, or both) will also be removed from your estate.
After the sale, you will own the 2% voting interests in the FLLC and will thereby control the FLLC.
You will also be able to serve as the Trust Investment Advisor, giving you effective control over all
investment decisions and transactions of the Dynasty Trust. The responsibilities of the corporate
Delaware Trustee will be primarily administrative in nature.
The sale of the 98% non-voting interest will create a promissory note ("Note"). If we use the above
$10 million example, the note will be in the approximate amount of $5,940,000.

Step 1:

Establish FLLC

We will establish an FLLC with both voting and non-voting interests. You will transfer marketable
securities and interests in the Companies to the FLLC in exchange for voting and non-voting
interests. I anticipate that you will receive a 2% voting interest and a 98% non-voting interest.

Step 2:

Value non-voting interest ofthe FLLC

The FLLC non-voting interest will need to be valued prior to the sale of the FLLC non-voting
interest. As a part of the FLLC valuation, each asset of the FLLC (i.e., the Companies) will need to
be valued in some manner. The FLLC valuation will take into account the lack of marketability and
lack of control of the interest along with other discount considerations. The discount for the FLLC
non-voting interest is anticipated to range between 40% and 45%.

Privileged and Confidential
James E. Hargrove, Atty, CPA
Stoll, Keenon & Park, LLP
November 19,2004
Page 2

PROPOSAL
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Exhibit C

BUSINESS AND TAX PLAN FOR
John Q. Client
Establish and Fund Upper Generation Beneficiary-Grantor Dynasty Trust(s)

Step 3:

One of your parents will contribute (gift) $5,000 into the Dynasty Trust to provide for the initial
funding of the Dynasty Trust. l Neither your parent nor anyone else will need to provide any
additional funding for the Dynasty Trust beyond this initial funding.
Your parent will not retain any rights in the Trust. Assuming the Dynasty Trust is established in
Delaware, the Trustee will be XYZ Bank, Delaware. You will serve as Trust Investment Advisor.
The Dynasty Trust will be established as a Beneficiary-Grantor Dynasty Trust. (See Tax
Disclosures letter for a discussion of the Beneficiary-Grantor Trust.)
Upon completing Step 3:
•

Dynasty Trusts established for the benefit of you, your spouse, and your issue

•

Each Trust funded with $5,000 in cash

Sale ofnon-voting interest to Dynasty Trust

Step 4:

After the valuation is completed, the 98% non-voting interest in the FLLC will be sold to the
Dynasty Trust. You will sell these assets to the Dynasty Trust in a non-taxable sales transaction.
The sale will be non-taxable due to the Trust being a Grantor Trust for income tax purposes as to
you.
Upon completing Step 4:

Step 5:

•

The Dynasty Trust owns all of your non-voting interest in the FLLC

•

The Dynasty Trust owes you an amount equal to the purchase price (less $5,000)
evidenced by a Promissory Note payable to you

Gift Tax Returns arefiledfor you and your parent

These returns will be due by April 15, 2005, and are necessary to properly qualify the gifts into the
Trusts for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.
1 Your parent will also establish a Non-Grantor Dynasty Trust at the same time the Beneficiary-Grantor Trust is
established. This is to give you greater flexibility for income tax planning purposes. You will also establish a Grantor
Retained Annuity Trust. This trust will be combined with the Dynasty Trusts to minimize any risk of there being a
taxable gift for federal gift tax purposes. We can discuss these added trusts in more detail later.

Privileged and Confidential
James E. Hargrove, Atty, CPA
Stoll, Keenon & Park, LLP
November 19,2004
Page 3
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Exhibit C
BUSINESS AND TAX PLAN FOR
John Q. Client
Comments:
The following are additional comments and information about the above planning:
•

You will have broad access to the assets in the Dynasty Trust. Until and unless a suit is
filed against you or you have some other risk of liability, you will completely control the
assets and effectively have complete access to all assets for your and your family's
benefit.

•

Upon your death the assets can then pass (in the manner in which you may determine in
the future) to your spouse, your children, and/or charitable interests. Such assets may
pass to the children without any estate and gift taxation in your estate.

•

Assuming the Dynasty Trust is established in Delaware, it will offer additional asset
protection and the continuation of the Trust in perpetuity.

•

You, as a Beneficiary of the Dynasty Trust, should not make any gifts into the Trust.

•

Any transaction, such as a loan to the Trust or to an entity owned by the Trust or a sale
of assets (e.g., shares of non-voting stock and/or non-votinglnon-controlling LLC
membership interests) at fair market value between you and the Dynasty Trust should be
an arms-length transaction.

•

If you do sell assets to the Dynasty Trust, such a sale will be recognized for federal and
Kentucky gift and estate tax purposes, but will not be recognized for federal or Kentucky
income tax purposes. The reason that such a sale is ignored for income tax purposes is
due to the legal stance adopted by the IRS that a sale to the Dynasty Trust by the
Beneficiary of the Trust is, in essence, a sale to the Beneficiary. In other words, because
the assets held in the Dynasty Trust are treated as assets of the Beneficiary, for income
tax purposes, a transaction between the Trust and the Beneficiary does not result in
income or capital gains to the Beneficiary and thus, is not an income-taxable event.

•

At a later time, the assets in the Dynasty Trust can be appointed to the Non-Grantor
Dynasty Trust, allowing for a shift of the income tax burden from the Beneficiary to the
trust. The Non-Grantor Dynasty Trust, like the Dynasty Trust, allows its assets to be held
for the benefit of you and your spouse, and after the last of your and your spouse's
deaths, in lifetime trusts for your children and then for your grandchildren and other
future descendants.

Privileged and Confidential
James E. Hargrove, Atty, CPA
Stoll, Keenon & Park, LLP
November 19,2004
Page 4
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Exhibit C
BUSINESS AND TAX PLAN FOR
John Q. Client

Events

Family Limited Liability Company established and securities and Company
interests transferred into it
2

Company interests and non-voting FLLC interests valued

3

Beneficiary-Grantor Dynasty Trust established
Non-Grantor Dynasty Trust established
Grantor Retained Annuity Trust established (same day as Dynasty Trusts)
Two Dynasty Trusts funded with $5,000 each
Crummey letters and Release of Withdrawal Right executed (in connection
with gift to Beneficiary-Grantor Dynasty Trust)

4

5
(A r 2005)

Sales Agreement, Note, and Security Agreement for sale of non-voting
interest to Beneficiary-Grantor Dynasty Trust to be executed
Gift Tax Returns filed

Privileged and Confidential
James E. Hargrove, Atty, CPA
Stoll, Keenon & Park, LLP
November 19,2004
Page 5

PROPOSAL

D - 43

TO DISCLAIM OR NOT TO DISCLAIM:
EFFECTIVE USE OF DISCLAIMERS IN ESTATE PLANNING

John T. Bondurant
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Louisville, Kentucky

Douglas A. Bozell
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Louisville, Kentucky

Copyright 2005. John T. Bondurant, Douglas A. Bozell and UKlCLE. All Rights Reserved.

SECTIONE

TO DISCLAIM OR NOT TO DISCLAIM:
EFFECTIVE USE OF DISCLAIMERS IN ESTATE PLANNING
1.

Purpose Of Disclaimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... E-l

2.

Typical Tax-Oriented And Non-Tax Related Objectives
Of Disclaimers

E-l

Effectiveness Of Disclaimers In Kentucky For Federal Tax
Purposes

E-3

3.

4.

Disclaimer Of Particular Types Of Property

E-I0

5.

Disclaimer Of Less Than An Entire Interest

E-16

6.

What Constitutes An "Unqualified Refusal...To Accept
An Interest In Property"?

E-18

What Constitutes An Acceptance Of An Interest Or Any Of
its Benefits ?

E-19

Whether An Interest Passes Without Any Direction On The
Part Of The Person Making The Disclaimer

E-20

9.

To Whom Does The Disclaimed Interest Pass?

E-21

10.

By Whom Must The Disclaimer Be Executed?

E-22

11.

Summary

E-23

12.

Conclusion

7.
8.

'

E-23

References

E-24

SECTIONE

TO DISCLATh1 OR NOT TO DISCLAIM
EFFECTIVE USE OF DISCLATh1ERS IN ESTATE PLANNING

Jolm T. Bondurant and Douglas A. Bozell
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Louisville, Kentucky

1.

Purpose of disclaimers, as with other types of post-mortem estate planning, is to make

adjustments in the estate after the decedent's death to overcome disadvantages (usually, but not
always, tax-related) that may have resulted from one or more of the following:

2.

(a)

Inadequate pre-death estate planning;

(b)

Change of circumstances of the decedent or the beneficiaries or both;

(c)

Modification of the applicable law; or

(d)

Circumstances surrounding the decedent's death.

Typical tax-oriented and non-tax related objectives of disclaimers:
(a)

Increase the portion or quality of the property interests passing to the surviving

spouse, in order to increase the marital deduction and thereby decrease the estate tax on the
decedent's estate (see Private Letter Rulings ("PLR") 7820022, 7833008, 7937011, 7947008,
8022021, 8347001, 8443005 and 9623064; R. Goree, Jr. Estate, 68 TCM 1068 (1994));
(b)

Divert the portion of the estate passing to the surviving spouse in excess of the

amount conferring a tax benefit, so as to reduce or eliminate tax on the surviving spouse's estate
(see PLR's 7911005, 7912049, 7913119, 7922018, 7933013, 7940062, 8012129 and 9439020);
(c)

In case of successive deaths, divert the share of the second decedent in the estate

of the first decedent in order to reduce estate tax on the second decedent's estate (see PLR's
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7829008, 7937011 and 8015014; J. Dancy Estate v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), 89-1
USTC ~13,800);
(d)

Divert property constituting income in respect of a decedent away from a single

or high tax bracket beneficiary to multiple or lower tax bracket beneficiaries in order to reduce
the overall income tax impact (see PLR 7830022 and 7909055);
(e)

Bypass beneficiaries with substantial estates in favor of succeeding generations in

order to take advantage of the decedent's available (and otherwise unused) generation - skipping
transfer tax exemption and decrease the income and death taxes payable by the original
beneficiaries or their estates (see PLR's 7803065, 7806080, 7933066 and 8003020);

(f)

Avoid the impact of undesirable generation-skipping transfer taxes;

(g)

Cure defects in a charitable remainder trust in order to qualify the trust for a

charitable deduction and thereby decrease estate or gift tax (see PLR's 7809043, 7821045,
7914003, 8550018, 9347013, 9532026, 961005 and 200010019);
(h)

Divert property from a beneficiary who does not want or need it to an alternate

taker who does (see PLR's 7751093, 7913082, 8008078 and 8824014);
(i)

Permit use of alternate valuation under Code § 2032 by having surviving spouse

disclaim a portion of marital bequest sufficient enough to create a taxable estate and a small
estate tax that will be reduced by alternate valuation (See Steiner, "Disclaimers - Post-Mortem
Creativity," 4 Probate & Property No.6, 43, 45 (Nov.lDec. 1990)); and

G)

Avoid reach of beneficiary's pre-existing or potential creditors (if pennitted by

applicable state law, such as Kentucky), but may not be effective in event of bankruptcy (in In
Re Watson, 65 Bankr. 9 (Bankr. C.D. Ill., 1986), disclaimer was regarded as transfer within 180
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days of filing of petition) and will not defeat a federal tax lien attaching under Code § 6321 (see
Drye v. U.S., 528 U.S. 49 (1999)).
3.

Effectiveness of disclaimers in Kentucky for federal tax purposes
(a)

Prior to January 1, 1977 - as provided in Treas. Regs. §25.2511-1(c), in order for

a disclaimer not to be treated for federal gift tax purposes as a gift from the person disclaiming to
the alternate taker or takers, the disclaimer had to be (1) recognized and effective under local
law; (2) made within a "reasonable time" after knowledge of the existence of the transfer; (3)
made before acceptance of the property transferred; and (4) unequivocal. There was also stated
in the regulation a presumption of acceptance of the property if a person failed to refuse to accept
a transfer to him of ownership of the decedent's property within a "reasonable time" after
learning of the existence of the transfer.
PLR 200516004 demonstrates that disclaimers of pre-1977 interests are still
occumng. There a beneficiary within nine months after he attained majority disclaimed his
contingent remainder interests in four pre-1977 trusts created by his great-grandparents and his
grandfather, including any interest as a potential appointee of a limited power of appointment
given to his grandfather by his great-grandparents.
The IRS ruled that these disclaimers were effective under Treas. Reg. § 25.25111(c), even though the disclaimant had received discretionary distributions from one of the trusts
while he was a minor. The ruling notes that the disclaimers were valid under state law and
assumes that the disclaimant had not accepted or received any benefit from the disclaimed
interests.
Prior to 1974, the only provision in Kentucky relating to disclaimers was KRS
394.320, which was repealed in 1980 and which provided:
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"A devisee may disclaim by deed, acknowledged or proved, and left for
record in the county clerk's office of the county in which the probate is made,
within a year after notice of the probate. A copy of such disclaimer shall be filed
with the clerk of the district court in which probate was made."
This provision clearly applies only to testamentary gifts. It is not clear whether it
is limited to true devises (that is, gifts of interest in real estate) or applies as well to testamentary
dispositions of personal property. Compare Faulkner v. Tucker, 83 S.W. 579, 26 K.L.R. 1130
(1904), with Harding's Adm'r v. Harding's Ex'r, 140 Ky. 277, 130 S.W. 1098 (1910).
In 1974 the Legislature enacted (effective June 21, 1974) the Unifonn Disclaimer
of Transfers by Will, Intestacy or Appointment Act (KRS 394.610 to 394.670).
Enactment of this statute considerably broadened the scope of disclaimers
authorized by Kentucky law and therefore effective for federal gift tax purposes. The basic
limitations of this provision are:
(1)

It appears to apply only to interests created by and persons taking under

testamentary instruments. It does not by its tenns apply to interests created by or persons taking
under inter vivos instruments, such as revocable or irrevocable inter vivos trusts.
(2)

The right of disclaimer must be exercised within six months after the death

of the decedent or the occurrence of the detennining event (usually someone's death).
(3)

The right to disclaim does not survive the death of the person having it.

The Internal Revenue Service ("the Service") would not rule whether a pre-1977
disclaimer had been made within a reasonable time (see PLR 7842103) but in view of the rather
short period provided by the Kentucky statute, this presented no practical problem.
(b)

Between January 1, 1977, and July 15, 1980 - In the 1976 Tax Refonn Act

(effective January 1, 1977) Congress enacted §2518 of the Internal Revenue Code. The
Conference Committee Report on this legislation states in part:
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"Under present law, there are several estate and gift tax provisions which
provide rules governing the tax consequences of an effective disclaimer.
However, the provisions do not contain uniform rules on what constitutes an
effective disclaimer for estate and gift tax purposes.
"H.R. 14844 provides a single set of definitive rules for disclaimers for
purposes of estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes. This provision
generally applies to transfers creating an interest in the person disclaiming made
after December 31, 1976."
Section 2518(b) sets forth the essential elements of what is defined therein as a
"qualified disclaimer" as follows:
(1)

It must be an irrevocable and unqualified refusal to accept an interest in

(2)

It must be in writing.

(3)

It must be received by the transferor or his legal representative or the

property.

holder of the legal title to the property involved within nine months after the later of (A) the date
on which the transfer creating the interest is made or (B) the day on which the person in whom
the interest is created attains age 21.
(4)

The person in whom the interest disclaimed is created must not have

accepted the interest or any of its benefits.
(5)

As the result of the refusal or disclaimer the interest must pass without any

direction by the person making the disclaimer either to the spouse of the decedent or to someone
other than the person making the disclaimer.
One of the first questions which arose in the application of §2518 was whether in
order for a disclaimer to be a qualified disclaimer for federal estate tax purposes it must also
comply with and be authorized under the applicable state law.
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The House Ways & Means Committee Report seems to make it clear that
compliance with state law is not required, saying:
"The bill provides definitive rules relating to disclaimers for purposes of
the estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer taxes. If the requirements of the
provision are satisfied, a refusal to accept property is to be given effect for
Federal estate and gift tax purposes even if the applicable local law does not
technically characterize the refusal as a 'disclaimer' or if the person refusing the
property was considered to have been the owner of the legal title to the property
before refusing acceptance of the property."
This approach would appear to be necessary to carry out Congress' intent to
establish a single set of principles governing the effect of a qualified disclaimer for estate, gift
and generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. Otherwise, instead of a single set of disclaimer
rules there would be fifty sets, one for each state. In addition, there could be complex questions
as to which state law should apply -- that of the state where the transferor lives, or where the
transferee lives, or where the property is situated?
Moreover, ifreference must be made to state law to determine whether a refusal is
a qualified disclaimer, the result would undoubtedly be that residents of one state might be able
to disclaim a particular interest or to disclaim under certain circumstances, while a resident of an
adjoining state could not. Such a result is not only inequitable, but obviously is contrary to the
legislative intent reflected in the above committee reports. The Service first appeared to concur.
PLR 7820022 states:
"[I]f the disclaimer is delivered to the decedent's executor within nine months
from the date of the decedent's death, you will not be considered as having made a
gift for federal gift tax purposes. However,' we wish to emphasize that section
2518 of the Code is a federal law. Compliance with section 2518 does not
necessarily mean compliance with relevant state disclaimer statutes. Accordingly,
in order to insure that your disclaimer is valid for state law purposes, you should
also comply with the state disclaimer-statute." (Emphasis added)
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However, in PLR 7937011, the Service took a different position. There the
executor of the deceased transferee attempted to disclaim her interest in the estate of the
transferor. State law (Iowa) provided that a disclaimer must be filed within six months after the
date of the second publication of notice to creditors, which apparently was not done, and also
provided that if a disclaimant died within the time allowed for filing the disclaimer, the right to
disclaim terminated. The Service ruled that while there was some authority for waiving the six
months requirement, the right to disclaim under state law was terminated by the disclaimant's
death. Acknowledging that Section 2518 was silent as to whether post-death disclaimers might
be made by the disclaimant's personal representative, the Service concluded that if disclaimers of
property were not effective under the applicable state law so as to divest ownership of the
property in the disclaimant and vest it in another, the disclaimer was not a qualified disclaimer
under Section 2518.
This position was confirmed in PLR 8022021, where the issue was stated as
follows:
"Where a disclaimer meets all of the requirements of sections 2045 and
2518 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, such as being filed within 9 months
of the date of death of the decedent, may it still fail for federal tax purposes if it
does not meet all of the respective state law disclaimer requirements?" (Emphasis
added)
The state law applicable in this situation permitted the disclaimer of testamentary
interests by filing the disclaimer within six months after the decedent's death or after the interest
was indefeasibly fixed as to both quality and quantity. Disclaimers complying with Section 2518
were filed seven months and 18 days after the decedent's death. The Service ruled that since the
beneficiaries did not file disclaimers within the period required by state law, they did not
effectively divest themselves of their interests in the decedent's estate. Therefore, although the
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disclaimers were filed within the nine month period required by federal law, the failure of the
disclaimer to divest ownership from the beneficiaries and vest it in another person under local
law prevented it from being a qualified disclaimer for federal estate and gift tax purposes. The
Service's position was upheld by the Tax Court in Estate of Charles Bennett, 100 T.C. 42 (1993).
(c)

Beginning July 15, 1980 - On the theory that discretion is the better part of valor,

it was decided that the Kentucky disclaimer statute ought to be broadened so as to coincide
insofar as possible with the federal statute. Accordingly, an amendment to KRS 394.610 was
drafted and submitted to provide that the right of disclaimer shall survive the death of the person
having it and may be exercised by the personal representative of such person's estate, and
amendments to KRS 394.620(1) and (2) were drafted and submitted to extend the filing period in
each case from six to nine months. These amendments were passed and took effect on July 15,
1980.
Also taking effect on that date was a new provision (KRS 391.035), which
enacted into Kentucky law the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers under Non-Testamentary
Instruments Act, with modifications identical to the amendments to KRS 394.610 and 394.620
mentioned above.
The principal consequence of this enactment was to authorize without question
under Kentucky law the right to disclaim by a donee, grantee, beneficiary or surviving joint
tenant under a non-testamentary instrument or contract such as a deed, inter vivos trust
agreement, insurance policy or employee benefit plan.
Subsection (6) of this provision provided that it applied to a present interest in
property existing on July 15, 1980, as to which the time for filing a disclaimer had not expired
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and to a future interest in property existing on July 15, 1980, which had not become indefeasibly
vested or the taker of which had not been finally ascertained.
Under Section 2518(c) (3), enacted as a part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, a transfer that is not effective under state law will nevertheless be treated as a qualified
disclaimer for federal tax purposes if
1.

The transfer is made within the time limit provided for a qualified

2.

The transferor has not accepted the interest or any of its benefits; and

3.

The transfer is made to a person (or persons) who would have received the

disclaimer;

property if the transferor had made a qualified disclaimer.
PLR's 9228004 and 9610004 illustrate both the application of § 2518(c)(3) and its
trickiness. In PLR 9228004 under the decedent's will the surviving spouse received an income
interest in his wife's estate, with remainder to his two sons. However, the surviving spouse's
interest did not qualify for the marital deduction. Consequently, the surviving spouse and the
sons entered into a written agreement not to probate the will and to allow the estate to pass by
intestacy to the sons, who then disclaimed any interest therein other than a pecuniary amount.
This caused the entire estate, except for the pecuniary amount, to be treated as having passed
from the decedent to the surviving spouse, thus qualifying for the marital deduction. The written
agreement was regarded by the Service as a qualified disclaimer by the surviving spouse under
§ 2518(c) (3).
In PLR 9610004, on the other hand, the Service determined that an agreement

among the surviving spouse and her two children not to probate the decedent's will was not a
qualified disclaimer under § 2518(c) (3). Under the will the residue of the decedent's estate was
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divided into a family trust and a marital trust. If the surviving spouse and both children had
predeceased the decedent, the principal of the marital trust would have been added to the family
trust and would have passed in equal shares to the children's descendants (the decedent's
grandchildren) living at his death, none of whom filed a disclaimer or entered into the agreement
not to probate the will.
The Service ruled that the agreement not to probate the will was not a qualified
disclaimer under § 2518(c) (3), since the transferred interest did not pass to the person or persons
(that is, the decedent's grandchildren) who would have received the estate in the event of a
qualified disclaimer. Instead, the surviving spouse and her children were regarded as having
directed the transfer of the residuary estate to the surviving spouse.
4.

Disclaimer of particular types of property:
(a)

Property held as joint tenants with right of survivorship:
(1)

Upon the death of the other joint tenant (A)

KRS 391.035(1) provides in part:

"A surviving joint tenant may disclaim as a separate interest any property or
interest thereon devolving to him by right of survivorship. A surviving joint
tenant may disclaim the entire interest in any property, or interest therein, that is
the subject of a joint tenancy devolving to him, if the joint tenancy was created by
act of a deceased joint tenant, if the survivor did not join in creating the joint
tenancy and he has not accepted a benefit thereunder...."
(B)

Under KRS 391.035(2)(a), the person entitled to disclaim must

deliver the disclaimer within nine months after acquiring knowledge of its existence.

The

effective date of a revocable instrument or contract (such as a joint checking or savings account
or investment account) is the date on which the maker no longer has power to revoke it or to
transfer to himself or another the entire legal and equitable ownership of the interest. Moreover,
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the surviving joint tenant may not disclaim any portion of the joint account that is attributable to
consideration furnished by the surviving joint tenant.
(C)

Before December 31, 1997, the Treasury regulations provided that,

except with respect to certain tenancies in real property created after 1976 and before 1982, a
qualified disclaimer of a survivorship interest (other than a joint checking or savings account and
some joint brokerage accounts) had to be made no later than nine months after the transfer that
created the joint tenancy. In addition, a joint tenant could not make a qualified disclaimer of any
joint interest that was attributable to consideration furnished by the disclaimant.
Several federal appellate courts held that this regulation was
invalid to the extent that it required a survivorship interest in

a severable joint tenancy to

be

disclaimed within nine months after the creation of the tenancy. Consequently, the Service
promulgated Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c) (4) (i), applicable to disclaimers made on or after
December 31, 1997, under which a qualified disclaimer of the survivorship interest to which a
surviving joint tenant succeeds by operation of law upon the death of the first joint tenant to die
(1)

Must be made no later than nine months after the death of

the first joint tenant (except for the special rule relating to disclaimers by persons upon attaining
age 21), regardless of whether the joint interest could have been unilaterally severed under
applicable state law, and
(2)

Except for certain tenancies created on or after July 14,

1988, where the donee spouse is not a U.S. citizen, will be deemed to be ofa one-half interest in
the property, regardless of the portion attributable to consideration furnished by the disclaimant
or the portion that is included in the decedent's gross estate under § 2040.
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(D)

The person seeking to disclaim must still comply with the

requirements of Section 2518. The biggest obstacle is likely to be an assertion by the Service that
the surviving joint tenant has previously accepted the interest or its benefits (see PLR's 7911005,
7912049 and 7940062). In a recent ruling (PLR 200503024), the ingenuity of the surviving
spouse's attorneys enabled her to preserve the right to disclaim the survivorship interest in a joint
brokerage account to which she and her husband had contributed equally, even though during the
eight month period after her husband's death she had (1) directed the broker to sell certain
securities in the account and buy other securities and (2) withdrawn cash from the account.
After the surviving spouse timely disclaimed her "beneficial
survivorship interest" in her husband's share of the account, her attorneys directed the broker to
establish and find three accounts:
(1)

A tenants in common (TIC) account, held by the wife and

the husband's estate as tenants in common, into which were placed assets that could not be
evenly divided;
(2)

An account for the wife, into which were placed (i) assets

attributable to the wife's contributions to the account and (ii) assets attributable to the husband's
contributions with respect to which the surviving spouse had directed purchases or sales after the
husband's death; and
(3)

An estate account,

into which were placed assets

attributable to the husband's contributions with respect to which the surviving spouse had after
the husband's death made no withdrawals and directed no sales or purchases. The Service ruled
that the wife's disclaimer of any interest in the estate account and of the estate's one-half share in
the TIC account was a qualified disclaimer, since because the securities in the account were
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severable assets, she could make a qualified disclaimer of certain securities while accepting the
benefit of other securities in the account.
(2)

Upon creation of the interest -- the right of disclaimer under these

circumstances is presumably to be regarded in the same manner as any interest created by a nontestamentary instrument, regardless of whether the interest may be unilaterally severed under
applicable state law.
(b)

Interests created by a revocable inter vivos trust agreement:
(1)

Prior to July 15, 1980 -- disclaimer of such interest was not specifically

authorized by Kentucky law and therefore such interest probably could not be effectively
disclaimed for federal tax purposes, unless the trust agreement could be regarded as a
testamentary instrument within the meaning ofKRS 394.610 (see PLR 7909055, which suggests
that the designation of the beneficiary to receive a deceased serviceman's final pay is a
testamentary instrument within the meaning of a state disclaimer statute similar to KRS
394.610).
(2)

Beginning July 15, 1980 -- disclaimer of such an interest is clearly

authorized by KRS 394.035. The effective date of such an instrument is usually the date of the
settlor's death, when the provisions become irrevocable. Presumably this new provision of the
Kentucky statute applies to interests created by revocable instruments executed prior to July 15,
1980, which did not become irrevocable until after July 15, 1980. In PLR 8003020, a revocable
inter vivos trust agreement was executed July 23, 1968, and a pour-over will was executed June
25, 1971. The decedent died after December 31, 1976. The Service ruled that before the
decedent's death, transfers to the trust were not subject to gift tax and no beneficiaries thereunder
had any interests that required a disclaimer. The interests vested on the death of the decedent.
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Accordingly, Section 2518 applied to such interests and the nine month period provided for
therein commenced to run as of the date of death.
See also PLR 8008078, which quotes the House Committee Report to the
effect that "a transfer is considered to be made when it is treated as a taxable transfer, i.e., a
completed transfer for gift tax purposes with respect to inter vivos transfers or upon the date of
decedent's death with respect to testamentary transfers." Thus, the transfer of an interest in
default of the exercise of a general testamentary power of appointment is made at the death of
the holder, while the transfer of an interest in default of the exercise of a limited testamentary
power of appointment occurs when the power vests in the holder.
(c)

Proceeds of life insurance policies and death benefits under employee benefit

plans:
(1)

Prior to July 15, 1980 -- not specifically authorized by Kentucky law and

therefore possibly not effectively disclaimed for federal tax purposes, unless either not necessary
to comply with state law or beneficiary designation is regarded as a testamentary instrument
within the meaning ofKRS 394.610 (see PLR 7909055, supra).
(2)

Beginning July 15, 1980 -- clearly authorized by KRS 394.035. Effective

date is when designation of beneficiary becomes irrevocable, such as upon death of insured or
employee. In PLR 8012129, by a designation executed by the husband after December 31, 1976,
the widow was to receive a survivor benefit under a qualified employee benefit plan if she
survived her husband. Their children were designated as alternate beneficiaries. Neither the plan
nor the funding insurance policy restricted a disclaimer by a beneficiary. The applicable state law
(Florida) provided for disclaimer of interests passing to beneficiaries under insurance contracts.
In ruling that the disclaimer by the widow was a qualified disclaimer under Section 2518, the
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Service indicated that the widow had no interest in the plan until after her husband's death for
purposes of that section.
(d)

Powers of Appointment and Property Subject to Powers of·Appointment.
General powers of appointment, special or limited powers of appointment, assets

passing pursuant to the exercise of either a general or special power and assets passing in default
of the exercise of either a general or special power are all interests in property, a disclaimer of
which that complies with the requirements of § 2518 will constitute a qualified disclaimer.
Several points to keep in mind are:
(1)

The period (ordinarily nine months) within which the donee of a power of

appointment (either general or special) may execute a qualified disclaimer of the power itself
starts when the creation of the power becomes irrevocable.
(2)

Since for the most part assets subject to a general power are includible in

the power holder's federal estate tax gross estate (whether any such tax is due), the period within
which the recipient of such assets either by the exercise, or in default of the exercise, of a general
power will not start until the exercise, release or lapse of the power.
(3)

Perhaps bec'ause the exercise, release or lapse of a special power is not a

taxable event, the period within which the recipient of property either by the exercise, or in
default of the exercise, of a special power begins when the creation of the power becomes
irrevocable (Treas. Regs. § 25.2518-2(c)(3)(i)).
(4)

The exercise to any extent of a power of appointment, general or special,

by the donee is an acceptance of the benefits of the power, after which the donee cannot make a
qualified disclaimer of the power (Treas. Regs. § 25-2518-2(d)(1)). One possible example is an
attempt to "cut down" a general power of appointment to a special power of appointment.
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(5)

If the disclaimant of any interest in property (including a power of

appointment) retains a power of appointment over the disclaimed property, the disclaimer will
not be a qualified disclaimer unless the retained power is a power (perhaps even a nontestamentary power) the exercise of which is measured by an ascertainable standard (Treas.
Regs. §§ 25.2518-2(e)(2), 25.2518-3(a)(1)(iii) and 25.2518-3(d), Ex. (9) and (10)).
5.

Disclaimer of less than an entire interest:
(a)

Section 2518(c) provides that a disclaimer with respect to an undivided portion of

an interest which otherwise meets the requirements of Section 2518 will be treated as a qualified
disclaimer of such portion of the interest.
The earlier rulings which discussed this provision did not consider whether in
order for a partial disclaimer to qualify under Section 2518 it also had to be authorized by the
applicable state law. For example, PLR 7849009 concludes:
"An undivided portion of your interest, for example, may be 1/20 of your
1/5 interest in your father's marital trust or all of your interest (principal--income)
in corporation X stock.

"Therefore, assuming all other requirements of section 2518(b) are met,
you may disclaim all or a specified undivided portion or a specific asset or assets
in the marital trust and you will not be deemed as having made a gift for federal
gift tax purposes."
Again, PLR 7913082 concludes:
"Therefore, assuming all other requirements of section 2518(b) are met,
you may disclaim all, or a specified undivided portion (for example 1/20 of your
1/3 interest in the trust) or all your interest (principal and income) in a specified
asset or assets and you will not be deemed to have made a gift for federal gift tax
purposes."
In PLR 7913119, the Service approved the disclaimer of the right to receive any

of the stock of a certain corporation given by a specific provision in the will. In this ruling, the
Service also approved a formula-based disclaimer of so much of the listed stocks passing under
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the will as were in excess of the amount necessary to enable the estate to qualify for the
maximum marital deduction.
In PLR 9822014 the IRS ruled that the disclaimers by each of two trust
beneficiaries of their respective interests in a portion of the trust equal to one-half of the settlor's
available GST exemption were qualified disclaimers, where under the terms of the trust the
amount disclaimed would pass outright to the issue of the respective disclaimant. Note that even
though under the terms of the governing investment or applicable state law the effect of a
disclaimer is to cause the property or interest disclaimed to pass as though the disclaimant had
predeceased the transferor, this will not trigger the application for GST tax purposes of the
so-called "predeceased parent" provisions of § 2651 (e).
In PLR 7922018, the Service noted without further comment that the applicable
state law permitted disclaimer of the whole or any part of a property interest before concluding:
"[Y]ou may disclaim the entire interest bequeathed to you or a specified
undivided portion of the entire interest or a specific asset or assets and you will
not be deemed as having made a gift for federal gift tax purposes."
(b)

In PLR 8015014, the Service was asked to rule whether the disclaimer of a

designated dollar amount ($25,000) of a savings account with a balance of over $36,000 was a
qualified disclaimer under Section 2518. The response was as follows:
"Generally, a disclaimer of any interest in property which consists of less than an
entire interest in the property, is not a qualified disclaimer within the meaning of
section 2518 of the Code. However, a disclaimant shall not be treated as making a
disclaimer of a partial interest in property if the disclaimer relates to severable
property and the disclaimant makes a qualified disclaimer with respect to a
portion of these items. Severable property is property which can be separated
from other property to which it is joined and which, after severance, maintains a
complete and independent existence. Thus, the disclaimer of $25,000 of a fund
valued at $36,747.18 will be a disclaimer of severable property and valid under
section 2518 of the Code." (Emphasis added)
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A disclaimer of all interests in trust income or principal, etc. in excess of a
specific amount is a qualified disclaimer of a pecuniary amount. See PLR 8708069.
(c)

In PLR 7913119 the IRS ruled that a formula-based disclaimer in which shares of

stock were disclaimed only as to the portion that would not qualify the estate for the marital
deduction was a qualified disclaimer (prior to availability of the unlimited marital deduction) and
the undisclaimed portion qualified for the marital deduction.
In PLR 9203028 formula disclaimers of the specific portion of a residuary estate
equal to the maximum amount that could pass free of GST tax to grandchildren constituted
qualified disclaimers of specific pecuniary amounts.
(d)

Two "partial" disclaimers that will not constitute qualified disclaimers are
(1)

Where the entire interest in property is received outright, the disclaimer of

a remainder interest in an effort to carve out a life estate (Treas. Regs. § 25.2518-3(b)) or vice
versa (Treas. Regs. § 25.2518-3(d), Ex. 2); and
(2)

The disclaimer of any interest in specific assets in a trust, while retaining

an interest in other trust assets, unless the assets covered by the disclaimer are removed from the
trust and pass without the direction of the disclaimant to persons other than the disclaimant
(unless the disclaimant is the surviving spouse ofa deceased transferor) (Treas. Regs. § 25.25183(a)(2)).
6.

What constitutes an "unqualified refusal ... to accept an interest in property"?
In PLR 7809043, the Service ruled that the proposal of a non-charitable beneficiary to

disclaim the right to income from a charitable remainder trust in return for a lump sum payment
did not constitute an unqualified refusal of benefits and therefore was not a qualified disclaimer
under Section 2518.
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7.

What constitutes an acceptance of an interest or any of its benefits?
(a)

Acceptance of income benefits in trust -- in PLR 7808078 the income beneficiary

of a trust established in 1948 wanted to disclaim the right to withdraw principal from the trust
upon reaching age 30. The Service ruled that the earlier acceptance of income benefits from the
trust precluded the disclaimer of the right to withdraw principal.
(b)

Actions in a representative capacity:
(1)

In PLR 7821045, the Service ruled that the actions by the beneficiary of a

charitable remainder trust who was also the trustee and executrix to reform the trust provisions
so that it would qualify for a charitable deduction did not constitute an acceptance of any benefits
under the trust. See also PLR 8429085.
(2)

In PLR 7922018, the Service ruled that the act of qualifying as

independent executrix of an estate under Texas law did not constitute an acceptance of benefits
conferred upon the person so qualifying either under the will or otherwise.
(3)

A disclaimer by a decedent's spouse, who was also a co-executrix of his

estate, of her interest in the principal of a trust was ruled to be a qualified disclaimer The
exercise of her duties as a co-executrix did not constitute an acceptance of the trust property or
its benefits.
(c)

Actions by a joint tenant:
(1)

Acceptance of the benefits of a joint tenancy after its creation precludes

the subsequent disclaimer of the survivorship interest. See PLR 7911005 and 7912049.
(2)

The execution of a contract for the sale of jointly owned property

constituted the acceptance of the entire property interest, including the survivorship interest,
thereby precluding a qualified disclaimer of such interest. PLR 7940062.
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8.

Whether an interest passes without any direction on the part of the person making the

disclaimer:
(a)

In PLR 8015014, the Service ruled that property which is disclaimed by a person

in his capacity as the executor of an estate, and which, as a result of such disclaimer, passes to
that person in his capacity as the beneficiary of a prior estate, nevertheless qualified as "passing
to a person other than the person making the disclaimer".
(b)

In PLR 7951034, the Service ruled that a disclaimer was a qualified one, even

though the disclaimer directed to whom the disclaimed interest was to go, since that person
would have taken the interest in the absence of such a direction. The Service did comment,
however, that if this had not been the case the effort to direct the passage of the disclaimed
interest, even if ineffective, might be regarded as an acceptance of the benefit of the interest.
(c)

In PLR 200442027 the IRS approved a planning technique involving disclaimers

that in substance appears to significantly circumvent the restrictions on the disclaimant's ability
to control the disposition of the disclaimed property interests. Under the arrangement if the
surviving spouse disclaims any of her interest in Trust 1, the portion disclaimed will be held in
Trust 2, if the surviving spouse then disclaims any of her interest in Trust 2, the portion
disclaimed will be held in Trust 3, and so forth through Trust 5.
As one might expect, each trust contained different provisions.

Trust 1 was

designed to terminate upon expiration of the nine-month disclaimer period and any portion that
had not been disclaimed would be distributed outright to the surviving spouse, if she is living, or
if she is not then living, to her estate. Trusts 2 and 3 appear to have been two versions of
potential QTIP marital trusts and Trusts 4 and 5 two variations of a non-marital trust. The
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spouse planned to disclaim any interest in Trust 1 and fractional portions of Trusts 2, 3 and 4, so
that the trust assets will be allocated in accordance with her "wishes" among Trust 2, 3, 4 and 5.
During this period of transition with increasing estate tax and GST tax exemptions
and the possibility of ever greater exemptions or total repeal, where the surviving spouse (or her
representative, such as someone to whom she has given a durable general power of attorney that
specifically authorizes the making of disclaimers (see KRS 386.093(6)) can reasonably be
expected to "do the right thing" this approach could provide desirable flexibility for achieving a
balance between tax-related and non-tax objectives.
9.

To whom does the disclaimed interest pass?
(a)

The House Ways & Means Committee Report for Section 2518 states:

"If a qualified disclaimer is made, the Federal estate, gift, and generation-skipping
transfer tax provisions are to apply with respect to the property interest disclaimed
as if the interest had never been transferred to the person making the disclaimer."
(b)

KRS 394.630 provides:

"Unless the decedent or donee of the power has otherwise provided, the
property or interest disclaimed devolves as if the disclaimant had predeceased the
decedent or, if the disclaimant is designated to take under a power of appointment
exercised by a testamentary instrument, as if the disclaimant had predeceased the
donee of the power. A future interest that takes effect in possession or enjoyment
after the tennination of the estate or interest disclaimed takes effect as if the
disclaimant had predeceased the decedent or the donee of the power. A disclaimer
relates back for all purposes to the date of the death of the decedent or the donee
of the power."
(c)

KRS 395.035(3) provides:

"Unless the non-testamentary instrument or contract provides for another
disposition, the property or interest therein disclaimed shall devolve as if the
disclaimant had died before the effective date of the instrument or contract. A
disclaimer relates back for all purposes to that date. A future interest that takes
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the tennination of the disclaimed
interest takes effect as if the disclaimant had died before the effective date of the
instrument or contract that transferred the disclaimed interest."
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(d)

In PLR 7833008, a decedent bequeathed his entire interest to his two daughters on

the condition that they provide for their mother, his widow. In an apparent effort to vest the
estate in the widow so as to qualify for the marital deduction, the daughters executed timely
disclaimers of their interests in the estate. Unfortunately, each of the daughters had children
living at the decedent's death, to whom the disclaimed interests passed under the anti-lapse
provision in the applicable state statute.
(e)

Similarly, the effect of the disclaimers described in PLR 7914003 was to cause

the property disclaimed to pass to alternate takers under the decedent's will, rather than to escheat
to the state, as the disclaimants evidently intended in an effort to obtain a charitable deduction.
10.

By whom must the disclaimer be executed?
(a)

Neither Section 2518 nor the Committee Reports talk in terms of a qualified

disclaimer being made by anyone other than the person in whom the interest is created.
(b)

In PLR 7947008, the decedent died intestate, leaving a wife and four adult

children, each of whom had children. Each child disclaimed for himself or herself and attempted
to disclaim on behalf of his or her minor children 50% of the interest he or she was entitled to
receive as an heir. The Service ruled that under the applicable state law, the disclaimer on behalf
of the minor children could be executed only by a guardian ad litem with probate court approval
and that the attempted disclaimer by the parents on behalf of their minor children was invalid.
For successful qualified disclaimers on behalf of minors, see PLR's 8701001 and 9623064 and R.
Goree, Jr. Estate, supra.
(c)

In PLR 8015014, the Service approved as a qualified disclaimer under Section

2518 a disclaimer by the co-executors of a deceased transferee, where the applicable state law
permitted such a disclaimer. See also J. Dancy Estate, supra.
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(d)

KRS 394.035 and 394.610 authorize the representative of an incapacitated or

protected person (such as guardian or conservator of a minor or a disabled person) to disclaim on
behalf of such persons and permit a personal representative to exercise a right of disclaimer on
behalf of the decedent's estate.
11.

Summary
(a)

In appropriate circumstances, disclaimers can be utilized to accomplish significant

post-death changes in a decedent's estate plan and thereby effect substantial tax savings.
(b)

The modifications and extensions of the previous Kentucky disclaimer statutes

enable the beneficiaries of Kentucky decedents to obtain the maximum benefit available under
the federal tax law disclaimer provisions.
12.

Conclusion:
There is no better conclusion that that In BNA Tax Management #848,

Disclaimers, at A-68:
"The disclaimer is a magical device. Disclaimer permits estate planning
for two estates at the best possible moment. Disclaimer permits the personal
representatives and beneficiaries of a testator's estate to plan that estate after the
testator's death. Disclaimer permits estate planning for the "second" estate, the
estate of the beneficiary under the will of a testator, after the death of that testator
or the estate of an intestate take after the death of the intestate decedent.
Disclaimer permits estate planning when all of the possibilities are resolved and
everything you want to know is known: the date of death of the decedent; the size
and makeup of her estate; the age of the surviving beneficiaries, and their wealth,
health and family circumstances.
The disclaimer is not only a post-mortem or after-the-fact planning tool.
The possibilities of the use of a disclaimer can be anticipated and planned for by
the drafter of wills, trusts and durable powers of appointment.
The scope of the uses of disclaimer in estate planning is limited only by
the transfer tax sections of the Code and the extent of the estate planner's
knowledge of these sections, other provisions of federal tax law, and relevant state
law; the estate planner's ingenuity and creative thinking; and her understanding
and careful application of the technical rules of the qualified disclaimer."
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INTRODUCTION
Parents of children with disabilities face special challenges. At first, parents are often
overwhelmed with medical issues which govern whether their child will even have a future for
which to plan. As medical worries may subside, families must then confront harsh economic
realities. How will the child live as an adult if the child cannot work regularly or manage
money? What about the parents' other children? New terms like "public assistance benefits,"
"Medicaid," and "disinheritance" begin to creep in the parents' vocabulary.
For many years, conventional legal wisdom required parents to disinherit their children
with disabilities. This was the safest way to protect the child's eligibility for the basic public
entitlement programs of Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") to ensure support
for the child. Thus, parents often had to make the emotionally wrenching decision to disinherit
the very child who seemed to need the most from them.
Legislative changes, along with development of the common law have created estate
planning options other than disinheritance. Several types of trusts can now safely be drafted for a
person with a disability without jeopardizing his or her eligibility for public benefits. Some
options are safer than others, and families are often left weighing the desire for flexibility against
the need for certainty. Estate planning attorneys need to pay particular attention to the details of
the entire family situation, including the extent of the individual's disability and the need for
government assistance, the government benefits available, the individual's prognosis, the age,
health, availability and commitment of family caregivers, and the nature and amount of the
family's and the individual's assets. A plan that might be appropriate for an severely mentally
retarded adult child who is already on Medicaid in a residential care facility will be radically
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different from the plan for a daughter with mental illness who currently lives at home without
government assistance.

I.

GOALS OF SPECIAL NEEDS PLANNING
A. Assure quality of life for the individual with a disability
1.
2.
3.
4.

Identify a guardian/advocate
Make arrangement for residence, employment, social and medical care
Prepare a letter of intent
Make final arrangement

B. Preserve government benefits
1. Families planning for a child or other family member with a disability have a
number of planning vehicles available to them to leave assets to benefit the
disabled person without necessarily losing eligibility for need-based government
programs. These include trusts which are exempt by state or federal statute (all of
which have some sort of "payback" provision at the death of the beneficiary) or
discretionary trusts, which mayor may not be considered available, depending
upon the language in the trust and the current law.
2. The goal in planning should be to come up with a flexible plan that will
supplement available benefits, but is flexible enough to provide for basic care,
support and maintenance ifbenefits disappear or are not appropriate.

c. Provide for appropriate management of available funds
D. Long term care planning for the parents.

II. QUICK OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT BENEFIT PROGRAMS
Many persons with disabilities depend on government benefit programs for income,
health care coverage, and residential placement.
A. Some programs are available regardless of recipient's income or property.
1. Supplemental Security Disability Income (SSDI) pays benefits to disabled
individuals who worked long enough and paid social security taxes. The amount
of the monthly benefit is determined by prior work history of claimant or wageearner under whose record claimant qualifies for benefits, but not by financial
assets.
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2. Medicare is a health insurance program for seniors that covers a portion of
hospitalization, outpatient care, and a limited number of days of nursing home
care when skilled nursing care or short-term rehabilitation is needed.
B.

Need Based Benefit Programs, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and
Medicaid, have strict income and asset guidelines for eligibility.

1. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides a guaranteed income floor of
$552 for a single person.
2. Medicaid provides medical and hospital care, prescriptions, rudimentary dental
care, and residential/institutional care, and waiver programs up to $14,000/mo. In
addition, a number ofMR/DD Boards in Ohio will begin charging for services
provided if the recipient is not Medicaid eligible.
C. Eligibility For SSI And Medicaid
1. SSI and Medicaid assist individuals who are 65 years or older; legally blind; or
disabled as defined by Social Security.

2. Eligibility for both programs is based on financial need, and both income and
resources of the applicant are considered.
•
•
•

Income less than certain standards
Countable resources less than $2000 for individual, $3000 for couple for
SSI
Countable resources less than $1500 for Medicaid

3. Resources
•

A resource is property which is both owned by the individual, available to
him or her, and not exempt.

•

Amounts owned on the first of the month are resources, while amounts
received during the month are income. "Income" retained into the next
calendar month then is considered a resource. Income and resources
become countable only when they are available to the recipient (or could
be available upon request.) An individual has a duty to report increases in
income or resources within 10 days of receipt.

•

Receipt of assets from any source can impact one's eligibility for needbased programs. A monetary gift or an inheritance may be considered
income and/or a resource and disqualify an individual from receiving
benefits from these very important programs. The recipient cannot simply
give away the excess assets, or disclaim the inheritance, as this creates a
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period of ineligibility for both SSI and Medicaid; the length of the period
of ineligibility for SSI is dependent upon the amount of resources
transferred; the length of the period of ineligibility for Medicaid is also
dependent on the Medicaid benefits the recipient is receiving.

III.

IV.

WHEN IS A TRUST CREATED BY A MEDICAID RECIPIENT'S PARENTS
CONSIDERED AN AVAILABLE RESOURCE?
A.

Trusts that meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C.§ 1396p(d)(4)(A)or (C) -- called Special
Needs Trusts or Medicaid Payback Trusts and Pooled Trusts -- are not available.
These trusts were carved out as the exception to the rule set forth in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA '93) that self-settled trusts were deemed
available. Assets in these trusts do not count for purposes of determining the assets of
the beneficiary.

B.

Some states also have statutory safe harbor trusts for supplemental needs that are also
exempt. The Ohio Revised Code § 1339.51 permits parents to create supplemental
service trusts for individuals eligible for services from ODMR/DD or ODMH. The
trust must repay up to 50% of the remaining funds and the contributions are currently
capped at $222,000. Trust assets can not be used for any type of support or
maintenance.

C.

Common law trusts with an ascertainable standard related to support are clearly an
available resource for the beneficiary. Often called Support Trusts.

D.

Discretionary trusts mayor may not be considered available, depending on the terms
of the trust and the law of the state.

OBRA '93 SPECIAL NEEDS TRUSTS AND POOLED TRUSTS IN GENERAL
A. These are exempt resources for Medicaid under OBRA 93 - 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4),
and for~SSI under 42 U.S.C. § 1382b (e) (for trusts created on or after 1/1/2000).
B. They are generally self-settled trusts, intended to hold assets belonging to the individual
with the disability. However, many states, including Ohio, allow third parties, such as
the individual's parents to use these trusts.

c. Uses
1. To shelter existing assets to qualify for Medicaid and SSI - a transfer of resources
to one of these trusts is not a disqualifying transfer.
2. To shelter proceeds from a settlement or judgment in a lawsuit.
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3. To shelter an unplanned inheritance.
4. In divorces, to hold property settlements for a disabled spouse or child support
payments in Castle-type cases. Castle v. Castle, 15 Ohio St. 3d 279 (1984).
5. Transfer of assets from an elderly parent to an exempt trust for the benefit of a
disabled child in order to make the parent eligible for Medicaid 1•
D. Congress more recently clarified its intention to align the SSI eligibility rules with
Medicaid's. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(e) addresses the countability of revocable and
irrevocable trusts for SSI purposes. The new law confirms that most trusts accessible
to the beneficiary for basic needs are counted as a resource, but 42 U.S.C. §
1382(b)(e)(5) assures Medicaid and SSI recipients who have Special Needs Trusts that
"this subsection shall not apply to a trust described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of
section 1396p(d)(4) of this title." (Emphasis added.) The Social Security
Administration is applying the entire subsection anyway, and finding a number of
these trusts available to the beneficiary. To protect SSI eligibility it is important that
the trust meet the following requirements:
1. The trust must be irrevocable.
2. The trust should have a named residual beneficiary - not be payable to the
beneficiary's "heirs" or "estate" to be considered irrevocable for SS 1.
3. The "payback" provision at the death of the beneficiary must make repayment to
the state first priority upon the death of the beneficiary, above funeral expenses
and any other debts (final taxes, trustee fees and attorney fees may be paid first.)
E.

v.

Under Ohio's revised rules, cash distributions from these trusts to the
applicant/recipient are counted as unearned income. All other distributions from the
trust are treated under the rules governing in-kind income. ORC 5111.151 (F)(l)(c).

OBRA '93 SPECIAL NEEDS TRUSTS (a/k/a Medicaid Payback Trusts, (d)(4)(A)
trusts) O.R.C. §5111.151(F).
A. The special needs trust must be established by a:
1. Parent,
2. Grandparent,

Or directly to the disabled child, or to non-exempt trust solely for the benefit of disabled child. See O.A.C.
§ 5101:1-39-05(A)(13).
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3. Court, or
4. Legal guardian.
B. SSI policies indicate they will look at whether a parent or grandparent had legal
authority to act on behalf of the individual to determine the validity of the trust. See
SSA Transmittal, File No. EM 00067, May 26, 2000, paragraph D.1.e.
C. The beneficiary must be:
1. An individual under age 65 {trust remains valid after 65 but additional assets

cannot be added).3
2. Disabled - must meet social security definition (42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)) or
corresponding definition at O.A.C. § 5101:1-39-03 or 031.
D. Terms of the Special Needs Trust
1. The trust can be revocable or irrevocable for Medicaid eligibility. If revocable,
the trust should require notice to JFS upon revocation. Must be irrevocable for
SSI.
2. The trustee is generally given broad discretion arid broad powers.
3. The trust must be for the sole benefit of the disabled beneficiary.
4. The trust instrument should anticipate and authorize situations in which the
trustee or family members may receive significant incidental benefit.
5. All Medicaid subrogation claims or prior liens must be settled before the trust is
established. Federal and state case law in other states supports this position.
Sullivan v. County ofSuffolk, 174 F.3d 282,284 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1999); Norwest
Bank, N.D., N.A. v. Doth, 159 F.3d 328, 333 (8 th Cir. Minn. 1998); Cricchio v.
Pennisi, 90 N.Y. 2d 296, 683 N.E.2d 301 (1997). Ohio has recently allowed some
of these claims to be rolled over into the trust, but have requested specific
language addressing the subrogation claim.
6. Must include a "payback" provision at death of beneficiary. Ensure that your
payback provision is not state specific.
"Each State which has provided medical assistance to the beneficiary
since the trust was established shall receive a proportionate share of the
If the trust contains a structured settlement, include a statement that "any periodic payments received as a
part of the settlement shall not be considered additions to the Trust Estate."
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assets remaining in the within Trust upon the death of the beneficiary up
to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on his behalfby
such state under a State Plan pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., to the
extent permitted by law. The Trustee shall comply with all state and/or
federal regulations in effect at the time of the beneficiary's death
regarding notification and disbursement to the States."

OBRA '93 POOLED TRUSTS «d)(4)(C) trust) O.A.C. § 5101:1-39-271 (C)(3)(c)

VI.

A.

Pooled trusts are available in Ohio through Community Fund Management Foundation
(CFMF) and Fifth Third Bank of Northeastem Ohio or through the Disability
Foundation in Dayton. Both require a minimum initial trust size of $5,000.

B.

Pooled trusts are now available in Kentucky from the Cedar Lake Foundation for
families of individuals with mental retardation and development disabilities (MR/DD).
Information is available online at www.cedarlake.org.

C. In Tennessee, the Pooled Trust of Tennessee is available.
D. In Indiana, the Arc of Indiana Master Trust, can reached at (317) 259-7603.
E. The pooled trust is similar in most respects to the payback trust discussed above with
the following exceptions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

F.

The trust may be established by the individual with the disability,
There is no age limitation;
The pooled trust must be managed by a non-profit association;
A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary;
Individual accounts are pooled for investment and management; and
Funds which are retained by the trust at the death of the beneficiary are not subject
to payback to the state. Funds transferred by parents or their third parties are not
subject to payback.

The pooled trust is appropriate in following cases:
1. Those in which the assets are insufficient for a corporate fiduciary to handle, and
in which there is no suitable individual to serve as trustee (both Ohio pooled trusts
have a minimum funding requirement of only $5,000.)
2. When the beneficiary is over the age of 65.
3. If the beneficiary is competent to establish the trust, has no living parent or
grandparent, and does not want to go through the court.
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G.

Unfortunately, pooled trusts are not available in all states to all persons with
disabilities. For example, in Kentucky, the Cedar Lake Foundation limits participates
to those with MR/DD.

VII. DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS (3 rd Party Trusts)
A. Discretionary trusts must be established with assets belonging to someone other than
the disabled beneficiary and should never include a standard for distribution that could
be interpreted to include the support of the beneficiary.
B.

Historically, determination of whether or not a discretionary trust was available was
driven by Bureau of Support v. Kreitzer (1968), 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, and its progeny
(including Young v. Dept. of Human Services (1996), 76 Ohio St. 3d 547 and
Carnahan v. Ohio Dept. ofHuman Services (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 214, 743 N.E.2d
473).
1. If the Trustee could be compelled to make payments for the support ofthe
beneficiary, the trust was deemed available.
2. Exclusionary language that prohibited the trustee from making any payments that
would have an effect on the applicant/recipient's ability to receive government
assistance was disregarded by the Medicaid administrators BUT this language has
been respected by some Ohio courts.

C. The new rules for third party trusts in Ohio are much more specific. O.R.C
§5111.151(G).
Any portion of a trust ... is an available resource only if the trust permits the trustee
to expend principal or corpus or assets of the trust for the applicant/recipient's
medical care, care, comfort, maintenance, health, welfare, general well-being, or a
combination of these purposes. The trust will still be considered an available
resource even if the trust contains any of the following types of provisions:
(i) Any provision that prohibits the trustee from making payments that
would supplant or replace Medicaid or public assistance, or other
government assistance;
(ii) Any provision that prohibits the trustee from making payments that
would impact or have an effect on the applicant/recipient's right or ability
or opportunity, to receive medicaid, or public assistance, or other
government assistance.
(iii) Any provision that attempts to prevent the trust or its corpus or,
principal from being counted as an available resource under this rule.
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A trust ... that would normally be considered an available resource shall not be
counted as an available resource under the following circumstances.
(i) If the trust contains a "clear statement" requiring the trustee to preserve
a portion of the trust for another beneficiary or remainderman, then that
portion of the trust shall not be counted as an available resource. Terms of
a trust that grant discretion to preserve a portion of the trust do not qualify
as a clear statement requiring the trustee to preserve a portion of the trust.
(ii) If the trust contains a "clear statement" requiring the trustee to use a
portion of the trust for a purpose other than the medical care, care, comfort,
maintenance, welfare, or general well-being of the applicant/recipient, then
that portion of the trust shall not be counted as an available resource.
Terms ofa trust that grant discretion to limit the use ofa portion of the trust
do not qualify as a clear statement requiring the trustee to use a portion of
the trust for a particular purpose.
(iv) If the trust contains a "clear statement" that requires the trustee to
terminate the trust if it is counted as an available resource, then it shall not
be counted as an available resource. Terms of a trust that grant discretion
to terminate the trust do not qualify as a clear statement requiring the
trustee to terminate the trust.
(v) If any person obtains a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction
that expressly prevents the trustee from using part or all of the trust for the
medical care, care, comfort, maintenance, welfare, or general well-being of
the applicant/recipient, then the trust or that portion subject to the court
order shall not be counted as a resource.
(vi) If the trust is specifically exempt from being counted as an available
resource by this rule, another rule, the Ohio Revised Code, or the u.s.
Code, then it shall not be counted as a resource.
(vii) If the applicant/recipient presents a final judgment from a court
demonstrating that he or she was unsuccessful in a civil action against the
trustee to compel payments from the trust, then it shall not be counted as an
available resource.

D. Drafting Pointers:
1. Dispositive language must be purely discretionary. Avoid all standards. Also,
avoid phrases that imply a standard such as "...for the benefit of ," "...as the Trustee
shall see fit...," "...as the Trustee deems appropriate for...," or " as the Trustee may
deem best for..." WATCH OUT: Ohio courts have implied standards from seemingly
innocuous language. Dangerous words include: "benefit, need, desirable, require,
want, care, best..."
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2. Depending on the disabled person's current residential status, if you decide to limit
the Trustees' discretion to providing supplemental needs only, consider using a trigger,
such as the filing of an medical application, to impose the restrictions.
3. Always include an Anti Alienation Clause - Spend Thrift Clause.
Example:
The interest of any beneficiary in any Trust created hereunder shall not be subject
to the claims of creditors and shall not be subject to anticipation, attachment,
execution or other legal process or lien brought by or in favor of a creditor or
creditors of any such beneficiary, and no alienation or assignment of any interest
in this Trust shall be binding upon Trustee or anyone who may deal with Trustee.
If any such beneficiary shall attempt to alienate or assign hislher interest in any
Trust or the income therefrom, or if any creditor shall seek to attach it, execute
against it or secure a lien thereon, the interest of such beneficiary in this Trust and
the income thereof shall cease. Thereafter, Trustee shall hold the Trust until its
termination hereunder.
4. Always include a Poison Pil1/Explosion Clause - In Ohio, termination must be
mandatory, not discretionary. But also consider giving the trustee the discretion to
terminate before the mandatory termination.
Example:
If any of the principal or income of this Trust is deemed available to
[Applicant] as a resource or as income for the purposes of determining
hislher eligibility for, or the amount of benefits that he/she may receive
from, Medicaid, SSI, MRDD or any other needs-based benefit program
that he/she would otherwise be eligible for, or should the Department of
Job and Family Services or the Social Security Department or any state or
federal Attorney General or prosecutor try to' attach or otherwise access
any Trust principal or income, then this Trust shall terminate and all
remaining assets shall immediately be distributed as follows:
_
The Trustee shall have authority to engage counsel to defend the Trust
from such invasion.
5. Consider a clause "dumping" all Trust assets into a "safe harbor" Trust if attacked.
Example:
Furthermore, should [Applicant], hislher assignees, transferees,
subrogees, creditors or anyone claiming through or on hislher behalf
pursuant to a voluntary or involuntary subrogation, assignment or other
transfer of hislher rights, attempt to compel a distribution from this
Trust, or if the government benefits of [Applicant] under any current or
future needs-based government program are affected by the existence of
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this Trust or should hislher benefits be cancelled or otherwise reduced
in any manner as a result of the existence of this fund, then this separate
fund shall tenninate immediately and be distributed to the TRUSTEE
OF THE COMMUNITY FUND MANAGEMENT FOUNDATION
1995 MASTER TRUST, currently located at 1275 Lakeside Avenue
East, Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1132 to be placed in the FUNDED
MASTER fund to be used for the benefit of [Applicant] under tenns
and conditions to be set up by the Trustee hereunder as it sees fit at that
time. In such event, any residue that may remain at [Applicant]'s death
shall be paid to [
] or, if he/she is not living, then to
the living issue of [
], per stirpes.
6. Even if by regulation, no value is attributed to a statement articulating the Grantor's
"intent to preserve eligibility," such language will not hurt (if the language is proper)
and could help in an indirect way, such as in an action to refonn the trust.
7. Add additional beneficiaries so that you can distribute income to Applicant and
consider using a trusted "surrogate" - i.e. brother, sister, nephew, niece, etc. - to
receive discretionary distributions of the principal. This is safer than the disinheritance
option because you have creditor protection in the trust.
8. In addition to the strategies included in the new Ohio rules, consider giving the
Trustees the power to amend the trust for the narrow purpose of confonning the trust
to future changes in the regulations.
Example:
To amend the provisions of this Trust in any way that the Trustee
detennines will help achieve the Grantor's estate planning purposes or
to minimize any and all state and federal gift, estate, inheritance,
generation skipping and income taxes and to create a "safe harbor" for
the purposes of safeguarding Grantee's eligibility for Medicaid, SSI and
MRDD benefits or any similar or future "needs-based" program
otherwise available to [Applicant]. Trustee may make such
amendments as may be prudent in light of changes in all the laws and
regulations regarding Medicaid, SSI and MRDD benefits or any needsbased government program, which may exist in the future. Any such
amendment made by the Trustee in good faith shall be conclusive on all
persons interested in this Trust and neither the Trustee, nor
professionals employed by Trustee, shall be liable for the consequences
of any amendment or non-amendment hereof.
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VIII. UNIFORM TRUST CODE AND DISCRETIONARY SPECIAL NEEDS TRUSTS
A. Currently, there is a great deal of controversy about the rights of creditor's of trust
beneficiaries in Sections 501 through 504 of the Uniform Trust Code as it relates to
third party discretionary trusts for disabled individuals.
•

Tennessee adopted its version of the UTC in April 2004. (TN Code 3515-501 to 504)

•

The Ohio Bar- Association is working in conjunction with the Ohio
Banker's Association on the third draft of the Ohio UTC. (This draft is
available online at http://osba.ohiobar.org/docushare/dsweb/Get/
Document-19245/0UTC +Feb05+ Redlined.doc. OUTC will be located
in a new title, perhaps title 58 of the Ohio Revised Code).

•

Kentucky has not adopted the UTC at this time.

B.

Historically, trusts were classified by categories ranging from "support trusts" on one
extreme to "discretionary trusts to a subject to a standard" and "nonsupport
supplemental needs trust" in the middle and "purely discretionary trusts" on the other
extreme. These classifications are the source of much of the litigation about the
availability of trust assets. Critics fear that the elimination of the distinction between
the three different classes of discretionary trusts in UTC Section 504 will have an
adverse impact on discretionary special needs trusts.

C.

UTC Section 504(a) states, "whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a
creditor of a beneficiary may not compel a distribution that is subject to the trustees
discretion, even if: 1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of
distribution or 2) the trustee has abused the discretion." Section 504(b) states, "This
section does not limit the right of a beneficiary to maintain a judicial proceeding
against a trustee for an abuse of discretion or failure to comply wit a standard for
distribution."

D. Critics of the UTC 5 are concerned that elimination of the support/discretionary
distinction in the creditors' right context will bleed over into the rights and duties of
beneficiaries and trustees regarding distributions, making purely discretionary trusts
for disabled individual vulnerable to claims by the state that the trust assets are
"available," causing ineligibility for Medicaid. They are also concerned about the
UTC's good faith standard for the trustee's exercise of discretion, regardless of the use
of such terms as "absolute" or "uncontrolled" in describing the trustee's discretion.
There is fear that this will increase the beneficiary's ability to compel distributions,
also giving the state agency that administers the Medicaid reason to count the trust as
Merric and Oshins, "Effect of the UTe on Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts, Estate Planning (Aug.,
Sept. and Oct. 2004); Merric and Stein, "A Threat to all SNTs," Trusts & Estates, Nov. 2004.
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available. Finally, there is concern that the UTC permits judges to terminate special
needs trusts on the basis that they are against public policy. The most recent draft of
the Ohio UTC deleted this provision, but the Tennessee statute did not. TN Code 3515-410.

IX.

E.

Defender of the UTC 6 claim that the UTC will not negatively affect self-settled or
third-party settled supplemental needs trusts. They claim that by adopting the rule that
prohibits creditors from forcing trustees to exercise discretion, whether or not
expressed in the form of a standard, the UTC will actually clarify and improve the
creditor protection afforded by properly drafted third-party SNTs. This author worries
that the defenders are missing the point -- prohibiting the creditor from reaching the
trust assets is only half the battle. Medicaid administrators don't need to reach the
trust assets to ruin the effectiveness of the trust. They only need to successfully claim
that the beneficiary can reach the trust assets to deny eligibility.

F.

In Ohio, the current draft substantially rewrote the creditor's rights provisions to codify
the Kreitzer case by adding provisions to UTC Section 504 making it clear that the
state may compel a discretionary distribution to reimburse it for care provided to a
beneficiary, but only if the trust includes a support standard and does not contain a
spendthrift clause. The general rule that you should always include a spendthrift
provision and never include a support standard is reinforced by this position.

PLANNING STRATEGIES
A. Consider "stacking" a discretionary Trust on top of a "safe harbor" trust or a simple
trust for the benefit of the disabled person. In other words, the pure discretionary trust
would be set up to pay income and/or principals to a "Federal Medicaid Payback Trust"
(42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A), a "State Medicaid Payback Trust" (OHIO ANN. §
1339.51) or a simple trust that serves as a "pass through" for distributions to the
disabled person. The theory here is that when the disabled person applies for Medicaid
benefits, he/she is not required to disclose the pure discretionary trust because he/she is
not listed as a beneficiary of that trust - he/she is only a beneficiary of the "safe harbor"
trust or "pass through" trust. In addition, the larger discretionary trust can keep the
exempt trust funded at a low level to minimize payback at the death of the beneficiary.
B. Build flexibility into the documents. Include language which allows the trustee to
amend the trust if the rules change, and allow the trustee to pay over the trust assets to
another trust which has been established for the same beneficiary.
C. In cases where the trust is irrevocable and funded, and has been found to be an
available resource for a beneficiary receiving or in need of benefits, consider utilizing

6

Walsh, Davis, Kent & Newman, "What is the Status of Creditors Under the Uniform Trust Code?," Estate

Planning, Feb. 2005.
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one of the safe harbor trusts discussed above as an alternative to hold the funds.
Establish a separate exempt trust and transfer the existing trust assets to the exempt
trust. If the trustee has broad discretion to distribute principal, the trust assets can
simply be distributed to the beneficiary, who can then transfer the assets to the exempt
trust. If the trustee does not have broad discretion, a court order is generally needed.

D. Strongly consider using a combination of all the options, including partial
disinheritance. You might give a part of the disabled child's share of the parent's estate
to a non-disabled child to hold for the disabled child's benefit and place the remaining
funds in a purely discretionary trust with multiple beneficiaries, including the disabled
child's safe harbor special needs trust.

x.

TAX ISSUES FOR SPECIAL NEEDS TRUSTS
A. The special needs trust requires a separate tax ID number.
B. Estate taxes - the assets in the special needs trust (after repayment to ODHS) are
generally in~luded in the beneficiary's estate under Internal Revenue Code §2036. We
have incorporated credit shelter trusts in a special needs trust to minimize estate taxes
upon the death of the spouse.
C. Income taxation of the trust - the special needs trust is often considered a grantor trust
for income tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 83-25, 1938-1 C.B. 116, Internal Revenue Code §§
673-677. This means that the trust's income, deductions, credits, etc. are allowable to
the grantor in calculating his or her income tax. Grantor trust treatment provides more
favorable tax rates.
D. If election is made to treat the trust as a complex trust, new IRS regulations allow the
trust a $2,900 exemption (rather than the $100 exemption generally allowed a complex
trust) if AGI is equal or less than $137,300 (2002). Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief
Act of2001, Section 642(b)(2)(C).
E.

Distinguish between taxable income and income for Medicaid eligibility purposes
1. Hold all assets in trusts name, under trust EIN
2. Document what every expenditure is used for
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XI.

TRUST ADMINISTRATION
A. Even an exempt trust can cause ineligibility for Medicaid, food stamps, HUD rent
subsidy and SSI if improperly administered.
B. The trustee must know which benefits the beneficiary is receIvIng, and clearly
understand the resource and income requirements for those benefits. It is much easier
to hire a corporate trustee if you delegate all decisions regarding distributions to an
individual serving as the advocate for the beneficiary.

c. Trust assets should be used only to supplement benefits.
D. If the beneficiary is receiving SSI or is on Medicaid, the trust should not be used to
provide food, clothing or shelter without a careful analysis, as this may constitute
deemed income to the beneficiary. The rules state that the presumed maximum value
(PMV) rule applies to these payments - the income attributed to the person will be a
maximum of 1/3 of the SSI benefit rate plus $20 ($201.67), even if the actual amount is
larger.
E.

Payments should be made from the trust directly to the providers of services and goods
rather than to the disabled individual.
1. No cash to beneficiary
2. No cash equivalents

F.

Probate court supervision of court approved SNTs varies widely. Although the
majority treat the SNT the same as a guardianship, requiring an inventory, authority to
expend, bond, and accountings, some follow the requirements for testamentary trusts,
requiring inventory and accountings, but no prior court approval of expenditures.
Some courts do not retain continuing jurisdiction over the trust.

G.

All trust records may be reviewed by the Department of Job and Family Services
(DJFS) at the beneficiary's annual redetermination to ensure that expenditures have
been for the benefit of the beneficiary and have been for appropriate goods or services.
Good record-keeping and documentation is critical.

H.

Inform the county DJFS office of plans to make major or questionable distributions.
Write a letter stating what you intend to do, why it is acceptable under the regulations,
and ask for a response to let you know if they agree or disagree.

F.

Housing Issues - SSI released POMS SI 01120.200 F7 in August 1999 regarding
purchase of a home by a trust. This section should be considered carefully prior to

POMS is available online at http//policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsfl.
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purchase of a home, to determine the impact on SSI and Medicaid eligibility. The
section provides:
1. If the home is held by the trust as a residence for the beneficiary, the house is not a
resource to the beneficiary whether or not the beneficiary resided in the home.
2. If residing in the home owned by the trust, the beneficiary would be considered to
be living in his or her own home. The beneficiary would not be considered as
receiving in-kind support and maintenance (ISM), except in the month of
purchase. If the trust pays a mortgage, the monthly payment of the mortgage
would be considered ISM, however, to be valued at no more than the PMV.
3. If the trust pays other shelter or household operating expenses such as utilities,
insurance or real estate taxes (see SI 00835.465D), these would be ISM to the
beneficiary.
4. If the trust makes capital expenditures for the home, (improvements or
renovations which increase the value of the home) these are not ISM.
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Tax Payment Provisions and Equitable Apportionment
Jeffrey N. Pennell
I.

Introduction
A. Scope Of This Outline
1.

2.

This outline considers apportionment of the federal and state wealth transfer tax
burden, including a discussion of:
a.

why the topic is relevant and timely,

b.

the present state of the law if an estate plan is silent regarding apportionment
of the tax burden, and

c.

why and how that state law burden ought to be changed in well crafted estate
plans.

This outline will not consider questions of how to pay the tax or when it is payable,
except as those topics relate to the question of who pays and from what source.

B. Importance Of This Topic
1.

When the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, 8A U.L.A. 331 (1993), was
originally promulgated, two pre-eminent scholars of this topic stated:

The classic prank of out fumbling a friend for the restaurant check has a grim counterpart
in the [apportionment] of state and federal death taxes ... Many testators unwittingly
[provide] for the members of their immediate family by leaving thep1 their residuary
estates. As a consequence, the burden of the unforeseen taxes often [falls] upon the ...
members nearest to the decedent.
Scoles & Stephens, The Proposed Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, 43
Minn. L. Rev. 907 at 907 and 915 (1959).
2.

As a glance at the articles listed in the Selected Bibliography shows, interest in
this topic is cyclical, probably spurred by periodic tax law changes (and, perhaps,
because the lessons to be learned are forgotten over the course of time). This is a
planning issue that seems to get overlooked in vast numbers of plans.

3.

The topic remains timely because of inattention to tax law changes.
a.

Consider the following fact situation, taken from Collier v. First Nat'l Bank,
417 S.E. 2d 653 (Ga. 1992): The decedent created a revocable inter vivos
trust and, because probate in Georgia is not cumbersome and the decedent
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wanted certain income tax advantages that were available to probate estates
but not to trusts that served as will substitutes, provided that the trust would
pour back into the estate at death and be distributed from the estate to the
intended remainder beneficiaries. The decedent's probate estate benefited
children by a second marriage; the trust remainder went to children of a first
marriage, and the trust corpus was monies inherited by the decedent from
that first spouse.
(1) The problem in Collier arose because the decedent's will had a
traditional burden on the residue tax payment provision that waived all
rights of reimbursement, in a state that does not require apportionment
of the tax liability. The trust corpus was includible in the decedent's
gross estate and passed to the children by the first marriage under a
specific bequest, leaving the residue of the decedent's probate estate to
pay the taxes thereon.
(2) The children of decedent's second marriage, as residuary beneficiaries
of the estate, claimed they were entitled to reimbursement for those
taxes, notwithstanding the tax payment provision that purported to
waive all rights of reimbursement, on the grounds that §2207B was
applicable and its provisions cannot be waived without making specific
reference thereto, which was lacking in this case.
(3) So what did the children of the first marriage argue? Here's a clue: the
Supreme Court of Georgia "resolved" the dispute by saying:
[T]he [parties] argue that the trust assets are includable in the decedent's gross estate ...
under different sections of the Internal Revenue Code, each with different estate tax
consequences.
The question of whether the transfer ~f these assets from the decedent . . . casts tax
liability on the estate or upon the trust must be answered under the Internal Revenue
Code. As such, it is beyond the jurisdiction of this court.
417 S.E.2d at 655. In other words: the Georgia Supremes don't do taxes!
(4) There appears to be no answer to the question whether inclusion of the
trust assets was properly under §2033, §2036, or §2038 and,
correspondingly, whether §2207B was applicable in the first instance.
More importantly, §2207B was not enacted when the trust and will were
drafted.
b.

Another primary tax provision that generates tax payment problems is the
unlimited marital deduction.
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(1) It is common to avoid pa:yment offederal (and most states') wealth
transfer taxes on the death of the first spouse to die.
(2) This marital planning correspondingly shifts the tax burden to the estate
of the surviving spouse, with a concomitant risk of bankrupting the
spouse's estate if the source for payment of the tax is not properly
specified or considered.
(3) At the same time, an increase in the incidence of second marriages
requires a reappraisal of
(a) the appropriate size of a bequest to a surviving spouse if there are
children by a prior marriage or if the decedent does not want to
make the children wait until the survivor's death to receive all of
their inheritance, and
(b) the source for payment of taxes (which inevitably will reduce the
share left to either object of the client's bounty) attributable to a
nonmarital disposition that exceeds the amount sheltered by the
unified credit.
(4) In conjunction with postmortem planning involving the marital
deduction, it is necessary to consider the source for payment of taxes
caused by the
(a) surviving spouse's partial disclaimer of a marital deduction bequest,
or
(b) personal representative's decision to make only a partial election
under §2056(b) ( 7 ) . '
(5) Adoption in 1988 of §2056(d) - disallowing the marital deduction if
the decedent's surviving spouse is not a United States citizen, unless a
Qualified Domestic Trust is used - further illustrates the importance of
tax payment planning in conjunction with marital deduction planning.
c.

Adding further marital deduction related complications are the spousal
annuity requirements of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA'84) under
§401(a)(11).
(1) If the nonparticipant spouse does not consent and the participant dies
first, with a disposition that does not conform to the spousal annuity
requirements, the nonparticipant spouse makes a gift if no objection is
made thereto (with potential §2036(a)(1) exposure when the spouse
subsequently dies, if the nonparticipant spouse is a beneficiary ofthat
nonconforming beneficiary designation). There may be no provision
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that would permit the nonparticipant spouse to apportion taxes to the
plan, there being no applicable gift tax apportionment rule to mirror the
estate tax rules discussed below. As a consequence, the nonparticipant
spouse may incur and must pay the tax, which may not be feasible.
(2) If the nonparticipant spouse dies first, it may be the wealth transfer tax
result (but we just don't know) that the nonparticipant spouse is deemed
to be the owner of a portion of the benefit, causing inclusion in the
nonparticipant spouse's estate. However, notwithstanding concerns that
no marital deduction is available to the nonparticipant spouse's estate
(because the participant spouse may subsequently remarry and then die
prior to full withdrawal of the account, in which case the spousal
annuity rules may have renewed application, denying control over the
benefit to the participant). Technical Advice Memorandum 8943006
held what §2056(b)(7)(C) now expressly confirms in most cases, that a
nonparticipant spouse's community property interest in a qualified plan
is deemed to pass to the surviving, participant spouse and to qualify for
the marital deduction.
4.

A further reason why tax apportionment is important is the amount and form of
nonprobate property includible in determining the tax burden imposed on a
typical decedent's estate.
a.

For example, repeal in 1984 of the remaining $100,000 exemption under
§§2039(c) and 2039(e) has made planning for tax payment with respect to
employee benefits a severe problem, particularly because many participants
specify that any death benefits under the plan shall pass other than through
the participant's probate estate.

b.

Another example is §2044, requiring inclusion of qualIfied terminable
interest property in the e~..tate of a surviving spouse, notwithstanding the
spouse has no control over that property at death.

c.

An even more dramatic example is Chapter 14, which may require inclusion
of property in the estate of a decedent who has no control over it at death
(e.g., under the "suspense account" rules of §2701(d) or subject to §2703
because a buy-sell agreement was not effective for estate tax valuation
purposes).

d.

Similarly, inclusion of assets under §§2035 through 2042 continues to raise
the issue of how taxes will be paid on includible assets passing outside a
decedent's probate estate. This would be exacerbated by proposals to alter
§2042 and has been intensified by gaming with §2702(a)(3)(A)(ii)authorized personal residence GRITs and other life estate and remainder
interest planning.
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5.

6.

In addition to traditional estate tax payment concerns, new taxes always present
problems for estate planning purposes.
a.

A good example was the 1986 version of the generation-skipping transfer
tax and its tax payment complexities.

b.

Introduced in Congress in 1990 was H.R. 5501, an Appreciation Estate Tax
taxing capital gains at death that, ifultimately adopted, would substantially
increase the tax payment problems of many estates. A carryover basis
alternative would merely defer the problem, not eliminate it.

c.

Both the estimated income tax payment obligations (now imposed on all
private trusts, and on estates after their second tax year) and the Alternative
Minimum Tax (as now applied to fiduciary entities) will increase the income
tax problems of estate administration, in addition to the traditional wealth
transfer tax problems that must be considered in drafting.

Finally, the area is important because of the potential liability that may be visited
upon a personal representative resulting from failure to consider beneficiaries of
nonprobate property who may be liable for contribution to the payment of wealth
transfer taxes.
a.

Liability may exist in terms of exposure to beneficiaries of the probate estate
for failure to collect amounts that should have been recovered from
nonprobate takers.

b.

Liability also may exist in terms of exposure to nonprobate takers for
improperly failing to join them when petitioning for an order directing
apportionment of the tax burden and for closing the estate without their
consent, approval, or knowledge. See In re Estate of Whitaker, 538 N.E.2d
174 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (fiduciary personally liable for misapportioning
estate tax burden). See also Estate ofRosta, 444 N.E. 2d. 704 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982) (because other nonprobate beneficiaries were represented, however,
doctrine of virtual representation was deemed to apply with respect to
nonprobate beneficiaries not made parties to court actions affecting
apportionment of taxes); and cf Estate ofLyons, 425 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1981) (estate beneficiaries successfully challenged personal
representative's apportionment of tax burden, which was deemed improper,
notwithstanding that it was based on federal estate tax values of assets
received); In re Estate of Guattery, 656 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1997) (beneficiary of
Totten trust account not entitled under state law to accountings but was
entitled to a copy of the federal and state estate tax returns with which to
audit executor's performance as it affected those trusts' estate tax liability).
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7 . "This is an area in which costly litigation and costly surprises are nearly always
possible." Scoles, Estate Tax Apportionment in the Multi-State Estate. 5 U.
MlAMIINST. EST. PLAN. ~700 at 7-28 (1971).

a. A nearly perfect illustration of this is In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771
(Mont. 1999), finding that the decedent left a valid holograph bequeathing
property in Montana to a beneficiary about which the estate planner (indeed,
the family) didn't know existed. After losing the battle over the holograph,
the Wall Street firm that drafted the primary estate plan had to deal with the
fallout consequences of a burden on the residue tax payment provision that
wiped out the credit shelter portion of the estate and impose taxes from the
Montana bequest on the marital bequest, which eroded the marital deduction
and generated more tax that also was paid from the marital bequest and
further generated taxes in a circular whirlpool calculation, all without
apportionlnent, according to the final chapter in 68 P.3d 662 (Mont. 2003).

b. In another case it might be an insurance policy payable to comply with some
unrevealed promise or obligation (such as to support a nonmarital child or
part of a business deal), property discovered in a safety deposit box with a
handwritten note constituting a valid disposition to (or confirming a joint
tenancy with) a third party, or an asset transferred inter vivos and includible
in the gross estate, all in ways that increase the gross estate for tax purposes
but, because of the beneficiary, cannot qualify for the marital deduction. The
point is that there are significant unexpected consequences of placing the
burden of tax payment on the residue of an estate without knowing all the
facts (indeed, without ever being able to know all the facts).
II

Summary of Rules Regarding Paylnent
A. Primary obligation to pay.
1.

The initial obligation to pay the entire federal estate tax imposed on a decedent's
gross estate (whether probate or nonprobate property) rests on the decedent's
personal representative, regardless of the fact that certain assets constituting the
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes may not be in the possession or
control of that fiduciary.

2.

Under §2002, "[t]the tax imposed by this chapter shall be paid by the executor,"
and §2203 defines "executor" to mean "the executor or administrator of the
decedent . . . ."

3.

So extensive is this primary obligation that, ifany portion of the tax is paid by
the recipient of nonprobate property included in the gross estate, that payor is
entitled to reilnbursement from the personal representative.
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a.

A recipient other than the personal representative might be compelled to pay a
portion ofthe estate tax, equal to the value ofproperty actually received by that
person, ifthe estate tax othelWise is not paid when due (as discussed below).

b.

Under §2205:

If the tax or any part thereof is paid by, or collected out ot: that part of the estate passing
to or in the possession of any person other than the executor in his capacity as such, such
person shall be entitled to reimbursement out of any part of the estate still undistributed
or by a just and equitable contribution by the persons whose interest in the estate of the
decedent would have been reduced if the tax had been paid before the distribution ofthe
estate or whose interest is subject to equal or prior liability for the payment of taxes,
debts or other charges against the estate, it being the purpose and intent ofthis chapter
that so far as is practicable and unless otherwise directed by the Will ofthe decedent the
tax shall be paid out ofthe estate before its distribution. (Emphasis added)
c.

4.

By virtue of the definition of "executor" in §2203, only "if there is no
executor or administrator appointed, qualified, and acting [does] any [other]
person in actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent"
become initially liable for payment of the tax. Thus, the person paying the
tax is given the right to reimbursement from the personal representative.

Time of Payment. It is not the purpose of this outline to discuss the time for
payment of taxes. Nevertheless, the time of payment is important to the question
of who must pay the tax because, if the tax is not paid when due, liability for
payment of the tax may extend to each transferee or holder of property included
in the gross estate, with personal transferee liability attaching to the extent of the
lesser of the total tax that is due or the value of the property received or held by
the transferee. Thus:
a.

Payment of the tax is du~tat the time the return is required to be filed, unless
an extension of the time for payment is secured (note that an extension of the
time for filing the return does not constitute an extension of the time for
payment of the tax). Treas. Reg. §20.6151-1(a).

b.

If the personal representative does not pay the tax when due, §2002 imposes
personal liability on that fiduciary for the amount of the tax, effected through
a lien under §6321 (based on 31 U.S.C. §192, which imposes personal
liability on anyone who distributes estate property prior to satisfaction of all
indebtedness to the United States). See Hochberg & Silbergleit, Recent cases
narrow scope ofexecutor's personal liability for estate taxes, 7 EST. PLAN. 2
(1980); Casey, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE §§12.51-12.63 (rev. ed. 1977); and
Annot., Construction and Effect of31 USC section 192 Imposing Personal
Liability on Fiduciary For Paying Debts Due by Person or Estate For Whom
He Acts Before Paying Debts Due the United States, 41 A.L.R.2d 446
(1955).
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5.

c.

Transferee liability is thus in addition to the liability that normally attaches
to the personal representative and is dictated by §§6324(a)(2) (lien) and
6901(a)(I) and (h) (transferee liability); in addition, the lien attaches to any
proceeds from the sale of assets included in the estate, under §6324(a)(2)
and Treas. Reg. §301.6324-1(a)(2)(iii).

d.

In either case, personal liability is discharged under §2204(a) (discharge of
personal representative), 2204(b) (discharge of fiduciary other than personal
representative), or 6325(c) (discharge of transferee liability) once.the tax is
paid (or payment is adequately secured).

Several extensions of time may defer liability for estate tax payment:
a.

Under §6161(a)(2), an extension of up to 10 years may be granted in the
discretion of the Secretary for "reasonable cause," and of up to 12 additional
months for any installment under §6166.

b.

Qualifying under Treas. Reg. §1.6161-1(a)(I) Examples 1-4 as "reasonable
cause" for deferral would be:
(1) an inability to marshall liquid assets because they are located in other
jurisdictions or because litigation is required to collect them;
(2) an inability to borrow on better than disfavorable terms (in relation to
returns otherwise available to the estate on its investments); and
(3) an insufficiency of funds to maintain the decedent's family, pay claims
against the estate, and pay the estate tax, coupled with an inability to
I
borrow at prevailing market rates.
._'

c.

In addition, the Code contains two automatic extensions of the time for
payment:
(I) Section 6163 permits extension of that portion of the estate tax
attributable to inclusion in a decedent's gross estate of either a reversion
or a remainder.
(a) Under this extension provision, the tax need not be paid until six
months after termination of all preceding interests in the property,
and for reasonable cause may be extended for an added three years,
presumably under the same standards applied for extensions for
reasonable cause under §6161. See Joint Comm. on Tax'n, General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R. Rep. No. 1380,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 546, reprinted at 1976-2 C.B. 558.
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(b) Apparently this extension is not available for taxes attributable to
an executory interest (e.g., "to A, but if (s)he remarries, to B;" B's
interest is a shifting executory interest).
i)

Presumably, this is because the shifting executory interest
may never become possessory.

ii)

If deferral were permitted until termination of all preceding
interests, the tax payment obligation could be extinguished
entirely.

iii)

Thus, it makes sense that §6163 does not apply to such an
interest.

(c) Once the tax is payable, questions of apportionment to the subject
property may arise, long after death of the subject decedent and
with §2015 credit allocation issues that may need resolution.
(2) The second automatic extension of time for payment is that granted
under §6166 for the portion of tax attributable to inclusion of the value
of a closely held business in decedent's gross estate, permitting payment
in as many as ten equal annual installments, with the first required no
sooner than five years after the time otherwise specified for payment.
(a) Section 6166 is a lengthy subject in its own right, well beyond the
purview of this outline and adequately covered in other excellent
materials.
(b) See, e.g., Metz v. United states, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~60,071
(10th Cir. 1991) (recipient of property pursua~t to personal-services
contract incurre.d transferee liability when estate was unable to
service its §6166 installment payments on corporate· stock also
included in the decedent's estate).
d.

Problematical about all these deferrals is that each requires the taxpayer to
pay interest on the taxes deferred; interest is computed under §6621 at the
same rate as that charged on any underpayment, with the exception of any
tax deferred under §6166 on the first $1.1 million (inflation indexed) of
includible property in excess of the applicable exclusion amount sheltered by
the unified credit. See §§6601(a), (b)(I), 6166(f), and Treas. Reg.
§§20.6161-1(c)(2), 20.6161-2(e), 20.6163-1(d), and 20.6166-1(£). With
respect to §6166 deferral, §6601G)(I)(A) gives a special 2% rate of interest
for the tax on that first $1.1 million of includible value and §6601G)(I)(B)
reduces the interest on the balance of the deferred tax to 45% of the
otherwise applicable rate on any balance exceeding that 2% portion.
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e.

While personal liability of the fiduciary for payment of the deferred tax
otherwise is mandated under §6321, it may be supplanted by the posting ofa
bond under §§2204 and 6165.
(1) Often, however, the requirements for the bond are so onerous that this
alternative seems unattractive.
(2) See Treas. Reg. §§20.2204-1(b) and 20.6165-1(a), calling for bonds not
in excess of twice the tax deferred, and §§2204(c) and 6324A, which
provide for a lien with respect to taxes payable in installments under
§6166.
(3) Thus, the personal representative may have continuing significant
liability if deferral is selected, making this a troubling prospect for many
estates.

B. Apportionment options.
1.

Section 2205 represents Congressional policy that the estate tax should be a
burden on the estate as a whole, not on the individual beneficiaries of the estate
as is the case with most state wealth transfer taxes.
a.

Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942), held that state law or the terms of
the decedent's estate plan may alter this apportionment of the federal estate
tax in any manner.

b.

Thus, the tax burden may be apportioned, so that the effect of credits,
deductions, and inclusion of assets affects or benefits those beneficiaries
who receive assets, generate credits or deductions, and so forth.
I

2.

With this freedom to apportiqp, up to six major apportionment decisions must be
made, several with additional subissues that may be addressed under state law.
a.

Inside Apportionment deals with the question whether taxes ought to be
borne by all classes of dispositions within (inside) a probate estate.
(1) The firmly established common law rule is that taxes in the probate
estate are a "burden on the residue," meaning that all taxes are paid out
of the residuary estate before any taxes are allocated to or payable from
other dispositions, such as general, demonstrative, or specific
dispositions under a will. See, generally, Annot., Ultimate Burden of
Estate Tax in Absence ofStatute, Will or Other Provision, 68 A.L.R.3d
714 (1976).
(2) To the extent inside apportionment is dictated, every taker under a will
bears a proportionate share of the taxes payable, regardless of the
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priority or class of disposition involved, and regardless of whether the
subject property is realty or personalty.
(3) At one time the common law distinguished between personalty and
realty within any class of disposition, favoring the realty by specifying
that the personalty should be used first to pay debts, expenses, and
taxes. Thus, for example, even in a burden on the residue
apportionment, the takers of residuary personalty would be disappointed
prior to the takers of residuary realty. This antiquated system appears to
have been rejected everywhere, notwithstanding that it was consistent
with the common law abatement rules that favored realty.
(4) This rule was consistent with the common law abatement rules that
favored realty and called for diminution of the residue before using
property earmarked for general dispositions and before exhausting
assets specifically bequeathed or devised.
b.

Outside Apportionment. Outside apportionment stands in juxtaposition to
inside apportionment in testate and intestate estates alike, involving the issue
whether taxes on the total taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes ought
to be apportioned among the takers of probate assets (either with or without
inside apportionment) and the recipients of includible nonprobate assets.
(1) Thus, if property is includible in the gross estate of a decedent under
any of the following sections, outside apportionment would dictate that
the recipient of the property pay that portion of the taxes imposed on the
total estate attributable to that inclusion (computed in one of several
methods discussed in more detail below). And the same state law rules
that govern outside apportionment of the federal e,state tax ought to
govern apportionment of any state estatetax equal to the §2011 state
death tax credit. See,.,e.g., In re Marital Deduction Trust under Will of
Adair, 695 A.2d 250 (N.J. 1997), dealing with the state pick up tax
attributable to a QTIP trust that was includible in the decedent's gross
estate, as to which state law apportionment rules were deemed to apply,
and cf Cleveland v. Compass Bank, 652 So. 2d 1134 (Ala. 1994), and
Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Staples, 461 S.E.2d 921 (N.C. Ct. App.
1995) (both involving federal estate tax attributable to inclusion of
QTIP property in the decedent's gross estate, which yielded a larger
state death tax credit that correspondingly increased the state pick up tax
equal to that credit, which the court did (not) apportion to the QTIP trust
along with the federal estate tax itself depending on whether state law
called for apportionment of the federal tax (Branch Banking) or
imposed the burden on the residue (Cleveland), absent an effective
provision in the decedent's estate plan):

G - 11

(a) To the extent not eliminated by changes to §2035, applicable to
property transferred within three years of the decedent's death for
less than full and adequate consideration and as to which inclusion
would have resulted under §§2036-2038 or §2042 had there been
no transfer or gift taxes paid with respect to property transferred
within three years of the decedent's death;
(b) under §2036(a)(1), property transferred for less than full and
adequate consideration as to which the decedent retained the right
to income or possession for life or a period not measurable without
reference to the decedent's death and that did not end before death;
(c) under §2037, property transferred for less than full and adequate
consideration while retaining a prohibited form of reversion;
(d) under §2036(a)(2) or §2038(a)(1), property transferred for less than
full and adequate consideration as to which the decedent retained a
prohibited degree of control over the enjoyment of income or
principal;
(e) under §2039, an annuity (whether payable as a death benefit under
an employee benefit plan or otherwise) to the extent the
chronological exemptions from repeal of the §2039(c) and (e)
exemptions do not apply;
(f) In a community property jurisdiction this §2039 exposure is all the
more significant if it is the nonparticipant spouse who dies first,
with a community property ownership interest that is includible but
not subject to the spouse's control or disposition and almost
certainly not in any distribution status; hopefully it qualifies
automatically uq,der §2056(b)(7)(C) for the estate tax marital
deduction, but this is not necessarily true;
(g) under §2040, property owned as a joint tenant with right of
survivorship or as a tenant by the entirety;
(h) under §2041, property over which the decedent possessed a general
power of appointment at death;
(i) under §2042, proceeds of insurance on the life of the decedent as to
which the decedent possessed incidents of ownership at any time
with three years of death (and, under various legislative proposals,
insurance on the decedent's life that is payable directly or indirectly
to or for the benefit of a third party);
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U) under §2044, qualified terminable interest property as to which the
decedent was the income beneficiary at death; or
(k) under §2701(d), potentially the tax incurred on a suspense account
would be paid by the recipient thereof; under §2703 the tax
attributable to a buy-sell agreement that failed to peg estate tax
value; and under §2704 the tax incurred with respect to a deemed
transfer.
(2) As illustrated below, it is with respect to outside apportionment that
most state apportionment statutes apply and as to which the limited
federal apportionment rules exist. However, apportionment to some of
the above described forms of nonprobate property is addressed far more
clearly and appropriately than it is with respect to other forms.
c.

Equitable apportionment involves the question whether dispositions that
generate a tax deduction should be freed from contribution toward payment
of the total taxes imposed on the estate. If equitable apportionment applies,
the deductible disposition alone benefits from the deduction, rather than the
deduction benefiting all beneficiaries of the estate.
(1) The most common example of this property passing to a surviving
spouse that qualifies for the marital deduction, in which case the
question can apply
(a) in an intestate estate in which the spouse takes a statutory share of
the estate,
(b) in a testate estate in which the spouse rejects the decedent's estate
plan in favor of a statutory forced heir share, I
(c) in a testate estate (or will substitute) involving apportionment as
between the spouse's bequest (whether as a part ofthe residue or
some other part of the total estate), and
(d) in any estate, to the extent a prenuptial agreement or §2053
deductible property settlement agreement creates a claim against
the estate (or a disposition under the will is in satisfaction of such a
contractual claim against the estate), with the issue being whether
distributions in satisfaction of the claim are subject to
apportionment of taxes.
(e) Also the source of equitable apportionment is the §2055 charitable
deduction and, although less obviously so, §§2032A(c)(5) and
2057(i)(3)(F) (prior to its repeal in 2004) pose similar issues
relating to the reduction in tax attributable to special use valuation
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or the family-owned business exclusion and the subsequent liability
for recapture tax under either.
d.

Apportionlnent of Rate Differentials. Closely related to equitable
apportionlnent is whether to pass along or apportion state wealth transfer tax
rate differentials based on each beneficiary's share of the estate (for
example, some states ilnpose a tax that favors more closely related
beneficiaries over strangers or distant relatives). In such a state the issue is
whether any apportionlnent should reflect these rate differentials.

e.

Apportionlnent of Credits. Similarly related is the question whether to
apportion the benefit of credits available to the estate that are connected with
separate identifiable properties passing to designated individuals. For
example:
(1) Subj ect to §§20 15 and 2016, if some property incurs more state death
tax or foreign death tax than others, the apportionment issue is whether
the beneficiaries thereof should receive the benefit of any §2014 credit,
respectively, attributable to the tax incurred on their bequests. Now that
§2011 has been replaced by the §2058 deduction a similar concept
should apply, with equitable apportionment of the benefit of that
deduction.
(2) The §2012 credit for gift taxes paid on pre-1977 transfers of property
subsequently included in the estate may be apportioned.
(3) The §2013 credit for previously taxed property may be apportioned, and
can be a source of real inequity ifnot considered properly. To illustrate:
(a) Assulne that the decedent was beneficiary ofla generation-skipping
trust created by a parent, with a §2041 general power of
appointment to 'avoid generation-skipping tax. Because the parent
and the decedent died within ten years of each other, a §2013credit
is available to the decedent's estate. If §2207 liability for the estate
tax attributable to the trust is imposed on the remainder
beneficiaries of the trust, they also should receive the benefit of that
credit, but they do not under most state laws.
(b)- The decedent could match the tax liability with the credit by
waiving the §2207 reimbursement entitlement or by apportioning
the credit. The issue is whether the decedent's estate can afford to
pay the §2041 taxes on the trust. And in a more sophisticated plan
in which the generation-skipping tax might be allowed to apply
instead of §2041, it would be unwise to have the two tax liabilities
payable by different sources, one by the decedent's estate and the
other by the trust.
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(4) Finally, the §2015 credit for deferred taxes attributable to future
interests may be apportioned to the takers of those interests.
f.

Apportionment to Temporal Interests. Related to the §2015 issue, a final
apportionment alternative relates to the proper method for apportioning taxes
attributable to property that is split into temporal interests, such as a life
estate, a term of years, or an annuity given to one individual and the
remainder or reversion given to another.

g.

Apportionment Among Multiple Entities. If several estate planning
documents (such as a will and an inter vivos funded trust or an irrevocable
unfunded insurance trust) are involved, these issues are compounded by the
need to decide how tax payment obligations should be imposed on the
multiple entities.
(1) For example, the tax payment provisions in each document could: .
(a) provide for payment of all taxes out of the probate estate (with or
without inside apportionment);
(b) provide for payment of all taxes from the trust corpus (similarly
with or without a form of inside apportionment among several
shares created thereunder);
(c) provide for a ratable apportionment of taxes between the several
entities (with or without apportionment under each as among the
respective shares thereunder);
(d) provide that the trust shall contribute to the payment of taxes only
to the extent the probate estate is insufficient to pay all the taxes
imposed on the 'gross estate (or vice versa, and again with questions
of apportionment under each disposition);
(e) provide that the trustee shall pay taxes only in the discretion of the
trustee (under established guidelines, and with or without
apportionment);
(f) provide that the trustee shall pay taxes to the extent the personal
representative of the decedent's estate certifies the need therefor
(again under guidelines and an apportionment regime that must be
specified); or
(g) simply permit the trustee to purchase assets from the estate to
provide needed liquidity.
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(2) Not incidentally, these decisions must take into consideration the
potential for conflicts of interest and the difficulty of exercising
discretion if conflicting beneficial interests and different fiduciaries are
involved.
h.

Decedent's Choice. With respect to all apportionment issues, it is relatively
clear that, should the decedent wish to do so,
(1) a testamentary disposition by clear provision may expressly specify the
property and the dispositions that will bear the tax burden, permitting
alteration of the customary burden on the residue rule;
(2) the decedent also, by a clear provision in a testamentary disposition,
may exonerate nonprobate property from any otherwise applicable state
law directive requiring outside apportionment; and
(3) although not nearly as clearly permissible, it is relatively well
established that the decedent may impose the burden for tax payment on
nonprobate assets through the use of a will provision, subject to certain
exceptions to be noted below in dealing with the proper method for
drafting such a provision. See generally Annot., Construction and Effect
of Will Provisions Expressly Relating to the Burden ofEstate or
Inheritance Taxes, 69 A.L.R. 3d 122 (1976).

3.

Factors to Consider. In advising a client as to the best apportionment approach, a
number of policies or considerations might be relevant, including:
a.

With respect to inside apportionment, does the client favor the particular
beneficiaries over the residuary takers?
(1) The common law abatement rules presume this to be the case, and
failure to permit inside apportionment is consistent therewith.
(2) In reality, often the particular beneficiaries fit into one of the following
categories:
(a) First is a marital deduction bequest that the client wants to
maximize, in most cases resulting in no tax at the client's deathso apportionment is a moot issue (even if it does not eliminate
taxes, however, protection of the deduction is served by equitable
apportionment).
(b) Second are those relatively minor dispositions (e.g., "$100 to my
brother Fred who said I wouldn't remember him in my will" or
"$10,000 to my loyal bartender who swore I wouldn't live this
long") that most individuals place in a separate article preceding the
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heart of the estate plan; with respect to these, the common law
abatement and apportionment rules are likely to be directly contrary
to the intent of the client in the sense that, if anyone should suffer
for insufficient assets in the estate, it should be these takers.
b.

With respect to outside apportionment, does the client wish to have the
probate estate pay taxes generated by property over which the client has no
control?
(1) This is particularly important with respect to §2044 qualified terminable
interest property, especially in the second marriage or related situations
in which the QTIP property passes to beneficiaries for whom the
surviving spouse has no affinity.
(2) It is conceivable that inclusion could result (under §§2036 through
2038, 270 1(d), and under §2042 if proposals that eliminate the ability to
remove insurance proceeds from the gross estate using an irrevocable
insurance trust ever are adopted) in the context of transfers over which
the client may have no meaningful control at death.
(3) Employee benefits that generate §2039 liability also could be beyond
effective control due to the §401(a)(11) spousal annuity rules or the plan
terms (especially if Death Benefit Only plan inclusion legislation or
reversal of Estate ofDiMarco v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 653 (1986),
occurs. See Estate of Levin v. Commissioner, 90 T.e. 723 (1988».

c.

With respect to the issue of equitable apportionment involving the marital
deduction (and, to a certain extent, involving the charitable deduction as
well):
(1) Should the

deductibl~

share bear no tax because it generated no tax?

(a) With an "optimum" or unlimited marital deduction, any normal
estate tax imposed on the estate would be generated by property
that did not qualify for the deduction.
(b) Most individuals embrace the notion that the marital deduction is
designed for the benefit of the surviving spouse and, therefore, that
the spouse ought to be the sole beneficiary of the deduction. A
similar argument could be made in favor of charity, perhaps with
even greater merit because it is unclear whether the marital
deduction was intended as a benefit solely for the spouse as
opposed to a benefit to the estate in general. For example:
i)

Section 2056(b)(4)(A) provides that "In determining for
purposes of subsection (a) the value of any interest in
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property passing to the surviving spouse for which a
deduction is allowed by this section - (A) there shall be
taken into account the effect which the.tax imposed by
section 2001, or any estate, succession, legacy, or inheritance
tax, has on the net value to the surviving spouse of such
interest . . . ."
ii)

This seems to indicate that Congress anticipated that taxes
might be paid out of the marital share, which may suggest
that Congress did not anticipate that the marital would be tax
free (although this may only indicate that Congress could not
predict whether state law would match the federal tax free
marital deduction).

iii)

Moreover, §2056 is available to the estate of any individual;
until the adoption of §2056(d), the status of the surviving
spouse was irrelevant, which also seems to indicate that the
spouse was not the focus of Congress' attention when the
marital deduction was first introduced to the Code. Not even
the adoption of §2056(d) indicates a shift in Congress' vision
of who is "entitled" to the benefit of the deduction in the tax
apportionment sense.

iv)

Contrariwise, however, the last sentences of §§2206 and 2207
(federal apportionment provisions that are discussed below)
appear to favor marital deduction dispositions by
apportioning taxes away from the marital:

Section 2206: In the case of such proceeds receivable by the surviving spouse of the
decedent for which a deduction is allowed under section 2056 (relating to marital
deduction [sic], this section shall not ~pply to such proceeds except as to the amount
thereof in excess of the aggregate amount of the marital deductions allowed under such
section.
Section 2207: In the case of such property received by the surviving spouse of the
decedent for which a deduction is allowed under section 2056 (relating to marital
deduction [sic], this section shall not apply to such property except as to the value thereof
reduced by an amount equal to the excess of the aggregate amount of the marital
deductions allowed under section 2056 over the amount of proceeds of insurance upon
the life ofthe decedent receivable by the surviving spouse for which proceeds a marital
deduction is allowed under such section.
v)

Authority supports each proposition: for examples of those
holding that the deduction is meant to benefit the .entire estate
and not just the surviving spouse, see Robinson v. United
States, 518 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Mosby's Estate.

G· 18

554 P.2d 1341 (Mont. 1976); and Estate ofMarans v.
Newland, 390 P.2d 443 (Mont. 1964).
vi)

With respect to the converse position, see Kahn, The Federal
Estate Tax Burden Borne By a Dissenting Widow, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 1499 (1966); and Note, Estate and Gift Tax: Federal
Estate Tax - Burden on a Marital Share. 33 OKLA. L. REv.
384 (1980).

(2) To the extent the purpose of the intestate or forced heir marital share is
to protect the surviving spouse, it can be argued that this protection
should be maximized by computing the marital share without
diminution by taxes.
(3) Because the original purpose of the marital deduction was to provide
equality between common law and community property spouses,
arguably at least a portion of the marital share should be computed
without reduction by taxes in a common law state (because a surviving
spouse takes half the community estate tax free in a community property
state).
(4) But perhaps the most persuasive argument in favor of equitable
apportionment is that, if the marital share bears a portion of the taxes
imposed on a decedent's estate (because equitable apportionment does
not apply), the deduction itselfwill be reduce under §2056(b)(4)(A).
Indeed, the marital deduction will be reduced by the full amount of tax
that could be paid, even if for some reason it is not. See Jeschke v.
United States, 59 A.F.T.R.2d ~148,886 (10th Cir. 1987); Adee Trust No.
1 v. United States, 52 A.F.T.R.2d ~148,598 (D. Kan. 1983); Estate of
Reno v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CclI) ~60,046 (4th Cir.
1990); Private Letter.,Rulings 8622022, 8517036, 8508022, and
8450018, and cf Pyne v. United States, 86-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
~13,677 (D. Me. 1986) (if equitable apportionment had not applied,
marital deduction would have been reduced).
(a) In some cases a reduction in the deduction correspondingly
increases taxes that further serve to reduce the size of the marital
share (because that share is a portion of the total estate available for
distribution), which further increases taxes that again reduce the
deduction, ad nauseam. See, e.g., Estate ofLewis v. Commissioner, /
69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2396 (1995) (tax burden imposed on residuary
estate, which would qualify for the marital deduction, coupled with
waiver of apportionment and reimbursement rights, caused loss of
deduction because tax on preresiduary bequests unexpectedly
exceeded unified credit; result was circular whirlpool reduction of
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deduction as more tax was produced by increasing loss of deduction
to pay increasing tax).
(b) Consider the following example illustrating the comparative
computations (using g~i rates and credits) ofa one-third forced
heir share or intestate entitlement of a surviving spouse in an estate
of $2.4 million:
1/3 of "Gross" Estate
(i.e. before taxes)

1/3 of "Net" Estate
(i.e. after taxes)

(c) The final result is: a net estate division produces a marital share
exactly half the size of the remaining residue, preserving the 1/3 x
2/3 division dictated by the marital entitlement provision, but the
method of computation generates a smaller marital deduction (by
$!j~j7~~47) and more taxes (by $~~14~I); curiously, the residue is
a~t~~iiy' better off (by $9~7QI) beca{ise of it.
(d) The issue whether the marital share should be a fraction of the net
estate (after taxes) or the gross estate (before taxes) is simply the
equitable apportionlnent issue working to protect the marital share
from bearing a portion of the taxes in the gross estate division but
not in the net estate computation. See In re Estate of Thompson,
512 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 1994) (net estate division required);
Technical Advige Memorandum 8640009 (gross estate division
adopted).
(e) To say that the issue is confused is an understatement; as an
illustration, consider the situation in Illinois, where it apparently
makes a difference whether the computation is to determine the
intestate entitlement of a surviving spouse as opposed to the
statutory force heir marital share of a spouse who is rejecting a
decedent's estate plan by electing against it. See Note, In re Estate
ofGowling and In re Estate ofGrant: The limits ofEquitable
Apportionment, 13 LOYOLAL.J. 309 (1982).
(f) Further, in considering the proper division involving an election
against the estate, a tax clause in the decedent's will is irrelevant
because, by virtue of the election, the surviving spouse is deemed to
reject any and all provisions in the will for the benefit of the spouse,
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including the tax clause (the so-called doctrine of "equitable
election"). See Merchants Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. United
States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1957); In re Estate of Thompson, 512
N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 1994); Annot., Surviving Spouse Taking Elective
Share as Chargeable With ~state or Inheritance Tax, 67 A.L.R.3d
199 at §5 (1975).
(g) Similar disputes arise in applying the concept of equitable
apportionment to the charitable deduction under §2055 and the
question whether division ought to be before or after taxes. See,
e.g., YMCA v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924). Under §2055(c), any tax
burden on a charitable bequest reduces the charitable deduction.

c. Federal Rules Applicable to Apportionment.
1.

Section 2205 establishes the general rule that distinguishes the federal estate tax
from an inheritance tax, specifying that

If the [federal estate] tax ... is paid by, or collected out ot: that part of the estate passing
to or in the possession of any person other than the executor ... such person shall be
entitled to reimbursement . . . it being the purpose and intent of this chapter that . . .
unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent the tax shall be paid out of the estate
before its distribution.
2.

This federal rule, calling for payment from the residue of the estate, applies only
if state law does not provide to the contrary or the decedent's will does not direct
otherwise, and is subject in all events to four federal statutory rules that permit
reimbursement for federal (but not any state) estate tax imposed on specific types
of nonprobate property.
I

3.

Reimbursement for Tax on Insurance Proceeds. Section 2206, added to the Code
in 1918 (the oldest such form of reimbursement provides that

[u]nless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross estate on which
tax has been paid consists of proceeds of policies of insurance on the life of the decedent
receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor, the executor shall be entitled to
recover from such beneficiary such portion of the total tax paid as the proceeds of such
policies bear to the taxable estate. If there is more than one such beneficiary, the executor
shall be entitled to recover from such beneficiaries in the same ratio. In the case of such
proceeds receivable by the surviving spouse of the decedent for which a deduction is
allowed under Section 2056 (relating to marital deduction) [sic], this section shall not
apply to such proceeds except as to the amount thereof in excess of the aggregate amount
of the marital deductions allowed under such section.
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a.

Established is a right of reimbursement for taxes paid by the estate, the
personal representative being entitled to collect from every beneficiary of
includible insurance proceeds the proportionate share of the total taxes paid
by the estate that is attributable to such insurance.

b.

As established by case law, this right of reimbursement is not applicable
with respect to annuities, even if underwritten by an insurance company. See
Annot., Construction and Application ofStatutes Apportioning or Prorating
Estate Taxes, 71 A.L.R.3d 247 at 302-303 (1976).

c.

In addition, by the greater weight of authority, reimbursement may not be
asserted against the insurer, even if the proceeds have not yet been
distributed to the designated beneficiary; most cases hold that the personal
representative must recover from the beneficiary. See Annot., Remedies and
Practice Under Estate Tax Apportionment Statutes, 71 A.L.R.3d 371 at 409410 (1976).

d.

Great care should be exercised to avoid waiver of this right (as authorized
under the introductory clause of §2206). In this regard, consider In re Estate
ofKapala, 402 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), in which the decedent
owned insurance on his life, payable to his partner to provide liquidity under
a buy-sell agreement when the decedent died.
(1) Section 2042 inclusion applied and the court found that §2206
reimbursement was not waived, notwithstanding the buy-sell agreement
providing that the surviving partner would receive all assets "free and
clear of all claims of every kind."
(2) The court determined that waiver of §2206 must appear in an instrument
with testamentary intent, which it found the buy-s~ll agreement to lack.
There may be precedential value in this element ofthe case for §2703
purposes.

e.

If §2042 were amended to include insurance not owned by the decedent and
over which the decedent possessed neither incidents of ownership nor
control, §2206 might be the only way to afford the taxes caused by inclusion
in some estates. Thus, even in planning under current law with respect to any
irrevocable insurance trust, the settlor-insured ought to either preserve §2206
or include a contingent tax clause in the trust, dictating (at the least) payment
of taxes to the extent the decedent-insured's estate is insufficient.

f

Also consider Estate ofBoyd v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1987), in
which the court found that the decedent's waiver ofthe §2206 reimbursement
right constituted a "bequest" from the decedent to the beneficiary ofthe
proceeds ofthe policy, which "bequest" that beneficiary could disclaim. In re
Estate ofFogelman, 3 P.3d 1172 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000), similarly treated a
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waiver ofthe §2206 right of reimbursement as a bequest, in that case that failed
because the estate was insolvent. In Boyd, the effect ofthe disclaimer was to pay
taxes from the proceeds (which were payable to a child) and preserve the
decedent's residue (which passed to the surviving spouse and qualified for the
marital deduction). A smaller marital deduction would have been available if
the decedent's waiver had not been "reversible" by the child's disclaimer.
4.

5.

Reimbursement for Tax on Power of Appointment Property. Added with the
power of appointment provisions in 1942 and employing virtually identical
language to §2206, §2207 grants an identical right of reimbursement for taxes
attributable to "property included in the gross estate under section 2041."
a.

The personal representative may recover from "the person receiving such
property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise or release of a power of
appointment."

b.

Waiver of this provision also is allowable under the authority of Boyd, just
as is waiver of the §2206 right of reimbursement. See Private Letter Ruling
200127007 (waiver of the §2207A right of reimbursement is an interest in
property that may be disclaimed).

Reimbursement for Tax on oTIP Property. Added in 1981 with adoption of
§2044 and' the §2056(b)(7) qualified terminable interest property trust. Section
2207A grants a significantly different right of reimbursement.
a.

Applicable to property "which is includible in the gross estate by reason of
section 2044 (relating to certain property for which marital deduction [sic]
was previously allowed)," this right of reimbursement differs because it is an
incremental rather than a proportionate entitlement.
(1) Sections 2206 and 2207 apply to bottom line taxes imposed on the
estate with respect to'those portions causing inclusion under §§2042 and
2041, respectively (and after considering the marital deduction),
effectively prorating all deductions and credits proportionately among
all takers.
(2) Section 2207A permits recovery of the amount by which taxes were
increased by inclusion of §2044 property, meaning the incremental
taxes without benefit of deductions or credits available to the estate as a
whole.
(3) The difference between these reimbursement provisions is illustrated in
Sarosdy v. Johnson, 804 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994), in which a
general power of appointment versus a QTIP marital trust was involved,
the estate was entitled to only pro rata reimbursement under §2207
rather than incremental reimbursement under §2077A, meaning that
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estate tax attributable to inclusion of the marital trust was payable in
part from the decedent's own property, which would have passed totally
free of tax under the decedent's unified credit had the marital trust not
been includible.
(4) Thus, if the spouses agreed that the survivor would have the use of the
decedent's wealth for the survivor's overlife, but that their respective
shares would pass at the survivor's death to their respective
beneficiaries, §2207A disrupts the intended equity of that plan by
imposing a greater than pro rata share of the survivor's taxes on the
decedent's QTIP property. Only if the survivor is willing to alter the
incremental dictate of §2207A by a provision in the survivor's will
would this be avoided, and the decedent cannot guarantee that the
survivor will do so.
(5) It may be that no modification is appropriate, however, because the
inequity is balanced by the fact that the surviving spouse's unified credit
reduces that tax imposed on all the beneficiaries interested in the
surviving spouse's estate tax computation, including whose who take
the QTIP trust remainder as well as the survivor's other beneficiaries,
while the decedent's unified credit benefited the beneficiaries of the
decedent's bypass trust entirely.
b.

The §2207A right of reimbursement extends to gift taxes caused under
§2519 by relinquishment of any portion of a qualified termipable interest; no
similar right exists under either of the §2206 or §2207 reimbursement
provisions if gift taxes are incurred on insurance proceeds or power of
appointment property.
I

(1) Section §2207A does not, however, allow recovery of gift taxes
incurred under §2511 as, for example, if the beneficiary ofa QTIP trust
assigned a portion of the right to receive income and incurred gift tax on
both the §2511'gift of income and the §2519 imputed transfer of the
remainder interest in the entire QTIP trust.
(2) In addition, §2207A does not grant any right inter vivos to recover the
benefit of any unified credit "used" on such a lifetime transfer under
either §2511 or §2519. The effect is to "use" the unified credit on the
§2511 transfer first, then on the §2519 transfer.
c.

Section 2207A(d) specifies that interest and penalties attributable to §2204
property are subject to the incremental right of reimbursement. This also has
no counterpart in §§2206 and 2207.

d.

According to Treas. Reg. §20.2207A-l(a)(2), failure to assert the right of
reimbursement constitutes a gift from the beneficiaries of the spouse's estate

G - 24

to the beneficiaries of the QTIP property who benefit from that failure,
although Treas. Reg. §20.2207 A-1(a)(3) states that this can be avoided to the
extent the surviving spouse's will expressly waives the right of
reimbursement or the beneficiaries cannot otherwise compel recovery.
e.

Quaere what happens if the decedent's personal representative neither
reports the QTIP trust nor asserts the §2207A right of reimbursement: do the
beneficiaries of the surviving spouse's estate make a gift, and how would
anyone know?

f.

These dangers Inight encourage waiver of the right of reimbursement, but
the magnitude of §2044 inclusion in some estates causes the inability to
assert the right of reimbursement to have calamitous consequences, as the
following exalTIple indicates:
(1) Decedent was the beneficiary ofa QTIP trust that passed to the
surviving children of the settlor (who was Decedent's second spouse);
those children were not Decedent's children.
(2) Decedent, who had been married several times, created a QTIP trust for
Decedent's surviving (third) spouse, and created a bypass trust to
benefit Decedent's children from Decedent's first marriage.

(3) Inclusion of the second spouse's QTIP in Decedent's estate generated
sufficient taxes to wipe out Decedent's bypass trust and exhaust a
portion of the Decedent's marital deduction trust (created for
Decedent's surviving (third) spouse). Obviously §2207A should have
been preserved in Decedent's will.
g.

Similar problelTIs have been experienced by attorneys 'in cases in which a
decedent's bypass trust ~as consumed by state death taxes or expenses of
administration. These also could be the subject of apportionment under the
decedent's estate plan in an effort to more equitably share those burdens
among varying and disparate beneficiaries of the estate.

h.

Another interesting issue arose in a case in which the surviving spouse did
not waive §2207 A and the survivor's own property was less than the
applicable exclusion amount, meaning that all estate tax payable in the
survivor's estate was attributable to the QTIP trust that passed to children of
that trust's settlor. Those children wanted to pay their tax to stop the running
of interest and penalties, but the surviving spouse's personal representative
refused to file a return for the survivor's estate and denied all requests to
provide accurate information about the spouse's estate. The QTIP trustee
finally filed a return showing just the QTIP trust assets, reporting the estate
assets as unreturned, and forcing the spouse's estate to file on its own.
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1.

In proposed form Treas. Reg. §25.2519-1(a) established the principle that
the gift under §2519 is the value of the corpus less the amount of any
§2207A reimbursement to which the surviving spouse was entitled, and in
proposed form Treas. Reg. 20.2207A-1(a) established the proposition that
the spouse made an added gift of the amount of the reimbursement if it was
not collected.
(1) Treas. Reg. §20.2207A-1(a)(2) continues to state that the beneficiaries
of an estate make a similar gift if the estate fails to collect
reimbursement, although §20.2207A-1(a)(3) provides that this gift does
not occur to the extent the beneficiaries cannot compel recovery and
gives as an example that the spouse waived the recovery right by will.
(2) This provision also gives as an example the surviving spouse's executor
exercising discretion granted by the spouse's will to waive the right of
recovery. The example is a bit odd, for two reasons.
(a) First, if there would be no benefit by virtue of a waiver, because the
beneficiaries with the right and those subject to it are the same,
there would be no gift attributable to the waiver and the example is
not useful. It: however, the beneficiaries are not the same and a
benefit therefore is bestowed by the executor's waiver, it would be
unusual that a fiduciary would abandon a valuable right such as the
ability to seek recovery, because the effect is to benefit one set of
individuals over another.
(b) Second, the example does not indicate who was acting as executor,
which would appear to be an important fact. Notwithstanding these
quibbles, Prop. Treas. Reg. §20.2207A-l(a)(i) provided that any
failure to assert the right of recovery was a gift "even if recovery is
impossible"; this. too was deleted from the final regulation.

j.

As illustrated only obliquely by Treas. Reg. §25.2207A-l(f), the §2207A
right of reimbursement for gift taxes does not extend to any tax imposed
under §2511 on the gift of the income interest and §§20.2207A-I(c) and
25.2207A-I (d) effectively provide that the principles of equitable
apportionment will apply in determining which recipients of property subject
to §2044 or §25I9 will bear the cost of reimbursement. For example, if the
property passes to a surviving spouse of the surviving spouse or to a charity,
in either case qualifying for a deduction and therefore causing no tax, the
recipient would not be required to contribute to the §2207A reimbursement.

k.

In early 2002 the Treasury Department reissued the exact same proposed
regulation first introduced in 1984 and later withdrawn. First it elaborated on
the principle established under Prop. Treas. Reg. §25.25I9-I(a) that the gift
under §2519 is the value of the corpus less the amount of any §2207A
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reimbursement to which the surviving spouse was entitled. Then it reinstated
the Prop. Treas. Reg. §25.2207A-l(a) proposition that a spouse makes an
added gift of the amount of the reimbursement if it is not collected, and that
any "delay" in enforcement itself constitutes a gift (without elaboration on
what "delay" means).
1.

Curiously, Prop. Treas. Reg. §25.2519-1(c) recognized that the donee of
property subj ect to the §2207A right of reimbursement receives less value
than if the right of reimbursement did not exist. That regulation therefore
provides that the value of any §2519(a) gift to the donee is calculated as a
net gift, reducing the fair market value of the property subject to §2519(a) by
the amount of the §2207A(b) reimbursement. That sensible provision,
omitted once from the final regulations, now is restored by Treas. Reg.
§§25.2207A-l(b) and 25.2519-1(c)(4).

ffi.

The government worries about the tax consequences of the spouse not
requesting the §2207A(b) reimbursement but instead remitting other funds in
payment of the tax under §2519(a). The proper result-now also embraced
by the now final regulation- is to regard the spouse's waiver of or failure to
assert the right of reimbursement as an additional gift, itself subject to tax.

n.

The theoretically correct treatment is to treat this gift as being made either in
the year in which the spouse paid the gift tax under §2519(a) or the year in
which it no longer is possible to assert the §2207A(b) right of
reimbursement.

o.

1.

As a practical matter it might be easier to treat all gifts as occurring in
the year of the original transfer that triggered §2519(a), rather than
requiring a net gift computation in that year and an additional gift tax
determination in a subsequent year. Nevertheless,lthe regulation takes
the more cumbersol1Je but theoretically correct approach: the gift occurs
when the right of recovery no longer is enforceable, and adds the notion
that this lapse of the right of reimbursement "is treated as a gift even if
recovery is impossible."

11.

The spouse cannot even indicate on the gift tax return reporting the
§2519(a) transfer that the §2207A(b) right of reimbursement will not be
asserted and therefore that the gift is the full §2519 amount unreduced
by the §2207A(b) right of reimbursement - effectively releasing the
right of reimb~rsement and accelerating the year of the gift. Perhaps the
spouse can just file an amended gift tax return when it becomes clear
that the reimbursement right will not be asserted.

A tax simplification change made it impossible to waive §2207A without
"specifically indicat[ing] an intent to waive" the right of reimbursement,
thereby avoiding inadvertent waivers of the variety that have produced
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problems in several notable cases. See the discussion of the Gordon case at
page 111. That same change added the ability to waive the right by a
provision in the decedent's revocable trust as well as in the decedent's will.
Neither of §2206 nor §2207 so permit. See the discussion of Estate ofRoe at
page 120 regarding use of wrong instrument to waive reimbursement rights.
6.

7.

Somewhat like a QTIP trust is the Qualified Domestic Trust of §2056A,
applicable with respect to any decedent whose surviving spouse is not a citizen of
the United States.
a.

Section 2056A(b) imposes an estate tax upon certain events, such as if the
trust ceases to qualify as a Qualified Domestic Trust or if distributions of
corpus are made during the surviving spouse's overlife, and at the surviving
spouse's death.

b.

By §2056A(b)(2) the tax is computed at the decedent-settlor's rates and is
imposed ab initio on the trustee under §2056A(b)(5).

c.

In this respect, §2056A differs from the treatment of a normal QTIP trust
under §§2044, 2519, and 2207A because the tax is not computed at the
surviving spouse's estate or gift tax rates and the provision that imposes the
tax on the trust property cannot be waived or overridden by the surviving
spouse's estate plan.

d.

Nevertheless, the fundamental apportionment aspect is that the tax is paid
out of the Qualified Domestic Trust property.

Reimbursement for Tax on Section 2036 Property. Section 2207B applies to
taxes caused by inclusion of property under any part of §2036 (not just §2036(c),
which was the Code provision that prompted this addition; '§2207B remains in
the Code, notwithstanding reR~al of §2036(c) and replacement of it with Chapter
14).
a.

Section 2207B calls for a pro rata right of reimbursement, like §§2206 and
2207, but includes penalties and interest attributable to the tax in the amount
subject to reimbursement, like §2207A.

b.

Also like §2207A, the entitlement created by §2207B may be waived by the
decedent's revocable inter vivos trust as well as by a will, and the
requirement that any waiver "specifically indicates an intent to waive" the
reimbursement right, whatever that means. The tax simplification proposal
that added the same requirement to §2207A was accompanied by legislative
history that almost surely will become part of the regulations when issued,
providing that "a specific reference to QTIP section 2044, or section 2207A"
would suffice, and presumably a similar reference to §2036 or §2207B
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would suffice for this provision - although the legislative history was silent
on this issue for §2207B purposes.
c.

8.

It has not been determined whether failure to waive or assert the §2207B
right of reimbursement will result in a gift of the type imposed under
§2207A.

For reasons that probably are more historical than substantive, there is no
comparable federal provision for recovery of taxes attributable to nonprobate
assets includible under §§2035 and 2037 through 2040 and none with respect to
estate tax aspects of Chapter 14, although a move has been afoot for over a
decade to enact a provision similar to §2207A for the taxes caused by inclusion
of §2039 employee benefits in a decedent's gross estate.
a.

It is sensible to seek such an addition because these benefits typically pass
outside probate and often constitute a large share of the estate, risking
bankruptcy of the probate estate in payment of estate taxes absent a right of
reimbursement.

b.

One underlying justification for §§2207 and 2207A is that the decedent did
not create the interest that generated the estate tax liability under §2041 or
§2044. The absence of this element in most situations involving inclusion
under §§2035 and 2037 through 2040 is not a persuasive justification for the
lack ofa right of reimbursement, however, given the fact that §§2206 and
2207B usually apply to insurance proceeds at to which decedent possessed
incidents of ownership that caused inclusion in the estate or property
transferred during life in a manner that triggers §2036.

c.

There has been some suggestion that the Treasury ,DeBartment regards each
of §§2206 through 2207B as matters properly left to state property law.
(1) Thus, it is suggested that, because these sections are not related to the
imposition or collection of taxes in the first instance, Treasury has no
interest in adding a Code provision relating to §2039 or other
nonprobate assets.
(2) Addition of a provision comparable to §§2206 through 2207B, or a
deferral rule like §§6161 through 6166, or a "pay as you go" rule like
Treas. Reg. §20.2056A-4(c), is not high on any list of tax reform
priority. This is particularly unfortunate, given the magnitude of some
of these assets relative to a decedent's total estate and the assets
otherwise available to pay taxes caused by their inclusion.

d.

Note, however, that source of payment concerns are not easily addressed if
the employee benefit proceeds are designated for installment payment; at a
minimum, plan actuarial assumptions that inform plan liquidity
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considerations would need to anticipate imposition of potentially large onetime distributions in cases in which the proceeds do not qualify for the
marital or charitable deductions.
9.

Sections 2206 and 2207 (but not 2207A and 2207B) also contain a provision that
"allocates" the marital deduction in an estate, first to insurance proceeds and then
to power of appointment property.
a.

By the last sentence of §§2206 and 2207, the right of reimbursement is
inapplicable to the extent a surviving spouse receives proceeds of insurance
or property subj ect to a general power of appointment, in either case to the
extent qualifying for the §2056 marital deduction.

b.

As between the two provisions, §2207 presumes that insurance proceeds first
qualify for any available marital deduction, with §2041 power of
appointment property filling only any excess of the amount ofthe deduction
over the amount of insurance proceeds passing to the spouse and qualifying
for the deduction.

c.

The effect of these presumptions is to reduce any otherwise applicable
reimbursement right in an estate that qualifies for the marital deduction. In
effect, these sections work as a form of equitable apportionment, denying
apportionment through reimbursement against assets deemed to qualify for
the deduction.

d.

Neither section has a similar provision with respect to the charitable
deduction, and §§2207A and 2207B are devoid of a comparable provision
altogether.
(1) Treas. Reg. §20.2207A-l(a)(1) reflects that an eq~itable apportionment
rule is unnecessary b_ecause the §2207A increment in tax attributable to
an asset that qualifies for either a marital or a charitable deduction is
zero, but this effect does not apply with respect to the pro rata right of
reimbursement in §2207B.
(2) In effect, then, §§2206, 2207, and 2207A embrace equitable
apportionment with respect to the marital deduction, but only §2207A
does so with respect to the charitable deduction, and that only by virtue
of the incremental reimbursement regime.
(3) Curiously, by express provision, §2207B(d) provides specifically that
no taxes will be apportioned under §2207B to a qualified charitable
remainder trust, but it has no counterpart with respect to the marital
deduction.
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10. All of §§2206, 2207, 2207 A, and 2207B appear to deny reimbursement for taxes
deferred under §§6161, 6163,6166 and not yet paid, which may be equitable
(why should the recipient provide reimbursement before the estate tax is paid)
and avoids administrative problems such as:
a.

when a deferred payment would occur with respect to property subject to
reimbursement (that is, would a pro ration or some other rule apply with
respect to all deferral property), and

b.

tracking down the beneficiary to enforce reimbursement many years in the
future.

11. Generation-Skipping Tax Apportionment. Finally, the generation-skipping
transfer tax contains its own reimbursement provision in §2603.
a.

Section 2603(a) specifies that the distributee pays the tax in a taxable
distribution, the trustee in a taxable termination, and the transferor (or the
transferor's estate) in a direct skip.

b.

Section 2603(b) does not conform to the legislative language in each of
§§2207A and 2207B but instead provides that "unless otherwise directed
pursuant to the governing instruments by speCific reference to the tax
imposed by this chapter, the tax imposed by this chapter on a generationskipping transfer shall be charged to the property constituting such transfer"
(emphasis added).

c.

Collectively the two provisions in §2603(b) appear to establish a single,
easily stated rule: in essence, "the person with the generation-skipping
property pays the tax using that property."

d.

Like most

simplification~J

this statement is not entirely accurate.

(1) For example, because the transferor (or the transferor' s estate) pays in
the case of direct skips, the picture is drawn of a transfer that triggers
the tax, with the transferor holding out enough dollars to pay the tax
thereon.
(a) Because the tax is computed "exclusive" of the dollars used to pay
the tax, however, in reality the transferor makes the direct skip
transfer and then comes up with additional dollars to pay the tax.
(b) So §2~03(b) is a fiction in the case ofa direct skip because the tax
is not in fact paid from the property that constituted the transfer.
i)

Indeed, §2515 recognizes this, in the sense that it imposes a
gift tax on the dollars used by the transferor to pay the direct
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skip tax, to insure that these dollars do not also escape gift tax
liability.
ii)

A net gift (or some other form of apportionment) presumably
will not avoid this gift tax consequence because §2515 speaks
to tax imposed on the donor, not just those paid by the donor.

(c) There probably are two reasons why §2603 is drafted as it is.

i)

If the transferor does not produce the added dollars to pay the
direct skip tax, then transferee liability and lien provisions
(incorporated by reference in §2661) allow the government to
proceed against the transferee who received the direct skip
property.

ii)

The transferor also is protected in the case of an inadvertent
direct skip. For example, assume the transferor gives property
to a child, who disclaims, causing a direct skip because the
property passes to the child's descendants. If the transferor
did not anticipate the generation-skipping transfer tax,
§2603(b) comes to the rescue by imposing the tax on the
transferred and then disclaimed property received by the
child's descendants.

(2) In most other cases, however, §2603(b) merely states what should seem
obvious: the trustee who holds the property following a taxable
termination, or the distributee who just received a taxable distribution,
should use the property to pay the tax imposed under §2603(a).
e.

A number of interpretative questions likely will arise Jnder these provisions.
(1) What constitutes a sufficiently "specific reference to the tax imposed"
by chapter 13 to overcome §2603(b)? Estate ofMonroe v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 352 (1995), held that a garden variety tax
payment provision referring to "federal estate taxes ... or other death
taxes attributable to" certain bequests without specification or explicit
reference to generation-skipping transfer taxes of Chapter 13 of the
Code was not adequate to overcome the §2603(b) regime. Similarly, In
re Estate of Tubbs, 900 P.2d 865 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995), held that a
general reference to "estate, inheritance, and death taxes" was not the
required explicit mention of the generation-skipping transfer tax
anticipated by §2603(b). These are the right result. A general waiver of
reimbursement rights should not suffice, which (at least in many direct
skip situations) probably is appropriate because some transfers will be
inadvertent or unexpected and the transferor may not have considered
the unexpected tax thereon when directing in a standard tax payment
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provision that all taxes be paid from the residue of the transferor's
estate, without reimbursement.
(2) If a decedent's will bequeaths, for example, $2 million to grandchild as
a direct skip transfer, does this indicate an intent to leave $2 million
after the generation-skipping tax is paid from other sources or is $2
million to be set aside to be used to pay the tax as directed by §2603(b),
with only the balance actually passing to the grandchild?
(a)

Without more, the Code dictates the latter res~lt, in which case the
tax (assuming.:rl~.~xemption or exclusion applies) would be
computed (in gjQQi~) as:
[rate] x [transfer (after tax)] = [tax]

-!:tti

x

$2 mi;:gi,on
1.4.7
.:.:.:.:.:.:.

= $'I~~;w.1

and the grandchild would receive $2 million less this tax =

$!J.!~~~j~~Q~i~~4·
(b) As illustrated in the Form 706 Estate and Generation-.~~.p.ping Tax

return, another formula to make this computation (in

Trans~1~:i~II.~~
(c)

tax) where "lJ.~IJ,~1 =

gggl) is:

1 :~~e

As illustrated in Technical Advice Memorandum 9822001, any
interest is computed on the direct skip tax would not be reflected in
these calculations.

(d) If this is not the decedent's intent, then the document must clearly
override §2603(b), causing ag~~~ter..~mount to be subject to the tax

($2 Inillion rather than the $~I~~!i!§Q~!~t14 in the prior example) and
c~~.~~.~.g ..~.he tax thereon to be greater ($94Q~QQI rather than
$:§~~Qj~~~i§).

(e)

Fortunately, because the tax itself is not subject to the generationskipping tax, there is no algebraic circularity caused by increasing
the bequest and thereby increasing the tax. Nevertheless, the
difference in result is dramatic and should not be left to postmortem
deterlnination of the decedent's intent.

(3) Another interpretative question is whether taxes imposed on a direct
skip transfer are subtracted before determining the inclusion ratio, or
whether the exelnption is applied first, followed by a portion of the $1
Inillion exelnption being "wasted" by §2603(b) taking a portion of the
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transferred property to pay the tax. The proposed generation-skipping
regulations do not address this question.
(a) Here the answer should be that the inclusion ratio denominator

("the value of the property ... involved in the direct skip") is the
amount subject to the tax ($~lljJ.~§9~~i@p the prior example), not the
amount actually transferred but before payment of the tax.
(b) Section 2642 is not, however, clear on this point. Indeed,

§2642(a)(2)(B)(ii) specifies that the denominator shall be reduced
by any estate or death taxes actually recovered from the transferred
property, but says nothing about generation-skipping tax, indicating
perhaps that a contrary result was intended (assuming Congress and
the legislative drafters even considered this issue).
(c)

Adding to the lack of clarity is the clear fact that, if a trust were
only partially exempt and suffered a taxable termination or made a
taxable distribution payment of the generation-skipping tax using
trust or distributed assets would use partially exempt dollars to pay
the tax., thereby "wasting" exemption on the tax payment. A
legititnate question is whether a direct skip should be treated any
differently.
i)

The simplistic answer is that direct skips should be treated
differently because they are taxed "exclusive" of taxes
ilnposed, unlike taxable terminations and taxable
distributions.

ii)

This misses the mark. The issue is not whether the
generation-skipping tax is imposed on the dollars used to pay
the direct skip tax; the issue is whether the exemption is
wasted in"paying the direct skip tax.

iii)

Although these are not the same questions, a proper
interpretation would be that the exemption should be applied
to the alTIOunt of the direct skip, not to the full amount
transferred before payment of the tax. This is consistent with
the tax exclusive intent of Congress to favor the direct skip
and is supportable (even though not explicitly stated) by the
language of §2642.

(4) One commentator gives two additional examples of situations in which
§2603 is not clear:
(a)

Assume that T is the income beneficiary of a trust and assigns that
income to T's grandchild. As a taxable gift and a direct skip, this is

G - 34

one of the rare cases in which §2603(a)(2) may apply ("a direct skip
from a trust," in which case the trust pays the tax) rather than
§2603(a)(3) (which directs that the transferor pays the tax). Even if
that is not the correct conclusion, the further question is how to
apply §2603(b), which says that the direct skip tax should be paid
from "the property constituting such transfer," which is an income
interest.
i)

One analogy is that T received the income and made a direct
skipping gift, making §2603(a)(3) applicable and removing
this from the "direct skip from a trust" category.

ii)

But, realistically, this transfer comes directly out of the trust
as income is paid to the grandchild, which presumably is just
the type of situation anticipated by §2603(a)(2).

iii)

In either case, the property constituting the transfer is an
income interest. Because the generation-skipping tax cannot
be paid as income is received and paid to the grandchild, and
because the tax imposed likely would exceed the income
available in the year of the assignment, presumably the tax
would be paid from trust principal.

iv)

As discussed below, imposing the tax on trust principal here
only appears to be the wrong result (notwithstanding that it
seems to shift the tax liability from the income beneficiary to
the remainder beneficiaries), because reducing the principal
correspondingly reduces income subsequently earned thereon,
thereby effectively amortizing the tax out of income.
I

v)

Thus, notwithstanding some lack of clarity in the rule, it
should be that the trust will pay from corpus, particularly
because regarding this as a direct skip from T, not from the
trust, followed by T paying the tax to avoid this income
versus principal issue, would trigger §2515. And all these
problems would arise if T failed to pay the tax and the
government asserted liability against the property subject to
the transfer.

vi)

In any case, if the tax is paid out of the property subject to
this direct skip transfer (whatever that may mean), the amount
subject to tax is only the remaining balance.

(b) As a second example, assume that a decedent names a grandchild as

beneficiary of insurance on the decedent's life. Is the direct skip
represented thereby at decedent's death "from a trust" for purpose
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of §2603(a)(2), presumably meaning that the insurer would be
treated like a trustee and would be primarily liable to pay the
generation-skipping tax? And, in any event, must the tax be paid
from the insurance proceeds under §2603(b)?
i)

The "clean" result is to say that an insurance policy is not the
same as a trust, thus making §2603(a)(3) apply (the
decedent's estate would pay the tax).

ii)

Then §2603(b) would act like §2206, meaning the grandchild,
as recipient of the insurance proceeds, would reimburse the
decedent's estate for the taxes incurred on the direct skip
transfer (unless the decedent's will expressly waived this
right of reimbursement), and

iii)

the amount of the transfer for generation-skipping tax
purposes should be the amount of the proceeds less the taxes
incurred thereon.

iv)

Unfortunately, Treas. Reg. §26.2662-1(c)(2)(iii) and
Schedule R-l of Form 706 adopt the position that, if the
insurance proceeds exceed $250,000, the personal
representative of the decedent-insured's estate should report
the transfer on Schedule R-l (and send a notice thereof to the
insurer) but the insurer should pay the tax; if the proceeds are
$250,000 or less, however, the personal representative would
report the transfer on Schedule Rand pay the tax from the
decedent-insured's estate, and then seek reimbursement from
the insurance company or the beneficiary. The rule exposes
fiduciaries to potential liability if this distinction is
overlook~9 and the fiduciary improperly pays - or fails to
pay - the tax.

v)

That liability would be avoided if the insurance were treated
like a trust, thus clearly imposing the tax payment liability on
the insurer (as "trustee").

(5) Finally for §2601 transition rule purposes, if the special election was
made to treat pre-enactment directly skips to grandchildren as qualifying
for the "Gallo" amendment ($2,000,000 grandchild exclusion), then
"unless the grandchild otherwise directs by will, the estate of such
grandchild shall be entitled to recover from the person receiving the
property on the death of the grandchild any increase in Federal estate tax
on the estate of the grandchild by reason of the preceding sentence."
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(a) The special election has the effect of causing subject property to

incur tax "as if [it had been paid] to the grandchild's estate," with
tax liability being imposed under §2033 as to which no federal right
of reimbursement otherwise exists.
(b) This provision calls for an incremental reimbursement right, like

§2207 A, but is not coordinated with §2207A to specify which right
"goes first." Thus, the question is whether the increment in tax
caused by §2044 property would be considered before, after, or in
conjunction with the increase caused by inclusion of this grandchild
exclusion property. Presumably a pro ration of the aggregate
increase caused by both types of property is the proper result.
(c) The provision also does not appear to require the same "specific

reference" dictated in §2603(b) to override its application. Quaere
whether this was intentional or merely another legislative oversight.
Given these problems with the provision, it is probably fortunate
that it is unlikely that it often will apply.
D. Summary of state law: Silence generates what result?
1.

2.

3.

The foregoing exegesis ought to illustrate that:
a.

There are a number of legitimate choices that might be made in determining
the proper apportionment result.

b.

Conflicting results are dictated by the law in various jurisdictions in which
the apportionment issues have been resolved.

c.

Federal laws lays its own layer of complexity over this area.

This portion of the outline illustrates the state law result if the estate plan does
not address the apportionment issue.
a.

In some states the issues are (partially) resolved by statute.

b.

In a declining number of states only judicial authority exists.

c.

In a few states, on some issues, common law presumptions apply by default
because state law is entirely silent.

d.

Many of the results in this segment are confused and inconsistent because
the law is not uniform.

In a sense, although the intent is the exact opposite, the federal rules under
§§2002 and 2205 are the starting point regarding state law apportionment.
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a.

Those provisions establish the fundamental proposition that the federal
estate tax is not apportioned at all; it is a "burden on the residue" of the
estate, as was true under common law.

b.

But the Supreme Court established very early that federal law governs only
to the extent state law regarding apportionment is not inconsistent. Riggs v.
Del Drago, 317U.S. 95 (1942).
(1) If state law differs, the state law is supreme in this arena.
(2) Thus, a state may alter the federal presumption and control the
apportionment result.

c.

If there is an established state dictate, especially if mandated under a state
apportionment statute, that rule usually will apply unless the decedent
clearly directs otherwise in an appropriate manner, whether by will, trust, or
other document (as discussed in more detail below). The same is true about
an alteration by settlement agreement in the wake of estate litigation, as
painfully illustrated by In re Estate ofBrabson, 752 A.2d 761 (D.C. App. Ct.
2000) (it likely is a precursor to malpractice litigation if a court has occasion
to remark, as this one did, that "[i]t may even be that ... former counsel did
not detect the issue, and he evidently did not insist during negotiations that
estate tax liability be allocated proportionately"), and less so but equally
disappointingly in Houghland v. Lampton, 33 S.W.3d 536 (Ky. App. Ct.
2000) (family settlement of a prior estate led to a favored bequest in the
decedent's will that could not be fully satisfied due to tax payment
obligation, which was not apportioned in a manner that protected the favored
bequest), in which will contest litigants eventually resolved their differences
in negotiated compromises that failed to anticipate the'tax payment
consequences of their resplution, and therefore totally failed to articulate
how taxes would be apportioned among their respective beneficial interests.
The courts therefore defaulted to state law pro rata apportionment as if that
was the dictated distribution under the decedents' articulated estate plans.
(1) In determining whether a decedent has provided otherwise with
sufficient specificity and clarity, the burden of proof normally is placed
on those who challenge the state apportionment result.
(2) A direction to pay all taxes from the residue ofa decedent's estate
typically will cause taxes on nonprobate property to be paid from the
residue in an apportionment state, although cases like In re Estate of
Kirby, 498 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (will provision directing
payment of all taxes was deemed to overcome statutory outside
apportionment rule, notwithstanding lack of specific reference thereto),
and Ferrone v. Soffes, 558 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990) (will
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provision directing payment of all taxes from residue deemed
inadequate to override statutory outside apportionment without specific
reference), clearly show that a nonspecific direction is likely to cause
litigation if it does not unambiguously identify and override state law.
(3) If not carefully drafted, a general tax payment direction in a will may be
read to negate apportionment, if any, only within the probate estate,
leaving any state outside apportionment statute to apply with respect to
nonprobate assets. See Note, Proposalfor Apportionment ofthe Federal
Estate Tax, 30 IND. L.J. 217 (1955); Annot., Construction and
Application ofStatutes Apportioning or Prorating Estate Taxes, 71
A.L.R.3d 247 (1976); Annot., Construction and Effect of Will
Provisions Not Expressly Mentioning Payment ofDeath Taxes But
Relied On As Affecting the Burden ofEstate or Inheritance Taxes, 70
A.L.R.3d 630 (1976); and Annot., Construction and Effect of Will
Provisions Expressly Relating to the Burden ofEstate or Inheritance
Taxes. 69 A.L.R.3d 122 (1976).
4.

Although any effort to summarize the law in the 50 states is subject to
inaccuracies, Study #12 of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel,
dated August 2002, is available and relatively up to date. Errors due to
interpretation and reporting communication glitches are inevitable, and even
information once accurate gets stale, so:
a.

b.

At the risk of stating the obvious, the following summaries are not
certifiable; these laws change, cases are subject to differing interpretations,
reports upon which reliance has been placed are only as good as the reporter
and the interpretation thereot: and the reader is cautioned to use the
following information only as an introduction to a detailed determination
I
upon which reliance may be based.
Please look for your state and, if the characterization of it appears to contain
an error, a misreading, or lacks more current information, please contact me.
I update the summaries, and ... you know how that goes.
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5.

The importance of the following quick summary is to help illustrate why the
material next below, dealing with conflict of laws and the need to affirmatively
confront these issues in the estate planning and drafting process, is so important.
a.

As of 2002 22 states had adopted (and not subsequently repealed) either the
original (1958) or revised (1964) Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act
(most with some local modifications, a few so extensive that the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws do not claim parentage
notwithstanding the Uniform Act was the template for the state statute) or
the Uniform Probate Code (which, at §3-916, contains the same provisions
as the Uniform Act):
North Carolina (1964)
North Dakota (1964/UPC)
Oregon (1964)
Rhode Island (1964)
South Carolina (UPC)
South Dakota (1958/UPC)
Texas (1964)
Utah (UPC)
Vermont (1964)
Washington (1964)
Wyoming (1958)

Alaska (1958/UPC)
Colorado (UPC)
Hawaii (1964/UPC)
Idaho (1964/UPC)
Maine (UPC)
Maryland (1964)
Minnesota (UPC)
Mississippi (1964)
Montana (1958/UPC)
New Hampshire (1958)
New Mexico (UPC)

Arizona and Florida have otherwise adopted the UPC but do not appear to
have retained §3-916.
As of August 2003 a newly Revised Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act
became available for future adoption. A summary of its changes is included
in an Appendix (to avoid confusion with existing law),
b.

In addition to the above listed states, 16 other states can be identified that
provide forfull apportionment by statute:
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Delaware

District of Columbia
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky

Louisiana
Nebraska
Nevada
New York

Oklahoma
Tennessee
Virginia
West Virginia

c.

Missouri provides for full apportionment by judicial decision.

d.

Six states, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, provide for some form of limited apportionment by statute.

e.

Illinois provides for a form of limited apportionment by judicial decision.

f.

Finally, five jurisdictions may be identified that direct against apportionment
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By Statute: Alabama, Georgia, and Iowa
By Judicial Decision: Arizona
By Statute and Judicial Decision: Wisconsin
6.

Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act. Because the Uniform Estate Tax
Apportionment Act is regarded by almost half of the states as the best form of
statutory apportionment, it is appropriate to consider its major provisions briefly
herein; problems with these provisions, and similar statutes or judicial rules, are
considered in more detail in later segments of this outline. The Act establishes
rules of four major types:
a.

Inside and Outside Apportionment. First, §2 of the Act establishes the basic
proposition that all taxes imposed on an estate (which would include an
inheritance tax only if it were a charge against the estate as a whole, which is
not always the case) should be pro rated among all persons "interested in the
decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes."
(1) This is a total inside and outside apportionment rule, applying a straight
pro rata allocation based on the size of each interested individual's
entitlement as compared to the size of the total estate for federal estate
tax purposes.
(2) Two special rules are designed to prevent unnecessary conflict with
federal law.
(a) One special rule, equitable apportionment, is found in §5(e) and
may be illustrated by a simple example:

i)

Assume that a decedent's estate passes to the decedent's
surviving spouse in a fashion that qualifies for the federal
estate taxtnarital deduction but not (entirely) for the state
wealth transfer tax marital deduction.

ii)

Under §5(e) of the Act, if apportionment of a state tax to the
marital share would have the effect of reducing the federal
estate tax marital deduction, the apportionment rule is not to
apply, thus preserving the deduction without reduction.

iii)

A similar result would apply for charitable deduction
purposes, if relevant.

iv)

This is likely to apply in those states that have yet to conform
their law to the addition in 1981 of the unlimited marital
deduction and the §2056(b)(7) qualified terminable interest
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property exception to the nondeductible terminable interest
rules for federal estate tax marital deduction purposes.
v)

For a detailed explanation of all the ramifications of§5(e),
consult Scoles & Stephens, The Proposed Uniform Estate Tax
Apportionment Act, 43 MINN L. REV. 907. 928-931 (1959).

(b) The other special rule is contained in §9, added in 1982, specifying

that federal law will control if federal and state laws differ with
respect to apportionment; it appears that the rationale for this
provision was addition in 1981 of §2207A (as discussed above),
calling for an incremental as opposed to a pro rata reimbursement
of taxes, and the Act is simply specifying that the difference
between §2207A and state law will be resolved in favor of federal
law.
(3) A different rule of a special nature, deviating from the otherwise
pervasive pro rata allocation of the tax burden, applies to temporal
interests.
(a) Under §§5(b) and 6, the tax otherwise attributable to a life estate,

term of years, or annuity is not apportioned thereto; instead, the tax
is payable from corpus.
(b) This result is dictated even if the remainder interest qualifies for a

deduction (most commonly the charitable deduction in a qualified
charitable remainder trust); this allocation of taxes attributable to
the temporal interest against the deductible remainder interest
otherwise reduces the available deduction.
(c) This result also .apparently applies notwithstanding the dictates of

§5(e), as discussed above.
b.

Alteration. The second major proposition established by the Act is how
allocation under the Act may be altered; two methods are authorized:
(1)

In unusual circumstances a court may alter the proportionate allocation
of taxes, under authority of §3(b).

(2) A decedent may waive or alter the dictates of the Act under authority of
§2, but only (as is expressly underscored by the comments to §2) by a
provision in the decedent's will. See the discussion of Estate ofRoe at
page 120.
(3) Unfortunately, a specific reference to the apportionment rule being
waived or altered is not required by the Act, meaning that broad,
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nonspecific will provisions can raise important interpretative questions
under the Act.
c.

Entitlelnents. Third, the Act establishes the proper treatment of certain
entitlelnents that affect the tax burden.
(1)

For example, §5(c) provides that federal credits under §§2012 (credit for
gift tax on pre-1977 transfers), 20 13 (credit for tax on prior transfers),
and 2014 (foreign death tax credit) inure to the proportionate benefit of
all beneficiaries interested in the entire gross estate, rather than to the
benefit of any particular recipient of property, such as the taker of the
property that was previously taxed or subjected to a foreign death tax.
Only the §20 11 state death tax credit was apportioned to individual
takers, and that credit was repealed after 2004.

(2)

Alternatively, however, §§5(a), (b), and (d) provide that individual
takers of interests included in the gross estate benefit from exemptions,
deductions, and credits that relate specifically to "the purposes of the
gift." "the relationship of any person to the decedent, "or the payment of
any taxes attributable to the property.
(a)

Thus, the charitable and marital deductions usually inure to the
benefit of the recipient of property qualifying therefor, this being
the rule of equitable apportionment (subject, as noted above, to the
special rule applicable to temporal interests in property).

(b) For estates in which the prior §2039(c) or (e) $100,000 exemption

for employee benefits is still applicable it is questionable whether
the language or intent of this provision would allow the recipient of
those death benefits to enjoy the exemption.'
(c)

Presumably the"~§2058 deduction for state death tax that took the
place of the §2011 credit in 2005 also should benefit the individuals
who bear that tax, as the §20 11 credit also was apportioned.

(d) This rule also provides that the recipient is entitled to an adjustment

in the allocation of tax to reflect any reduced rate of tax for state or
other tax purposes, based on the relation of the recipient to the
decedent (for example, if a state inheritance tax is paid out of the
estate and recognizes more closely related individuals with a
reduced rate of tax). Cf In re Estate of Morris, 838 P.2d 402 (Mont.
1992) (estate distributable in two halves, one for relatives of
decedent's predeceased spouse and one for decedent's relatives,
under will that directed payment of all taxes from residue of estate
before its division, which overcame state law and argument by
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decedent's relatives that estate should be divided before payment
from each half of the taxes attributable to that half
(e)

For a strange application of the rule "giving" the benefit ofa special
tax rate to the beneficiary who "generated" it, see Estate of
Garrison v. Garrison, 728 P.2d 535 (Or. App. Ct. 1986) (Oregon
estate tax credit for a handicapped child inured solely to the child's
benefit, not to the benefit of the entire estate, providing a larger
effective share of the estate for the benefit of that child).

(1)

If a recipient paid any tax that generated a §2011 credit for state
death taxes before its repeal in 2005, it appeared that this credit also
inured to the benefit of that individual, notwithstanding the
difference in treatment of the allocation of the foreign death tax
credit under §5(c); this would not be the case, however, if the state
death tax had been paid by the decedent's estate. With §2058
Congress converted the state death tax credit into a deduction, that
presulnably will be allocable to those takers who paid state tax that
generated the deduction.

(g) Quaere how §2015 is meant to he reflected. It allocates any §2011

or 2014 credits related to a future interest qualifying for §6163
deferral to that interest.
i)

The Act would say that the §2011 credit is properly allocated
to that taker, but not the §2014 credit.

ii)

By virtue of the Riggs case, presumably state law would
prevail in this conflict, although most decedents - if they
thought about it - presumably would want the federal rule to
apply.

(h) Under the unified federal wealth transfer tax computation
procedure, the §200 1(b) credit for gift taxes paid on property

transferred during life should inure to the benefit to the estate as a
whole if the transferred property is included in the gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes (e.g., under §§2035 through 2038,2041,
or 2042).
i)

If the gift tax was paid by the decedent (including if the
transfer was a net gift, with the donee's payment of gift tax
treated as sale to the donee with the donor/decedent thereafter
paying the tax), the credit for gift tax paid ought to inure to
the benefit of the estate as a whole.
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ii)

(i)

d.

In essence the estate has simply prepaid its wealth transfer
taxes by virtue of the prior but included gift.

Although the Act does not direct itself thereto, it also would appear
that the unified credit is a benefit to the entire estate for
apportionment among all takers.

Enforcement. Finally, the Act establishes mechanisms for enforcement of
outside apportionment by providing for the "collection" of apportioned
taxes.
(1) For example, §4(a) is a right of set oft: allowing a personal
representative to withhold property otherwise distributable to a
beneficiary in that amount necessary to recoup the beneficiary's
proportionate share of apportioned taxes.
(2)

§4(a) also gives a right of recovery against any beneficiary whose share
of taxes exceeds the amount of property the personal representative may
withhold (if any).

(3)

§8 gives a right to pursue enforcement of the §4(a) recovery in a foreign
jurisdiction and grants a similar right to an out-of-state personal
representative, by reciprocity.

(4) Finally, §7 recognizes that some beneficiaries of nonprobate assets will
be immune to collection procedures; it specifies that the residue of the
estate should pay any deficiency if a portion of tax cannot be recovered
and, if the residue is exhausted, then the remaining beneficiaries will
bear the balance of the deficiency in proportion to their existing tax
allocations.
I
e.

The Act itself applies to the estate of any decedent dying after a specified
time following enactment, regardless of the time of execution of that
decedent's estate plan and the unexpected effect the Act may have on the
pattern of tax payment therein.

f.

There is a final issue under the Uniform Act relating to the fiduciary's right
to collect taxes apportioned to interested parties and the effect of a failure or
inability to do so. §7 of the Act provides that:
(1) There is no duty to institute legal proceedings against any person
interested in the estate to collect taxes apportioned to that person, prior
to expiration of a specified period after determination of the tax.
(2) Further, any fiduciary who institutes a timely action to recover taxes is
exonerated from liability if ultimately unable to collect.
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(3) Implicit in this provision is the common law requirement that the
fiduciary must assert any right of recovery for the benefit of the estate.
(a) Just as the fiduciary must marshall all assets available to the estate.
(b) the "right" to apportion taxes and the "authority" to recover is

properly viewed as a requirement or duty. See Merchants Nat' I
Bank v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 62 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1945);
Annot., Remedies and Practice Under Estate Tax Apportionment
Statutes, 71 A.L.R.3d 371 (1976).
(4) With respect to assets located out of state, or taxable nonprobate assets
received by a beneficiary who expends the property prior to a demand
for apportionment or collection of the amount owed, this duty imposes
an obligation that the fiduciary may be unable to satisfy.
(5)

Assuming the fiduciary acted reasonably but was unable to collect, the
burden then must fall somewhere, either on the estate or other
beneficiaries.
(a) If the burden fell on other takers, §2205 would give them a right of

recovery exercisable against the residuary estate.
(b) Under §7 of the Revised Uniform Act, the burden for those

uncollected taxes is apportioned directly to the residue ofthe estate,
presumably because this would be the end result in any event.
i)

Only if the residue is insufficient for payment is the
uncollected amount reapportioned among the remaining
persons or~ginally subject to apportionment.

ii)

Under §7 of the original Uniform Act, those uncollected taxes
are apportioned directly against the full class of individuals
who must contribute in the first instance, permitting
apportionment to apply immediately to uncollected taxes as
well as to the original amount of tax initially determined.

(c) Many state statutes appear to be silent on these issues, presumably

meaning that general fiduciary principles will apply to the necessity
to enforce apportionment and to the inability to recover from any
individual who fails to pay an apportioned amount. See Annot.,
Construction and Application ofStatutes Apportioning or Prorating
Estate Taxes, 71 A.L.R.3d 247 (1976).
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(d) In any event, it appears that inability to collect under a permitted

proration entitlement generates a §166(d)(1) bad debt deduction to
the individual(s) who ultimately suffer therefrom. See Rev. Rul. 69411, 1969-2 C.B. 177.
7.

Equitable Apportionment. If the estate plan is silent on the issue, state law
determines whether equitable apportionment is available to any portion of the
estate that qualifies for a deduction in the wealth transfer tax computation.
a.

With respect to the computation of dispositions that qualify for the marital or
charitable deductions, the law of the 50 states is reasonably clear.
(1) The vast majority of states embrace equitable apportionment, meaning
that the deductible portion of an estate is exempt from apportionment of
any portion of the taxes imposed on the estate.
(2) If the estate plan calls for a larger disposition than qualifies for a
deduction, as under prior law when the marital deduction was not an
unlimited entitlement or, under present practice, if the surviving spouse
makes a disclaimer or only a partial qualifying election is made under
§2056(b)(7)(B)(v), only the qualifying portion should be protected from
apportionment.

b.

At least to the extent noted, however, the following states do not appear to
embrace equitable apportionment:
(1) No apportionment at all in Georgia and Wisconsin.
(2) No equitable apportionment for charitables in Arkansas.
I

(3) Equitable

apportion~ent only

for statutory intestate shares in Ohio.

(4) No equitable apportionment, but spousal share abates last, in Iowa.
(5) Equitable apportionment only for forced shares in Mississippi.
c.

Much less certain is the treatment of distributions in satisfaction of a
contractual entitlement, such as under a prenuptial agreement.
(1) If deductible under §2053 as a claim against the estate, these
dispositions should be treated in the same fashion as a charitable or
marital disposition.
(2) In this respect, §2043 makes certain property settlements at death
deductible under §2053 if incident to a divorce and otherwise meeting
the requirements of §2516.
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(3) Otherwise, obligations incurred incident to divorce that are satisfied out
of an estate at death but that are not deductible (along with pretermitted
heir shares, which are not deductible), normally are ineligible for
equitable apportionment.
(4) In a limited number of cases, claims satisfied at death that arise fro.m a
prenuptial agreement are treated as claims against the estate similar to
claims of.other creditors.
(a) Notwithstanding that they are not §2053 deductible like most

creditors' claims, the recipient of property under the agreement is
entitled to priority in payment, along with all other creditors.
(b) Because creditors are unaffected by the amount of taxes (except to

the extent the estate is bankrupt, so that not all otherwise entitled
claimants are satisfied) the claimant in these cases is effectively
granted equitable apportionment. See, e.g., In re Cordier's Estate,
145 N.Y..S.2d 855 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
8.

Apportionment of State Inheritance Taxes. Even in states that embrace full
inside, outside, and equitable apportionment, state inheritance taxes imposed
directly on individual recipients ofa decedent's wealth usually are not subject to
apportionment in a manner that equitably (re)allocates the burden. Thus, the
decedent's estate plan must direct the estate to pay those taxes and, by virtue of
this direction, cause the taxes to become an item subject to ~pportionment. In re
Estate ofHerz, 651 N.E.2d 1251 (N.Y. 1995) (German inheritance tax
(Erbschaftsteuer), normally payable by estate beneficiary, deemed to be imposed
on residue of decedent's estate by tax payment provision directing payment of all
"estate, inheritance, and other death taxes"), is a good reminder that foreign
inheritance taxes also ought t9 be considered if they will be relevant.

9.

Apportionment of Fees and Expenses. Several cases dictate outside
apportionment of fees and expenses of administration, but this sensible extension
of the general theme has not been embraced widely. See Roe v. Farrell, 372
N.E.2d 662 (111. 1978); cited in Estate ofFender v. Fender, 422 N.E.2d 107 (111.
App. Ct. 1981); Cloutier v. Lavoie, 177 N.E.2d 584 (Mass. 1961); In re Estate of
McKitrick, 172 N.E.2d 197 (Prob. Ct. Ohio 1960).
a.

The effect of fees and expenses and their apportionment can be significant in
the marital and charitable deduction arena and is illustrated by several
seemingly contradictory opinions addressing the proper treatment of estate
income generated after a decedent's death in determining the allowable
charitable or marital deduction for the decedent's estate.
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10. To illustrate the importance of the following topic, consider an estate in year
gQI~! that qualifies for the marital deduction the smallest (ormula-determined
amount needed to eliminate tax in the estate of the first spouse to die. Also
assume that the estate incurs $50,000 of administration expenses that the §642(g)
"swing item" election allows it to deduct for income tax or estate tax purposes.
Finally, assume in the third column that these expenses are paid from estate
income rather than from estate corpus as they are in the first two columns, and
that they are deducted for income tax purposes in the middle two columns. For
more detailed examples extrapolating from this illustration see Malin & Keller,
Planningfor the allocation ofadministration expenses to income under Hubert,
84 J. TAX'N 213 (1996).
Pay with Corpus
& Deduct on the
Estate Tax Return

a.

Pay with Corpus
& Deduct on the
InCOlne Tax Return

Pay with Income
& Deduct on the
Income Tax Return

Pay with Income
& Deduct on the
Estate Tax Return

The reason the bypass trust is smaller in the second column is because the
swing iteln expenses were paid from corpus but not deducted for estate tax
purposes, requiring a larger marital deduction to zero out t~~~~.. ~~4)~aving
less property for the bypass trust. The bypass trust can be $~l:~~~~9Q~mQ in the
third colulnn even though the marital deduction is $i!QQ~QQQ because estate
income was used to pay the expenses.

(1)

As cOlnpared to the first column, the price to be plaid in the third column
for a bypass trust of.$iJ.~i~i~!9Q~lQQq is a larger amount includible in the
estate of the surviving spouse.

(2)

Compared to the second column, however, there is no price to be paid
for using estate income instead of estate corpus to pay the expenses if
the §642(g) election is Inade for the income tax deduction rather than
estate tax deduction for the $50,000 of expenses.

(3)

As illustrated, the use of estate income therefore increases the amount
includible in the estate of the surviving spouse or it increases the bypass
trust with no other benefit, respectively. Contrary to governmental
allegations, there is no itnproper or abusive double deduction benefit
involved.

(4)

Notice that the destination of estate income in the first two columns is
not noted because there is no telling how income earned during estate
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administration will be allocated, that being a function of state law, the
terms of the document, and the nature of the various entitlements under
the document (specific, general, and residuary). The important legal
aspect regarding income earned during estate administration is that
Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(f)(9) specifically provides that income
earned during estate administration prior to distribution of marital
deduction assets need not be made payable to the surviving spouse.
Only a directed or authorized delay in distribution beyond a period
reasonably required for administration would run afoul of the income
entitlement requirements for marital deduction qualification.
b.

If the result illustrated in the third column is authorized by state law or the
applicable document, the income tax deduction will produce an immediate
income tax savings but the corpus of the estate will not be reduced by the
$50,000 of payments made from estate income. Thus, the bypass trust is
$~~~i~~iQjQ~~QQjQ in the third column above and the only estate tax effect of the
election to claim these deductions on the income tax return is a larger marital
deduction (still needed to zero out the estate tax because no §2053 deduction
is claimed for the swing items), and more wealth subject to inclusion in the
surviving spouse's estate.

c.

The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93
(1997), affg 63 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 1995), affg 101 T.C. 314 (1993) (a
2 reviewed opinion), held that the use of estate income to pay the estate
administration expenses does not necessarily produce an improper result,
effectively rejecting a government argument that
(1)

~4

the marital bequest cannot be $§~P9~~9PP in the right-hand column if the
bypass trust is $i~~~§PQ~mQ, so

(2) the marital deductio~ must be reduced (that is, cannot be made larger by
the amount of estate income used to pay the expenses).
d.

In the recent past a number of contradictory opinions have addressed the
proper treatment of using estate income generated after a decedent's death in
determining in the allowable charitable or marital deduction for the
decedent's estate. Although the Supreme Court spoke on this issue in
Hubert, that decision is a plurality opinion that left a great deal to be desired
and a number of issues to be resolved.

e.

To illustrate the nature of the caselaw, consider the early case of Estate of
Horne v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 100 (1988), in which the decedent's estate
paid fees to the decedent's personal representative, using income earned
during the period of probate administration to avoid invading corpus of the
estate's residue. The estate made the §642(g) election to claim a deduction
for the payment of these fees under §212 for income tax purposes rather than
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claiming them as a §2053 expense of administration for estate tax purposes.
The estate then claimed a charitable deduction for the full value ofthe
residue of the estate, measured by the full amount left available for
distribution - unreduced by the fees paid using postmortem estate income.
f.

The Commissioner reduced the charitable deduction by the full amount of
those fees, claiming a deficiency for the estate tax on that amount, which the
Tax Court upheld. Essentially the question in Horne turned on the proper
determination of the "residue" for state law purposes, and how much of it
was both includible for federal estate tax purposes and then passed in a
qualified manner to the charity for §2055 deduction purposes.
(1) Citing Alston v. United States, 349 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1965), the Tax
court determined in Horne that the estate was improperly trying to
"deduct" postmortem income by paying fees from the income account
to prevent reduction of the residue that otherwise would pass to the
charity and would be deductible undet §2055. The court reasoned that,
had there been no income in the estate sufficient to pay those fees, the
estate would have been forced to pay the personal representative's fees
from the residue proper and would have had less available for
distribution to the charity, resulting in a reduced deduction.
(2) According to the Tax Court, the estate could not improve on this
position by expending postmortem income. More importantly, as these
cases have developed, state law required those expenses to be charged to
corpus for fiduciary accounting purposes, meaning that the estate's
payment from income was improper for state law purposes.

g.

Estate of Richardson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 119 (1987), was quite
different in result. The decedent's estate incurred inter~st on unpaid estate
tax liabilities, which the estate paid and properly charged to income for
fiduciary accounting purposes. The Commissioner attempted to reduce the
estate's marital deduction by the amount of this charge, which the estate
successfully resisted.
(1)

As explained by the Tax Court, payment of this interest as an
administration expense using postmortem income earned by the residue
of the estate did not diminish the amount passing to the surviving
spouse for marital deduction purposes. Nor was the estate trying to
increase the size of the deduction based on income earned postmortem.

(2)

Because payment of estate taxes was delayed, the estate was able to earn
income while incurring interest payable to the government. The court
properly held that neither the income earned nor the interest payable
should alter the amount of marital deduction claimed for the corpus
remaining after payment of all the debts, expenses, and taxes. The
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government eventually conceded this question in Rev. Rul. 93-48, 19932 C.B. 270, discussed more fully shortly.
J.

k.

Estate of Street v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 774 (1988), a.f!'d in part
andrev'dinpart, 974 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1992), involved both interest on
unpaid state and federal taxes and other administration expenses, all paid
from postmortem estate income and claimed as a deduction on the estate's
income tax return. The terms of the decedent's will and state law both denied
exercise of any power or authority that would have the effect of preventing
qualification for the marital deduction. But both state law and the document
granted the personal representative discretion to allocate items of income or
expense to either income or principal.
(1)

The Tax Court followed Richardson (both cases turned on the law of
Tennessee), meaning that the marital deduction was unreduced by these
payments. That decision was affirmed with respect to the interest
expense, but reversed with respect to the payment of administration
expenses, as if these somehow differed (a notion that Justice O'Connor
specifically rejected in her Hubert concurring opinion).

(2)

According to the Tax Court, under State law expenses of the type
involved in Street were a proper income expense for trust accounting
purposes, which is how the personal representative charged these items
for estate accounting purposes. Based on that finding, the Tax Court
extended its prior ruling in Richardson to cover payment of both
interest and expenses of administration.

(3)

On appeal, however, the court distinguished the payment of
administration expenses on the ground that they were deemed to accrue
at the decedent's death and, as such, must be deemed to reduce the
estate at death for pu..rposes of determining the amount available for the
marital deduction. Citing Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-4(a), the court held
that administration expenses are different from interest paid postmortem
on the basis of when each expenditure is deemed to accrue and
concluded that income from the marital share that is used to pay the
expenses that accrued at death should belong to the marital trust and, if
diverted, must cause a reduction of the marital deduction. This
distinction is silly and wrong and the Supreme Court opinion in Hubert
did not embrace it.

At about the same time Street was decided on appeal, the Tax Court again
held, in Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 770 (1992),
that administration expenses paid with estate income do not reduce the
amount of the marital deduction, essentially following the Tax Court's
decision in Street prior to its reversal.
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I.

n.

The Tax Court ultimately rendered two very strong opinions that most
forcefully determined that the government was wrong entirely on this issue.
(1)

Estate ofHubert v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 314 (1993) (a 14-2
reviewed opinion), a.!f'd, 63 F.3d 10~3 (11th Cir. 1995) (a 2-1 opinion),
a.!f'd, 520 U.S. 93 (1997) (a 7-2 decision with no majority opinion, the
plurality opinion representing the views of four Justices, a concurring
opinion another three, and there being two dissenting opinions), rejected
the distinction between expenses of administration and interest on
deferred tax payments made by the appellate court in Street and by the
government in Rev. Rul. 93-48.

(2)

The Tax Court reaffirmed its position in Richardson and, the very next
day, again held that the marital deduction should not be reduced by the
use of postmortem income to pay administration expenses as authorized
by state law or the terms of the document. Estate of Allen v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 351 (1993). And, although one dissenting Tax
Court opinion in Hubert claimed that "[t]he Tax Court stands virtually
alone on this issue," the Tax court opinion was adopted virtually
verbatim by the court on appeal and proved to be the winning position at
the Supreme Court - indeed, the Tax Court majority opinion makes far
better sense than any of the four Supreme Court opinions.

Of all the various Tax Court and other decisions and pronouncements,
therefore, the Tax Court opinion in Hubert is the momentous decision
because it reflects the best thinking and because it was a watershed
modification of the Tax Court's analysis.
(1)

Although a number of issues were involved in Hubert, flowing from a
will contest settlement and delayed distribution of marital and charitable
bequests, the crux ofthe case and the topic in common to the Tax Court
majority and both dissenting opinions was the use of income to pay
administration expenses.

(2)

The Tax Court majority opinion determination that
(a) use of estate income to pay administration expenses was authorized.
(b) There is no merit to the distinction drawn by the appellate court in

Street between administration expenses (such as fees paid to a
personal representative or attorney) and interest on deferred tax
payments, and
(c) The marital deduction issue properly analyzed involved Treas. Reg.

§20.2056(b)-4(a), which (prior to its replacement following Hubert)
was "merely a valuation provision which requires material
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limitations on the right to receive income to be taken into account
when valuing the property interest passing to the surviving spouse."
(3)

Although there was no similar discussion for charitable deduction
purposes (and there is no corresponding regulation under §2055), the
Supreme Court's opinion correctly stated that both deduction should
require the same answer and the analysis under both sections is the
same.

(4)

According to the Tax Court, estate income has no effect on the estate's
federal estate tax liability; it is not includible in the estate, it does not in
any way increase the marital or charitable share, and it does not result in
double deductions. Administration expenses properly allocated to
income do not change the amount of the estate principal received by a
spouse or charity and do not reduce the marital or charitable deductions.

11. Thus, if amounts charged to income are no greater than proper under state law
and the governing document, there is no impact on either deduction. In this
respect, Notice 97-63, 1997-47 I.R.B. 6, requested comments from interested
observers and suggested a number of alternatives that the government ultimately
.decided to scrap, along with the material limitation approach in Treas. Reg.
§20.2056-4(a). Thus, the proposed regulations released on December 15, 1998
and made final on December 3, 1999 (effective for estates of decedents who die
after December 2, 1999) embrace a different approach.
a.

b.

The concept embraced by the regulation reflects a number of legitimate
governmental concerns, noted in the preamble to the proposed regulation.
(1)

One is that local law principal and income dictates should not govern
the question of what is a proper charge to income earned during estate
administration, becayse local law will vary between jurisdictions.
Moreover, some states allow the relevant documents to override state
law, making this notion "too malleable to protect the policies underlying
the marital and charitable deductions." It also is fair to imagine that the
government did not want to promulgate any kind of Federal principal
and income mandate.

(2)

The second conclusion reached by the drafter of the proposed regulation
is that the prior test in Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-4(a) (penultimate
sentence) of a "material" limitation on the deductible bequest was too
complex and difficult to administer. That was confirmed by many of the
comments to the various methods of determining materiality proposed
in Notice 97-63 and elsewhere.

So the new regulation punts on materiality, it dodges state law principal and
income determinations, and falls back to its own new-found distinction. The
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notion articulated was formally advocated by the New York State Bar
Association comments to the Notice and turns on a distinction that was
refined in the final version of the regulation and that still will require some
refinement in practice but that probably could not be much further detailed
in the regulation.
(1)

(2)

One way to think about the concept is to conjure the difference between
expenses of administration that are a proper charge to income and those
that are more properly a charge to principal.
(a)

By way of example, the Hubert estate administration was
prolonged for an extensive period by two waves of litigation, during
which time the estate incurred investment advisory fees much as
would an on-going trust administration. (Indeed, if Hubert had
involved an inter vivos trust these expenses might have been
legitimate trust administration costs. It would be wise in this
discussion to recognize that most everything said in the context of
estate administration expenses will have a counterpart and spillover
application in probate avoidance inter vivos trusts during their
postmortem administration.) A normal fiduciary allocation of such
a fee probably would charge income and principal equally, on the
assumption that the investment advice benefited both income and
remainder beneficiaries.

(b)

Alternatively, the Hubert estate incurred the typical one-time
expenses of estate administration relative to marshalling assets,
appraising property, filing estate tax returns, paying creditors, and
making final distribution. A typical estate administration would
regard these as a proper charge to principal. quaere the proper
treatment of the Hubert costs of litigation that predominantly
benefited the income beneficiary and were charged to estate income
in that case. Consider below which characterization would apply to
these.

The, new regulation only "sort of' embraces this kind of dichotomy.
Because the government wants to avoid principal and income act
distinctions, it instead developed two new terms: estate management
expenses, and estate transmission expenses.
(a) Estate management expenses are like those properly charged to

income: as .defined in the regulation they are "incurred in
connection with the investment of estate assets or with their
preservation or maintenance during a reasonable period of
administration" (emphasis added). Examples given are investment
advisory fees, investment brokerage commissions, custodial fees,
and interest paid.
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(b) Estate transmission expenses are like those properly charged to

principal: as defined in the regulation they are "expenses that would
not have been incurred but for the decedent's death and the
consequent necessity of collecting the decedent's assets, paying the
decedent's debts and death taxes, and distributing the decedent's
property to those who are entitled to receive it" (emphasis added).
Examples given are probate fees, expenses incurred in a
construction proceeding or will contest, appraisal fees, and fees
paid to a personal representative and its attorney ("except to the
extent ... specifically related to investment, preselVation, and
maintenance of the assets" - emphasis added to stress that the
regulation prC?bably precludes unbundling or allocation of
unspecified fees but may permit an on-going administration to
bifurcate or distinguish between typical one-time administration
costs and those that look more like recurring long-term fiduciary
management fees).
i)

The reference to construction or contest proceedings may be
the regulation's way of reversing the result in Hubert, in
which a big chunk of these items was paid from estate income
because it was the income beneficiary who benefited from the
litigation. Notice that the regulation refers to "expenses" and
not specifically to "fees" in this statement, although it uses
both terms elsewhere and in the same sentence. It appears that
fees are just one form of expenses and that all litigation
expenses are meant to be treated as transmission expenses.
That may go too far but it appears to be the intent of the
drafter.

ii)

Also, qua~re whether some portion of fees paid postmortem
are entitled to estate management treatment. For example, at
least to the extent of amounts paid for management by the
same fiduciary who was managing the property premortem, it
would seem that postmortem fees should be regarded as
attributable to management and not transmission of the estate.
(A) In this light, fiduciaries might consider a fee schedule
that actually imposes their fee on a segregated basis for
postmortem work, including separate charges for clearly
management functions such as income tax planning and
investment, versus those that clearly relate to settlement
or transmission of the estate. Similar distinctions might
be made for attorney, accountant, and perhaps even
appraisal fees.
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(B) It has been noted that the fiduciary fee for a full estate
administration might be very little more than the same
fiduciary would charge for investment management and
custodial services. If that is true, perhaps a good
argument can be made that only the excess amount
charged in the full management situation is for estate
transmission - the base amount would appear to be
management expense in all cases.
(3)

At any rate, there is some degree of oversimplification in the
regulation's bifurcation, as illustrated by the estate litigation in Hubert
that was in large part directed at preserving the income interest of the
surviving spouse and, as such, the costs were a proper charge to some
degree against the income account. But as illustrations, the estate
transmission expense items listed as they relate to a normal short-term
fiduciary administration (of an estate or probate avoidance trust) all
entail the limited function of marshalling the decedent's wealth, figuring
out what it is worth, to whom it passes, how to pay taxes or debts and
expenses, and finally make distribution.
(a) All these fit easily within the rubric of items incurred because the

decedent died. Historically those have been allocated to the
principal of the residue of an estate. It remains to be seen whether
the regulation will be interpreted to preclude more fine distinctions
- a form of rough but simple justice.
(b) The distinction between management and transmission expenses

was more significant in the proposed regulation and in practical
administration it may not make a great deal of difference, as this
discussion and the spreadsheet illustration will reveal.
c.

Now the concept in full: For deduction purposes, the value of any deductible
property interest "shall be reduced by the amount of estate transmission
expenses and paid from the [deductible] share." Which is to say that the
normal one-time kinds of expenses of administration incurred in simple
estate administration reduce the marital or charitable deductions to the extent
those expenses are paid from that portion of the estate that passes to the
surviving spouse or to charity.
(1)

Because expenses of administration normally are paid from the estate
residue, it is easiest to comprehend what the government envisions by
considering a residuary marital or charitable bequest. It does not matter
whether estate income or principal is used to pay these estate
transmission expenses: transmission expenses that reduce the estate
available for the spouse or charity reduce the deduction, regardless of
whether income or principal is the source from which they are paid.
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(2)

On the other hand, the marital deduction or charitable deduction shall be
reduced by estate management expenses in two circumstances. One is
quite proper, the other quite the opposite.
(a) The one that makes sense is that management expenses reduce the

deduction to the extent those expenses are "attributable to" property
that passed to a beneficiary other than the spouse or charity, but are
paid from the deductible property interest.
i)

The proposed regulation added a requirement that the other
beneficiary was entitled to the income produced by the
property passing to that other beneficiary. Which was to say
that these expenses to manage the estate reduced the marital
deduction or charitable deduction only if the expenses were
incurred to produce income that passed with a nondeductible
bequest, but the management expenses are borne by the
deductible portion of the estate. That distinction was removed
and now it would appear that this implicit connection
between management expenses and income generation has
been more formally severed.

ii)

Oddly enough, and inconsistent with this change, the final
regulation added an example (Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)4(d)(5) Example 7) stating that, if'a pecuniary marital
deduction bequest is not entitled (under state law or the
document) to any income earned by the estate, then the use of
income to pay transmission expenses is not cause to reduce
the marital deduction. Quaere whether this
should have been
I
management expenses and whether it reveals that income
entitlement remains a viable lodestar in this paradigm.

iii)

The preamble to the final regulation contained the following
passage: "the final regulations illustrate the application of
these rules to pecuniary bequests to the surviving spouse. It:
under the terms of the governing instrument or applicable
local law, the recipient of a pecuniary bequest is not entitled
to income earned prior to distribution ... the amount of the
property passing to the surviving spouse or charity for which
a marital or charitable deduction is allowable will not be
reduced even if estate transmission or estate management
expenses are paid out of the income earned by assets that will
be used to satisfy the pecuniary bequest." No provision in the
regulation proper appears to actually establish such a rule at
all for charitable deduction purposes and the only example for
marital deduction purposes is limited to transmission
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expenses, so it may be that this "principle" stated in the
preamble is less than reliable.
(b) The second aspect of the management expense portion of the rule is

quite controversial. An item of history may help to appreciate why.
The swing item election - whether to deduct these various
expenses of administration on the estate tax return (Form 706) or
the estate's income tax return (Form 1041) - was not a factor in
the proposed version of this regulation: there was none of the
"double deduction" nonsense that the Hubert opinion properly
dismissed, except in one tiny (but, again, controversial) respect.
i)

The proposed regulation addressed the problem illustrated by
Estate ofBahr v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 74 (1977), acq.,
1978-1 C.B. 1, by stating that, if the administration expense
deduction was claimed under §2053 on the estate tax return,
and that deduction reduced taxes and thereby increased the
residue, and the residue passed in a deductible manner to the
spouse or a charity, that increase in the residue could not be
reflected in the tax calculation.

ii)

This phenomenon informed an illustration that related solely
to estate management expenses. In this illustration tax
payment is deferred and interest incurred on a loan is
deductible under §2053, which reduces the estate tax, which
increases the residue passing to the surviving spouse or a
qualified charity, which creates a larger deduction, again
increases the residue, and further increases the deduction.
constant, imagine:
Thus, with a §2053 deduction that remains
I
$5..,000,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
50,000

First Trial Calculation
5,000,000
Gross Estate
§2053 deduction
(50,000)
§2055 deduction
(2,000,000)
2,950,000
taxable estate
tax on new taxable
975,000
estate amount (assume)
iii)

gross estate
specific bequests
residuary charitable bequest
assumed tax on $3 million taxable estate
expenses - paid from income

Second Trial Calculation
5,000,000
(50,000)
(2,025,000)
2,925,000
960,000

Third Trial Calculation
5,000,000
(50,000)
(2,040,000)
2,910,000
even less tax
than before

Commentary allegedly attacked that rule and, instead of the
government resisting the ability of taxpayers to leverage
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postmortem administration expense deductions into an everincreasing marital or charitable deduction, it "capitulated"
into a very more egregious provision in the final regulation.
Not subject to comment and of major significance, this
provision quite possibly is invalid (although any challenge is
likely to be a hard fought and expensive battle).
(c) In lieu of the limited but questionable provision in the proposed

regulation, Treas. Reg. §§20.2055-3(d)(3) and 20.2056(b)-4(d)(3)
adopt a hugely expansive and even more controversial dictate that
estate management expenses that are attributable to and paid from
the deductible portion (a clarification confirmed by examining
Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-4(d)(5) Example 3) and deducted under
§2053 reduce the allowable marital or charitable deduction dollar
for dollar, under the questionable authority of §2056(b)(9).
(3)

The net result is that management expenses reduce the deduction
(a) to the extent they are paid from the deductible portion but are
attributable to nondeductible sources or
(b) to the extent attributable to deductible sources and actually claimed

for estate tax (versus income tax) purposes.
(c) Transmission expenses reduce the deduction to the extent paid from

a deductible portion.
(4)

Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-4(d)(5) Example 4 illustrates the government's
approach. The facts are: a gross estate of$3,000,000,I ofwhich $150,000 is
life insurance payable to a child. The decedent's unified credit was
exhausted inter vivos.and the documents provide that the child shall incur
any tax on the insurance proceeds. The balance ofthe estate passes to the
surviving spouse 'and qualifies for the marital deduction. Management
expenses are $150,000, all attributable to and paid from the marital bequest.
They do not constitute a reduction to the deduction because they are
entirely allocable to the deductible portion. Not stated in the example,
presumably these expenses are paid from the marital portion ofthe estate
- there is no other wealth involved from which to make payment.
Calculation oftaxes without application ofthe regulation's new rule is:
gross estate
3,000,000
marital deduction (2,850,000)
§2053 deduction
(150,000)
taxable estate

°
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The rub, according to the regulation itself: is that: "claiming a marital
deduction of$2,850,000 would be taking a deduction for the same
$150,000 in property under both sections 2053 and 2056 and would shield
from estate taxes the $150,000 in insurance proceeds passing to the
decedent's child."
(a) An estate tax will be incurred by the estate here because the marital

deduction is reduced by the $150,000 of §2053 deductions claimed,
but the regulation does not state whether that tax will be paid by the
child or from the probate estate passing to the surviving spouse. If
the latter is the case a circular whirlpool calculation would be
created as marital deduction was lost for the amount of taxes paid
by the marital bequest, causing more tax to be incurred and paid,
causing more deduction to be lost, ad nauseum.
(b) The government's intended resolution.is to claim the $150;000 of

deductions on the estate's income tax return - denying the child
the benefit of those estate tax deductions. Unknown to most
observers, this is the exact opposite of what the government wanted
to happen in Hubert: it offered to settle that case for zero dollars of
estate tax liability if the taxpayer would simply flip its income tax
deductions off the estate's income tax return and take them for
estate tax purposes. This objective is particularly spurious in the
regulation, given that administration expenses generated by
deductible portions of estates have produced estate tax deductions
that have forever benefited nondeductible portions of estates.
(c) This is true merely because the deductible portion (being

nontaxable) never benefits from expenses that are deductible if
applicable local law embraces the concept of~quitable
apportionment (which is the law virtually everywhere): if taxes
incurred by an estate are regarded as the obligation of the portion of
the estate that spawned those taxes, then of necessity deductions
that reduce those taxes "belong to" or "benefit" the nondeductible
portions of the estate. So in essence what this regulation is
attempting to accomplish is a change of many decades of
established estate tax law.
(5)

The regulation wants to accomplish that change by applying §2056(b)(9),
which arguably cannot apply to management expenses because the
reference in §2056(b)(9) is to "an interest in property" that is being
deducted more than once and these expenses - generated postmortem
and basically ignored in the estate tax calculation (if paid pro rata) are not "an interest in property" as that term is used in the Code. At least
not as that concept is interpreted by these regulations, which regard
management expenses as outside the estate tax valuation regime.
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(6)

There is another, more fundamental, matter involving error in these final
regulations. Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-4(d)(5) Example 4 reveals a
fundamental inconsistency of the regulations' approach to management
expenses, and in doing so reveals the heart of the government's
objection. In the process it also shows that the regulation position
regarding §2056(b)(9) is improper. It seems clear that the government
views management expenses as a proper charge to the deductible
portion because they are incurred to generate income or preserve and
manage that portion, which is a right concept: these expenses will be
incurred for the life of the deductible portion and they do not enter into
the calculation of the estate tax value of the deductible portion. That
notion (albeit not economically sound) is consistent with decades of
estate tax administration. Any other approach would raise the same kind
of administrative and valuation impossibility that Hubert itself found it
could not address.
(a) That notion about the nature of management expenses is, however,

inconsistent with saying that a double deduction impropriety is
involved if a §2053 deduction is claimed for those same expenses:
how can it be that items that are outside the estate tax valuation of
the deductible portion - they are not really an estate tax
consideration at all - become an element of value that is included
in the estate tax calculation and represent an improper double
deduction just because the expense is deducted under §2053?
(b) In reality, the problem being addressed is §2053 itself: which is

inconsistent with the very nature of the estate tax, which basically
takes a snapshot at the date of death to determine what is includible
and its value, and what is deductible. Yet postmortem expenses
constitute a ded.1Jction, even those that have nothing to do with
administration of the estate in the transmission expense sense even management expenses that would have been incurred even if
the decedent had not died. If the system worked properly, either
postmortem income and postmortem expenses would all be
considered in the determination of value at the date of death or,
because that is a fundamental administrative impossibility, neither
postmortem income nor postmortem expenses (particularly
management expenses) would be considered.
(c) Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-4(d)(5) Example 7 confirms that the lack

of a postmortem income entitlement does not alter the estate tax
value of the deductible bequest to the surviving spouse - which
itself is inconsistent with Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-4(d)(5)Example
4 suggesting that postmortem expenses do alter the estate tax
treatment. Consistency would say that Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-
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4(d)(5) Example 7 is wrong too, but it is favorable to taxpayers who
make pecuniary bequests to a surviving spouse that do not carry
income or interest under state law and is not likely to be challenged.
(7)

Notice the improbability of what all this does, in terms of timing. If the
wealth transfer tax system is meant to employ a snapshot principle, this
regulation makes it nearly impossible to know the marital or charitable
deduction until estate transmission (and certain estate management)
expenses are known - unless those expenses cannot be paid from a
deductible portion of the estate or are not deducted on the estate tax
return.
(a) Quaere what would happen if the document precluded payment

from the "wrong" source but the fiduciary improperly paid from
that prohibited source anyway. Presumably the result would be to
redress the fiduciary breach and not to adjust the deduction.
(b) Also notice, however, that the document probably should not

dictate or prohibit certain sources for payment. As the illustration in
the spreadsheet below reveals, postmortem administration that
generates a reduction in the deduction may be the best result!
Similarly, although Example 6 in the regulation illustrates that
drafting a bypass trust by reference to the applicable exclusion
amount in a vacuum is not a wise technique, it probably is not
desirable to draft formula marital deduction bequests that will self
adjust to always produce a zero tax result, based in this context on
whether more than a pro rata portion of management expenses are
paid from the deductible portion.
d.

Because estate transmission expenses include taxes, sdme examples in the
regulation illustrate that ~p estate with less, marital or charitable deduction
than needed to reduce taxes to zero will require an interrelated computation
if the deductible portion incurs those taxes. That is not a change, but it
illustrates that residuary marital and charitable bequests pose problems that
might best be avoided by falling back to traditional preresiduary deductible
bequests, even in larger estates. And because the §663(c) separate share rule
regulations as applied to estates create the need to account for a pecuniary
bequest in the same "rolling fraction" manner currently required in fractional
marital or charitable bequest situations, it may pay to reassess entirely the
parameters of marital funding and strongly consider using the pick-andchoose fractional approach.

e.

In the spreadsheet illustration that follows the assumption in the last two
columns is that estate transmission as well as estate management expenses
are paid - using income - from both the marital and nonmarital portions
of the estate, pro rata. Payment of transmission expenses from the marital
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reduces the marital deduction for estate tax calculation purposes. In addition,
the first and last columns posit that the management expenses are deducted
under §2053, causing a reduction of the marital deduction for the amount of
those expenses attributable to the marital portion.

f.

(1)

Notice that, although the marital deduction is reduced, the marital
bequest itself is not changed - neither increased to maintain a zero tax
result nor decreased to match the amount of the deduction. This is a
function of the formula marital deduction bequest used, which in most
drafters' forms otherwise might ratchet the marital bequest to be larger
if the deduction is reduced by virtue of these regulations. Unless the
desirable result illustrated in the fourth column below is to be avoided,
however, this self-adjusting formula may not be desirable.

(2)

Also notice that estate tax incurred because the marital deduction is
reduced is paid from the bypass trust, essentially to avoid further
reducing the marital deduction by virtue of payment of tax from the
marital share. It may pay to push a pencil to see if that further reduction
in the deduction actually pays dividends over both lives.

(3)

Finally, the assumption is that there is enough income in the estate
administration to pay all the expenses from income, and that the spouse
dies after just the first year's income is received and taxed to the two
trusts. All figures reflect the 2000 and 2001 unified credit and,
notwithstanding the assumption of deaths that close together, no effort
has been made to factor into the calculation either the surviving
spouse's overlife or the income yield assumptions to make a §2013
credit calculation.

(4)

The final result illustrated nevertheless requires the estate administrator
to consider how to apportion payment of the expenses, whether to pay
using estate income or principal, and whether to deduct expenses for
estate tax or estate income tax purposes. To determine which approach
is preferable, compare the difference in total wealth on the bottom line
after all the anticipated income and wealth transfer tax. By all accounts
it appears that the last column produces the best results, even with the
regulation reflected and the marital deduction reduced: the taxes saved
over both estates is greater than the difference in total wealth.

If these conclusions are valid, then it would seem that, by all means, the
document should leave all options open by authorizing payment from estate
income or principal. without distinction between estate management and
estate transmission expenses, and authorize deduction on either return.
(1)

Added considerations include whether to adjust the marital bequest to
reflect the reduction - it would appear that not adjusting is the better

G - 64

result economically - and whether to make any adjustment to reflect
all the fiduciary decisions being made that affect the entitlement of the
marital and bypass beneficiaries.
(2)

Note in particular that the authority alone will not pose a threat to the
marital or charitable deduction - it is the source of actual payment and
deduction that appear to be the key.

(3)

Also quaere, however, how the government's administration of this
result will work if estate administration is not complete before a closing
letter is set to issue and expenses of administration might be paid in a
manner that should reduce the deduction: will some form of settlement
agreement or condition on the closing letter be imposed, or in that
context will the authority alone suffice to preclude the deduction? All
these kinds of issues remain to be resolved and the regulation gives no
indication of these practical consequences.

G - 65

Pay All with Bypass
Pay All Pro Rata with Pay All Pro Rata with
Pay All with Bypass
Corpus and Deduct on Corpus and Deduct on fucome and Deduct on fucome and Deduct on
Estate Tax Form 706
Estate Tax Form 706 hlcolne Tax Form 1041 fucome Tax Form 1041
Gross Estate
2005 Applicable Credit Amount

3,000,000
(1,500,000)

3,000,000
(1,500,000)

3,000,000
(1,500,000)

3,000,000
(1,500,000)

Transmission Expense (ETE)
Management Expense (EME)
§2053 Deduction
Formula Optimum Marital
Actual Marital Deduction
Taxable Estate
Bypass Trust Before Tax
Tax on Bypass Trust
Bypass Trust After Tax

(150,000)
(50,000)
(200,000)
(1,300,000)
(1,276,786)
1,523,214
1,500,000
10,446
1,489,554

(150,000)
(50,000)
0
(1,500,000)
(1,500,000)
1,500,000
1,300,000
0
1,300,000

(150,000)
(50,000)
0
(1,500,000)
(1,425,000)
1,575,000
1,500,000
33,750
1,466,250

(150,000)
(50,000)
(200,000)
(1,300,000)
(1,213,333)
1,586,667
1,700,000
39,000
1,661,000

Remaining fucome
Marital fucome
Marital fucome Tax (at 35%)
Net Marital Income
Total Marital Trust

200,000
92,857
32,500
60,357
1,360,357

200,000
107,143
0
107,143
1,607,143

0
0
0
0
1,500,000

0
0
30,333
(30,333)
1,269,667

Bypass fucome
Bypass fucome Tax (at 35%)
Net Bypass Income
Total Bypass Trust

107,143
37,500
69,643
1,559,196

92,857
0
92,857
1,392,857

0
0
0
1,466,250

39,667
(39,667)
1,621,333

Total Wealth
Tax When Spouse Dies
Total Wealth After All Tax

2,919,554
147,161
2,772,393

3,000,000
242,500
2,757,500

2,966,250
190,000
2,776,250

2,891,000
106,350
2,784,650

Note that the frrst column entails
loss of marital deduction because
of prohibited §2053 deduction of
the marital share of the EME. The
third column entails loss of
marital deduction because of
payment of the ETE pro rata from
the marital portion. The fourth
column entails loss of marital
deduction for both reasons.

Al~.. ~alculations assume
death in 2005, a fonnula
provision that does not
self adjust to increase
the marital bequest to
the extent the marital
deduction is reduced
under the Hubert
regulation, and no
§20 13 credit.
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°

Pro rations are based
on size of the marital
and bypass trusts
before tax payment
from the bypass, to
avoid circular
calculation. Tax paid
from the bypass trust
avoids further
reduction of the marital
deduction.

.12. Apportionment of Interest and Penalties. Many state statutes, including the
Uniform and the Revised Uniform Acts, dictate apportionment of interest and
penalties assessed along with the underlying taxes imposed on an estate. See
Rev. Rul. 80-159, 1980-1C.B. 206, and Estate of Simpson v. White, 67 Cal. Rptr.
2d 361 (Ct. Ct. App. 1997) (citing another version of this author's work). In
addition, §2207A(d) and 2207B(d) specifically dictate this result for federal tax
purposes. Unfortunately, this is not a universal rule and, in some states, these
added items are not chargeable in the same manner as the underlying tax. See,
e.g., Estate of Richardson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1193 (1987); and Annot.,
Construction and Application ofStatutes Apportioning or Prorating Estate
Taxes, 71 A.L.R.3d 247 (1976). As illustrated by Estate of Whittle v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 362 (1991), aff'd, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~60,14~
(7th Cir. 1993), and In re Estate ofDetlefs, 418 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1988), interest
on estate tax is not the same as the tax itself and may be chargeable in a different
manner unless the document or applicable state or federal law specifically
provide for it.
13. Apportionment of Credits. Consistent treatment also is lacking with respect to a
number of other important issues that often are ignored or only partially
addressed under state law. For example, only partially recognized under the
Uniform Acts and ignored by many states entirely is the effect of credits.
14. Computing Various Entitlements. A related question is the order in which shares,
taxes, and allocations are to be determined.
a.

For example, federal tax is computed after all deductions are reflected but
the discussion above about whether the marital share is computed before or
after payment of those taxes illustrates that it is not always clear how
computations interrelate for purposes of federal tax, state tax, marital and
other "forced" shares, aria division of the "residue."

b.

Thus, for example, the question may arise whether state law provides that
federal taxes (reflecting all credits) are to be paid from or charged against
the available assets, then any division into shares made, followed by
computation and payment of state death taxes based on the various shares?
(1)

An alternative would be to compute and subtract the federal and state
taxes based on the same amount in the estate, then divide the balance as
provided in the estate plan.

(2)

A third alternative mechanism would be to divide the estate according to
decedent's estate plan, then compute and subtract the federal and state
taxes based on the size of those shares.
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c.

Different approaches may be dictated in different situations:
(1)

For example, the third alternative basically describes the operation of
equitable apportionment whereby a deductible share, such as a marital
or charitable deduction bequest, is computed before taxes while the
balance of the estate is divided after payment of taxes.

(2)

As indicated earlier in discussing the issue of equitable apportionment,
there is no uniformity of approach on these issues; state law must be
consulted to determine the "standard" approach and then the estate plan
should be drafted with any desired changes clearly specified (that is, a
decedent can change equitable apportionment by changing the marital
share from a gross to a net estate division).

15. Apportionment Versus Reimbursement. Also note that, procedurally, the order of
payment of the tax and the apportionment and collection thereof may differ
between jurisdictions.
a.

In some states it may be necessary to pay all taxes before their allocation and
collection, this being the procedure that §§2206, 2207, 2207 A, and 2207B
appear to anticipate (in terms of their right of reimbursement for taxes
already paid).

b.

Other states (apparently including states that have adopted the Uniform
Acts) permit apportionment prior to payment, presumably improving
liquidity by allowing (requiring?) interested parties to contribute liquid
assets rather than require sale of estate assets, followed by reimbursement.

16. Apportionment to Nonprobate Assets. It is not universally established that a
decedent's will may apportion taxes to nonprobate assets in the absence ot: or
contrary to, state law.
..'
a.

If state law calls for apportionment of taxes, a decedent's will may negate
that local apportionment rule by calling for payment of all taxes out of the
probate estate (assuming the decedent's intent is clear).

b.

If state law contains no apportionment authority, or if state law expressly
directs against apportionment, the issue is whether a decedent may
affirmatively direct, by a provision in a will, that taxes will be allocated to
nonprobate assets.
(1)

This is a particularly acute issue if the nonprobate disposition is an
irrevocable transfer as to which the decedent relinquished all rights of
control and in which the decedent included no special payment
directive. Moreover, if the direction is not valid under local law but the
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beneficiary nevertheless accedes and does contribute, the question
answered in the negative by Private Letter Ruling 200027016 - is a
gift made when the taker of nonprobate property contributes to the tax
payment as obligated under state law - may tum the other way if
there is no state law power to compel those nonprobate takers to
contribute but they do so nevertheless.
(2)

Ifa decedent's transfer is incomplete for federal tax purposes (or
otherwise was subject to inclusion), the suggestion is that there is a
correspondingly sufficient nexus to permit the decedent to exert control
by means of a testamentary apportionment provision. Thus, for
example, with respect to §§2037-2039 and 270 1(d), as to which no
federal reimbursement provision exists, maya decedent's will apportion
a share of the total taxes to the assets subject thereto?

c.

A similar but perhaps less severe issue is whether a decedent may direct a
different form of apportionment than that permitted or directed under state
law, again in situations in which a will otherwise would be regarded as
ineffective or alter or amend an irrevocable nonprobate transfer. For
example, if Congress were to amend §2042 to cause inclusion of insurance
owned by and payable to an irrevocable insurance trust, §2206, would allow
reimbursement of the pro rata share of taxes attributable thereto, but could a
decedent's will call for an incremental reimbursement or direct the trust to
pay those taxes directly?

d.

Although the authorities in this respect are not uniform, the better supported
position appears to be that a sufficient nexus to require inclusion for federal
estate tax purposes is a sufficient nexus to permit the decedent to require
. apportionment or to direct a different form of apportiohment than that
specified under state law. See, e.g., United States v. Goodson, 253 F.2d 900
(8th Cir. 1958); and in re King, 22 N.Y. 2d 456, 239 N.E.2d 875 (1968); but
see Warfield v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 147 N.E.2d 809 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
1958) (citing but refusing to follow Goodson). It might be argued that the
maximum amount of tax that could be collected from such property under
§6324(a)(2) (an amount equal to the asset's federal estate tax value) should
be the only limitation on the decedent's power to alter state or federal
apportionment rules.

17. Apportionment to Temporal Interests. The law is relatively clear regarding
apportionment of taxes allocable to life estates and terms of years but significant
variations exist relative to taxes attributable to an annuity.
a.

Section 6 of the Uniform and the Revised Uniform Acts is representative of
the law in most states, specifying that taxes attributable to a life estate or
term of years are to be paid out of corpus, not charged against the temporal
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interest. See, e.g., National Newark & Essex Bank v. Hart, 309 A.2d 512
(Me. 1973); In re Williamson's Estate, 229 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1951); Estate of
Jack v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 272 (1947) (involving charitable remainder
and reduction of charitable deduction by virtue of apportionment rule).

b.

(1)

Although this rule appears inequitable on its face, it actually is sensible,
given the fact that reduction of corpus for the payment of taxes
correspondingly reduces income to be earned thereon and effectively
amortizes the tax allocable to the income interest.

(2)

The rule also is administratively attractive because the present interest
income beneficiary need not contribute toward payment of taxes that
might exceed any income received at the time of tax payment.

With respect to annuities, a different situation is presented because the
annuity may be a guaranteed amount, payable from corpus to the extent
annual income is insufficient. Thus, a reduction of corpus in payment of
taxes allocable to the annuity may not cause a reduction in the amount of the
annuity.
(1)

More importantly, many annuities precede a qualified charitable
remainder in situations in which taxes attributable to the lead annuity
are the only taxes attributable to the entire property (because the
remainder qualifies for the charitable deduction); payment from corpus
not only is inequitable but also will reduce the charitable deduction
under §2055(c). See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.
952 (1984); Rev. Rut. 82-128, 1982-2 C.B.71.
(a) Under the present actuarial and valuation tables, charitable

remainder annuity trusts are more attractive in terms of the
deduction generated. Thus, more annuity trusts than unitrusts are
likely to be drafted.
(b) Unlike the annuity (which is fixed in amount regardless of the

income of the trust), the unitrust interest more closely resembles an
income interest (and, in fact, it may be geared to the annual income
earned by the trust), making the allocation rule seem more equitable
(although it still does not protect the charitable deduction).
Technical Advice Memorandum 9419006 illustrates tJIat a
reduction of corpus correspondingly reduces future unitrust
payments that are a percentage of the annually determined fair
market value of the trust.
(2)

Notwithstanding reasons suggestions that annuities deserve different
treatment than other term interests, the law in most states follows the
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Uniform Acts' approach for term interests in general, causing all taxes
to be paid from corpus.
(a) The comments to §6 of both Uniform Acts state that this result is

mandated by the fact that no other practical solution exists.
(b) Nevertheless, at least one state (New York) has, by statute, dictated

that the proper treatment is to pay taxes allocable to the annuity
interest from corpus and then reissue the annuity to pay a smaller
annual amount as a result thereof See Annot., Construction and
Application ofStatutes Apportioning or Prorating Estate Taxes, 71
A.L.R.3d 247 at §19(b) (1976) and Annot., Liability ofIncome
Beneficiary of Trust for Proportionate Share ofEstate or
Inheritance Tax in Absence ofSpecific Direction in Statue, Will or
Other Instrument, 67 A.L.R.3d 273 at §4(d) (1975).
(c) Even in New York, however, there is authority that the payor of the

annuity is not liable for payment of the tax. See In re Bissell's Will,
130 N.Y.S.2d 103 (A.D. 1954), although this is related to the New
York position with respect to the liability of an insurer for payment
of taxes allocable to proceeds held by the company (as discussed
above).
(d) There is some support for the proposition that the annuitant should

be charged with the full amount of taxes allocable to the annuity,
regardless of the fact that this individual may not have liquid assets
with which to pay that portion of the taxes. See Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1954).
(e)

(3)

One final altern~Jive is recommended by Scoles & Stephens, The
Proposed Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, 43 MINN. L.
REv. 907, 928, (1959), that taxes be paid from the underlying
corpus but be recovered by an amortization assessment against the
annuitant over the life of the annuity itself This approach is
justified on the grounds that the risk of an early termination of the
annuity, prior to full collection of total taxes allocable thereto, is
matched by the benefit to the remainder beneficiaries if the annuity
does in fact so terminate.

In drafting an estate plan, appo·rtionment of the tax burden with respect
to annuities could be addressed, even though the vast majority of plans
do not. Prior to 1984 this may have been an acceptable default in
drafting, but the apportionment issue relating to annuities is
extraordinarily important because of the repeal of all §2039 exclusions
for employee benefits.
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(a) The issue can be avoided if the benefit qualifies for the normal

estate tax marital deduction, if state law recognizes equitable
apportionment.
(b) Similarly, with respect to employee benefit payments made in a

lump sum, no serious issue is raised because the recipient has the
funds to make immediate payment.
(c)

(4)

Otherwise, because federal law does not grant a right of
reimbursement, this likely will be a significant issue because of the
amount of wealth tied up in employee benefit plans.

If the standard rule for apportionment is not followed with respect to
employee benefit annuities, a number of issues are created under the law
relating to qualified employee benefit plans.
(a) For example, if apportionment is applied against a qualified

survivor's annuity, as dictated by §401(a)(II), to the extent the
annuity does not qualify for the §2056(b)(7) marital deduction (for
example, because the automatic election is reversed), would
apportionment somehow violate either the spirit or the letter of
§401(a)(II)?
(b) More directly, with respect to any beneficiary, does the plan permit

or even address apportionment, and without authorization in the
plan or under federal law is apportionment even possible? Certainly
it would affect the plan's assumptions regarding time of payments
I
and its determination of liquidity needs.
,

...

'

(c) Do the anti-alienation or anti-assignment rules preclude

apportionment against the plan?
i)

In this respect Treas. Reg. §1.401(a)-13(b)(2) provides that
the plan shall not preclude enforcement of federal tax levies
under §6331 (which covers any tax) or collection on
judgments from unpaid tax assessments, and §1.401(a)13(c)(2) provides that ~'[a]ny arrangement for the withholding
of Federal, State or local tax plan benefits" is not regarded as
an "assignment or alienation." See Hyde v. United States, 932 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~50,605 (D. Az. 1993) (enforcement
of §6331 levy against plan benefit of taxpayer's surviving
spouse; as a community debt, the survivor's entire benefit
was deemed subject to the government's levy).
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ii)

(5)

Curiously, however, §6324(a)(2), the lien for estate and gift
taxes, by its terms, excepts from its reach the trustee of a
§401(a) employees' trust.

As noted above, there is some talk about adding to the Code a clone of
§2206, 2207, 2207 A, or 2207B to apply with respect to §2039; among
the difficult issues to be addressed in drafting such a law and the will
drafting in response to it (if adopted) are:
(a) Apportionment of not only the underlying estate tax but also any

income tax on plan distributions deemed to be made pursuant to the
right of reimbursement.
(b) Do normal annuity apportionment rules apply, and otherwise how

should taxes be apportioned among various interests (does equitable
apportionment apply, the value of certain credits, and so forth).
(c) May the decedent waive (or alter) this right of reimbursement or

would waiver (or alteration) constitute a prohibited contribution to
the plan in light of Boyd (discussed at page 22 in the context of
§2206)?
(d) May the plan administrator rely without verification on the personal

representative's certification of the amount of reimbursement due?
(6)

Without question, decedents today need to be mindful of tax payment
when selecting death benefit payout options, to insure liquidity will
exist if needed to pay taxes due, considering each of the marital
deduction, the guaranteed spousal annuity rules ot §401(a)(II), the
income tax consequ~nces of all this, and any chronologically or
otherwise exempt amounts.

18. Apportionment of §§2032A and 2057 Recapture Tax. If an estate qualifies for
§2032A special use valuation or the §2057 family-owned business interest
deduction (prior to its repeal after 2003), state law ought to (but virtually always
does not) provide two specific rules:
a.

The benefit of the reduction in value, and the corresponding reduction in tax,
should inure to the benefit of the recipient of the qualifying property. Cf In
re Estate of Martin, 515 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (apportioning
against estate beneficiaries who refused to consent to special use valuation
the increase in tax attributable to their refusal effectively apportioned to
those who did consent the savings attributable to their election).
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b.

This apportionment is appropriate because the tax should be apportioned
against the qualified property if any disqualifying sale or act causes
recapture of the tax benefit. By §§2032A(c)(5) and 2057(i)(3)(F) the
qualified heir is personally responsible for the additional tax on recapture,
but may post a bond to be relieved of that liability and may be able to argue
that decedent's tax clause otherwise overrides this burden.

c.

California's apportionment provision, found in Probate Code §20114,
addresses these issues but in a manner that itself may produce inequities.
(1) According to Klug, The Effect 0/ Special Valuation on Estate Tax
Apportionment: A Plea/or Uniform Legislation, 1 PROBe & PROP. 6
(MarchiApril 1987), the California statute would create an inequity if
the reduction in tax due to §2032A were, say, $97,500 but the qualified
heir's prorate share of the estate tax were only $76,500.
(a) Here the entire liability apportioned to the qualified heir would be
wiped out, and the excess $21,000 of tax benefit would be allocated
to other estate beneficiaries (to avoid wasting it).
(b)

It: however, a subsequent recapture event occurred, the qualified
heir would be required to pay the full $97,500 of tax attributable
thereto. Thus, the other takers would have shared in the benefit but
would bear none of the recapture risk.

(2) Klug notes that the full $97,500 of benefit might be allocated to the
recipient of the qualified property if there were significant tax liability
apportioned to that beneficiary (not all attributable to the qualified
property) against which the benefit could be allocated, but this may not
be the case.
(3) Although the full benefit could be allocated to all takers pro rata, this
would be even more unfair (unless all takers were made responsible for
the recapture tax, which would create administrative problem and
reduce the incentive on the qualified heir to avoid a recapture event).

(4) Klug recommends that, in administering the estate, only a partial
§2032A special use valuation election be made, to reduce the tax by
only the amount of benefit that the qualified heir could enjoy, to avoid
improper dispersion of the benefit.
(5) That alternative does not seem as adaptable to the §2057 context. But in
any case a side agreement might be executed whereby the other takers
would agree to indemnify the recipient of the qualified property to the
extent of the $21,000 excess tax liability.

G -74

d.

Also a problem is the temporal interest rules. If the qualified property were
placed into a trust and the life tenant were the party causing recapture, the
corpus of the trust nevertheless would incur the tax under traditional
temporal interest apportionment, constituting another form of inequity. But
see Estate ofLibeu, 253 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Ct. App. 1988) (income and
remainder beneficiaries required to pay tax).

e.

With respect to all of this, drafters working with §§2032A and 2057 must
consider fashioning a result that is equitable and that reflects the decedent's
intent, all in light of §§2032A(c)(5) and 2057(i)(3)(F) and any relevant state
law. For example, the document might provide that any recapture tax will be
imposed entirely on the income beneficiary if recapture is caused by a
cessation of qualified use, but that the tax will be imposed in a manner that
properly amortizes it against the income and remainder interests if the land
or business interest is sold.

19. Apportionment of §529(c)(4)(C) Recapture. A similar issue can arise with
respect to a death that occurs during the first five years following a contribution
to a §529 education savings plan that took advantage of accelerated annual
exclusions that is subject to recapture if the donor dies before those exclusions
are "earned out." This is a phantom asset in the estate, generating an estate tax
liability, that the document also should apportion. There is no body of law or
general expectations that would inform an outsider asking the question whether
the object of those gifts (the §529 account?) should bear that tax. This issue is
similar to whether any §2035(b) gross up rule tax that is attributable to gifts
made within three years of death should be apportioned to the donee or paid by
the estate in general. Whatever is the decedent's intent ought to be specified
because these are not items about which a body of expectations or general legal
principle would inform a couIj'S decision in the absence of guidance.
20. Apportionment of Income Tax Burdens. Estate planners don't always consider or
draft for the numerous issues that surround payment of wealth transfer taxes, but
they even more frequently overlook the income tax problems that arise in estate
administration. Particularly with respect to changes made in 1986 to Subchapter J
and related areas, tax payment provisions today probably should address several
income tax issues.
a.

Inequitable Sharing ofDNI. Although the separate share rule of §663(c) is
applicable to estates with substantially independent and separately
administered shares for individual beneficiaries, distributions of otherwise
equal portions of an estate can result in a sharing of estate DNI that is not
what the decedent intended or the beneficiaries regard as equitable.
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(1)

The end result of such distributions can be a need to make an equitable
adjustment, if the document does not waive the need therefor. See In re
Estate ofHolloway, 323 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sur. Ct. 1971), modified, 327
N.Y.S. 2d 865(Sur. Ct. 1972), And see Blattmachr, The Tax Effects of
Equitable Adjustments: An Internal Revenue Code Odyssey, 18 U.
MIAMI INST. EST. PLAN. ~1400 (1984); Moore, Conflicting Interests in
Post-Mortem Planning, 9 U. MIAMI INsT. EST. PLAN. ~1900 (1975).

(2)

To avoid the problem entirely, the document may dictate that
distributions be made in such a manner that no inequitable allocation of
estate income will result.
(a) For example, in Harkness v. United States, 469 F.2d 310 (Cl. Ct.

1972), the estate plan called for an equal split of the decedent's
estate, with estate taxes and expenses being payable out of the
estate prior to division but being charged entirely to one of the two
halves.
(b) To maintain the equality dictated by this division, every time the

personal representative paid any tax or expense, a distribution was
made to the other taker in the same amount. Because the case arose
before the separate share rule applied to estates the equalizing
distribution carried out DNI but the payments did not, causing
income to be taxed disproportionately to the share that did not incur
the taxes and expenses. An equalizing adjustment was required so
as to tax DNI in the same equal proportions as the estate was to be
divided.
(c) Under the separate share rule the result would be the same as if the

personal represeJ)tative had been authorized to make equal
distributions to the two shares, then the one share had used its
distribution to pay the taxes and expenses, with each share
receiving equal amounts ofDNI.
(d) If the decedent's intent had been that DNI be shared in the same
proportions as the shares resulting after payment of taxes and
expenses, however, the result reached in Harkness prior to the
adjustment would have been proper, and the separate share rule
would need to be considered in how division and payment were
structured.
(e)

Although the document could have dictated this result, the drafter
did not appreciate or anticipate the problem. Some planners will not
embrace a solution that calls for payment before division because
payment after division may mean that less liquidity exists in the

G -76

share from which payment is to be made and, for other reasons, this
detriment otherwise cannot be avoided.
(f)

b.

c.

Because it is not possible to predict the best result of the client's
intent in all cases, issues such as these simply must be evaluated in
the planning process and the document drafted accordingly.

Tax on Appreciation at Death. If Congress were to adopt the proposed
appreciation estate tax, exacting an income tax on built in gains at a
decedent's death, estate planners would need to consider the payment of this
additional tax liability.
(1)

Estate of Ballard v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 300 (1985), and Rev. Rul.
82-82, 1982-1 C.B. 127, and Technical Advice Memorandum 8203135
provide that the Canadian tax on appreciation at death is not an estate
tax for purposes of the §2014 foreign death credit (however, each
authority permitted a §2053(a)(3) deduction for the tax, as a claim
against the estate, and paragraph.7 of Article XXIXB of the U.S.Canada Convention, signed in 1995, specifically overrides both
authorities and treats the Canadian capital gain at death tax as creditable
under §2014).

(2)

If the tax on appreciation is not an "estate" tax, the typical tax clause
may not speak to the source of its payment.
·

(3)

In addition, allocation of the benefit of any deduction for this tax under
§2053 ought to be considered, particularly if the tax on appreciation
might be imposed on one beneficiary while the benefit of the deduction
inures to another.
'

(4)

In addition, if Congress fails to provide some form of marital deduction
or election to defer the tax until the death of a surviving spouse (or if
such an election were not made), the source of payment of the tax
should be considered so as to prevent the tax obligation from bring an
unexpected or inappropriate §2056(b)(4) reduction of the marital
deduction otherwise available to the estate.

(5)

Finally, if Congress does impose such a tax, drafters will need to
establish whether the tax has an apportionment regime (for example, do
beneficiaries incur the tax generated by assets received by each
beneficiary) and whether that tax liability may be reallocated without
additional income tax cost.

Estimated Tax Burden. As between fiduciary accounting income and
principal, presumably the portion of a trust or estate that produces an income
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tax liability that is subject to estimated tax payment should be charged with
the payment of that tax. And it ought to be the case that a trust will not lose
simple trust status if the trust uses fiduciary accounting income to pay
estimated taxes incurred by income of the trust.
(1)

Wait: how can the income account of a simple trust incur an income tax
liability? The unfortunate answer relates to the loss of deductions under
§67(e).

(2)

Consider an example in which an estate's fiduciary accounting income
is $500,000 and deductions subject to §67(e) are $130,000. If the
expenses were a proper charge against fiduciary accounting income, the
amount available for distribution would be $370,000 and the
corresponding distribution deduction would be $370,000.
(a) The §67(e) threshold amount is 2% of the remaining $130,000 of

income, meaning that $2600 of deductions would be lost, leaving
deductions of 127,400 and taxable income of $2,000 after reflecting
the $600 deduction under §642(b).
(b) With a tax at, say, 36% (applicable, perhaps, because of other

income properly allocable to corpus), the estate would owe $720 of
tax attributable to fiduciary accounting income and an estimated tax
return would be necessary unless one of the estimated tax
exceptions applies. A similar scenario could apply to a trust,
including a simple trust.
(3)

Notice that, in this example, if estate income were used to pay the
estimated tax liability attributable to the income account, then less than
$370,000 of income would be available for distribution, which would
reduce the distribution deduction and increase the amount subject to the
2% threshold, increase the amount of taxable income attributable to the
income account, and thereby increase the taxes incurred by the estate
and properly allocated to the income account. Obviously the allocation
of this income tax burden will be of some significance; it should not be
allocated to corpus if the estate ultimately passes to beneficiaries other
than those receiving current income.

(4)

The problem posed here could be avoided if the deductible items were
paid from corpus, so that a full $500,000 of income were available for
distribution.
(a) This would "give" the benefit of those deductions to the

beneficiaries of estate corpus if distributable net income were
adequate to cover the entire income distribution, in which case the
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income beneficiary would pay for that higher distributable net
income carryout but would have a reduced DNI due to a smaller
§67(e) loss of deductions.
(b) Unless the document provided for such a result, however, the

normal principal and income act rules probably would dictate the
results illustrated in the example (the uncertainty implicit in this
statement being attributable to the fact that the estimated tax rules
were first imposed on trusts and estates in 1987 and, presumably,
no one previously addressed these questions).
(c) Moreover, payment of these items from corpus would hurt the form

of planning involved under Hubert, discussed beginning at page 49.
d.

Without belaboring the point, a similar computation and similar results could
occur under the alternative minimum tax, attributable to items paid from
fiduciary accounting income for which no alternative minimum tax
deduction is available. An alternative minimum tax could be generated and,
ifpaid using income (under normal fiduciary accounting principles),
additional income taxes similarly could be incurred due to a similar loss of
distribution deduction due to the use of income to pay the alternative
minimum tax liability. See Hall, The Application ofthe Alternative Minimum
Tax to Estates and Trusts, 22 U. MIAMI lNST. EST. PLAN ~900 (1988).

e.

Finally, consider that, unlike estate taxes (which normally will be paid, and a
closing letter obtained, before final distribution of an estate), the income tax
liabilities and potential payment responsibilities considered here could arise
several years after an estate has been closed and distributed. In this respect,
fiduciaries need to pay attention to filing the proper §6903 notice of the
termination of fiduciary r_~sponsibility so that, if an income tax assessment is
brought, it is asserted against the proper distributees rather than the
fiduciary.

E. Conflict of Laws and Enforcement Jurisdiction. Perhaps the most perplexing and least
definite issues under the entire apportionment umbrella are whose law should govern
apportionment questions in multiple state estates and how is an apportionment rule in
one state to be enforced against property or beneficiaries in another state, especially if
the law of that other state is at variance with the law of the state calling for
apportionment.
1.

As most litigators well know, the conflict of laws issue often is the most difficult
and least predictable aspect of any controversy, and this certainly is true with
respect to apportionment.
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a.

Based on how it sees the equities of the controversy, an apportionment
question may be one that a court will want to decide a certain way on the
merits, so the court may undertake to resolve the conflict of laws issue in a
manner that allows the court to select the substantive law needed to render
the decision it prefers.

b.

In the conflict of laws arena, looking for a state whose law supports the
result a court may prefer frequently involves a choice of law decision that is
not entirely copacetic under accepted conflict of laws principles.

c.

It probably is fair also to note that courts are prone to adopt their own state's
law if possible, meaning that forum shopping to bring a case in a state whose
law is favorable is a wily litigation tactic.

2.

No reader should undertake to resolve the conflict of laws issue in a given
situation by relying on the following overly generalized synopsis, without also
consulting two extremely helpful summaries of the conflict of laws rules in this
area, being Scoles, Apportionment ofFederal Estate Taxes and Conflict ofLaws,
55 COLUM. L. REv. 261 (1955), along with its sequel in Scoles, Estate Tax
Apportionment in the Multi-State Estate, 5 U. MIAMI INST. EST. PLAN.~700
(1971). See also Annot., What Law Governs Apportionment ofEstate Taxes
Among Persons Interested in Estate, 16 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1951).

3.

Policy Principles. As a policy matter, it probably is unassailable that the law
should favor four essential conflict of laws objectives in this arena, being:
a.

uniformity,

b.

predictability,

c.

d.

4.

.equal treatment of all parts of an estate, regardless of their physical or legal
location for conflict of law purposes, with application of the same rules with
respect to testate and intestate assets, and

equal treatment of various legal issues, applying the same conflict of laws
rules for apportionment as, for example, for testing the validity of a will.

Rules That May Apply. As an example of how confused this area may become,
however, consider the following rules, all of which potentially being applicable
in a particular situation:
a.

With respect to intestate property, the law of the state of the asset's situs
may be applicable, meaning the law of the decedent's domicile with respect
to moveables and the law of the actual situs of the asset with respect to
immoveables (land).
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b.

5.

Regarding testate property, classification of the issue for conflict of laws
purposes will affect the choice of law rules applied; for example:
(1)

If the apportionment question is regarded as either a succession or a
validity question, in all likelihood the law of the decedent's domicile
will govern the choice of law.

(2)

It: however, apportionment is regarded merely as an administrative
question, the law of the situs of the primary estate administration may
be applicable.

c.

If inter vivos nonprobate transfers are involved, either the law of the donor's
domicile at the time of the transfer or the law of the situs of the transferred
property at the time the conflicts issue is resolved may apply for choice of
law purposes (and these could differ).

d.

Regarding apportionment and the use of trusts, the law of the situs of the
trust for administration may govern for choice of law purposes.

e.

Finally, if appointive property is involved, the traditional conflict of laws
rule applies the law of the state of the domicile of the person who created the
power (its donor) on the fiction that appointment relates back to the donor's
estate plan, with the donee (the holder of the power) merely acting as the
donor's "agent" in exercising the power or otherwise with respect to the
appointive assets.
(1)

The conflict of laws rule that the law of the donor's domicile, rather
than that of the powerholder's domicile, shall govern is one of the most
troublesome and lea~t expected conflict rules applicable in the estate
planning arena.

(2)

Professor Scoles suggests that Code §2207 was enacted in large part to
minimize the difficult and unexpected effect of this conflict of laws rule.
See Scoles, Apportionment ofFederal Estate Taxes and Conflict of
Laws, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 261,285 (1955).

Proper Resolution. Professor Scoles also argues that the proper resolution of a
conflict of laws issue in the apportionment setting should follow a two step
analysis.
a.

First, the law of the situs of property should apply to determine whose law
will govern the choice of law question.
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(1)

Thus, if a trust is involved, the choice of law rules of the state of trust
administration should govern with respect to the choice of law issue.

(2)

With respect to transfers at death, situs law also should govern the
choice of law, whether the assets are probate or nonprobate and
regardless of whether administration is domiciliary or ancillary.

6.

To illustrate that this suggestion is not necessarily what the courts of a given
jurisdiction will adopt, the reader need only compare Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963) (law of the decedent's domicile governed apportionment
involving inter vivos trust),with Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 91
N.E.2d 334, 16 A.L.R.2d 1277 (Mass. 1950) (law of situs of trust governed
apportionment).

7.

Insuring Consistent Results. As a consequence, probably the only way to insure
consistent apportionment results is to either:

8.

a.

designate the applicable law with respect to all assets, which cannot be done
in many cases because there is no way to designate the governing law with
respect to some assets, or

b.

provide for tax payment and apportionment that does not rely in any manner
on state law.

Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction issue is whether a personal representative with a
duty to apportion taxes can obtain jurisdiction over takers of nonprobate property
located in other jurisdictions.
a.

Section 8 of both the Uniform and the Revised Uniform Acts provides that
an out-of-state personal r~presentative may bring an action in the enacting
state to obtain reimbursement from a nonprobate beneficiary located in the
enacting state.

b.

Each version of the Uniform Act requires that the state of the decedent's
domicile be a "reciprocity" state to qualify for this privilege; reciprocity is
not always clear in states that are silent on the issue ofjurisdiction over
nonprobate beneficiaries.

c.

Absent a statutory right to bring an action, whether a personal representative
will obtain jurisdiction over a recalcitrant nonprobate beneficiary is
guesswork.

d.

The Uniform Acts (and other state laws as well) grant a right of set off
against the probate share of an individual, allowing the personal
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representative to withhold testate assets pending full contribution with
respect to nonprobate assets that the individual also takes.

e.

III.

(1)

In many cases this is sufficient to cover the apportioned liability,
because the taker of nonprobate property also frequently receives
sufficient probate property to cover the total allocated tax liability.

(2)

This is, however, at best a partial solution if the nonprobate taker
receives a small share of probate property and bears a heavy allocation
attributable to receipt of substantial amounts of nonprobate property.

Professor Scoles suggests that Code §2205 grants a federal right of action to
beneficiaries of an estate who suffer from an inability to apportion taxes
against takers ofprobate property located in another state; this does not,
however, assist in obtaining judgment against out-of-state takers of
nonprobate property who fail to comply with an outside apportionment
dictate of the law of decedent's domicile. See Scoles, Estate Tax
Apportionment in the Multi-State Estate, 5 U. MIAMI INST. EST. PLAN.
~718.2 (1971).

Planning Aspects of the Apportionment Rules.
A. If experience is any guide, even accomplished drafters and estate planners devote
little thought to questions regarding tax clauses once the task of creating formbook
trust and will provisions is complete, and issues such as those discussed below .
frequently never are considered in the context of individual estate plans. Today such a
failure to consider these issues on a routine basis probably is inappropriate, even in
most "normal" situations.
B. Planning and Drafting Issues. The-following segment addresses three basic aspects of
drafting tax clauses in light of the apportionment rules above.

c.

1.

First, a number of glitches and disadvantages can be identified for avoidance in
planning and drafting.

2.

Second, several uncertainties that may affect administration are isolated for
consideration.

3.

Third, affirmative planning choices and their merits are explored.

Glitches to avoid.
1.

Because state law may shift the tax payment liability to nonprobate takers under
applicable apportionment rules, the interests of those takers must be considered
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during administration of the estate to avoid unintentionally affecting their rights
without their knowledge or consent.

2.

a.

If a state court might decide that they are entitled to representation regarding
administrative decisions that affect them, failure to notice or join these
beneficiaries may invalidate certain orders obtained or actions taken during
administration of an estate.

b.

One easy mechanism to avoid this concern (and the general lack of state law
to dictate the requisite form ofjoinder or notice) is simply to direct that all
taxes be paid out of the probate estate.

c.

If negation of apportionment under state law is not appropriate or desirable,
(1)

state law might permit the decedent to indemnify the fiduciary from
liability to nonprobate takers and direct that all decisions of the
fiduciary in the ordinary course of probate administration shall be final,
without notice or joinder.

(2)

On the same theory that a decedent in a nonapportionment state may
allocate taxes to nonprobate assets (because a sufficient nexus exists to
require inclusion of the asset in the first instance), it ought to be
permissible to "disadvantage" or restrict the rights of nonprobate
beneficiaries in this lesser fashion.

The federal reimbursement provisions (§§2206, 2207, 2207A and 2207B) are
not apportionment provisions. Under these sections the estate initially pays its tax
liability and then is entitled to reimbursement.
a.

As a consequence, liquidity may not be where it needs to be and collection
problems may arise or be exacerbated by the existence of multiple
beneficiaries, all subject to these rights of reimbursement. In this respect,
directing apportionment in the first instance rather than preserving these
reimbursement rights many be more expeditious.

b.

In addition, §2207A creates a significant and easily overlooked gift tax
liability if taxes subject to reimbursement are not collected by or on behalf
of the beneficiaries entitled to assert the right of reimbursement.
(1)

During life, gift taxes attributable to relinquishment of any part of a life
estate in qualified terminable interest property are subject to
reimbursement and failure to collect disregarded as an added gift by the
surviving spouse who relinquished the income interest.
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c.

(2)

Similarly, at death, failure to collect the §2207A reimbursement of taxes
caused by §2044 inclusion may result in a gift (even if collection would
have proved impossible) ifbeneficiaries of the §2044 property differ
from recipients of the surviving spouse's estate. See Treas. Reg.
§20.2207A-I (a). This problem presumably is avoided if the surviving
spouse's estate pours over in the QTIP trust (or passes as that trust does)
so that the same beneficiaries are both benefited and hurt by the failure
to assert the reimbursement right.

(3)

One difference between the inter vivos and testamentary consequences
of §2207A is that the right of reimbursement at death may be waived,
with a concomitant relief from this gift tax consequence. See Treas.
Reg. §20.2207A-l(a).

If a gift occurs due to a failure to either waive or assert a right of
reimbursement, that gift will be the result of the personal representative's
failure to act, while the gift (and therefore the tax to be paid thereon) is
regarded as made by the beneficiaries affected by this inaction.
(1)

It seems entirely possible that those beneficiaries will be unaware of the
fiduciary having caused this gift, meaning that a return may not be filed
and substantial interest and penalties may be imposed.

(2)

Especially if a non-professional personal representative is involved,
(s)he should be made aware of the gift tax exposure, perhaps by
including a warning to the personal representative to this effect in both
the QTIP trust and in the surviving spouse's estate plan.

d.

In addition, §2207A may produce an unexpected inequity attributable to
QTIP property being tax~d at the highest estate tax rate applicable to the
surviving spouse's estate, if that property passes to the settlor's remainder
beneficiaries and the surviving spouse's property passes to the survivor's
beneficiaries and the parties expected that the aggregate tax burden would be
shared proportionately.

e.

Unfortunately, although it would eliminate all these problems, waiver of the
right of reimbursement may leave taxes of such magnitude (caused by
inclusion of the QTIP trust in the surviving spouse's estate) that probate
assets are insufficient to pay those taxes; in such a case waiver alone is not a
viable alternative. Nor would waiver be necessary ifno gift would result
(due to identity of the beneficiaries).

f.

In most cases, the better approach is to waive federal reimbursement rights
but preserve all state law apportionment rights, except with respect to
specifically designated assets or classes of assets.
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3.

Temporal Interests. A third negative result of the apportionment rules in most
states relates to the manner in which taxes attributed to annuities, life estates, and
terms certain are allocated.
a.

Because paid out of principal in most cases, it is possible for the taxes on a
lead beneficiary's interest to diminish the share of the remainder
beneficiaries. Thus, for example, if §2207A applied to a QTIP trust that
continued after the surviving spouse's death for the life of a secondary
income beneficiary, remainder to a third party, the income beneficiaries
presumably would be protect - except to the extent a reduction in corpus
reduces income therefrom and essentially amortizes the tax burden.

b.

If the lead interest is nondeductible but the remainder qualifies for either the
marital or charitable deduction, the conse~uence of this apportionment rule
is to reduce the size of the deduction, increasing taxes as a direct
consequence and thereby increasing the diminution of the deductible
amount, again increasing the taxes incurred, ad infinitum.
(1)

By way of example, if a trust required income to be paid to parent for
life, remainder to surviving spouse, the remainder would qualify for the
marital deduction.

(2)

Similarly, qualified charitable remainder trusts present the same
problem.

c.

In such cases in states that embrace both equitable apportionment and the
apportionment rule allocating taxes attributable 'to a lead interest to the
remainder, the result is a conflict, usually resolved in favor of forcing corpus
to pay, with unfavorable results for deduction purposes.

d.

Resolution of this problem would require taxes on the lead interest to be
directly apportioned to the lead interest (rather than indirectly doing so by
amortization), itself creating a problem of how those taxes are to be charged.

.

_'

(1)

For example, if the taxes are substantial, will the lead interest
beneficiary be able to pay the cost of an immediate apportionment?

(2)

It is no solution to charge the tax to corpus and argue that this
necessarily reduces the income interest over time, because the charge to
corpus reduces the deduction.
It might be possible to "borrow" from corpus the amount of taxes
attributable to the lead interest, with repayment out of income earned
over time or reduction of an annuity; however, in a qualified charitable
remainder trust, such a loan may constitute a prohibited form of self-

(3)
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dealing and reduction of the annuity would affect computation of the
deduction.

4.

e.

Alternatively, waiver of apportionment entirely may avoid the problem if
another fund exists for tax payment purposes and imposition of the tax
liability also will not reduce available deductions.

f.

Section 2207B(e) provides that no taxes will be apportioned under §2207B
to a qualified charitable remainder trust and appears to be directed at
preventing reduction of the charitable deduction by virtue of the split interest
apportionment rules.

Employee Benefits. Similar to the preceding discussion, taxes attributable
employee benefits includible in the estate under §2039 must be considered.
a.

Thus, if the benefits are payable in annuity form, the temporal interest issue
discussed above exists, with the same set of available solutions.

b.

If the recipient is the decedent's surviving spouse and a marital deduction is
sought, equitable apportionment must be considered.

c.

In each case in which apportionment is considered with respect to employee
benefits, the planner must carefully consider beneficiary designations and
the terms of the plan.
(1)

If the settlement of the plan is not in a lump sum, can the beneficiary
afford to pay taxes imposed by apportionment?

(2)

If not, does the plan permit apportionment against the plan itself?

(3)

If the answer to both these questions is no, then the planner must
consider some other beneficiary designation, or some other source for
payment of the tax. All other things being equal, it probably is wiser to
impose tax on the beneficiary, not on tHe plan, and then attempt to
provide the beneficiary with the funds to pay that tax, thereby avoiding
plan restrictions, §401(a)(11) concerns, and so forth.

(4)

The planner also must pay careful attention to whether the spousal
annuity rules will prevent the type of payout otherwise desired.

(5)

In a community property jurisdiction, it also is necessary to consider
inclusion in the estate of a nonparticipant spouse of his or her
community property interest and whether it will qualify for the marital
deduction or generate tax that probably cannot be allocated to the plan

._'
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and may not be apportionable elsewhere because the participant is not
yet in pay status.
(6)

Finally, the income tax consequences of the payout option selected, and
of the tax apportionment selected, also should be considered.

5.

As a practical matter, estate planners must consider whether the breadth of
nonprobate assets is such that apportionment would be difficult (if not
impossible) to administer and, if so, whether the tax clause should waive
apportionment or reimbursement (at least with respect to certain assets or classes
of property). With all the various forms of nonprobate property and taxes that
may be involved, however, it seems unlikely that blanket waiver of all
apportionment or rights of reimbursement will be appropriate or feasible. This
reality informs several provisions in the sample tax clause found beginning at
page 127, particularly paragraphs 1.2.6.4 and 1.4.4.

6.

Finally, as noted above, in some states it is uncertain how various computations
and allocations are to be made and in what order, in which case the estate plan
should establish the mechanism and dictate apportionment consistent therewith.

D. Administration Uncertainties. During (and in anticipation of) estate administration, a
number of uncertainties or problems may affect the personal representative and ought
to be considered at the time the estate plan is prepared.
1.

Effect of Audits. One is the effect that an audit will have on the determination of
estate and inheritance taxes and the apportionment and collection thereof
a.

Ifvalues change, resulting in either a change in taxes payable or simply a
readjustment in the relative size of various shares, anY'previously
determined allocation of taxes under an apportionment routine will be
affected. This will be parlicularly true in a state that imposes different wealth
transfer tax rates, based on degrees of consangui~ity, if property subject to
the audit changes passed to beneficiaries in different degrees and the rate
differential is apportioned under state law.

b.

The issue is whether it is prudent to distribute the bulk of an estate prior to
final determination and collection of taxes. This issue is addressed in the
sample tax clause found beginning at page 127, paragraph 1.4.3.

c.

The planner should consider whether needs of the beneficiaries are such that
a mechanism must be established for early distributions with allocation of
taxes secured by a lien, bond, repayment agreement, or other method, or
whether apportionment should be waived entirely (or waived with respect to
changes resulting from audit).
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2.

Collection.. Problems of collection and asserting jurisdiction over nonprobate
takers should be considered before the death of a client, with measures taken to
alleviate potential problems by waiving apportionment or assuring an ancillary
administration in the beneficiary's domiciliary state to obtain jurisdiction. This
issue is addressed in the sample tax clause found beginning at page 127,
paragraph 1.4.4.

3.

Conflict of Laws. Conflict of laws issues should be anticipated, especially if a
change of the client's domicile is likely or if a conflict of laws battle is
anticipated because of the nature and location of nonprobate assets.
a.

This probably is the easiest potential problem to address, with the estate plan
adopting either or both of two defensive procedures.

b.

First, the estate plan may dictate the method of apportionment (if any)
desired, thereby alleviating the vagaries of state law and uncertain
application of any state's rules.

c.

Second, the estate plan may dictate the law that should apply, making certain
that there is a substantial relation of the client's estate or estate plan to the
jurisdiction whose law is selected (and that the policies of the governing law
state do not violate any strong conflicting policy of any state that might be
deemed to have the most significant relationship to the client's estate).

E. Planning Choices. Based on all the foregoing, the following segment attempts to
indicate all the affirmative planning options or decisions required with respect to
apportionment.
1.

Marital Deduction. Effective apportionment of taxes may restrict the entitlement
of a surviving spouse.
a.

b.

For example, if the client selects a qualified terminable interest property trust
format for marital deduction purposes because the client wants to tie the
hands of the surviving spouse,
(1)

the likelihood of the spouse electing against the estate to take a statutory
forced share outright is greater than if the spouse were given more
control, and

(2)

the client's choice of such a "handcuff' trust for the spouse may
indicate that minimization of a statutory forced heir share would be
appropriate.

This outline is not the proper forum to discuss available methods to
effectively reduce the size ofa client's estate for forced share purposes, but
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apportionment of taxes is a planning tool that may assist in accomplishing
this objective.

c.

(1)

In states that recognize equitable apportionment, the share of the spouse
will be computed before determination of taxes; the forced heir share
will be larger because taxes are not charged against it.

(2)

Although the concept of equitable election in most states will prevent a
tax clause from working to the benefit of a surviving spouse who elects
against the estate, it may be possible in a tax clause to specify that
equitable apportionment will not apply if the spouse elects against the
estate. Such a provision might not be valid. See, e.g., RockIer v.
Sevareid, 691 A.2d 97 (D.C. Ct. App. 1997), holding that the elective
share in the District of Columbia was computed before tax due to
equitable apportionment and that the decedent's will, which imposed the
tax liability on the residue without apportionment, was not effective to
alter this because the spouse's election had the effect of rejecting all
provision in the will that affected the spouse's entitlement.
Nevertheless, it probably cannot hurt to attempt to override a state law
equitable apportionment result by specifying in the client's tax clause
that taxes shall be apportioned without regard to the marital deduction if
the spouse elects against the decedent's estate plan.

Charitable Remainder oTIP Trust. The Journal of Taxation carried a number
of letters in its "Shop Talk" section that indicated some doubt about the
effect of tax payment on the combined marital and charitable deduction'
under a plan leaving a life estate to a surviving spouse in a §2056(b)(7)
qualified terminable interest trust with remainder to charity. See 59 J TAX.
287 (1983) and 60 J. TAX. 200 (1984).
I
.•..

(1)

In essence, the question was whether imposition of tax at the death of
the surviving spouse under §2044 would cause diminution of the
remainder that otherwise would qualify for the charitable deduction.

(2)

The argument that it might is circular, based on a logic that any tax
imposed would reduce the remainder which would reduce the deduction
which would result in tax in the first instance that would then befall the
remainder, ad infinitum.

(3)

In reality, because §2044 calls for inclusion at the surviving spouse's
death and §2055 will grant the surviving spouse a full charitable
deduction (as if the property had been owned outright by the surviving
spouse and transferred directly to the charity), there should be no taxes,
the net effect being a wash.
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(4)

d.

It might be appropriate to preclude any argument by the IRS to the
contrary by simply negating the effect of §2077A, avoiding the
suggestion that taxes under §2044 are automatically payable from the
remainder under that section's apportionment rule; such negation must,
however, come in the will of the surviving spouse who is otherwise
entitled to its benefit and, in an outside apportionment state, the
surviving spouse also ought to negate that dictate to impose tax on the
spouse's probate estate.

Partial QTIP Election. If only a partial qualified terminable interest election
is made, perhaps taxes generated by that decision should be paid out of the
nonelected portion of the marital deduction trust. See Private Letter Ruling
8301050 and Comm. Rep., Death Tax Clauses in Wills and Trusts:
Discussion and Sample Clauses, 19 REAL PROP., PROBe & lRUST J. 495, 509510 (1984). This issue is addressed in the sample tax clause found beginning
at page 127, paragraph 1.2.3.5.
(1)

By proper accounting, this decision should not affect the amount
includible at the death of the surviving spouse, at least if equitable
apportionment applies, because taxes would not be paid from the
qualified portion in any event.

(2)

Forcing payment of taxes from the nonele'cted portion of the QTIP trust
has the advantage of preventing an alteration of the decedent's estate
planning equities if the QTIP and decedent's bypass trusts benefit
different remainder beneficiaries. Otherwise, payment from the bypass
trust of taxes incurred by virtue of a partial QTIP election would shift
taxes from the death of the surviving spouse (under §2044) imposed on
the QTIP trust (under §2077A) to the death ofthe'decedent, imposed on
the bypass (assuming that is how the decedent's tax clause otherwise
apportions all taxes avoid reduction of the marital deduction).

to

(3)

To work properly and without conflict with the Service, the qualified
and nonqualified portions of the marital trust physically should be
segregated following election, making it easier to identify each and to
justify the apportionment of taxes to the nonqualified portion without
jeopardizing the marital deduction for the qualified portion.

(4)

Further, Private Letter Ruling 8517036 illustrates that it is important to
draft the provisions of the nonqualified portion in such a way that
making taxes payable from that portion will not affect deductibility of
the elected portion.
(a) In that Ruling, the effort was to qualify a bypass trust that contained

a tax payment provision. Had the government allowed the 100%
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election sought by the estate, there would have been no taxes and
the provision authorizing payment of taxes from that bypass trust
would have had no effect.
(b) As it was, however, the government opined that §2056(b)(4)

required reduction of the otherwise allowable marital deduction by
the full amount of taxes that could have been paid from that trust in this case, as if no marital had been elected.
(c) In the context presented here, the thought is that taxes be made

payable from the nonqualified portion only if it is a separate trust to
which the nonelected property is added and that it be drafted in
such a manner that it is clear that no part of the otherwise qualifying
marital property could be diverted to the payment of taxes.
e.

Disclaimer. A similar concern should apply if the surviving spouse disclaims
part of the marital bequest, causing taxes to be incurred. These taxes also
should be payable from the disclaimed property and, if the disclaimer would
send the property to grandchildren or more remote beneficiaries, incurring a
generation-skipping direct skip tax, that tax also probably ought to be
imposed on the disclaimed property. This issue is addressed in the sample
tax clause found beginning at page 127, paragraph 1.2.3.5.

f.

Order of Events. Finally, some thought ought to be given to the proper
sequence for payment of taxes in relation to division of an estate into shares
under a fractional marital deduction entitlement or in conjunction with a
partial qualified terminable interest election.
(1)

For example, assume that the decedent's estate plan or a partial election
called for a marital deduction of a certain fraction of the estate (not that
amount needed to reauce taxes to zero) and, because of other assets
passing to the spouse, the amount specified totals $1,000,000 to be set
aside (by fractional distribution or qualified election) for the benefit of
the surviving spouse.

(2)

Accepting that equitable apportionment dictates that no taxes be paid
from the marital share, a question still remains regarding division and
payment of taxes.
(a) In this case, assume that the estate was $4,000,000 at death and that

taxes imposed on the nonmarital estate (including nonprobate
properties) total $1,000,000, leaving $3,000,000 after payment of
the tax (of which $1,000,000 is to" qualify for the marital
deduction). '

G - 92

(b) Before the time for final distribution of the estate (but after payment

of the taxes), assume that the remaining $3,000,000 increases
fourfold in value to $12,000,000 (which is not entirely unlikely if
the proper assets exist, and in any event the illustration is easier
with these assumptions).
(c) At the time for final distribution of the spousal share or segregation

of the elected and nonelected QTIP portions, is the proper fraction
one-third of the $12,000,000 or one-fourth? (Note that, in all of this
discussion, it is assumed that no other distributions are made that
would require adjustment of the fraction. Although this also is not
realistic in practice, again it makes the illustration easier.)
i)

The one-third argument is based on an assumption that the
decedent was directing a fraction of the true or net residue,
after payment of all taxes, with the fraction being
$1,000,000/3,000,000 to generate the proper sized entitlement
using date of death values.

ii)

The one-fourth argument is based on an assumption that the
decedent was directing a fraction of the gross residue, before
payment of all taxes, with equitable apportionment dictating
that all the $1,000,000 of taxes be paid from the nonmarital
share, making the spouse entitled to $1,000,000/4,000,000
and the remaining three-fourths bear the taxes after division.

(d) Under either argument, the government appears to have no problem

with the marital entitlement being $1,000,000 (using date of death
values), protecting qualification of the marital deduction.
(e) Obviously, however, the issue is worthy of consideration because,

in this simple example, the difference in result between one-third or
one-fourth of the $12,000,000 ultimately available is a modest
$1,000,000 to the spouse. Indeed, because the same fraction would
affect distribution of estate income during administration, the stakes
can be even greater.
(t)

If a client's intent is to freeze the spouse's estate to the extent
possible, or to maximize the amount of generation-skipping
exemption allocated to a bypass trust, the one-fourth of gross estate
fraction is best. Most drafters probably call for the one-third
division, however, either by inadvertence or because that result best
protects the surviving spouse.
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(3)

Notice that the issue is not determination of the size of the deduction,
nor is it whether equitable apportionment should apply; the simple issue
is whether taxes are paid first, followed by division, or whether division
occurs first, followed by payment out of the nonmarital fund.

(4)

The estate plan (and, for that matter, any prenuptial agreement that
dictates such a bequest) ought to be clear in defining terms such as the
"residue" available for division or distribution and whether it is being
referred to as that amount before or after payment of taxes.

(5)

See, e.g., Barley v. Albertini, 694 So. 2d 843 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997), in
which the tax payment provision preceded all other provisions in the
document and directed payment from the "residuary estate," along with
the proviso that "[I]n no event shall any portion of such taxes be
apportioned or allocated to my spouse or any property passing to my
spouse ... which qualifies for the marital deduction." Two paragraphs
below this the marital trust was described as "90% of the remainder of
my estate ... after the payment of ... taxes ... referred to above." The
trial court held that taxes should be paid first and the marital trust
created out of the remaining balance, meaning that 90% of the taxes
effectively would be paid from the marital bequest. On appeal the court
reversed and remanded because an ambiguity existed. Between the
inconsistent statements in the two provisions - relating to
nonapportionment to the spouse and division after payment - along
with the different terms used in the two provisions, this conclusion
appears to be an understatement.

(6)

See also Leavenworth Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7046 (D. Kan. 1996) (direction to pay taxes from
residue of estate "wjlhout the necessity of charging them against the
interest of any beneficiary," followed by pour over of the residuary
estate to an inter vivos trust, which distributed half to the decedent's
surviving spouse, deemed to negate equitable apportionment because of
the chronology and the documents in which the payment and the
bequest appeared); Banker v. Northside Bank & Trust Co., 1996 Ohio
App. LEXIS 930 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (division equally between
decedent's surviving spouse and child ofa former marriage, with the
chronological order in which the provisions appeared in the document
- pay taxes first, then divide - deemed significant in determining that
the marital share should be computed net of estate taxes; state law
equitable apportionment deemed overcome by a statement in the tax
payment provision that the fiduciary "shall not seek to recover ... taxes
from any Beneficiary").
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(7) A similar problem involving the charitable deduction is illustrated by
two conflicting cases: Greene v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 885 (N.D.
Ill. 1978), and In re Estate of Bell, 764 P.2d 689 (Wy. 1988), in which
the court held that the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act was
superseded by a tax payment provision directing payment of all taxes
from the residue of the decedent's estate. See also In re Estate of
Robinson, 720 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) (reformation of tax
payment direction to change from payment before division into marital
and nonmarital bequests to provide instead for division followed by
payment from the nonmarital alone); American Cancer Society v. Estate
of MasseII, 373 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. 1988) (decedent bequeathed portion of
undefined "said estate" to charity; court determined that,
notwithstanding tax payment provision calling for division of residue
after payment of taxes, decedent did not intend to reduce the residue
before division and adopted a gross estate division that effectively
reflected equitable apportionment and preserved charitable deduction).
(a) In Bell the residuary provision included two charitable bequests of a
fraction of the residue; the charities argued that equitable
apportionment should apply so that a gross residue division would
be made and all taxes would be paid from the noncharitable portion
of the residue.
(b) The court concluded that the tax payment direction overrode all
portions of the Uniform Act, including equitable apportionment,
and held that net estate division was mandated by the chronological
aspect of the will, directing payment of taxes and then division of
the balance of the residue.
(c) Consistent abo~! Greene is that the court also applied a
chronological interpretation, by which division and payment of
taxes was deemed to occur in the order in which the respective
provisions were found in the documents. That approach is not
always best, nor do courts always follow it, making proper
anticipation of these issues essential in the initial drafting of the
document and each of its provisions.
(d) The court did not even mention the effect of this conclusion on the
§2055 charitable deduction, nor did it discuss equitable
apportionment as a matter of policy that might guide its decision.
Similar cases are In re Estate of Robbins, 544 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sur.
. Ct. 1989), In re Estate of Atkinson, 539 N.Y.S. 112 (A.D. 1989),
and Technical Advice Memorandum 9616001 (debts, expenses, and
taxes attributable to preresiduary bequests were payable from
residue and reduced amount charity received by virtue of partial

G - 95

disclaimer by decedent's sibling, but equitable apportionment
applied within a residuary bequest split between the charity and the
sibling and assessed all taxes incurred by the residue against the
sibling's share). And see Estate of McKay v. Commissioner, 68
T.C.M. (CCH) 279 (1994), in which a §2055(c) reduction of the
charitable deduction squarely was involved under a similar tax
payment provision in a will that was found to overcome equitable
apportionment within the residuary estate.
2.

Use of Credits. Apportionment of the benefit of credits available to the estate
under §§2010 through 2015 also should be considered.
a.

The general rule is that, excepting credits attributable to charges actually
borne by the recipient of a particular asset, these credits work to the overall
benefit of the estate, not to the benefit of any particular beneficiary.

b.

The client may, however, prefer that the recipient of property subjected to a
foreign death tax be granted the benefit of the credit therefor,
notwithstanding the general rule.

c.

Failure to consider the effect of credits under general allocation rules can
work unexpected consequences.
(1) For example, lack of apportionment in an estate can work an unintended
inequity with respect to the §2013 credit available to the estate ofa
beneficiary who dies within ten years after the client.
(a) On death of that beneficiary, taxes paid by the client's estate on
property subsequently included in the beneficiary's estate qualify as
a §2013 credit ~gainst the beneficiary's estate taxes.
(b) If the taxes paid by the client's estate (generating the credit) were
not originally charged against that beneficiary, the result is the
beneficiary's estate enjoying a credit generated by the payment of
the client's estate taxes by other individuals.
(2) In certain circumstances it might be appropriate to preserve
apportionment so that each beneficiary is obliged to pay the tax on the
property (s)he receives, thereby "paying" the price for any possible
§2013 credit that ultimately many be generated.

d.

With respect to property transferred by gift by the client during life, the
result of the normal sharing of credits could cut either way.
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(1) If the gifted property subsequently is included in the client's estate
under any of §§2035-2038, 2040, or 2042, the donee may be required by
apportionment to bear a pro rata portion of estate taxes allocable to the
gifted property, which may be an amount well in excess of the actual
gift taxes incurred by the decedent at the time the gift was made. This
would be true particularly with respect to life insurance, with its low gift
tax value but much greater estate tax inclusion, and apportionment to
the beneficiary is especially appropriate with respect to insurance
because the proceeds provide such a ready source of liquidity and the
tax could be such a large liability.
(2) If the donee is not required to bear a portion of the estate tax caused by
inclusion of the gifted property, the donee enjoys the benefit of credits
that otherwise are reserved to the estate as a whole.
(a) If the donee is not a beneficiary of the estate, the donee "enjoys"

estate tax credits because the gifted property is included in the
adjusted taxable gifts base for estate tax computation purposes but
the donee is not required to contribute to the taxes caused by that
inclusion. See, e.g., In re Metzler, 579 N.Y.S.2d 288 (App. Div.
1992), and In re Estate of Coven, 559 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sur. Ct. 1990)
(apportionment against taxable gifts that are not included in the
decedent's gross estate is not permitted notwithstanding that the gift
pushes the estate into a higher marginal bracket for estate tax
computation). And see In re Estate ofDetlefs, 418 N.W.2d 571
(Neb. 1988), which denied to the donees of inter vivos gifts the
exclusive benefit of the credit for gift tax paid by the decedent's
estate, noting that the gifts increased the tax burden of all
beneficiaries of the estate and that the estate i~ general therefore
should benefit from the' gift tax payment.
(b) Indeed, the gift may have "used" the unified credit long before the

client's death. For example, see In re Estate ofFinke, 508 N.E.2d
158 (Ohio 1987), which involved nonprobate assets transferred
within three years of the decedent's death but included in the estate
for state (but not for federal) estate tax purposes.
i)

Because the unified credit precluded a gift tax on the inter
vivos transfers, the court held that the unified credit was a
"credit directly attributable to a particular ... gift [which]
shall inure to the benefit of the ... donee" under Ohio Rev.
Code §2113.88.

ii)

With that entitlement, the court held that apportionment of tax
to the inter vivos donees was precluded because the credit
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exceeded the state tax liability on the gift. In essence,
therefore, those donees enjoyed the unified credit to the
exclusion of other objects of the donor's bounty.
(c)

Contra, Shepter v. Johns Hopkins University, 637 A.2d 1223 (Md.
Ct. App. 1994), which held that taxes otherwise payable from the
residue of the decedent's estate, which passed to charity, should be
apportioned against the beneficiary of an inter vivos gift that
constituted an adjusted taxable gift and boosted the estate tax
marginal bracket but otherwise was not includible in the decedent's
gross estate for estate tax purposes (and apparently did not generate
a gross-up tax problelTI under §2035(b) either), stating that full
apportionment as adopted in states that enacted the Uniform Estate
Tax Apportionment Act should include donees of gifts that are
included in the estate tax computation. By ch. 55 of Acts 1995 the
Maryland legislature effectively rejected the result in Shepfer,
stating that the reference in Md. Code Ann., Tax-General §7308(a)(4) to persons to whom estate tax may be apportioned does
not include the recipient of an adjusted taxable gift from the
decedent that is not includable for estate tax purposes,
"notwithstanding any holding or dictum to the contrary in Shepfer
v. Johns Hopkins University."

(d) The client may wish to consider whether some fonn of adjustment

should be dictated so that recipients of assets during life are not
placed at an advantage over beneficiaries who receive shares of the
estate at death; waiver of apportionment may be the only way to
insure that all beneficiaries receive their shares tax free (but this
form of equalizing various shares will work only if a fund will
remain for paYIl}~nt of taxes after all equalizing bequests have been
satisfied).
(e) More importantly, it should be remembered that use of the unified

credit during life generates a larger benefit than use at death,
meaning that the inter vivos donee is favored even if credits
otherwise are shared by a waiver of apportionment provision.
i)

For example, a client who wanted beneficiaries A and Beach
to receive $1,000,000 in value at the time of the client's death
could follow either of two approaches.
(A) The client could leave each $1,000,000 at death.
(B) Alternatively, the client could presently transfer a
remainder interest in property that will be worth
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$1,000,000 at the client's death (and, for the sake of
argument, avoiding §2036(a)(I) inclusion at death by
transferring the intervening life estate to another party).
(C) For gift tax purposes, the value of the transferred
remainder would be the discounted present value of
$1,000,000 and the gift tax on that discounted value
would be less than the estate tax on $1,000,000 at the
client's death due to both the discounting and the tax
exclusive nature of the gift tax.
(D) Even if each beneficiary were required to bear the
proportionate taxes allocable to the interest each
received, that would impose the tax on a gift of only the
discounted value if made during life rather than the tax
on a full $1,000,000 if made at death (or if the gifted
property were included in the gross estate).

(t)

ii)

If the client wanted to equalize the treatment of the
beneficiaries by adjusting for use of the unified credit during
life, any tax allocation to beneficiaries should reflect the
value of their respective entitlements - determined at the
same time, not at the time the various transfers were made and reflect the time-use value of any monies the donee used
to pay taxes on the gift prior to the client's death. This issue is
addressed in the sample tax clause found beginning at page
127, paragraph 1.2.1.3.

iii)

Although a net gift approach would avoid some of the
inequity considered here (because the donee loses the use of
the donee's money), the tax bracket at which the tax would be
imposed might be lower by virtue of the gift and discounting
technique, and the DuPont effect would benefit the donee.
Furthermore, the net gift approach would not be available
until the unified credit is exhausted. Rev. Rut. 79-398, 1979-2
C.B. 338. This issue is addressed in the sample tax clause
found beginning at page 127, paragraph 1.2.3.1.

A closely related planning issue was raised by gifting done by the
decedents whose estates were involved in Private Letter Ruling
9339010, Armstrong v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 94 (2000), and
Brown v. United States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ~60,424 (C.D. Cal.
2001), who made substantial gifts and paid millions in gift tax
within three years of death, triggering application of the §2035(b)
gross up rule in the decedents' estates at death. Inclusion ofthe gift
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tax in the decedents' gross estate produced estate tax, sometimes
exceeding the amount of the decedents' remaining probate estates
available for payment of that liability. This issue is addressed in the
sample tax clause found beginning at page 127, paragraph 1.2.1.2.
i)

Although the taxpayer in the Ruling only asked it to compute
the decedent's estate tax, the government opined that "under
State law, the federal estate taxes are to be apportioned"
among the donees of the gifts, citing no authority (which
made it impossible to verify the government's conclusion; a
computer assisted search as well as discussions with several
commentators who have extensive experience in this area
were unsuccessful in determining that any state has a tax
apportionment rule that is on point).

ii)

The Ruling did not establish the donee's responsibility to pay
the tax as either a gift tax or estate tax transferee liability
under §6324, although Armstrong establishes that it could.
(A) The tax is not a gift tax imposed by chapter 12 as required
for application of §6324(b) gift tax transferee liability.
(B) But estate tax transferee liability under §6324(a)(2),
which applies to any "beneficiary, who receives, or has
on the date of the decedent's death, property included in
the gross estate under §§2034 to 2042, inclusive, to the
extent of the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of
such property," is made applicable by §2035(c)(I)(C),
l
which deems the gifted property to be includible in the
gross..estate for purposes of the lien provisions.
(C) Thus, although it is not accurate to consider the donees as
receiving the property t~at produced the estate tax
(because the federal government received the gift tax
upon which the estate tax was incurred), the lien
nevertheless exists. Curiously, however, the Ruling did
not depend upon this analysis or even mention
§2035(c)(1)(C). More curious yet is: If this federal law is
the relevant authority, it is not clear why the Internal
Revenue Service opined regarding a question of state
law.
(D) One way to avoid the §2035(b) issue with a married
terminal donor is to split the gift and have the surviving
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consenting spouse pay all the gift tax on both halves of
the split gift.
iii)

Of the limited sources for payment of the gross up rule estate
tax, it is equitable that the donees who received the gifted
assets should pay the tax generated by the property they
received, as presumably they would if the decedent had died
with that property includible in the gross estate and left it to
the donees at death. Without that result in this situation the
tax would remain unpaid, and it hardly seems proper that a
decedent should be able to make gifts shortly before death
that, coupled with the gift tax itself, would diminish the
decedent's estate to the point that the gross up rule estate tax
could not be paid and therefore would be avoided entirely.

iv)

A related situation was involved in Technical Advice
Memorandum 9729005, in which the government addressed
the interplay of the gross up rule now found in §2035(b) and
the split gift provisions of §2513 and the ability of a donor's
spouse to pay all the gift tax incurred on a split gift without
added gift tax consequences. The facts revealed that D had
four children, three by a former spouse and one with S. D
wanted to make sizeable lifetime gifts to these children but
most of the couple's wealth in the community property
jurisdiction in which they lived was D's separate property. So
D wrote a check against D's separate property account to S,
who two days later wrote a check in the same amount to fund
a trust for D's four children. D elected to split S's gift for
§2513 gift tax purposes and, when the gift tax on that transfer
was comi~g due, D again wrote a check to S on D's separate
property account for the full amount of the gift tax on both
halves of that split gift; S wrote a single check the very next
day to pay all the gift tax on both halves of the split gift. S
had insufficient funds to make either the gifts or to pay the
gift tax, without the checks written by D, who died within
three years of these events.
(A) On these facts the government required inclusion in D's
gross estate of the full gift tax paid by S within three
years of D's death. According to the government the
form of the transaction should not prevail over the
substance, in this situation because D transferred the
funds to S with the understanding the S would use the
money to make gifts and then to pay their gift tax
liabilities.
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(B) Quaere, however, whether the legislative history of
§2035(b)., which makes it clear that any gift tax paid by
S on S' s share of any gifts made by D and split by S is
not includible under the gross up rule. H.R. Rep. No.
1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976), 1976-3 C.B. 735,
748. Should only half the gift tax be returned to D's
gross estate, leaving excluded S's payment of half the tax
on the half that S is deemed to have given by virtue of
the gift splitting election? Presumably the government's
litigation position will be that, notwithstanding the check
written by S, effectively D paid all the gift tax on the
split gifts; S effectively made none of the gifts and paid
none of the tax, so the rule relating to payment simply
does not apply.
v)

An interesting question is whether the decedent in this type of
situation could impose the gross up rule estate tax liability on
the donees as a form of net gift, applicable as a condition on
the gift itself if the decedent dies within three years of the
gift. If so, quaere whether this conditional liability would
reduce the value of the gifted property for gift tax
computation purposes, thereby also reducing the gross up rule
estate tax.

(A) A useful analogy might be to a decedent who made no
transfers and instead died with all the gifted property,
which passes to the same beneficiaries at the decedent's
death. Any tax liability incurred in'that case would
reduG~ the amount received by the donees but would not
reduce the value of the decedent's gross estate for estate
tax computation purposes.
(B) It seems unlikely that a court would accept a different
effective result if the decedent made the transfers as
death bed gifts, given the fact that §2035(b) is designed
to eliminate any advantage of planning to pay gift tax on
transfers made in contemplation of death.
3.

Benefit ofRates. The client also should consider whether the effect of any
differentials in the rate of state wealth transfer tax imposed on the estate (based
on degrees of consanguinity of the various takers) should be preserved to the
benefit of the respective takers. This issue is addressed in the sample tax clause
found beginning at page 127, paragraph 1.2.3.6.
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4.

5.

a.

A spouse typically enjoys this benefit through equitable apportionment
(although some states still do not recognize that doctrine).

b.

The benefit of a lower rate for children or descendants as opposed to more
distant relatives or strangers also is preserved under some states' laws,
including under the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act.

c.

An easy, common example of a situation in which this might be relevant is
the client with children and step-children who the client wants to benefit
equally. In some states the step-children would bear a larger share of the
state wealth transfer tax burden if the state imposes a higher tax rate on stepchildren than it does on natural born or adopted children.

d.

Because the computation necessary to allocate rate differentials is not easy,
the client may wish to alter the normal apportionment rule. Indeed, even if
preservation of this apportionment rule is the intent, it might be possible to
do so in an easier and roughly comparable manner by adjusting the size of
various shares or bequests (taking into consideration the effect of state taxes
and the beneficiary's relation to the client) and override the state
apportionment rule.

Shifting Beneficial Interests. The immediately foregoing discussions should
underscore the fact that apportionment of taxes can work a "tax free" shift of
wealth among various beneficiaries of a decedent's estate.
a.

One way to shift wealth as part of postmortem planning is to apportion (or
waive the apportionment of) taxes.

b.

In fact, it may be possible to generate an income tax deduction for a
beneficiary who pays taxes properly allocable to another, if the individual
liable for payment refuses to pay, creating a § 166(d)(I) bad debt deduction
for the party who bears the added tax. See Rev. Rul. 69-411, 1969-2 C.B.
177. Income or gift tax consequences of such a refusal and payment should,
however, be evaluated before attempting such ploy.

Generation-Skipping Taxes. Generation-skipping taxes are a major tax allocation
concern.
a.

For example, allocation of the generation-skipping tax exemption may have
inequitable tax consequences to otherwise equally situated beneficiaries due
to the way the generation-skipping tax burden falls.

b.

Many estate plans anticipate this inequity by inclusion of a generationskipping tax clause, dictating that taxes incurred on a taxable distribution
shall be paid by the trust (rather than by the beneficiary upon whom that tax
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otherwise would fall), notwithstanding the fact that this tax payment is itself
an added taxable distribution that is subject to the generation-skipping tax
under §2621(b). See Treas. Reg. 26.2612-1(c). This issue is addressed in the
sample tax clause found beginning at page 127, paragraph 1.1.2.
(1) Because that additional distribution is deemed to occur on the last day
of the year of the actual distribution, the total distribution for the year
requires an interrelated or algebraic computation to determine the tax on
the actual distribution, and then the tax on the deemed distribution in the
alTIOunt of that tax, and on any additional deemed distribution to cover
that tax, and so on, all in the year of the original distribution.
(2) The algebraic fortTIula to determine the total distribution, actual and
deemed, against which the tax applies, is:
total distribution = actual distribution + (1 - rate of tax)

gQQI

For example~.}f.~~e actual distribution in
was $100,000 and the
tax rate was :1~irl, the trustee's payment of the tax on that $100,000
actu~.~. . ~istribution would be another $i§~~~7~, computed as $100,000 +
(1 - .17). As verification: total actual and deemed distributions of
$~j,i~~~!~!~7Q; x .ij!7 tax yields $I!~~~~§J9 in tax that goes to the government
and leaves $100,000 that went to the beneficiary.
c.

In addition, the instructions to Form 706-B under the 1976 tax provided that,
if the generation-skipping tax paid by a generation-skipping trust upon
termination of an interest were paid from a portion of the trust not the
subject of the terlnination, that tax payment would constitute an additional
taxable terlnination. Although that position is not explicitly stated on the
current version of Form 706 Schedule R, it is a proper' result and could be
important in group trusts,a. which should insure that taxes paid are allocated to
the respective share(s) subject to tax (unless the §2654(b) separate share rule
applies and the terms of the document do this automatically).

d.

In the case of QTIP property includible in the estate of a surviving spouse
under §2044, payment of tax (either directly or pursuant to §2207A) may
exhaust assets as to which a §2652(a)(3) allocation of exemption had been
made, essentially wasting a portion of that exemption.
(1) If §2207A is waived, or if the settlor of the QTIP trust directed that all
taxes on QTIP property should be paid from any portion of the QTIP
that was not made exempt by an allocation under §2652(a)(3), Treas.
Reg. §§26.2652-1(a)(3) and 26.2652-1(a)(6) Examples 7 and 8 establish
that this relief of the exelnpted QTIP trust from its §2207A
reitnbursetnent obligation does not constitute a constructive addition to
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the trust for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes because, due to
the reverse QTIP election, for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes
the property is treated as the original transferor's, not as the spouse's,
notwithstanding inclusion in the surviving spouse's gross estate. As a
result, §2207A also is deemed not to apply, meaning that there can be
no constructive addition. To the same effect with respect to
chronologically exempt QTIP trusts are Treas. Reg. §§26.2601l(b)(I)(iii)(A) and 26.2601-I(b)(I)(v)(C).
(2) The express language of §2652(a)(3) supports this result, it specifying
that, if the election under this section is made, then "for purposes of
[chapter 13, the result is] as if the election to be treated as qualified
terminable interest property had not been made" by the settlor of the
trust.
(a) The non-addition position is that, lacking a QTIP election, there
would be no §2044 inclusion in the surviving spouse's gross estate,
and no §2207A right of reimbursement.
(b) Thus, for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes this trust should
be regarded as nontaxable at the surviving spouse's death; thus,
there is no tax burden properly allocable to the trust, meaning that
waiver of §2207A or any other apportionment provision is no
"benefit" to the trust for purposes of the tainting addition question
under chapter 13. And it does not matter whether the surviving
spouse waives the right of reimbursement or the personal
representative fails to assert it.
(3) This rationale leaves it open for the government to allege that failure to
assert the §2207A right of reimbursement in a normal QTIP trust is a
constructive addition by which the spouse's beneficiaries become the
generation-skipping transferors. As illustrated in Treas. Reg. §26.26522(d) Example 3, this is relevant for purposes of determining the
transferor ofthe §2207A reimbursement amount and, although not
stated, the gift tax treatment under Treas. Reg. 20.2207A-I(a) may
make the beneficiaries who are deemed to make a gift by failing to
assert the right of reimbursement the transferors to that extent, rather
than the surviving spouse. This treatment would be consistent with
Treas. Reg. §26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(C), which regards failure to assert the
§2207A right of reimbursement as a constructive addition for purposes
of the transition date rules that exempt chronologically advantaged
trusts.
(4)

Outside the chronologically exempt QTIP or the reverse QTIP election
situation, Estate ofBoyd v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1987)

G -105

(waiver of §2206 right of reimbursement deemed to be a form of
"bequest" that the beneficiary of insurance proceeds could waive), as
discussed at page 22, also supports the result that waiver of any right of
reimbursement is a form of bequest that could constitute a tainting
addition to an otherwise exempt QTIP trust. And the government's
rationale with respect to the reverse QTIP, that no reimbursement right
exists because of the reverse QTIP election, makes it more likely that
the constructive addition result will obtain in cases in which the
reimbursement right clearly exists.
e.

A similar issue reflects the fact that, under §2603(b), generation-skipping
taxes are apportioned to the property "constituting" the generation-skipping
transfer.
(1)

If a trust is partially exempt, use of general trust assets to pay taxes on a
taxable termination may serve to waste partially exempt assets in
payment of generation-skipping taxes.

(2)

Section 2653(b)(I) provides that "[u]nder regulations prescribed by the
Secretary ... proper adjustment shall be made to the inclusion ratio with
respect to such trust to take into account any tax under this chapter
borne by such trust which is imposed by this chapter on the transfer ...
." It is not clear what this means and it appears that the regulations
provide no guidance.

(3)

Because the inclusion ratio operates in a partially exempt trust to make
part of every asset "exempt" and part taxable, it is not possible to
apportion the tax within such a trust to only wholly taxable assets. Thus,
some of the exemption is wasted with respect to every dollar of trust
property used to pay_generation-skipping transfer taxes.

(4)

The easy solution to this problem is to create two trusts, one that is
totally exempt and one that is totally taxable, with all tax inclusion and
apportionment being limited to the totally taxable trust.

(5)

Another solution is a "net gift" type of approach by which the
beneficiary of a generation-skipping trust directs his or her estate to pay
any generation-skipping tax incurred by reason of that beneficiary's
death.
(a) Assuming this tax payment is a constructive addition by the

beneficiary, the result is to preserve the partially exempt assets but
effectively decrease the exempt portion by virtue of the constructive
addition.
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(b) Mathelnatically, however, this constructive addition result may be

better than use of partially exempt dollars to pay the tax directly, as
illustrated by the following example.
(c)

ASSUlne the trust is $10,000,000 and the applicable fraction is onefourth, Inaking $2,500,000 of the trust "exempt." Because the
exemption actually is built into the inclusion ratio, which reduces
the tax rate, the effect is to reduce the tax rate to 75% of the 4~7%
il!1.P.9.~~.~ni!!g9ig~:, Ineaning that a generating-skipping tax of
.
$:~~w.igi§i~i9Qq would be incurred at the beneficiary's death, leaving
$'~~4!1j~i~9QQ in the trust, still (unless the §2653(b)(I) regulations
provide otherwise) one-fourth ($~~i~I~J.!~I~m~~i) "exempt."

(d) It: instead, the constructive addition approach were followed, a new
fraction would be struck of $2 , 500 , 000/1.)3~~~J2i~~~OQD
and the
new
....•...•...".........•.•.......1': ::::::::::;:;:::
.
fr~.~.!.~.?!! . .~.?~ld produce an "exempt" portion ofil)§iHIHgl%
($W~~~~~~~~j+$ out of the actual fund of$10,000,000).

f.

Finally, §2612(a)(2) needs to be considered. Applicable in the context of a
trust with several beneficiaries and staggered distributions, this provision
specifies that distributions that are not due to the death of a lineal descendant
of the transferor are taxed as taxable distributions, not as taxable
terminations of that beneficiary's interest in the trust.
(1)

The effect for tax apportionment purposes is on the source of tax
payment - the tax being imposed on the beneficiary instead of on the
trust. In many cases this probably is the most equitable form of tax
apportionment.

(2)

If §2612(a)(2) does not dictate taxable distribution results, however,
because a partial terlnination occurs on the death of a lineal descendant
of the transferor, then an inequity may arise because taxable termination
treatlnent causes the tax liability to befall the trustee.

(3)

Unless this tax is allocated to the portion that terminated (for example,
as a charge against the distributable share), the effect is that all
beneficiaries of the tlUSt pay the tax on a termination that provides a
partial distribution to only one of the trust's beneficiaries. This is
inequitable and likely not the transferor's intent.

(4)

Here an appropriate fix could include dictating generation-skipping tax
apportionlnent either to the trust in all events or to the distributees in all
events, regardless of the operation of §2612(a)(2).
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6.

7.

Section 303. The effect of apportionment under state law or by virtue of
provisions in the estate plan should be considered in conjunction with §303 if
sale or exchange treatment on redemption of §303 stock is to be obtained.
a.

By virtue of §303(b)(3) and Treas. Reg. §1.303-2(f), the dividend avoidance
benefits of §303 are available only to the extent the owner of the stock
redeemed bears the burden of estate taxes and administration expenses of the
estate.

b.

If those burdens do not fallon that stockholder, the benefits of §303 may be
lost, a result that may be avoided through effective allocation of those
burdens.

Income and Principal Rules. Finally, in considering tax payment and
apportionment of the burden, an income and principal rule should be kept in
mind.
a.

Typically estate income earned on assets that are expended for tax payment
purposes remains income in the estate. See, e.g., Uniform Principal and
Income Act (1997 Act) §201(2)(A), 7B U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 1999), and
Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act (1962 Act) §5(b), 7B U.L.A.
160 (1985). An extreme example that illustrates this rule is Union Planters
Nat'l Bank v. Dedman, 1998 Tenn. App.. LEXIS 9, in which the tax payment
provision placed the burden on the residue of the probate estate without
apportionment and taxes attributable to nonprobate property exceeded the
value of the estate as determined'at the date of death. There was sufficient
postmortem income and capital appreciation, however, to satisfy the tax
payment obligation but the court held that postmortem income was payable
to the residuary beneficiary under what it called the "Massachusetts" rule
that the income benefici~ries enjoy the income from the entire residue and
not just the income from whatever corpus remains after satisfaction of all
payments from the residue. The result is counterintuitive in that it assumes
there to be residuary income even though there is no residue, although it
correctly reflects that, prior to payment of these estate charges, there is the
possibility for investment returns to the estate that must be considered in
drafting those provisions that dispose of the estate.

b.

A will may, however, direct that this income be added to principal to help
compensate for the diminution caused by tax payment.

c.

Alternatively, the will could provide that the income also be used to pay
taxes, in either event shifting a part of the burden of tax payment to the
income beneficiaries. But consider the Hubert issue discussed beginning at
page 49.

G -108

IV.

Drafting Considerations.
A. Presumption Favors Apportionment. Drafters should be mindful that equity favors
equality; if the provisions of an estate plan are ambiguous, the presumption favors
apportionment of taxes to achieve equality. Unfortunately, sometimes the document is
all too clear.
1.

To illustrate, consider the decedent's tax payment provision involved in
Technical Advice Memorandum 9434004. This classic burden on the residue
clause waived all rights of reimbursement and was deemed to override state
apportionment rules that would have pro rated the tax liability against includible
nonprobate properties.
a.

After making several preresiduary bequests, the will divided what it referred
to as the residue into a formula bequest that it described as "the exemption
equivalent of the maximum unified credit allowable in determining the
federal estate tax on my gross estate" and left the residue of the residue to a
marital deduction trust.

b.

The formula bequest made reference to the preresiduary bequests passing
under the will that did not qualify for the marital deduction but did not
indicate that it also should have been reduced by the includible nonprobate
assets or inter vivos gifts that consumed a portion of the decedent's unified
credit because they too did not qualify for the marital deduction. As a result,
the formula bequest called for an amount that was larger than the amount
that could be sheltered from tax payment by what remained of the decedent's
unified credit and taxes were incurred that were payable from the marital
deduction residue.

c.

This reduced the estate's marital deduction, which increased the tax liability
that also was payable froin the marital bequest, resulting in a circular
whirlpool computation of the decedent's estate tax liability. In addition,
because of the inter vivos transfers, the nonprobate includible assets, and the
improperly described formula bequest that totaled more than the $600,000
exemption equivalent at that time, and a marital deduction that did not
eliminate taxes in this estate, the marginal estate tax bracket in which the
estate was taxable was higher than the 37% marginal rate that normally was
applicable in computing the "exemption equivalent" of the $192,800 unified
credit that applied at that time.

d.

This created its own circular computation because, at a higher marginal rate,
less than $600,000 of total taxable property generates the same $192,800 of
tax liability ("exemption equivalent of the unified credit" applicable in that
estate), which caused the formula bequest to be smaller, resulting in a greater
residue of the residue qualifying for the marital deduction. This produced
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slightly less tax and therefore a slightly larger marital deduction as a result
of its own secondary circular computation, and that again affected the
exemption equivalent computation, setting off another round of interrelated
computations.
2.

Either the tax payment dictate or the formula bequest alone would have been
significant defects in effective estate planning. Together they created a swirling
stew of tax computation and payment complexity that, coupled with other
demonstrable blunders in the decedent's will revealed in the abbreviated facts of
the Ruling (including blanket exercise of powers of appointment by the residuary
provision and a bequest to "my children in equal shares per stirpes"), presented a
bewildering array of opportunities for potential litigation against the drafter's
malpractice liability insurer.

B. Waiving Rights of Reimbursement. This is so important that it ought to come first in
thinking about drafting.
1.

Sections 2206,2207, 2207A, 2207B and, in its special way, §2603(b) all create a
right of reimbursement for taxes caused by an individual's death (or a
generation-skipping taxable event). Inadvertent waiver of these rights could be
calamitous.
a.

Given all the other property that might generate taxes and the possibility that
there will be insufficient assets otherwise available to pay taxes under
normal apportionment rules, loss of these reimbursement rights as a source
offunds could create severe problems. It is in reflection of this fact that
§§2207A and 2207B require waiver of their rights of reimbursement to
constitute a specific indication of intent to waive reimbursement to be
t
effective.

b.

Note, however, that apportionment is better than reimbursement, for
liquidity purposes, because apportionment forces the recipient of property to
make the initial payment while reimbursement requires the estate to pay up
front and then seek a recovery of the expended assets. This issue is
addressed in the sample tax clause found beginning at page 127, paragraph
1.3.

c.

Liquidity and the apportionment/reimbursement issue is particularly
important in a tax environment that includes chapter 14 and state death taxes
that could exceed the amount of a bypass trust, even in an otherwise
nontaxable optimum marital deduction situation.
(1)

If this occurs, marital deduction property may be needed to pay taxes,
which will generate a loss of deduction and a corresponding imposition
of federal estate tax, with the need to further invade the marital to pay
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those taxes, with a corresponding loss of more deduction, resulting in a
whirlpool computation effect.
(2)

To the extent the marital bequest does not ,fully work to zero out state
taxes even equitable apportionment cannot protect against this result.

d.

On the generation-skipping side of this issue, Congress was well advised to
presume against waiver of the reimbursement right by requiring a specific
reference to chapter 13 to work a negation of §2603(b). Without this
requirement, inadvertent and serious consequences could attend an innocent
provision included in a tax clause with no conscious intent to impose the
generation-skipping tax on a decedent's estate.

e.

In addition, waiver of §2207A reimbursement should be considered carefully
because the regulations under §2207A provide that the simple failure to
enforce the right of reimbursement is a gift (neither of §§2206, 2207, nor
2207B so provide).
(1)

This liability (which often will be unexpected and the beneficiaries
deemed to have made the gift likely being without knowledge that the
gift was even made) can be avoided if the surviving spouse as
beneficiary of qualified terminable interest property waives the §2207A
right of reimbursement.

(2)

It is particularly important that the surviving spouse have the flexibility
to decide whether to preserve or waive this right of reimbursement;
normally, the qualified terminable interest trust should specify that taxes
attributable to trust property will be paid from the trust before it pours
over into a bypass trust (or otherwise is distributed) unless the surviving
spouse's will overricles that direction by a provision making specific
reference to the QTIP trust.

(3)

With respect to the requisite indication of intent required under §2207A
itself: consider In re Will of Gordon, 510 N. Y. S.2d 815, 817 (Sur. Ct.
1986), in which the decedent's tax clause read "I direct that all ... taxes
... imposed ... by reason of my death with respect to any property
includable in my estate ... whether such property passes under or
outside my will be paid out of my Residuary Estate ... without
apportionment."
(a) If the court had found the §2207A reimbursement right had been

waived by this provision, a charitable residuary bequest would have
abated completely.
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(b) The court found that this provision was not adequate to work such a

result. To the same effect was In re Kramer, 610 N.Y.S.2d 31 (App.
Div. 1994), which held that a direction to pay from the residue of
the decedent's estate all estate taxes except those attributable to
property includible in the decedent's gross estate under §§2035,
2039, and 2041 was not sufficient to overcome the statutory
requirement for specific reference to waive the §2207A right of
reimbursement. As a result, the decedent's daughter by a prior
marriage was not burdened with taxes caused by inclusion of QTIP
marital deduction trust property that passed to children of the
decedent's predeceased husband by his prior marriage.
(c) The subsequent amendment to §2207A now will generate the same

result nationwide, matching in principal a change to New York law,
E.P.T.L §2-1.8(d-l) (1992), providing that a general direction in a
will to pay all taxes imposed on account of the testator's death is
not applicable to taxes imposed at the death of the surviving spouse
as beneficiary of a QTIP trust unless the will specifically provides
otherwise. But see In reEstate of Beebe, 702 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App.
Div. 2000), in which the provision stated that "there ... be no
proration or apportionment" of taxes among the residuary
beneficiaries, on whom the tax burden fell, notwithstanding that
some were charitable beneficiaries to whom state law equitable
apportionment otherwise would apply.
(d) Other similar state statutes now include Mich. Compo Law Ann.

§700.133a(3) (1995) (decedent must "expressly manifest" an intent
that taxes imposed under §2044 be paid by decedent's estate); N.C.
Gen. Stat. §28A-27-2(b) (1994) (general direction to pay all taxes
from decedent'~_.estate without specifically stating otherwise does
not waive reimbursement under §2206, §2207, or §2207A); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §2113.86(1) (1995) (requiring reference to either
§2044 or its state law counterpart, or to qualified terminable interest
property); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3701 (1995) (waiver must expressly
refer to §2207A right of reimbursement).
(e) Other courts reached the same nonwaiver conclusion without the

benefit of state law, although the predictability of result in this
respect is quite low.
i)

See, e.g., In re Maurice F. Jones Trust, 637 N.E.2d 1301 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994) (direction to pay all estate taxes assessed "by
reason of my death
which I am legally obligated to pay at
the time of my death
without apportionment" deemed
ambiguous with respect to taxes caused by inclusion of QTIP
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trust property; extrinsic evidence allowed to establish that
decedent did not intend to exonerate the remainder
beneficiaries of the QTIP trust who were relatives of the
decedent's predeceased spouse and charities and burden the
decedent's residuary beneficiary, who was the decedent's
child by a prior marriage; notice also that the tax payment
direction mentioned apportionment but not the §2207A right
of reimbursement, which could have been relied upon as
well); Firstar Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 541 N.W.2d 467
(Wis. 1995), affg in part and rev'g in part 525 N.W.2d 53
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (will directing payment of all taxes
"payable by reason of my death" and that would have
exhausted funds otherwise passing to charity deemed
insufficient to require payment of federal estate tax
attributable to inclusion of QTIP trust property because that
tax was caused by reason of the decedent's predeceased
spouse's death; the general tax payment provision was not a
sufficient clear and specific direction to overcome §2207A although it was adequate to leave unchanged the state law
burden on the residue for the Wisconsin estate tax attributable
to the QTIP trust).
ii)

See also In re Marital Deduction Trust under Will of Adair,
695 A.2d 250 (N.J. 1997), in which it was the state pick up
tax attributable to the inclusion of a QTIP trust in the
decedent's gross estate that was the subject of an inartful trust
provision calling for distribution to the decedent's probate
estate of any amount the decedent's personal representative
determined "to be required for the payment of taxes payable
by reason..o f my death." The trust made reference to "all
property comprising [the decedent's] gross estate ... whether
or not such property passes hereunder," which arguably was a
waiver of state law apportionment to the nonprobate QTIP
trust, but the court concluded that, among other things, the
decedent's tax payment provision was "generic, boilerplate"
that did not "evince a clear and unequivocal intention" to
direct against state law apportionment of the tax burden to
nonprobate property, and that the word "required" could only
be taken to mean that the decedent was directing payment of
taxes that the probate estate was legally obligated to pay and
these were a legal obligation of the QTIP trust itself absent a
clear direction to the contrary.

iii)

Cf In re Estate of Tubbs, 900 P.2d 865 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995)
(Ka~. 1995) (specific reference required by §2603(b) to
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waive apportionment of generation-skipping transfer tax not
met by general references to estate, inheritance, and death
taxes; required is that the generation-skipping transfer tax be
mentioned explicitly); Estate of Monroe v. Commissioner,
104 T.C. 352 (1995) (reference to federal estates taxes or
other death taxes not adequate to constitute §2603(b) specific
reference.
(t)

For comparison purposes.
i)

In a case involving waiver of §2206 and 2207 and no
"special" remainder beneficiary, the following language was
adequate to waive those rights of reimbursement: "All estate
taxes payable by reason of my death shall be chargeable
against and payable out of my residuary estate without
contribution by anyone." In re Bruce, 516 N.Y.S.2d 748
(A.D. 1987) (notwithstanding the drafter's testimony that the
decedent and the drafter were unaware of nonprobate assets
and that the purp.ose of the provision was to avoid inside
apportionment only).

ii)

Similarly, in a case involving children by two marriages and
waiver of §2206 but not §2207A, the following language was
deemed adequate to preserve the latter and waive the former:
"my personal representative shall ... pay from the residue of
my estate all estate and inheritance taxes assessed by reason
of my death other than those related to qualified terminable
interest property contained therein." In re Estate of Tovrea,
845 P.2d 494 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). Very similar language
produced .the same §2206 waiver in Emmertz v. Cherry, 520
S.E.2d 219 (Ga. 1999).

iii)

Estate ofVahlteich v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2704
(1994), rev'd in an unpublished opinion, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ~60,218 (6th Cir. 1995), involved a charitable bequest
and a tax payment provision cailing for payment of "all
transfer, estate or inheritance taxes ... without
apportionment" and a state law calling for outside
apportionment unless the decedent referred specifically to the
statute "or to qualified terminable interest property." Lacking
the statutory requisite of a reference to either §2044 or its
state law counterpart, or to qualified terminable interest
property, the court on appeal concluded that the Tax Court's
holding that the decedent's will waived the QTIP trust's
§2207A and state law equitable apportionment share of the
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estate tax liability of the decedent "is wrong in its reading of
[Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2113.86(I)] and doubly wrong in not
reflecting the proper policy of the State" to preclude
inadvertent exoneration of QTIP trust property, especially if
the result is that residuary charitable beneficiaries receive less
and taxes are increased unnecessarily: "This is simply
counterintuitive on its face and counter to a presumption in
Ohio law that a testator intends to maximize deductions and
pass as much to chosen beneficiaries as possible."
(4)

As a matter of routine, similar results should be expected under §2207B
with respect to property that is includible in a decedent's gross estate
under §2036. Compare Technical Advice Memoranda 199918003 and
199915001 (typical pay-all-taxes-from-the-residue provisions with
nonspecific waiver of reimbursement language were inadequate to
override §2207B, notwithstanding that, in the earlier case, the same
language was sufficient to waive reimbursement rights under §2206
with respect to an insurance trust that was includible by virtue of §203 5)
with Myers v. Ellerbusch, 746 N.E.2d 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(corporate fiduciary's formbook tax payment direction to pay
all estate and inheritance taxes assessed by reason of my death whether with respect to
property passing under this Will or property passing otherwise than under the Will and
whether such taxes be payable by my estate or by any recipient of any such property. I
waive for my estate all rights of reimbursement for any payments made pursuant to
this item

was deemed adequate to waive the §2207B reimbursement right
notwithstanding the lack of any reference to §2036 includible property
or to §2207B). Some refinement may be required by virtue of the fact
that the specific refer_ence requirement originally part of §2207B was
moderated to make it identical to that added to §2207A in 1997; case
law decided based on the different rules before these provisions were
coordinated might produce different results. Decided without having to
evaluate the §2207B specific reference or specific indication of intent
requirement, In re Estate of Meyer, 702 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998), makes note of this change in the law. Arzt v. Savarese, 36 F.
SUppa 2d 653 (D. Del. 1999), held it to be determinative because both
includible trusts long predated the December 17, 1987 effective date of
§2207B.
(5)

Although there is yet no authority for the proposition, it seems likely
that the government will provide in regulations that failure to assert the
§2207B right of reimbursement also constitutes a gift, but that this
consequence may be avoided by an effective waiver of the right itselfwhich will require a specific indication of intent to be effective.
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2.

With respect to Chapter 14:
a.

Section 2701 (d) presents difficulty because it is not clear who "benefits" by
virtue of the deemed transfer attributable to unpaid "suspense account"
dividends. Therefore, if outside apportionment exists under state law it is
unclear who should pay any tax incurred under this provision.
(1)

Because the value of the unpaid dividends may be included in the value
of the underlying stock and, to that extent, will not be subjected to a
separate tax under §2701(d), this issue may resolve itself in all but the
more unusual valuation situations.

(2)

If it does not, payment of the tax attributable to the suspense account
from the residue may be inappropriate and thought should be given to
whether the donee ofjunior equities or the entity should pay the tax
attributable to this account. State law outside apportionment is unlikely
to answer this question.

b.

Under §2702, a personal residence GRIT, a qualified interest, or a joint
purchase that is treated as a split interest trust, may trigger §2036(a)(I)
inclusion if the decedent's interest does not terminate before death. In each
case inclusion should cause §2207B or outside apportionment to apply.

c.

Section 2703 raises the prospect of estate tax inclusion at a value that is
higher than the striking price under a buy-sell agreement. Conceivably the
buyer could be regarded as an estate beneficiary to whom taxes attributable
to this value differential should be apportioned, although the absence of an
agreement anticipating this result is sure to generate litigation. See, e.g., In
re Estate ofKapala, 402 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (insurance that
funded a buy-sell agreement generated tax in the decedent's estate that was
apportioned to the buyer notwithstanding argument that the buy-sell
agreement established the total liability of the buyer and was silent on this
issue; apportionment under §2206 was not a determination that the buy-sell
agreement produced a benefit like a specific or general bequest that caused
apportionment to the buyer), Estate of Benton, 215 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1974),
and In re Estate of Galewitz, 160 N.Y.S.2d 564 (App. Div. 1957) (both
similarly treating buyers as estate beneficiaries, liable for pro rata taxes
attributable to the imputed benefit received); but see In re Estate of Saylors,
671 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (purchasers not liable for inheritance
tax attributable to farm valued at $281,000 but acquired under option to
purchase for $1,000; tax payment provision waived all apportionment and,
even if apportionment applied, court regarded the estate as including the
proceeds and not the farm).
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d.

Finally, §2704 poses a problem similar to that under §2701(d) because the
deemed transfer attributable to the lapse or imposition of a restriction has no
readily apparent transferee to whom the tax generated should be
apportioned. The logical source for payment of the tax is the property as to
which the restriction applies.

C. Items to Consider. A good tax clause clearly will address the following topics - even
if state law is clear on many issues, because of the migratory nature of clients and the
potential conflict of laws problems that could arise.
1.

Which taxes are being apportioned (estate, generation-skipping, state, or any
income taxes).

2.

Both inside and outside apportionment, or the waiver thereof: clearly should be
covered; often only outside apportionment is contemplated and statutory inside
apportionment across the entire estate is forgotten.

3.

Equitable apportionment should be considered; it usually will be the client's
intent to embrace it, even if no other form of apportionment is desired.

4.

Any intent to preserve the effect of state wealth transfer tax computation
differentials (if any) should be stated clearly.

5.

Any desire to allocate credits to recipients of assets to which they relate should
be clear.

6.

Alteration of the apportionment rule relative to split or temporal interests always
should be considered, particularly in estates with annuity or installment payouts
of employee benefits.
I

7.

The tax clause should apportion or call for payment of interest and penalties in
the same manner as the taxes to which they relate.

8.

If it is known that there will be deductible claims against the estate, such as
pursuant to a prenuptial or separation agreement, and they are similar to or in lieu
of bequests from the estate, the determination of the size of those dispositions
and apportionment of taxes thereto should be considered and specified in the tax
clause, frequently applying the same considerations discussed above with respect
to other bequests. Especially sensitive, however, is whether the agreement
permits apportionment and whether various issues noted here were considered in
the preparation of that agreement.

9.

Finally, if it is appropriate to look to particular assets first for tax payment, this
should be specified.

,-'
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a.

Rather than relying on the personal representative to ferret out the
decedent's intent after death, the desire to preserve certain assets should be
noted.

b.

However, as illustrated by Estate of Reno v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 733
(4th Cir. 1991), rev'g (en bane) 916 F.2d955 (4th Cir. 1990), which aff'd 51
T.C.M. (CCH) 909 (1986), stating a preference to protect certain assets
probably should not be allowed to override other presumably more important
apportionment principles. For example, in Reno, the preference for
preservation of farm property was alleged to cause marital deduction
property to be tapped for tax payment; if correct, the tax payment provision
would have negated the concept of equitable apportionment and generated a
tax because the marital would have been reduced.

D. Pro Rata or Incremental Apportionment. Incremental apportionment (like
reimbursement under §2207A) may be desirable because a proportionate amount of
all taxes in the estate (which is the §§2206, 2207, and 2207B approach) may nearly
bankrupt a small probate estate that is taxed along with massive amounts of
nonprobate property (such as a huge §2056(b)(5) power of appointment marital
deduction trust).
1.

A change to incremental apportionment (deviating from the pro rata approach
dictated by most state statutes and by §§2206, 2207, and 2207B) probably is
permissible; the tax clause simply should call for apportionment of the amount
by which the decedent's taxes were increased by virtue of nonprobate assets
being included in the estate.

2.

If there are several nonprobate items as to which incremental apportionment is to
apply, the tax clause must specify the manner in which they will be considered
for allocation purposes.
a.

For example, if there were a Inarital deduction trust and substantial
employee benefits causing inclusion, the planner should consider whether
either should be deemed included before the other for computation of the
taxes caused by inclusion of each.

b.

Alternatively, they could be aggregated and the total increase in tax caused
by both then prorated between them. This might be appropriate if the
remainder beneficiaries of each differ and the incremental tax burden should
be shared pro rata by all. This issue is addressed in the sample tax clause
found beginning at page 127, paragraph 1.2.2.

c.

A third alternative would be to apportion taxes to each nonprobate asset as if
the subject asset were taxed last, thereby imposing on the aggregate ofthe
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nonprobate property a larger share of taxes than either a pro rata share or the
aggregate incremental share of tax.
E. If Apportionment Is Preserved, the order for computation of any bequest or share of
the estate and for payment of taxes should be specified if it is not clear under state
law.
1.

It is surprising how seldom this is done, given the number of cases revealing that
the proper method frequently is unclear.

2.

Thus, for example, if a net estate division in computing a marital deduction
fractional share is desired, this should be specified clearly.

F. Be Wary ofDiscretionary Reimbursement. Unless a fiduciary's overriding duty to
maximize the estate is waived, a right to allocate taxes is probably a duty instead,
meaning it is not discretionary at all.
111~'UllIlg

IL l:i IlUL
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elll.

1.

If the duty to maximize the estate is waived, it probably is wise to specify the
factors to be considered by the fiduciary in deciding whether to seek
reimbursement, in which case "discretion" may approach a mechanical
application of the relevant factors.

2.

If discretion is granted, be certain the fiduciary knows the tax consequences of a
failure to seek reimbursement (for example, under §2207A) and the income tax
consequences of exercising discretion; it may be wise to spell them out in a letter
to be included with the estate plan.

3.

Finally, consider conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of fiduciary
discretion: is the personal representative personally interested in the outcome of
the discretionary apportionm~pt?

G. Coordinate Multiple Tax Clauses. As frequently occurs, it is likely that severaltax
clauses will (or should) be involved if the client has a funded living trust and perhaps
an irrevocable insurance trust in addition to a will directing disposition of the probate
estate.
1.

To the extent those clauses differ or are contradictory, most decisions indicate
that the provision in the will controls.
a.

See, e.g., Estate of Bradford v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 337
(2002), Estate of Fagan v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1999),
and Estate of McKay v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 279 (1994), all
found that the decedents' tax payment provisions (in Bradford the provision
was an insufficiency tax clause in a trust and a linked will provision that
waived all rights of apportionment; the Fagan flaw was payment from the
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residuary estate under a will, with proper apportionment language in a
pourover trust that provided for charity; McKay provided "that
all ... taxes ... attributable to my probate estate ... shall be paid out of the
residue of my estate ... without adjustment among the residuary
beneficiaries, and shall not be charged against or collected from any
beneficiary of my probate estate"), in each case negated state law equitable
apportionment, and thereby caused taxes on the entire estate to be charged to
the residue before its division between charitable and noncharitable
beneficiaries. The result was a §2055(c) reduction in the charitable
deduction for that portion of the residue passing to charities (and an increase
in taxes that again reduced the deduction, which further reduced the residue,
ad infinitum). See also Estate of Wathen, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 805 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (although trust was silent, will specified that taxes should be paid
from the trust, without apportionment, thus overcoming state law pro rata
apportionment; court read the will and trust together as if they were one
document and allowed the will to govern).

2.

b.

But see In re Estate of Pickrell, '806 P.2d 1007 (Ks. 1991), holding that the
latter in time controls, that being the trust in that case. As among the other
documents, no clear order of priority exists.

c.

In re Estate ofPatouillet, 601 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sur. Ct. 1993), involved a will
executed before a funded living trust, which benefited different individuals
and provided that the trustee was to pay the decedent's executor any
amounts designated by the executor as necessary to pay the estate's taxes.
The will, however, directed payment of all taxes attributable to nonprobate
property and waived all apportionment rights. The court held that, under
N.Y. Est. Powers & Trust L. §2-1.8(d)(2), the nontestamentary document
that was executed later in time would control and, in this case, that meant the
trust would contribute. ,_'

The Uniform Acts and §§2206 and 2207 all ostensibly require that waiver of
apportionment be· by a will provision; only §§2207A and 2207B allow waiver by
the decedent's revocable trust as well and, although waiver in other tax clauses
may not work, it probably can't hurt (unless there is an inconsistency), so touch
each base ifpossible.
a.

For example, in Estate of Roe, 426 N.W.2d 797,798,799 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988), the decedent's will provided that "I make no direction for the
payment of ... taxes assessed by reason of my death, as 1 have provided for
their payment under a certain Agreement hereinafter mentioned." The trust
called for tax payment and specified that "the Trustee shall not seek
contribution from anyone for any portion of the taxes so paid." The court
held that apportionment under state law would apply because the will failed
to waive application of the state apportionment statute.
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b.

The court noted that an argument might be made that, although the will
failed to prevent apportionment to the trust, the trust waived apportionment
so no further allocation of the tax burden from the trustee to other recipients
of taxable property would be required. Even if successful, that argument
would not be helpful if some of the tax paid by the trust was attributable to
other nonprobate assets that was required under state law to pay a
proportionate share of the tax burden.

c.

The most notable aspect of Roe is that the tax clauses involved were
verbatim from a major Chicago fiduciary's forms book; this problem exists
in literally thousands of estate plans, probably nationwide because of the
subsidiaries of the fiduciary that also distribute the form involved.

3.

If there is a tax clause in more than one document, and taxes may be paid by
more than one entity, clearly specify which goes first or how aggregated
apportionment will work.

4.

In trusts (such as an irrevocable insurance trust or a grantor retained annuity or
unitrust) that are intended·to escape inclusion if everything goes as planned, it
makes sense to include a safety valve tax clause specifying that:
a.

the fiduciary may purchase assets from the grantor's estate or loan money
thereto, to provide liquidity; and

b.

if any part of the trust is includible in the grantor's estate, taxes caused by
inclusion of that portion are payable therefrom.

c.

(1)

To work, this probably requires that the grantor's ~state plan not waive
apportionment with .respect to the trust.

(2)

Also, the trust document needs to clearly provide that this provision
operates only it: quite independently, the trust is found to be includible.

Caution: with respect to irrevocable insurance trusts, the last sentence of
§2206 presumes that insurance included in a decedent's gross estate will be
used first to qualify for any available marital deduction; this means that, if
there is a contingent marital deduction provision in the irrevocable insurance
trust, principles of equitable apportionment may apply to and override the
tax payment provision in the trust.

H. As a checklist of other commonly overlooked apportionment issues discussed above
but that always arise, remember to consider:
1.

Fees and expenses.
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I.

2.

State taxes that don't conform to federal estate tax rules and that can produce
disparities.

3.

Special use valuation and recapture under §2032A.

4.

The §2057 family-owned business interest deduction and recapture tax.

5.

Section 6163 and future interests that invoke tax; who is to pay the tax thereon?

6.

Section 6166 deferral; who is to pay the deferred tax and interest thereon?

7.

Estate income tax and Alternative Minimum Tax liabilities.

8.

The appreciation estate tax (if adopted).

9.

With respect to any apportionment that is preserved, how enforcement will be
effected and whether to include a power of set-off in the client's will for any
dispositions of probate property to takers of nonprobate property that will bear a
share of the tax burden.

Clearly Specify Intent. The case reporters are full of decisions involving the meaning
of provisions relating to apportionment. A fine illustration of this notion is In re
Estate of Siebrasse, 652 N.W.2d 384 (S.D. 2002), labeled a Rehearing of Decision of
South Dakota Supreme Court, reversing 640 N.W.2d 747 (S.D. 2002) the court's
prior decision in the same case, to establish a "bright line approach" requiring that
state law apply unless a tax payment provision "clearly shifts the burden of federal
estate taxes from equitable apportionment and clearly identifies the property to which
the burden is shifted" using terms that are "specific, clear, and not susceptible of
rea~onable contrary interpretation,.:'
1.

Clearly state any intent to override any state apportionment rule. For example, do
more than just require "payment of all debts and taxes from the residue." See In
re Estate of Shoemaker, 917 P.2d 897 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996); First Nat'l Bank v.
McGill, 377 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1988).
a.

In Landmark Trust Co. v. Aitken, 587 N.E.2d 1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992),
litigation was needed to ascertain the decedent's intent because the will
simply directed payment of all taxes from the residue, which was
insufficient, and it was not clear whether state common law equitable
apportionment should apply with respect to the balance. The court
determined that state law apportionment was negated entirely by the tax
clause and that common law abatement principles were applicable to
determine how the excess taxes were to be paid. The result was that general
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bequests abated while specific bequests were protected from paying their
proportionate share of the excess taxes.
b.

On the other hand, Barlow v. Brubaker, 465 N.W.2d 276 (Iowa 1991), held
that a tax payment provision directing payment from the residue without
apportionment did not relieve the recipients of property transferred inter
vivos but included in the decedent's gross estate under §2035 from paying
their proportionate share of the tax. The estate was insufficient to pay all
taxes and the will specified that these inter vivos donees should receive
nothing under the will because the decedent had provided for them
otherwise. Relief from taxation would have amounted to a testamentary
benefit contrary to the decedent's stated intent. See also First Nat'l Bank: v.
McGill, 377 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1988), and Bunting v. Bunting, 768 A.2d
989 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000), in which the decedent made a sizeable inter
vivos gift to a child, as to which the gift tax was less than the available
unified credit. At death that gift, added to the taxable estate, caused the
remaining property at death to be subject to estate tax in excess of the
unified credit. The issue was whether the decedent's direction to pay all
taxes from the residue of the estate was meant to apply - given·that the
residue was less than the combine state and federal taxes due at death. The
court concluded that the decedent never anticipated that the inter vivos gift
would cause taxes to be generated and therefore could not have intended for
the tax payment provision to relieve the inter vivos donee of responsibility to
pay estate taxes attributable to inclusion of the taxable gift in the adjusted
taxable gifts base for estate tax computation purposes. Therefore, the court
apportioned estate tax to the donee of that inter vivos gift. In addition to
being completely wrong in citing and relying on the §2012 credit for gift tax
paid on pre-1977 gifts (the gift in Bunting was made in 1988), the dissent
argued that the court improperly admitted extrinsic evidence regarding the
decedent's understanding.of the tax law and the decedent's intent (and that
of the drafter of the document). But courts are not alone in making
demonstrable blunders in this arena.

c.

Two different rounds of litigation with appeals, one through the federal
courts and another through the state courts, were required in Estate of
Swallen v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 1996), rev'g 65 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2332 (1993); Matthews v. Swallen, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4669
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995), in which the decedent's irrevocable inter vivos trust
was includible in the gross estate and, although it provided for the
decedent's surviving spouse, did not qualify for the marital deduction; the
residue of the decedent's estate qualified for the marital deduction but only
after payment of all taxes and subject to a direction "that no tax ... shall be
charged ... against ... any ... trust beneficiary, so long as the funds or
property in the hands of my Executor ... are sufficient ...." Holding that
this provision in the will was not adequate to override state law
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apportionment to the trust, and relying on an income tax provision in the will
as stating the decedent's overall intent to minimize taxes, the court on appeal
stretched to find the tax payment direction inadequate to impose on the
residue the tax liability attributable to the trust and thereby salvaged the
marital deduction for the residue.
d.

And consider this language from In re Estate of Gerhard, 455 S.E.2d 683
(S.C. 1995): "I direct my executors to pay all ... taxes imposed upon or in
relation to any property
required to be included in my gross estate ... out
of my general estates
without proration or apportion." Does "general
estates" mean the decedent's residuary estate, and does "without proration or
apportionment" equate to waiver of reimbursement rights under federal law?
The court held yes to the former question (see In re Estate of Cline, 898 P.2d
643 (Kan. 1995) to the same effect, with a lengthy summary of similar
cases) but, instead of addressing the latter, determined that state
apportionment applied to the extent the residue was inadequate to pay all
taxes. It would appear that all taxes that were subject to the §2207 right of
reimbursement should have been paid from a trust includible in the gross
estate under §2041 (and, had the effective date provision not provided
othetwise, that taxes attributable to §2036(a)(I) inclusion of another trust
were subject to the §2207B right of reimbursement).

2.

For a good collection of cases dealing with sloppy drafting, consult Annot.,
Construction and Effect of Will Provisions Not Expressly Mentioning Payment
ofDeath Taxes But Relied on as Affecting the Burden of Estate or Inheritance
Taxes, 70 A.L.R.3d 630 (1976); Annot., Construction and Effect ofProvisions in
Nontestamentary Instrument Relied Upon as Affecting the Burden ofEstate or
Inheritance Taxes, 70 A.L.R.3d 691 (1976); and Annot., Construction and Effect
of Will Provisions Expressly Relating to the Burden ofEst~te or Inheritance
Taxes, 69 A.L.R.3d 122 (197.6).

3.

As an example of how a relatively simple tax clause can create numerous
drafting issues, consider a direction "to pay all taxes imposed on my estate by
reason of my death."
a.

Does this waive apportionment, or only direct payment of taxes that
thereafter may be apportioned?

b.

If the decedent's death is a generation-skipping taxable termination or direct
skip, does this assume the burden for those taxes that normally are imposed
on the generation-skipping trust or property?

c.

Could this be interpreted to include any additional estate tax imposed under
§2032A or §2057 upon a recapture event?
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V.

d.

Does the reference to "my estate" mean the gross estate, the taxable estate,
or the probate estate; both equitable and outside apportionment are involved
and not clearly specified.

e.

About a shockingly similar provision in the will of one Elmer Cohen,
deceased, ("I direct my Personal Representatives to pay, without
reimbursement or contribution, all estate [sic], inheritance taxes, and
succession duties assessed by reason of my death by the United States or any
State thereof'), the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of St. Louis
County, Missouri, No. 113549 (April 22, 1996), ruled that the will was "not
ambiguous. Ambiguous means reasonably susceptible of more than one
meaning. [This provision] is not susceptible of any meaning and cannot be
construed." This portion of the holding was overruled on appeal. Estate of
Cohen v. Crown, 954 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), the court refusing to
conclude that there was no meaning in the provision, but still concluding that
it did not effectively waive the §2206 right of reimbursement with respect to
includible insurance proceeds and thereby protecting a charitable bequest
that otherwise would have been reduced.

Conclusion.
A. As a practical matter, most estate plans probably still waive all apportionment, the
effect being that taxes are a burden on the residue as provided under common law.
B. Apportionment rules may create a more equitable method for payment of taxes, and
may represent the average decedent's intent when thought is given to the issue; they
are not a panacea, however, because they create problems of their own. Even in states
with well drafted apportionment statutes (such as either Uniform Act, in most
respects), the estate planner alway_~ must consider issues relating to the payment of
taxes.

VI.

Sample Tax Clauses.
A. Much against my better judgment, the following sample tax clauses are offered, for
discussion purposes only.
B. The first provision is not as comprehensive as my most recommended provision but
may be more readily adaptable to the typical estate plan; it is adapted from the
provision found in a major corporate fiduciary's forms book and is designed for use
in a trust. The user must remember to incorporate a consistent provision in the client's
will and be certain that deviations from state apportionment law are directed in the
will (perhaps by reference to the concepts in the trust) to meet the requirement that it
be a will that waives apportionment or reimbursement rights. Notice that this
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provision also contains generation-skipping tax payment and exemption allocation
provisions:
Upon my death the trustee shall pay from the principal of the trust estate the expenses of
my last illness and funeral, claims allowable against my estate, costs of administration including
ancillary, and estate, inheritance and generation-skipping taxes assessed by reason on my death,
except that
(a) the amount, if any, by which those taxes shall be attributable to property not passing
under this trust shall be paid proportionately by the person or persons holding or
receiving that property,

(b) the amount by which those taxes are attributable to property passing under this trust
shall be charged proportionately against the shares or distributions hereafter directed, and
(c) the concept of equitable apportionment shall apply so that any deduction or rate
differential attributable to the relation of the holder or recipient of property includible in
my gross estate and applied in the computation of those taxes shall enjoy the benefit of
that deduction or differential.
Interest and penalties concerning any tax shall be paid and charged in the same manner as
the tax. The trustee may make payment directly or to the legal representative of my estate as the
trustee deems advisable. The trustee shall exercise any available power to apportion taxes directed
to be paid by the holder or recipient of property includible in gross estate. To the extent possible,
assets or funds otherwise excludable in computing taxes payable by the trustee shall not be used to
make the foregoing payments.
The trustee's selection of assets to be sold to make the foregoing payments or to satisfy
any pecuniary bequests, and the tax effects thereof, shall not be subject to question by any
beneficiary. The trustee shall make such elections under the tax laws as the trustee deems
advisable, and shall allocate my generation-skipping tax exemption as it deems advisable, except
that the exemption shall be allocated (a) first to property given by me rather than by another or
appointed by me, and (b) to a direct skip caused by a disclaimer only if no other allocation is
possible. Elections and allocations shall be made without regard to the ~elative interests of the
beneficiaries and shall not be subject to question by any person. No adjustment shall be made
between principal and income or in the relative interests of the beneficiaries to compensate for the
effect of elections or allocations under the tax laws made by the trustee. My trustee shall not be
liable for the effect of elections or allocations made in good faith.
The succeeding provisions of this declaration are subject to this provision.

If a trust hereunder would be partially exempt from generation-skipping tax by reason of
an allocation of generation-skipping tax exemption to it, before the allocation the trustee in its
discretion may divide the trust into two separate trusts of equal or unequal value, to pennit
allocation of the exemption solely to one trust that will be entirely exempt from generationskipping tax. In addition, if a trust hereunder is entirely exempt or nonexempt from generationskipping tax and adding property to the trust would partially subject it to generations-skipping tax,
the trustee in its discretion may hold that property as a separate trust in lieu of making the
addition. Except as otherwise provided in this instrument, the two trusts shall have the same terms
and conditions but the trustee shall not make discretionary distributions from the income or
principal of the exempt trust to beneficiaries who are non-skip persons so long as any readily
marketable assets remain in the nonexetnpt trust.
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Upon division or distribution of an exempt trust and a nonexempt trust held hereunder,
the trustee in its discretion lnay allocate property from the exempt trust first to a share from which
a generation-skipping transfer is lnore likely to occur.
If the trustee considers that any distribution from a trust hereunder other than pursuant to
a power to withdraw or appoint is a taxable distribution subject to a generation-skipping tax
payable by the distributee, the trustee shall augment the distribution by an amount that the trustee
estimates to be sufficient to pay the tax and shall charge the same against the trust to which the tax
relates. If the tnlstee considers tllat any tertnination of an interest in trust property hereWlder is a
taxable termination subject to the generation-skipping tax, the trustee shall pay the tax from the
portion of the trust property to which the tax relates, without adjustment of the relative interests of
the beneficiaries.

C. The next provision is designed for use in a will. It is much more extensive than the
prior provision and reflects the thinking I would apply based on the material in this
outline. I don't doubt that it is far luore complex than the typical user would want to
incorporate and tnay apportion taxes to recipients the client would want to spare. The
presumption is in favor of apportionment except to the extent a recipient is absolved.
By way of exalnple, many users are likely to delete paragraph 1.2.1.2, requiring
apportionment with respect to donees who received gifts during life, because the
amounts involved are too small to be concerned with and the hassle of apportionment
is too great.
1.

Debts, Expenses, and Taxes: My personal representative shall pay from the residue of my
estate all obligations of tny estate., including expenses of my last illness and funeral, costs of
administration (including ancillary), other legally enforceable charges and claims allowable
against my estate, and (subject to apportionlnent as provided below) death taxes as defined
next below. Payments tnay be charged to estate income or principal and deducted for income
or other tax purposes in the discretion of lny personal representative without regard to
whether any other deduction otherwise allowable is reduced.
1.1.

Death Taxes Defined: Death taxes lneans all estate, inheritance, succession, or
transfer taxes and any incotne or sitnilar taxes on appreciation (including interest,
penalties, and any excise or suppletnental taxes) imposed by the laws of any
domestic or foreign taxing authority at the time of or by reason of my death, but
shall not include:
1.1.1.

Any additional estate tax incurred under §2032A(c) or §2057(i)(3)(F) of
the Internal Revenue Code or any similar or corresponding state tax law
or any successor provision to any such law, all as amended prior to my
death (hereafter collectively referred to as the Code) because of the
disposition of or failure to use qualified real property or family-owned
business interests; and

1.1.2.

Generation-ski pping transfer taxes imposed by Chapter 13 of the Code [,
except to the extent attributable to a direct skip of which I am the
transferor and that is not caused by a qualified disclaimer by a non-skip

G - 127

person (as those terlTIS are defined in the Code), which shall be paid from
the residue of my estate without apportionment or reimbursement
notwithstanding the provisions of §§2603(a)(3) and 2603(b) of the Code
or any other provision of this will].
1.2.

Apportionment: Except as otherwise provided herein, it is my intent that each
recipient of property that is includible in my estate for death tax purposes (whether
passing under this will or otherwise) pay the death taxes attributable to the
property (s)he receives, deterlTIined as follows:
1.2.1.

The death tax attributable to:
1.2.1.1.

Appreciation is the full alTIOunt of income or similar taxes
incurred by reason of my death.

1.2.1.2.

Adjusted taxable gifts as defined by §2001(b)(1)(B) of the Code,
any gift taxes includible in my gross estate by §2035(b) of the
Code, any recaptured inter vivos transfer subject to
§529(c)(4)(C) of the Code, or any comparable inclusion
(hereafter collectively referred to as completed lifetime gifts) is
the difference between (a) the total death taxes incurred by my
estate, less those death taxes described in paragraph 1.2.1.1 and
(b) the death taxes that would have been incurred if there were
no completed lifetime gifts. For apportionment purposes, the
recipient of property that produced gift tax includible by
§2035(b) of the Code shall be treated as having received the
amount of that gift tax, and the recipients of completed lifetime
gifts will pay the tax attributable thereto.
I

1.2.1.3.

The death tax attributable to all other property is the difference
between (a)-the total death taxes paid by my estate and (b) those
death taxes described in paragraphs 1.2.1.1. and 1.2.1.2. that
actually are collected by my personal representative.

1.2.2.

Multiple Recipients: If there is more than one recipient of property
separately described in paragraphs 1.2.1.1. through 1.2.1.3, each recipient
shall pay a proportionate share of the death tax attributable to all of the
property described in that separate paragraph based on the value of the
property received by the recipient as finally determined in the death tax
computation as compared to the same value of all property described in
that separate paragraph that is not excluded from apportionment under
paragraph 1.2.6.

1.2.3.

Tax Benefits: Credits, deductions, exclusions, exemptions, and similar
benefits shall be reflected as follows:
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1.2.3.1.

In cOlnputing the death tax paid by my estate for purposes of
paragraph 1.2.1.2. and determining the proportionate share of
such tax to be paid by any individual recipient, any gift tax
allowed as a credit by §200 1(b)(2) that was paid by the recipient
shall inure to the benefit of that recipient.

1.2.3.2.

In cOlnputing the death tax paid by my estate for purposes of
paragraph 1.2.1.3. and determining the proportionate share of
such tax to be paid by any individual recipient, the credit
granted by §200 1(b)(2) for gift taxes that were not paid by any
individual recipient, the unified credit granted by §2010 of the
Code, the credit for gift taxes granted by §2012 of the Code, the
credit for property previously taxed granted by §2013 of the
Code (but only to the extent attributable to property that cannot
be identified specifically as includible in my estate at death),
and any other credit the benefit of which is not allocated by
paragraph 1.2.3.3. because it is not possible to identify the
property passing to a recipient that produced the credit shall
inure to the benefit of all recipients of property described in
paragraph 1.2.1.3.

1.2.3.3.

The benefit of any other credit shall inure to the recipient of
property that produced the credit (e.g. the recipient of property
that generates a state death tax shall enjoy the benefit of the
credit granted by §2011 or the deduction granted by §2058 with
respect to payment of that tax, the recipient of property subject
to foreign death tax shall enjoy the benefit of the credit granted
by §20 14 with respect to the taxation of that property, and the
recipient of specifically identifiable property that is includible in
my estate and that previously was taxed shall enjoy the benefit of
any credit granted by §2013 with respect to that property).

1.2.3.4.

The benefit of any reduction in tax attributable to an election
under §2032A of the Code shall inure to the qualified heir who
receives the property that is the subject of the election.

1.2.3.5.

The benefit of any reduction in tax attributable to property
qualifying for the marital or charitable deduction shall inure to
the recipient of that property. Any increase in death taxes
attributable to a disclaimer of such property or a failure to elect
to qualify any part of a bequest that otherwise could constitute
QTIP property under §2056(b)(7) of the Code shall be charged
to the disclailned or non-elected property without the benefit of
any lnarital deduction otherwise available to my estate.
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1.2.3.6.

The benefit of any tax rate differential in computing death taxes
attributable to the relation of the recipient to me shall inure to
that beneficiary.

1.2.3.7.

The benefit of any other entitlement directly attributable to
identifiable property shall inure to the beneficiary who receives
that property.

1.2.4.

Telnporal Interests: Death tax attributable to property held in temporal
interests (e.g., a life estate, annuity, or term of years, followed by a
relnainder) shall be paid from corpus to the extent the effect thereof is to
alnoliize the cost over the respective interests but otherwise shall be
apportioned between the respective interests based on their respective
values. Apportionlnent to a lead interest may entail a loan from principal
or recomputation of an annuity or other guaranteed. payment, but neither
this paragraph nor any provision of state law shall apply to the extent the
effect is to reduce a deduction otherwise allowable for any part of the
property.

1.2.5.

oTIP Property: Notwithstanding paragraph 1.2.3.5., with respect to
property includible in my estate under §2044 of the Code, all taxes
attributable to all §2044 property shall be determined on a pro rata rather
than the increlnental basis provided by §2207A and shall be apportioned
to the §2044 property with the highest inclusion ratio to the extent doing
so will not constitute a constructive addition with respect to any §2044
property with a lower inclusion ratio.

1.2.6.

Exoneration: Notwithstanding any other provision of this will, the
recipient of property q~scribed in this paragraph shall not be subject to
apportionment and the taxes attributable to this property shall be paid by
the relnaining recipients of property includible in my estate according to
the cOlnputation of attributable tax described in paragraphs 1.2.1. and
1.2.2.
1.2.6.1.

To the extent apportionment of the attributable tax would violate
federal law relating to employee benefits and deferred
cOlnpensation.

1.2.6.2.

To the extent apportionlnent of the attributable tax would cause
an acceleration of income taxation or to the extent the property
otherwise would be eligible for exclusion from my estate by
§2039(c) or §2039(e) of the Code pursuant to the transition
rules in §§525(b)(2) through 525(b)(4) of the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 as amended.
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1.2.6.3.

Proceeds of life insurance that are exempt from inheritance or
silnilar death taxes to the extent not subject to apportionment
because paid to a beneficiary other than my personal
representative.

1.2.6.4.

Property not passing under this will to the extent the total tax
attributable thereto is less than *% of the total death taxes
described in paragraph 1.1.

1.2.6.5.

Property passing under * of this will (relating to personal
property) to the extent the total tax attributable thereto is less
than *% of the total death taxes described in paragraph 1.1.

1.3

Reimbursement: Because it is Iny intent to apportion death taxes as described
above, it is unnecessary to assert the rights to reimbursement provided by §§2206,
2207, 2207A, 2207B, and 2603 of the Code (and any similar provisions hereafter
adopted) and, except to the extent inconsistent with the foregoing, I hereby waive
those entitlements.

1.4.

Interest and Set Offs: In the discretion of my personal representative death taxes
attributable to property not passing under this will may be paid out of the residue of
my estate prior to recovering the attributable tax from the recipient of that property.
1.4.1.

Attributable tax that has not been paid by the recipient before my personal
representative pays death taxes or that is not yet due because my personal
representative Inade a valid deferral election under §6161, §6163, or
§6166 of the Code shall bear interest equal to that imposed by the Code
.
~
on Iny personal representative.

1.4.2.

In the discretion of either Iny personal representative or a beneficiary
under this will, as a forIn of payment by that beneficiary to my personal
representative, any entitlelnent of that beneficiary under this will may be
applied in paylnent of that beneficiary's share of the taxes and interest
attributable to other property received by that beneficiary.

1.4.3.

In its discretion my personal representative may distribute my estate in
whole or in part prior to final audit and settlement of the tax liability of
my estate, notwithstanding that attributable taxes may be altered
thereafter.

1.4.4.

My personal representative shall not be personally liable for withholding
an insufficient alnount as a set off against the liability of a recipient or for
failing to recover attributable taxes or interest following reasonable
effolis and shall not be required to litigate to enforce apportionment
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unless indemnified against the costs thereof
1.5

Adjustments: My personal representative's selection of assets to be sold to pay
death taxes, and the tax effects thereof: shall not be subject to question by any
beneficiary. My personal representative is hereby indemnified against any liability
it may incur to any recipient of property not passing under this will for the effect of
any action taken in the computation or payment of death taxes that directly or
indirectly affects any recipient's liability under this provision. Elections or
allocations authorized under the Code may be made by my personal representative
in its discretion without regard to or liability for the effect thereof on any
beneficiary or any tax consequence thereof No adjustment shall be made between
income and principal, in the relative interests of the recipients, or in the amount or
selection of assets allocated to any trust under this will to compensate for the effect
on any such action or for the effect on the amount of any tax attributable to any
recipient of property includible in my estate for death tax purposes.

1.6

Conflict of Laws: For all purposes of interpreting this provision and ascertaining the
rights of any recipient of property includible in my estate for death tax purposes the
law of the state of my domicile at death shall govern notwithstanding the nature or
location of the property or the domicile of the recipient.

CAUTION
The foregoing form is drafted for use in a will. If adapted to be used in a trust, remember
also to include a provision in the client's will waiving all rights of reimbursement (see paragraph
1.3) because only a will may waive the rights granted by §§2206 and 2207.
If multiple documents will be used for the estate plan, be certain that
all tax clauses mesh
I
in terms of calling for payment in a consistent manner and all from the proper sources in the
same order or under the same conditions. A provision in a trust authorizing a loan to or purchase
of assets from the settlor's estate may be as effective as a separate tax payment directive in the
trust, especially if the trust corpus otherwise is not includible in the settlor's estate at death.
For those faint of heart who fear that paragraph 1.2 is not adequate, the following
paragraph appropriately might be appended to make even more clear the drafter's intent.
1.7

Construction: To the extent a provision relating to the payment or apportionment of
taxes is unclear or no provision addresses a particular issue, the overriding principle
to be applied is full apportionment of tax liabilities to those dispositions generating
the tax, reflecting the notion of equitable apportionment to the fullest possible
extent to minimize taxes by preserving deductions, exclusions, and exemptions.

THE FOREGOING FORMS ARE NOT WARRANTED AS SUITABLE FOR ANY GENERAL
OR SPECIFIC USE. THE USER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERMINING HOW THEY
SHOULD BE ADAPTED TO ANY PARTICULAR SITUATION.
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Revised Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act Appendix
Coming to a legislature near you! The National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws gave its
final reading to the Revised Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act in August 2003. Drafted to
freshen up the current (1969) version of the Act, a number of changes are made that improve the
Uniform Act, but a variety of issues remain unresolved and decisions were made that may differ
from what your clients may prefer. As a result, be careful about whether to default into state law
in your state or any other: it is very likely that a well drafted tax payment provision will produce
better results than any version of state law, including the new revised Uniform Act.
The new revision is totally rewritten but bears many resemblances to the old. For comparison
purposes the drafters provided a document that identifies the major substantive changes made
from the current Act. Consult the Univ. of Pennsylvania website for these materials, and this
document specifically at www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uetaa/newfeb2003comparison.html. The
drafters listed seven notable alterations found in the new Act:
1. It adds apportionment of foreign death taxes and generation-skipping transfer tax on a direct
skip occurring at the decedent's death.
2. It alters the mechanism for allocation of taxes by eliminating from the denominator of the
fraction for pro ration (a) any deductible claims and expenses against the estate (regardless of
whether they are deducted) and (b) any §2035(b) gross-up tax amount. In each case the effect is
to increase the tax apportioned to every person to whom tax is apportioned in the estate.

3. It expands the prior rule to permit a decedent to override the statutory regime by a provision in
a revocable trust or other dispositive instrument, rather than just by a will.
4. It creates a complex approach for apportionment of tax to temporal or o~her "insulated"
property (meaning dispositions such that access to liquid funds is impossible or impracticable).
Tax attributable to such dispositions is paid frnm other "uninsulated" property and those
payments constitute "advancements" that give the beneficiaries who incur the tax a future right
to reimbursement from the takers of insulated property, delayed until a subsequent distribution of
an insulated disposition occurs. Effected through a fractional reimbursement entitlement that is
illustrated in the comments to §6 of the new Uniform Act, observers will do well to carefully
evaluate the complexity of the approach adopted.
5. It allocates the benefit of the §§2012 and 2014 gift tax and foreign death tax credits.
6. It allocates the benefits generated under §2057 (the deduction for qualified family owned
business interests), §2032A (special use valuation), and § 2031(c) (conservation easements).
7. It identifies the costs to defer tax under §§6161, 6163, and 6166 and apportions interest and
penalties attributable to them.
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The new Act does not make a number of other important changes, likely for a variety of reasons.
Reviewers may want to consider whether to recommend to their legislature that its consideration
of the new Act be accompanied by a study of additions that might improve the Act. For example,
it would be desirable if state law addressed questions such as:
a. Apportionment of the estate tax generated by §203 5(b) gross up rule inclusion of gift tax paid
within three years of death. Should the donee of the gift that generated the gift tax that was paid
by the donor incur the added estate tax attributable to the gross up rule, or should the legislature
assume (as did the drafters) that the donor who paid the gift tax intended that the donee take free
and clear of all tax, including any unanticipated estate tax attributable to the gift tax payment?
This is a very hard issue, on which a colloquy on the topic appears below to indicate how the
drafters considered issues of this nature, making it easier to see how or why a state legislature
might deviate from the new Uniform Act, or add to it.
b. There are a number of interesting equitable apportionment or adjustment issues not anticipated
by the new Uniform Act. One illuminating example is the §691(c) income tax deduction for
estate tax attributable to Income in Respect of a Decedent (IRD). Who should benefit from that
income tax deduction: the beneficiary against whom the estate tax was apportioned that
generated the income tax deduction, or whomever is the income beneficiary whose income tax is
reduced? Another illustration is the §2058 state death tax deduction: it is not so clear how
§2(1)(B) of the new Uniform Act is meant to operate when it refers to "the value of any interest
in property that ... qualifies for the marital or charitable deduction or otherwise is deductible or
exempf' in this context; does that provision accomplish the equitable apportionment result that
should apply for those who pay state death tax that generates the §2058 deduction? A third
example is the apparent failure to apportion differences in state inheritance or other death tax
rates that vary based on the relation of the beneficiary to the decedent.
c. The new Uniform Act does not apportion the benefit of a number of credits more important
than §§2012 and 2014, most significantly the §2013 previously taxed property credit. The
drafting issue is whether the person who incurred the estate tax that generates the credit should
get the benefit of that credit. By default the Act allocates the §§2010 unified credit and 2058
state death tax deduction to all beneficiaries of the estate and potentially either or both benefits
also should be allocated more directly to one class of beneficiaries or another (such as the §2058
deduction benefiting the takers of property that incurred and paid the state death tax in question).
d. The new Uniform Act also addresses recapture taxes in an oblique manner but fails to consider
all the different forms of recapture tax that may impact a decedent's estate. One obvious and
likely to be common illustration is the §529(c)(4)(C) recapture of accelerated annual exclusion
made available to contributors to college education plans.
e. The new Uniform Act continues the basic paradigm that taxes attributable to property that is
broken into temporal interests (such as a life estate or annuity, and remainder) shall be paid from
corpus. The mechanism embraced is complex and most especially produces untoward results in
cases in which a lead annuity of a fixed dollar amount is involved. The state law issue is whether
an adjustment provision could be formulated that would be more fair and easier to employ.
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f Waiver by a will, trust, or other dispositive document requires an "express" or "unambiguous"
provision (see §3) but the comment to that rule refers to "explicit" and "specific" references.
Federal law §§2207A and 2207B require the decedent to "specifically indicate an intent" to alter
their entitlements. It might be wise for state law to mimic federal law so that standards adopted
for each will inform the others.
g. The provisions that consider the generation-skipping transfer taxes could be more refined. For
example, any tax on a direct skip that occurs at death is addressed. by the Act as if direct skip tax
always is something the decedent could have anticipated. In that regard direct skip generationskipping tax caused by a child's disclaimer often is excluded from well drafted tax payment
provisions because it is thought that the child's trust normally would incur the generationskipping tax (usually when the child dies) and the child's disclaimer should not accelerate that
tax and change the source for its payment. Direct skip tax incurred on a disclaimer by a skip
person is another story, because that direct skip tax presumably was anticipated by the decedent.
Moreover, apportionment of estate tax to a QTIP marital trust includible in the decedent's gross
estate under §2044, either under the §2207A reimbursement right or a comparable state law,
appropriately might be allocated first against property with an inclusion ratio of one rather than
against exempt property attributable to a reverse QTIP election with an inclusion ratio of less
than one. The Uniform Act does not does protect the exemption by invading the nonexempt
property first.
h. The new Uniform Act does not appear to apportion fees and expenses that are incurred by a
probate estate in its compliance with the tax law but that are attributable to nonprobate assets.
For example, a large valuation expense might be incurred with respect to nonprobate assets
includible in an estate but directly expensed to the personal representative who is filing the estate
tax return. Shouldn't those nonprobate assets pay for that expense? Nothing in most state laws or
in the new Uniform Act makes such an allocation.
i. Finally, state law might legislatively addre~§ the conflict of laws issue that regularly will arise
with respect to decedents with property located in multiple jurisdictions, potentially subject to
the state apportionment rules of several.

Now, here is that colloquy between an observer/commentator (0) regarding the Act in an earlier
draft, and a member of the drafting committee advisory board (A). It shows a number of ways
that others in the legislative process might view their role and the standards to be applied by the
legislature in making certain determinations regarding apportionment:

0: I agree [with a letter written by yet another commentator] that the estate tax
attributable to the gross up rule of §2035(b) ought to be allocated to the donee of the gift.
A: There was probably no doubt that donors of inter vivos gifts intended them to be free
of tax. This is not an issue of conceptual purity, but of almost certain intent.
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0: I would bet that no donor ever considered the §2035(b) gross up tax (unless some
advisor put the question to them). I grant that donors almost without exception (that
exception being a net gift, in which intent is quite clearly expressed) want their donees to
take free of GIFT tax, but this IS different. It is a tax that I would guess the donor never
intended or contemplated. And if the transfer were at death - which is what §2035(b) is
equating - the statute y'all are drafting assumes that the donor would want the donee to
pay the tax on the transfer - your paradigm is full apportionment. So I question whether
this is as clear a case of presumed intent as you represent.

A: We started out with the proposition that preresiduary legacies would be exempt from
apportionment, on the theory that probable intent justified this. The inter vivos gift is an a
fortiori case. The preresiduary result was changed because of disputes on limitations on
exemptions and the interplay between reapportionment and the marital and charitable
deductions; that, however, shouldn't get in the way of the clearer case.

0: Imagine a situation involving an inter vivos gift, not to spouse or charity, that
produces gift tax paid within three years of death. The estate at death goes entirely to
charity or surviving spouse and would be nontaxable due to those charitable and marital
deductions. But you have estate tax attributable to the gross up rule. Is it really the intent
of the drafting committee that the deductions at death - that everyone thought would
make the estate tax free - would be reduced because tax attributable to the inter vivos
gifts would be paid from the estate in general? Your result will start a whirlpool
calculation that would produce a relatively large and entirely unexpected tax liability at
death. And, I suspect, not the intent of the decedent or the drafter at all.
Every time I confront a tax apportionment issue, the only results that seem to work when
you play them out to the end are full apportionment - everyone pays their own way. The
only quibble here is what that means, and I think still it is clear that if the donor wants to
exempt someone from a tax liability it'is best if the donor specifically identifies the gift or
the person and says "don't make that person pay" - but otherwise any tax attributable to
a transfer to that person comes from that person. Here you have what I think we can agree
would be an "unanticipated" tax liability and the only way I know that will avoid second
and third level problems is to say, sorry, the donee pays. Even if the donor paid the gift
tax on the original gift, if the planner and the donor failed to anticipate and plan
specifically for the gross up tax, I think having the donee pay is the right and less likely
destructive result.
After all, isn't your statute meant to provide rules for when people failed to think these
issues through and draft an efficient and different result? I truly believe that when you
pursue these kinds of questions the initial notion of what someone would intend (donee
gets the gift, tax free, for example) nearly always proves to be too blunt or simplistic or
could not anticipate the kinds of events that unfold and produce the kinds of litigation
that we encounter.

G - 138

A: I am not troubled by exoneration of preresiduary gifts even if the residuary is
nontaxable. In fact, that is what most, if not all, wills I have seen provide. On that basis I
feel very comfortable that we have captured probable intent. It is also considerably
simpler in cases where the donee is not a beneficiary at death.

0: I suspect most of the burden on the residue logic of most drafters is a function of ease
of administration. But I also think that most of the disasters that occur are a function of
burden on the residue. I'm not smart enough to know where to draw the line between
trying to avert disaster and facilitate administration, and I don't have any experience in
knowing what most people intend - especially the vast majority of those who never
thought to form an intent!
The hard issue to my mind is whether such a statute should try to predict intent or avert
disaster. I'm ofa mind that intent is easy enough to draft affirmatively, so state law
should do what so many UPC provisions have - which is to anticipate problems and
prevent them from becoming disasters.
As the colloquy shows, the objective of the drafters of the new Uniform Act may differ from
what your legislature has in mind to accomplish with laws in this area. It will be important to
consider first how the legislature wishes to approach its task (what the objective of the legislation
should be) and then to consider the types of rules or decisions that should be embraced under that
policy. Whatever the result, wise estate planners will realize that state law probably does not do
everything that a well crafted tax apportionment provision should accomplish, and likely will
create their own set of provisions either to override or to supplement state law. Given the variety
of state laws that may apply and the diversity of client investments and their locations, it seems
likely also that a drafter will not be able to rely on the application ofjust one state's rules.
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The following smattering of recent decisions is notable in that they have a common
thread. See if you detect the common mistake that seems to inform these, and the vast
majority of these unfortunate cases.
In re Estate of Klarner, 98 P.3d 892 (Colo.· Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, involved
two interesting issues in the context of a qualified tenninable interest property (QTIP)
trust created by a deceased husband for his surviving wife. One was the court's rejection
of administration expense apportionment to the QTIP trust without authority to do so
under state law. There is very limited authority for such an apportionment and the court
reached the traditional result (although not necessarily the equitable one). The other issue
was estate tax apportionment against the QTIP trust, the court concluding that the
specificity required by §2207A relating to waiver of the right of reimbursement for
federal estate tax had no counterpart with respect to the state death tax burden. The net
result was that the surviving wife's estate plan, which contained a burden on the residue
tax payment direction, was regarded as adequate to reject state law apportionment of the
state death tax burden to the QTIP trust and instead placed it on the residue of the
surviving wife's estate. This caused the QTIP trust to benefit the children of.the settlor
(the first spouse to die), at the expense of the children of the surviving spouse. That is not
a result nonnally expected, and it higWights the need to consider both state and federal
law in drafting tax apportionment provisions.
Hollis v. Forrester, 2004 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 823, involved a different
convolution to produce different claimants to the estate of the surviving spouse (heirs at
law) and of the QTIP trust (nieces of the settlor), and state law differed as well (Alabama
is one of only four states still retaining the burden on the residue rule), but the net result
was the same: state estate tax in the surviving spouse's estate, attributable to inclusion of
a QTIP marital deduction trust, were a charge against the survivor's residuary estate and
were not payable in the same ·manner as the federal estate tax from the QTIP trust.
People will fight over this and the only difference in Hollis from Klarner is that the
surviving spouse had no tax payment provision, instead of having an ineffective one.
Otherwise, would anyone doubt that the result reached in either case was contrary to the
intent of the surviving spouse? Or that one more case is likely (involving an estate
planner's malpractice liability)?
In re Estate of Siebrasse, 678 N. W.2d 822 (S. D. 2(04), may have reached the
"right" state law result, and it may have been the testator's intent as well, but it
showcased an issue that might be addressed in more tax payment provisions. The simple
situation was division of an estate that resulted in one brother receiving realty that he
thought was overvalued for federal estate tax purposes, and he proved it. In the end this
beneficiary generated a refund of federal estate tax, which this beneficiary thought should
belong entirely to him. The state supreme court reversed a lower court that agreed with
him, noting that under state law and the terms of the document equal division of the
estate after payment of all taxes meant that every beneficiary shared pro rata the tax
liability as fmally detennined. In tax payment planning, however, quaere whether
benefits that are beneficiary specific (such as §2032A special use valuation that requires
the beneficiary's material participation) ought to be allocated to the particular recipient
who generates that benefit. Siebrasse confinns that state laws typically do not apportion
those benefits without a specific direction in the document.
Estate of Green v. Commissioner, 86 T.e.M. (CCH) 758 (2003), involved
generation-skipping transfer tax on a direct skip bequest and held that the decedent
intended to exonerate direct skip bequests from paying the generation-skipping tax. At the
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same time, however, the plan did not effectively exonerate the same bequests from state
or federal estate tax. The net result was that the generation-skipping tax was imposed on
the other residuary beneficiary of the estate, which was a charity. That caused a reduction
in the federal estate tax charitable deduction, which generated federal estate tax, an equal
share of which was imposed on the direct skip beneficiaries under state law equitable
apportionment. The net result was that more wealth passed to the direct skip beneficiaries
than if §2603(b) had applied to apportion all the generation-skipping transfer tax against
the direct skip bequest, but it is doubtful that the result was what anyone anticipated when
drafting the decedent's estate plan.
In Estate of Lurie v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 830 (2004), the decedent
exhausted the unified credit on inter vivos transfers, meaning that no credit shelter trust
was created under the estate plan. The estate plan included a tax payment provision in a
pour over trust that was directed to pay if the probate estate was insufficient, which was
the case. Indeed, by stipulation, it was agreed that trusts created for the decedent by a
third party were includible in the estate, to the tune of over $40 million. State law
provided that, in the absence of a contrary direction in the decedent's estate plan, tax
generated by nonprobate assets would be paid from those assets under the concept of
apportionment, here both outside and equitable apportionment (because the estate
otherwise would pass entirely to the surviving spouse and qualify for the marital
deduction, generating none of the estate tax). Because state law was deemed waived by
the tax payment provision the net result was a reduction of the marital deduction by the
taxes paid on the $40 million, resulting in a fmal estate tax of over $47 million (after
reduction of the marital deduction to pay the tax on the $40 million, and then payment of
estate tax because of loss of the marital deduction, and further payment of that tax and
another round of lost marital deduction, with yet more estate tax, all in a circular
whirlpool calculation).
In re Estate of Williams, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 313, raised that age-old
nonprobate property issue whether divorce revokes a beneficiary designation in favor of a
now former spouse. The court held not, and the decedent drowned 54 days after the
divorce, without having changed the beneficiary designation, meaning that the former
spouse received annuities that were includible in the estate, with no matching marital
deduction, State law again dictated equitable apportionment but the tax clause in the
decedent's estate plan directed payment-of all taxes from the residue of the estate and
waived all rights of reimbursement. The court found that state law was made inapplicable
by that direction and rejected the estate's argument that the tax clause should be ignored
because it benefited the former spouse and all provisions in a will that benefit a former
spouse are regarded by state law as revoked upon divorce (state law actually stated that
"divorce revokes any disposition . . . to the former spouse" and the tax payment
provision was not such a "disposition" to the spouse).
In re Estate of Overturf, 819 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. Ct. App. 2(04), raised an issue that
should have been addressed in the estate plan because it is anyone's guess how the
decedent would have addressed the inequity that arose. The residuary estate was divided
equally between two daughters but one daughter survived to a larger share of joint
tenancy property owned by the decedent with the respective daughters. The estate tax
burden was placed on only the personal property in the residuary estate, which proved to
be inadequate. The daughter who was disfavored in the joint tenancy property argued that
the unfulfilled tax liability should be charged under state law outside apportionment
proportionately to the two daughters, each paying different amounts relative to the
amounts of joint tenancy property each received. The favored daughter argued that state
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law imposed the excess tax liability against the realty included in the residuary estate,
which equally burdened both daughters. The court imposed equal amounts of the tax
against the two daughters notwithstanding disparate division of the decedent's aggregate
wealth, fmding that the tax payment provision looking solely to probate personalty failed
and therefore that state law apportionment against the remaining probate estate would
prevail. Had the probate personalty beer! adequate that inequity would have been the end
result, so the conclusion is consistent with the plan as drafted, but was the resulting
inequity understood and intended by the decedent? A statement confirming that intent
might have avoided the litigation.
Finally, Rosen v. Wells Fargo Bank Texas, 114 S.W.3d 145 (Ct. App. Tex. 2003),
was one ray of good news for taxpayers, holding that equitable apportionment would
apply to protect a bequest to the decedent's surviving spouse, but only because the
testamentary direction to pay all transfer taxes "out of the residue of my estate without
apportionment" failed when the residue of the estate was exhausted. This caused taxes to
be paid from nonprobate assets includible in the estate, pursuant to state law that applied
once the tax payment provision cratered. That fortunate result was the product of
effective postmortem lawyering and the fortuitous selection of a preresiduary marital
bequest that was protected against abatement or tax payment when the residuary tax
payment direction proved ineffective to override state law. "The lack of a residuary estate
negates any specific direction for apportionment and therefore the default apportionment
provisions of [state law] should apply. "
Now the question with which we began: What mistake in drafting generated the litigation
in all eight cases? A tax payment provision directing payment of taxes from the residue of
the estate, waiving all rights of apportionment or reimbursement. A so-called "dad buys
dinner" tax payment provision. Nothing produces more litigation in situations involving
unanticipated assets or developments.
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SECTIONH

I.

Introduction and Scope

With the increase in blended families, .wealth of the baby-boomer
generation, and the current divorce rate, protection of assets wi~h regard to marital
rights is increasingly relevant for attorneys who practice in the area of estate
planning and family law. This article sets forth the general principals of Kentucky
law applicable to prenuptial agreements, drafting guidelines utilizing le~sons from
KentUcky case analysis, and a brief discussion of relevant issues of premarital
agreement litigation.
A· prenuptial agreement (also known as an antenuptial agreement) is an
agreement entered into by prospective spouses prior to marriage but in
contemplation and in consideration thereof. 1· Prenuptial agreements are favored
under Kentucky law. 2 In fact, the overwhelming majority of prenuptial
agreements litigated in Kentucky are upheld. 3 Only in very rare instances have
prenuptial agreements been struck down in their entirety by Kentucky Courts.
II.

Kentucky Prenuptial Agreements: General Requirements for a Valid
Prenuptial Agreement

Kentucky law recognizes the validity of prenuptial agreements for the
disposition of property in the event of death or a divorce. 4 However, to be
enforceable, a prenuptial. agreement must be supported by valid consideration,
even if such consideration is only the marriage itself. 5 Further, to be enforceable,
prenuptial agreements must be in writing. 6
In addition to the above requirements, in 1990, the Kentucky Supreme
Court ruled that the enforcement of prenuptial agreements is subject to three
limitations: 7
(1 )

(2)
(3)

Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or
through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts?
(Gentry Element 1);
Is the agreement unconscionable? (Gentry Element 2); and
Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was
executed so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?
(Gentry Element 3)

Blacks Law Dictionary
Hardesty v. Hardesty's Ex'r, 34 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. App. 1931)
3 See Appendix A Summary of Prenuptial Agreement Cases
4 Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W. 522 (Ky. App. 1916); Gentryv. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990) and
Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990)
5 Luck v. Luck, 711 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. App. 1986)
6 KRS 371.010(5)
7 Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990)
1

2
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These Gentry limitations apply to prenuptial agreements whether in the
'
context of death or divorce.
III.

Examination of Gentry Limitations on Prenuptial Agreements

A.
Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or
through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts?
(1)

Fraud

A prenuptial agreement is often a vehicle fo! the protection of
assets in the event one prospective spouse has assets which are significantly
greater than the other prospective spouse. An argument may be attempted that the
spouse seeking to protect assets may have been fraudulent simply by virtue of the
amount of assets that he or she may have in comparison to his or her spouse's
assets. However, disparity of assets alone without other supporting circumstances
does not in itself constitute fraud. 8
The court may consider parol evidence to determine whether
proper disclosure was made when fraud is alleged. 9 For example, in Lipski v.
Lipski, the Court considered evidence that the wife discussed the prenuptial
agreement and its terms with family 'members in determining whether her
knowledge satisfied the disclosure element. IO The court upheld the agreement. 11
(2)

Disclosure of Assets

To be bound by a premarital agreement, each spouse must
have been apprised of the nature and extent of his or her prospective spouse's
estate and the value of the marital rights which he or she is surrendering. I2 Courts
have not commented on just how detailed this disclosure must be, only noting that
to be valid, a prenuptial agreement must include an accurate listing of the assets it
purports to cover. 13
For the purpose of protecting assets, an· attorney' should
assume that more detail provides greater protection of the asset. Consider, the
Court of Appeals analysis in Lane v. Lane where the wife contested a general
8

9
10

11
12
13

Harlin v. Harlin, 87 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. App. 1935); also see Brown v. Brown, 265 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. App.
1954)
Gaines v. Gaines' Adm'r, 173 S.W. 774 (Ky. App. 1915)
Lipski v. Lipski, 510 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. App. 1974)
Id.
'
Potter's Ex'r v. Potter, 29 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. App. 1930); Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1995)
Luck v. Luck, 711 S.W 2d 860 (Ky. App. 1986); also see Lane v. Lane, 2004 WL 178374 (Ky. App.
2004)
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reference in the prenuptial agreement to "pension plan" as not including the
husband's 401(k).14 The Court considered the specific facts of the case and
ultimately found that the reference to "pension plan" did refer to' and include the
husband's 401(k).15 A clear designation to the 401(k) account with corresponding
account number may have avoided this issue altogether.
In one of the few cases where a prenuptial agreement was
struck down in Kentucky, the Kentucky Court of Appeals took into consideration
the lack of disclosure of assets to the prospective wife prior to the execution of the
purported prenuptial agreement. 16 However, other factors that contributed to the
failure of that prenuptial agreement included execution of the document on the day
of the wedding and the fact that counsel advised neither party. 17 In a similar case,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals Court struck down a prenuptial agreement where
the prospective wife had limited reading ability, was not read the proposed
agreement, and signed the document the day of the wedding. 18
When challenged, the burden of proof regarding the questions
of full disclosure of assets at the time of the prenuptial agreement was entered into
rests on the party relying on the prenuptial agreement. 19
(3)

Sophistication of the Parties

The sophistication of the parties is relevant to the
enforcement of a prenuptial agreement. The Kentucky Supreme Court has
reviewed the issue of disclosure and upheld a prenuptial agreement noting that
factors such as the age, education, previous marriages, and work experience are
relevant to whether the burden of disclosure has been satisfied. 2o In addition, other
cases· have considered the education and judgment of a spouse to be a relevant
factor in determining the viability of a prenuptial agreement. 21
B.

Was the prenuptial agreement is unconscionable?

Courts will review a prenuptial agreement at the time of the
termination of the marriage. 22 This is so whether the termination of the marriage
is a result of either death or by divorce. Courts are possessed of this power:

14

15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22

Lane v. Lane, 2004 WL 178374 (Ky. App. 2004)
Idat 4
Luck v. Luck, 711 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. App. 1986)
Id.
Potter's Ev'r v. Potter, 29 S.W. 2d 15 (Ky. App. 1930)
Harlin v. Harlin, 87 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. App. 1935)
Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1995)
Lipski v. Lipski, 510 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. App. 1974)
Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990); also see Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W. 3d 585 (Ky App. 2001)
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to ensure that facts and circumstances have not changed since
the agreement was, executed to such an extent as to render its
enforcement unconscionable. 23
A prenuptial agreement is "unconscionable" and must be set aside if
the court determines that it is "manifestly unfair and unreasonable." 24
The difficulty of this definition is that the consequences seem to be
subjective to the particular court and the parties to the action. A lawyer must
carefully explain Gentry Element 2 to his to his or her client prior to execution of
the agreement. In essence, what the lawyer must convey is that even under a
perfect situation where all aspects of a prenuptial agreement should render the
agreement enforceable, the Court will review the agreement for validity and
consider the circumstances of the parties at the time of enforcement (be it 1 year or
50 years) to determine whether the agreement is "manifestly unfair or
unreasonable." Although daunting, again consider that the overwhelming majority
of prenuptial agreements in unreported cases in Kentucky are in fact upheld when
challenged. 25
C.
Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was
executed so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?
There is not a specific discussion by Kentucky Courts concerning
what type of "change in circumstances at the time' enforcement is sought" will
render an agreement unconscionable. Rather, the fairness of the premarital
agreement will be considered on a case by case basis. 26
There are two recent cases that may provide some guidance in
examination of the Gentry Element 3. In Blue v. Blue, the wife argued that the
significant increase in Mr. Blue's wealth during marriage rendered the
enforcement of the agreement unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable. 27 In Blue
the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the prenuptial agreement and applied a
Substantive Fairness Test, the Court found:
A more appropriate test of the substantive fairness of a
prenuptial agreement requires a finding that the circumstances
of the parties 'at the time the marriage is dissolved are, not so
beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the

Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990); also see Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W. 3d 585 (Ky App. 2001)
Shraberg v. Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Ky. 1997)
25 See Appendix - Summary of Kentucky Prenuptial Agreement Cases
26 Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990)
27 Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585 (Ky. App. 2001)
23

24

,
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prenuptial agreement was entered into as to cause its
enforcement to work an injustice. 28
Ms. Blue's contention was that her spouse's increase in net worth
from an estimated, $5,000,000. at the time the prenuptial agreement was entered
into to an estimated $77,000,000 at the time of termination of the marriage
rendered the enforcement in violation of Gentry Element 3. The Court upheld the
Blue prenuptial agreement finding that the mere increase in Mr. Blue's nonmarital
assets does not render a prenuptial agreement unconscionable. Other factors that
the Court seemed to consider as relevant: Mrs. Blue received .in excess of
$650,000 pursuant to the prenuptial agreement; each party was represented by
counsel; and each party had been previously married.
Interestingly, Mr. and Mrs. Blue (soon known as Mr. Blue and Ms.
Ford) took yet another trip to the Kentucky Court of Appeal relative. to their
prenuptial agreement dispute. 29 See Attorney Fees below in Sectio'nV of this
Article.
In a recent decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals the
Substantive Fairness Test was applied to uphold a prenuptial agreement and deny
maintenance to a non-college educated wife. 3o The Court indicated that the wife
failed to meet her burden of showing that she did not contemplate the significant
increase in the annual income of her college educated husband. 31 The Court
reviewed Mr. Lane's earning capacity throughout the marriage which was
approximately $166,000 at the time of the marriage and approximately $1,000,000
before termination of the marriage. 32 The Court concluded that Mr. Lane's career
was developing during the marriage, a fact which in light of his educational
background should have been recognized by the parties. In addition, as in the
2001 Blue decision, the Lane Court in this case also seemed to take into
consideration the amount of property that Ms. Lane received (approximately
$300,000 of marital and non-marital funds).
IV.

Maintenance

A prenuptial agreement can determine maintenance/alimony so long as
there has been full disclosure and subject to scrutiny for unconscionability.33

Id.
See Ford v. Blue, 106 S.W.3d 470 (Ky. App. 2003)
30 Lane v. Lane, 2004 WL 178374 (Ky. App. 2004)
31Id.
32 I d.
33 Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990)
28

29
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v.

Attorney's Fees

While few prenuptial agreements have been struck down in their entirety,
prenuptial clauses concerning payment of attorney fees are often disregarded by
courts when there is a disparity in assets between the parties. 34 This is so, even if
the agreement is otherwise found to meet the three Gentry requirements. 35
VI.

Defenses to Prenuptial Agreement

As the vast majority of challenged prenuptial agreements ·since 1891 have
been upheld, very little'law exists as to recognized defenses. However, a few
remain. For example, abandonment is a recognized defense to the enforcement of
a prenuptial agreement in Kentucky. 36
In addition, destruction of original premarital agreement coupled with
intent to revoke can invalidate a prenuptial agreement. 37 Although a recognized
case does not exist, it could be argued that a missing original without a photocopy
is evidence of revocation of the agreement. This would be similar to cases that
have examined this scenario in the context of a last will and testament.
VII.

Limitations on Prenuptial Agreements in Kentucky

Questions of child support, child custody, and visitation are not subject to a
premarital agreement. 38

VIII. Drafting Prenuptial Agreements
.A.

Preparation Necessary for Drafting a Prenuptial Agreement
(1)

Representation

The general rule is that a lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client. 39 The
interests of parties entering into a contractual agreement to define (and most likely
restrict) their marital rights are obviously adverse. Therefore, when an attorney is
contacted by a potential client concerning .a prenuptial agreement, the attorney
should consider representing the interests of only one soon-to-be spouse. The
other soon-to-be spouse may be best served be represented by counsel of his or her
own choosing.
Ford v. Blue, 106 S.W.3d 470 (Ky. App. 2003); Lane v. Lane, 2004 WL 178374 (Ky. App. 2004)
Also see Appendix A, Summary of Kentucky Prenuptial Agreement Cases
36 Prather v. Cox, 689 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. App. 1985)
37 Carter v. Carter, 656 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. App. 1983)
38 Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990)
39 See SCR 3.130(1.7)
34

35
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Fee agreements should be written and should detail the
method of compensation to the lawyer whether a flat fee or an hourly based rate.
Generally, the attorney preparing the prenuptial agreement may want to be
engaged at an hourly rate as negotiation with opposing counsel and education of
the client may be difficult to gauge and may depend upon the specific situation of
the client.
(2)

Client Information

Once a written fee agreement is in place and each party is
represented by separate counsel, the attorney should require his or her client to
complete a written infonnation sheet.
The information sheet should be
comprehensive as to the client's assets and liabilities. Supporting documentation
should be attached including account statements, copies of deeds, copies of close
corporation stock certificates, and retirement statements. Further,· the lawyer
should know his or her client's personal information including legal name,
address, names and dates of birth of children, support ·obligations (maintenance,
property settlement agreement with previous spouse, and child support),
education, marital history, employment information (including annual income),
and information concerning ownership interests in businesses.
The above described type of information is c.onsistently take]}
into consideration by a court reviewing the agreement at enforcement time.
Although generally it is the entirety of the circumstances that the court considers,
it is relevant that the majority of recent cases detail the personal history of the
spouses (previous married, education, etc.).
(3)

Asset Disclosure

The completed infonnation sheet serves the dual purpose of
infonnation gathering and recordkeeping for the attorney. In the event that the
prenuptial agreement is challenged on the basis of inadequate disclosure, the
attorney representing the alleged non-disclosing. spouse may be called upon to
justify his or her method of accounting for assets. Note that full disclosure is the
basis for many prenuptial agreement challenges under Kentucky law. 40 Also, see
Legal Malpractice in IX of this Article.
(4)

Initial Client Meeting

Prior to the initial meeting, the attorney should have reviewed
the completed asset sheet. The client needs to be·advised and comprehend several
difficult concepts and realities.
40

Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1'(Ky. 1995); Luck v. Luck, 711 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. App. 1986)
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(a)

The purpose of a prenuptial agreement.

The purpose is generally to define the marital rights of
the parties prior to marriage and in the event of divorce or death. In addition, the
lawyer should know the client's expectations concerning the scope of marital
rights provided for in the prenuptial agreement.
(b)

General summary of Kentucky law on prenuptial
agreements

A key aspect is the client's understanding that a
prenuptial agreement is not a guarantee against litigation. However, if certain
requirements are met, the likelihood of a successful challenge is relatively small.
The fundamental requirements to be complied with are:
1) Full disclosure of assets
2) Independent legal "counsel
3) Adequate time prior to marriage to negotiate,
prepare, and execute. the agreement
4) A fair and reasonable agreement in light of the
particular facts and circumstances of the parties
5) Client acceptance that the prenuptial agreements
may be reviewed at the time of enforcement;
6) Prenuptial agreements may not define the scope of
child support, child custody, and visitation are not
subject to prenuptial agreements 41
(5)

After the Initial Meeting

The lawyer should draft a follow-up letter which serves as a
review and summary of the meeting. The letter should summarize. the meeting,
the law, and make recommendations for provisions within the particular
agreement and reiterate time frame to complete and sign prenuptial agreement
B.

Drafting the Prenuptial "Agreement

(1)
Disparity or non-disparity in ages, incomes, net worth, and
education must be taken into consideration by the drafter.

If the prospective spouses have unequal assets the lawyer
should not play the prenuptial agreement lottery,gambling that that spouse who
41

Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990)
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relinquishes all spousal rights in an agreement will not challenge the agreement at
the time of enforcement. Rather, given the case law, a properly drafted preJ;1uptial
agreement should provide for some material or marital benefit upon death or
divorce. Further, drafters of prenuptial agreements that do not provide· any marital
benefit should consider the Gentry Element 2 which requires that an agreement
not be unconscionable. 42
If the prospective spouses start on equal footing in terms of
assets, each can relinquish all spousal benefits without much fear of challenge,
under Gentry so long as the prenuptial agreement is valid on its face and satisfies
the basic requirements. However, although unlikely, note that the Substantive
Fairness Test could allow a valid challenge if the parties ,could not have
contemplated ali inc:rease in wealth which occurred. 43
'
A lawyer representing a prqspective spouse also must be
cognizant of the specific facts of a particular situation. Kentucky courts have held
that education, judgment, and business acumen of the challenging spouse is taken
into consideration. 44 Also, the Substantive Fairness test of Gentry allows a
prenuptial agreement to be considered at the time enforcement is sought. 45 The
lawyer should evaluate any foreseeable changes in circumstances.
(2)

Specific Prenuptial Agreement Provisions

With the exception of child support, child custody, and
visitation,46 the parties are free to bind themselves contractually as allowed under
law. Some cases have reflected interesting provisions which are illustrative of the
specific concerns of the couple. For example, in Ford v. Blue the court addresses
a provision of the prenuptial agreement which provided for a 50% premium in the
allocation of certain assets in the event the husband rather then the wife filed for
divorce. 47 However, the wife was entitled to the premium increase in the event
that the filing of the divorce by the wife was precipitated by infidelity on the part
of the husband. 48
In a similar manner, if a prenuptial agreement fails to
consider an issue, the parties most likely will be deemed not to have contractually
agreed. In Hardesty v. Hardesty, a prenuptial agreement failed to address the

Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990)
See Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585 (Ky. App. 2001)
44 Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1995)
45 See Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990)
46 Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990)
47 Ford v. Blue, 106 S.W.3d 470 (Ky. App. 2003)
48 Id.
42

43

relinquishment of dower and curtesy rights and the court therefore held that such
rights had not been waived. 49
The lawyer drafting the document should strive for clarity and
thoroughness in the prenuptial agreement clearly defining the parameters for who
gets what and when. This is especially relevant as the provisions for death and
divorce are often different. For example, maintenance or alimony could be waived
in its entirety or the agreement could provide that distribution be dictated by a
fonnula clause (i.e. a lump sum amount multiplied by the length of the marriage).
Although acceptable for provisions of an agreement to be
unique to the client, certain .standard prenuptial agreement provisions are as
follows:
(a)
Relinquishment of spousal rights. This includes a
general relinquishment of all spousal rights of any kind or nature, and specifically
includes the right to renunciation of a will under KRS 392.080, right of a widow's
exemption under KRS 391.030.
(b)
Residence.
A lawyer should consider the
circumstances of the parties when negotiating and/or drafting this provision.
Often one spouse sells a residence and both spouses live in the other spouse's premarital (and therefore protected under the prenuptial agreement) home. This
means that one spouse could be literally homeless in the event of a death or
divorce. Given the unconscionability aspects of Gentry Element 2 and Gentry
Element 3 50 in" the event of death or divorce, it is prudent to provide clarity to the
circumstances of the living arrangement.
(c)
Medical care. A relevant issue in modem times
especially in light of the seemingly astronomical cost of medical care and
prescription medications.
(d)
Definition of Joint Property and Separate Property. An
agreement must clearly define when property (if ever) is deemed joint and the
procedure for determination.
(e)
Asset Clause. Both parties to the prenuptial agreement
should acknowledge that a full and complete disclosure of assets was made and
they reviewed the assets of one another as provided within the agreement and were
fully apprised of the amount, .detail, and description of the same. After reviewing
the disclosure, both parties should agree within the agreement to. relinquish all
rights to those spousal assets.
Hardesty v. Hardesty's Ex'r, 34 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. App. 1930)
so See Section III of this Article

49
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(f)
Estate Planning. Both parties generally should be
permitted to provide for one another in their respective estate planning documents
in excess of what is provided in the prenuptial agreement.
(g)
Independent Counsel. Both parties should agree that
they have been represented by counsel who has explained their legal rights to
them. Counsel should be specifically named within the agreement.
(h)
In Terrorem Clause. Also known as an anti-fighting
clause. Especially important when there is a disparity in assets. If the non-asset
spouse is provided some material benefit under the agreement, then an in terrorem
clause may deter litigation.
(i)
negotiate maintenance. 51

Maintenance. Under Kentucky law, parties are free to

(j)
Waiver of interest in retirement. Anytime there is a
relinquishment of a spousal interest in a retirement plan, a waiver should be
specifically included within the prenuptial agreement to address this waiver. The
prospective spouses should be contractually bound to execute all documents
necessary to effectuate a release of any and all spousal rights under the retirement
plan.
(k)
Attorney fee provision. It is in the discretion of the
Court to designate payment of the attorney fees and courts will look outside the
terms of the prenuptial agreement if parties have disparity in assets. 52 In other
words, if the lawyer represents the client with significant assets, recognize that
court could order the asset spouse to pay the attorney fees of the non-asset spouse.
(1)
Choice of law.
If the agreement is drafted in
consideration of the law of Kentucky, the· prenuptial agreement should state that
Kentucky is the controlling law to be applied to the agreement.
(m) Amendment. All amendments to the prenuptial
agreement must be in writing and by agreement of both parties.
(n)
Substantive Fairness Test Clause. If relevant to the
circumstances, and in light of the Substantive Fairness Test a lawyer could include

51

52

See Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990)
See Lane v. Lane, 2004 WL 178374 (Ky. App. 2004) unpublished and Ford v. Blue, 106 S.W.3d 470
(Ky. App. 2003)
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language that the parties recognize and contemplate an increase in the wealth of
the party with greater assets. 53
(0)
Debts.
The prenuptial agreement should .clearly
define the parties obligations concerning debt incurred during marriage.

c.

Execution of Prenuptial Agreement

Many attorneys recommend execution of four originals of the
prenuptial agreement (two original copies to each). In addition to signing the
actual agreement, the parties also sign the asset sheets attached as exhibits
indicating review and acknowledgement.
D.

After Execution of Prenuptial Agreement

The lawyer should draft. a detailed closing letter which should advise
the client as follows:
(1)
Safekeeping of Originals. The original documents should be
kept in a protected location. Missing original documents could allow for a
challenge based upon revocation, destruction, or abandonment. 54
(2)
Estate planning.
The lawyer should clarify that all
amendments to the prenuptial agreements must be in writing. In addition, all
estate planning done in the future must contemplate the provisions of the
prenuptial agreement. This is particularly relevant with 'regard to power of
attorney documents which could frustrate the client's intentions with regard to
estate planning if not done correctly.55
(3)
Property Title. The lawyer should explain joint property
(survivorship) vs. separate property (tenants in common) in- the context of the
practicality of the particular prenuptial agreement.
IX.

Prenuptial Agreement Litigation

When a prenuptial agreement is challenged, the opponent of the prenuptial
agreement has the burden of proving the prenuptial agreement is invalid or should
be modified.56
Although the overwhelming majority of prenuptial agreements are upheld
by Kentucky Courts,57 an agreement is subject to the three limitations of Gentry.
See Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585 (Ky. App. 2001)
See Truitt v. Truitt's Adm'r, 162 S.W.2d 31 (Ky. App. 1942)
55 See Bohlinger v. O'Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan & Sergent, 2004 WL 2415071 (Ky. App. 2004)
56 Rupley v. Rupley, 776 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. App. 1989)
53

54
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And, it is well established that a prenuptial agreement is subject to review at the
time that enforcement is sought. 58
A.

Attorney Malpractice

There is always a potential for an attorney malpractice claim against
the lawyer/advisor to the client. This is especially so in the event that the
prenuptial agreement does not withstand court challenge. Certain aspects are
clearly within the realm of the responsibility of prudent counsel and include clarity
in the document, independent advice, and explanation of certain basic legal
principals. It is these factors which could be examined for the purpose of
malpractice.
There are general guidelines for avoiding malpractice in drafting
prenuptial agreements. A basic review of Kentucky caselaw reveals the following
as necessary for the representation of a client in the prenuptial agreement process:
engagement letter, initial letter of explanation, separate counsel, full disclosure of
assets as documented by a letter in the lawyer's file, signature on asset sheet of
both parties, waivers with substantial fairness language, and detailed closing letter.
Claims against an attorney for malpractice have extended to estate
planning attorneys. In a recent unpublished decision, the family of a decedent
brought a malpractice action against the estate planning attorney who drafted the
prenuptial agreement, the will, and the power of attorney.59 In the action against
the attorney who drafted the documents, the allegation was that the power of
attorney was so broadly written as to enable the spouse/wife to frustrate her
husband's estate plan (leaving his estate to his children).6o The Court found that
the one-year statute of limitations began to run on the date the cause of action was,
or reasonably should have been, discovered. 61 In this case, the plaintiff/children
were advised by a separate attorney that the same should be investigated in excess
of a year before the claim was made thereby barring the action against the
attorney. 62
B.

Fraud on the Dower

If a prenuptial agreement is not challenged or if it withstands
challenge, then if spousal rights were properly relinquished, fraud on the dower
will not be an issue. However, in the event a prenuptial agreement is successfully
See Appendix A- Summary of Prenuptial Agreement Cases in Kentucky 2004-1929
Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990); also see Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W. 3d 585 (Ky. App. 2001)
59 Bohlinger v. O'Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan & Sergent, 2004 WL 2415071 (Ky. App. 2004)
57

58

6°Id.
61Id.
62 I d.
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struck down, a claim for to recoup assets may come in the form of a fraud on the
dower claim.

c.

Spousal Services

In the area of probate, often a spouse seeking to challenge a
prenuptial agreement asserts a claim for services. The typically claim for services
demands compensation for the care of the spouse during the term of his final
illness. Spouses cannot claim services, they are assumed. to provide services free
of charge. 63

x.

Conclusion

Parties to a marriage can enter into a written contractual agreement prior to
marriage which defines certain legal marital rights. Although issues related to
child support, custody, and visitation are off limits, parties are otherwise free to
determine and relinquish other marital rights which would normally result from
death or divorce. The agreements are subject to a three part test and may be
reviewed at the time enforcement of the agreement is .sought. This test is applied
to each case and dependent upon the specific facts and circumstances of the
parties.

63

Bagby v. Koch, 98 S.W.3d 521 (Ky. App. 2002)
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PA

=prenuptial agreement

H = husband
W=wife

A SUMMARY OF PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
CASES IN KENTUCKY 2004-1929

Did not
Case
1)

Upheld

Struck
Down

Considerl
or Mixed

x

Bohlinger v. O'Hara
2004 WL 2415071

~
Death

Wand H signed PA, 7 years later H named W as

Legal Mal.

attorney in fact. W used POA and transferred

(Ky.App. 2004)

Holdings and Points of Interest

$160,000 to joint name
Did not consider

unpublished

Allegation against attorney for failure to properly
advise H that wife could sell or gift assets which
could frustrate H's estate plan
Court found that SOL began to run against
attorney when children knew of the incident

2~

Lane v. Lane

x

Divorce

Disparity in assets: H made $166,000 at the time of

2004 WL 178374

marriage and wife made $18,000. At the time of

(Ky. App. 2004)

dissolution H made $1,000,000.

unpublished

W argued Gentry #3 - PA became unconscionable
based upon the parties changed circumstance
Ct. applied Substanative Fairness Test of Blue 2001
t~

uphold agreement and deny maintenance. Court

found that W had not met her burden in showing
that her position suffered in such a way that was
not comtemplated at the time of the marriage
Court allowed attorney fees in the Cts discretion

3}

Ford v. Blue

x

Divorce

106 S.W.3d 470

Already upheld

(Ky. App. 2003)

in 2001 decision

Interpretation of 50% premium clause to wife
if H files for divorce where W filed for
divorce in FL, H then filed for divorce in KY,
and FL case was dimissed
Court considered disparity of finanical resources
and looked passed PA to award attorney fees
to wife
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Did not
Case
4)

Upheld

Struck
Down

Consider!
or Mixed

x

Bagby v. Koch

~
Death

98 S.W.3d 521

Holdings and Points of Interest
Plaintiff, an attorney, did not file renunciation
which complied with the statutory

(Ky.App. 2002)

requirements. Ct. then did not have to
address the issue of the validity of the
PA
Spouses cannot claim services

5)

Blue v. Blue

x

Divorce

W argued unconscionability based upon

60 S.W.3d 585

signifcant increase in value of H's non-

(Ky. App. 2001)

marital property - This is the third element of
Gentry
Court upheld the PA finding that no increase
in H's net worth, however great, would render
the agreement unconscionable absent some
negative change in her financial condition
Applied Substantive Fairness Test: A more
appropriate test of the substantive fairness of a PA
requires a finding that the circumstances of the
of the parties at the time the marriage is dissolved
are not so beyond the contemplation of the parties
at the time the PA was entered into as to cause its
enforcement to work an injustice
W received $650,000 pursuant to agreement
which compensated her based upon the.
length' of the marriage.
Wife claimed "homemaker" services
increased his net worth
Each had separate counsel; W's counsel drafted PA
Parties had been married previously to each
other and to someone else

6)

Lawson v. Loid

x

Death

Issue: Full disclosure

896 S.W.2d 1
(Ky. 1995)

Wife's previous marriage and education were
a factor.
Signed PA on day of the wedding
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SELECTED INCOME TAX ISSUES
OF INTEREST TO ESTATE PLANNERS
By
Theodore B. Atlass
Atlass Professional Corporation
Denver, Colorado

I.

II.

INTRODUCTION
A.

It is the author's premise that insufficient attention is paid by practitioners to
income tax minimization in estate planning and the administration of trusts and
estates. Income tax issues impact almost all decedents and survivors (not just
those very wealthy clients with gift and estate tax problems).

B.

Significant dollar savings can be achieved by taking advantage of perfectly legal
and appropriate income tax planning steps. On the other hand, not taking such
steps will subject the fiduciary and fiduciary's professional advisors to substantial
malpractice exposure.

C.

Estate planning and the administration of trusts and estates should be a team
effort, and it is essential that the fiduciary obtain both accounting and legal advice
in order to minimize income taxes.

GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS (i.e., GIFTS)
A.

Introduction. Clients are routinely encouraged to make gifts. Gifts are made for a
variety of reasons (for junior to have funds for college or a start in life, to allow
junior to gain experience in handling investments, to minimize income taxes and
transfer taxes, for asset protection planning, etc.).

B.

Obvious Tax Issues. When a client makes a gift, certain income tax consequences
are generally assumed to occur: (1) the donor gets no income tax deduction; (2)
the donee has no taxable income; and (3) in the case of an in-kind gift, the donee
will have the donor's acquisition date and cost basis, with an adjustment if gift
taxes were paid.

C.

Income May Result. It is possible for the donor to have income as a result of
making a gift.
1.

Imputed Interest Income. Gift loans (i.e., those containing a below market
rate of interest) cause the lender to have imputed interest income for income
tax purposes, subject to a de minimis rule. IRe §7872.
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D.

2.

Gift of Installment Note Receivable. The transfer of an installment
obligation by lifetime gift will constitute a disposition and will cause an
acceleration of the deferred gain for income tax purposes. IRC §453B.

3.

Assets With Debt in Excess of Basis. Where a gift is made of property
subject to nonrecourse indebtedness, the donor will realize gain to the extent
that indebtedness exceeds the basis of the property. Winston F. C. Guest, 77
T.C. 9 (1981). The "amount realized" is equal to the outstanding balance of
the non-recourse obligation, and the fair market value of the property is
irrelevant to the computation. Tufts v. Commissioner, 103 S.Ct 1826
(1983).

4.

Certain Net Gifts. Where a "net gift" is made (i.e., the gift taxes on the
transfer, which are the legal obligation of the donor, are instead to be paid by
the donee), the donor will realize gain to the extent the gift tax paid by the
donee exceeds the donor's adjusted cost basis in the property. Diedrich v.
Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981).

Computation of Basis.
1.

2.

Adjustments for Gift Tax and GST Tax Paid.
a.

The donee of property which is received in a lifetime gift transaction
where no gain is recognized receives such property with a carryover
of the donor's cost basis and acquisition date. IRC §1015.

b.

The basis of gifted property is increased for pre-1977 gifts by the gift
tax paid. For gifts made after 1976, the basis of gifted property is
increased by that portion of the gift tax paid attributable to the
donor's net appreciation in the gifted assets. IRC §1015.
Example: Assume that in 2000 the donor gives stock having a basis
of $200 and a fair market value of$I,OOO to child, and pays $400 of
gift tax. The basis adjustment for the gift tax paid is [($1000 minus
$200)/$1000] times $400, or $320. The donee's basis becomes $200
plus $320, for a total basis of $520.

c.

The basis of gifted property is increased (but not to above fair market
value) by generation-skipping taxes paid. IRC §2654. This basis
adjustment for GST taxes paid is applied after the basis adjustment
for gift taxes paid pursuant to IRC §1015.

Dual Basis is Possible. For purposes of determining loss in a subsequent
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sale of a gifted asset by the donee, the donee's basis cannot exceed the fair
market value of the gifted property at the time of its receipt by the donee.
IRC §1015. Example: Donor gives stock having a basis of$100X and a
fair market value of $50X to Child. No gift tax is paid on the gift. Child
has a $1 OOX basis for gain purposes and a $50X basis for loss purposes.
3.

E.

ill.

PAL Losses Are Added to Donee's Basis. The transfer of a passiveactivity asset by lifetime gift does not trigger the recognition of suspended
passive activity losses. IRC §469G)(6).

Conflicting Code Provisions. In the case of the gratuitous forgiveness of
indebtedness, the Code contains conflicting provisions relating to whether or not the
donee has received gross income. IRC §§61(a)(2) and 102(a). It has been held that
the forgiveness of indebtedness which is a true gift made gratuitously and with
donative intent is not included in gross income. Helvering v. American Dental, 318
U.S. 322 (1943).

TRANSFERS FOR VALUE (i.e., SALES)
A.

Introduction. Clients often engage in sales transactions for value with family
members or family-controlled entities. Sales are made for a variety of reasons (to
freeze transfer tax values, to get the family business to the children and cash for
retirement to the parents, etc.).

B.

Obvious Tax Issues. When a client sells an asset, certain income tax
consequences are generally assumed to occur: (1) the seller has either gain or a
loss; (2) such gain or loss can either be treated as short-term or long-term gain or
loss; and (3) well-known rules apply to transactions qualifying as a 1031 tax-free
exchange or as an installment sale.

C.

Some Transactions are Ignored.

D.

1.

Sales Between a Husband and a Wife. No gain or loss is recognized upon
the transfer for value (i.e., the sale) by an individual to such individual's
spouse. The transaction is treated as a gift, and transferee has the
transferor's cost basis. IRC §1040.

2.

Sales Between a Grantor and a Grantor Trust. The deemed owner (i.e., the
"grantor") of a trust under the so-called "grantor trust" rules will not
recognize gain or loss in a sales transaction between such grantor and
grantor trust. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.

Gain and Loss Issues Result.
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E.

F.

1.

Ordinary Income Results if Depreciable Property is Sold. Any gain
recognized by the transferor upon the sale or exchange of property
between specially defined related persons will result in ordinary income
(i.e., not capital gain) to the transferor if the property is depreciable
property in the hands of the transferee. IRC §1239.

2.

Capital Gain Results if Depletable Property is Sold. The IRS has
determined that IRC §1239 does not apply to the sale of depletable
property between specially defined related persons (i.e., the transferor can
have capital gain). PLR 8139052 (June 30, 1981).

3.

Losses are Disallowed if Sale is to a Related Party. Any loss recognized
by the transferor upon the sale or exchange of property between specially
defined related persons will be disallowed. However, any gain
subsequently recognized by the transferee will be reduced by the amount
of such previously disallowed loss. IRC §267.

4.

Sale of Term Interests in Trusts. The basis of the owner ofa term interest
(i.e., a life estate, term of years, or remainder interest) will be considered
zero ifit is sold by itself, but shall be its portion of the entire adjusted
outside basis of all trust interests if such sale is part of a transaction in
which all interests in such trust are being sold. IRC §1001 (e).

Unusual Timing Issues.
1.

Installment Sale to Related Party. If an installment sale is made to a
related party who subsequently resells such property before the original
seller has been fully paid (with a 2-year cutoff for property other than
marketable securities), the sale by the second party accelerates the
recognition of gain to the original seller. IRC §453(e).

2.

1031 Exchange with Related Party. Ifa taxpayer enters into a tax-free
exchange with a related party and, within two years of the last transfer
which was part of the exchange, either party disposes of the property
received by that party in the exchange, then the original transaction does
not qualify for the non-recognition of gain or loss under IRC §1031 for
either party. IRC §1031(f).

Who Reports the Income? Who is liable to report any income is not clear where
the asset sold was owned by a life tenant and remainderman. See United States v.
DeBonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9 th Cir. 1960); Robinson v. United States, 192
F.Supp. 253 (ND Ga. 1961); Rev. Rul. 61-102, 1961-1 CB 245; Hirschmann v.

1-4

United States, 309 F.2d 104 (2nd Cir. 1962); West v. United States, 310 F.Supp.
1289 (ND Ga. 1970); Gaskill v. United States, 188 F.2d 507 (ND Tex. 1960).
IV.

BASIS ADJUSTMENTS AT DEATH
A.

Introduction. All assets included in a decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes potentially qualify for basis adjustment, or for other special income taxrelated relief: upon a decedent's death.

B.

Obvious Tax Issues. When a client dies, certain income tax consequences are
generally assumed to occur: (1) the decedent's assets (except IRD) are stepped up
(or down) in basis to their fair market value as of date of death; and (2) the
recipients ofIRD ("Income in Respect of a Decedent") deduct the federal estate
tax attributable to such IRD as it is collected.

C.

General Rule. The basis of property acquired from a decedent generally becomes
the fair market value of that property at date of death unless one of the exceptions
outlined below applies. IRC §1014.

D.

Property Acquired From a Decedent. Property acquired from a decedent includes
virtually any property deemed owned by the decedent for estate tax purposes (i.e.,
included in the decedent's gross estate), including probate and non-probate
property, whether or not the decedent's gross estate was large enough to require
the filing of a Form 706, Federal Estate Tax Return.
1.

Property in Which the Decedent Had an Interest. Any property owned by
the decedent (i.e., probate property) is caught under this provision. IRC
§2033.

2.

Transfers With Retained Life Estate. Property given away by the decedent
is nevertheless included as a part of the decedent's estate where the use of
(or income from) such property was retained until the decedent's death.
IRC §2036.

3.

Transfers Which Take Effect at Death. Property given away by the
decedent is nevertheless included as a part of the decedent's estate where
the decedent retained a reversion worth more than 5% and someone else
can get the property by surviving the decedent (i.e., Donor to Beneficiary
for life, remainder to Donor if then living, otherwise to Beneficiary's
descendants). IRC §2037.

4.

Revocable Transfers. Property given away by the decedent is nevertheless
included as a part of the decedent's estate where the decedent retained a
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prohibited power to alter, amend, or revoke the transferred property until
the decedent's death. IRC §2038.

E.

5.

Gifts Made Within Three Years of Decedent's Death. Certain property and
rights no longer held by the decedent are taxed as part of the decedent's
estate, including life insurance on the decedent's life where incidents of
ownership were given away within three years of the decedent's death, gift
taxes on gifts made within three years of the decedent's death, and
property in which the decedent released an IRC §2036, 2037, or 2038
power or interest within three years of his or her death. IRC §2035.

6.

Joint Interests. Some portion of property in which the decedent has an
interest as a joint tenant (or tenant by the entirety) is included in the
decedent's estate. IRC §2040.

7.

Powers of Appointment. Property over which the decedent held too broad
a power of appointment (as defined in this section) will be deemed owned
by the decedent for estate tax purposes. IRC §2041.

8.

QTIP Property. The assets in a QTIP marital trust established by a prior
spouse of the decedent for the decedent's benefit are taxable as assets of
the decedent at the decedent's death. IRC §2044.

Exceptions to General Basis Rules.
1.

Alternate Valuation Exception. If alternate valuation has been elected
under IRe §2032, the IRC §2032 value becomes the new basis. IRC
§1014.
a.

Alternate valuation can only be elected where the gross estate and
estate tax due are both reduced as a result of the election.

b.

If alternate valuation is elected, all estate assets are subjected to the
alternate valuation rules (i.e., no "pick and choose").

c.

Alternate valuation causes the value of the assets six months after'
date of death to be used, unless the assets are disposed of or
distributed sooner, in which case their value at such earlier date of
disposition or distribution is used.

d.

Joint tenancy property is treated like probate property for alternate
valuation purposes. Death (and the resulting passage of ownership
to the surviving joint tenant) is not a disposition for alternate
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valuation purposes, but the subsequent disposition (by gift or sale)
by the surviving joint tenant within the six months after the
decedent's death is such a disposition. Rev. Rul. 59-213, 1959-1
CB 244.
2.

3.

Special Use Valuation Exception.
a.

If special use valuation has been elected under IRC §2032A, the
§2032A value becomes the new basis. IRC §1014.

b.

If the special use property is disposed of so as to result in
additional estate tax being due, making an election is necessary to
increase the property's basis to its date of death value. IRC
§§1016(c)(I) and 1016(c)(5)(B); Treas. Reg. §301.9100-4T(f).

c.

If no election is made, there is no adjustment to the property's
basis. Coni Rept. No. 97-215 (PL 97-34), p. 251.

d.

It should be noted that no similar provision applies to IRC §2057
qualified family-owned businesses receiving a valuation break (that
provision is structured as an exclusion, rather than as a deduction),
so such qualified family-owned businesses get full date of death
fair market value basis.

Income in Respect of a Decedent ("IRD") Exception.
a.

General Rule. Items of income in respect of a decedent under IRe
§691 are not entitled to stepped-up basis at the decedent's death.
Examples of such items include IRA and pension plan proceeds,
renewal commissions, deferred compensation, and installment
notes receivable.

b.

Special Rules for Partnerships. The basis of a partnership interest
acquired from a decedent is the date of death (or alternate) value,
increased by the estate's (or other successor's) share of partnership
liabilities and reduced by the income in respe.ct of a decedent
attributable to such partnership interest. Treas. Reg. §1.742-1.

c.

Special Rules for S Corporations. The basis of S corporation
stock is date of death or alternate value, reduced by the income in
respect ofa decedent attributable to such stock. IRC §1367(b)(4),
effective with respect to decedents dying after August 20, 1996
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d.

Certain Lifetime Constructive Sales. Certain lifetime constructive
sales, amounting to hedging (constructive sale) transactions, such
as going "short against the box" during lifetime in order to lock in
profit and pullout cash, will no longer be able to be closed out
income tax free after death, as the pre-death portion of the gain will
be considered IRD taxable to the estate or other successor. TRA
'97, §1001(d)(3), adding IRC §1259, effective (with complex
exceptions and effective date rules) to constructive sales made after
June 8, 1997.

4.

Exception for Qualified Conservation Easement. A carryover of the
decedent's income tax cost basis will occur with respect to that portion of
a property which is excluded from the decedent's estate by reason of a
qualified conservation easement. TRA '97, §508, amending IRC
§§170, 1014, 2031, and 2032A, effective for decedents dying after 1997.

5.

Exception for Certain Recently Gifted Property. Property received as a
gift by the decedent within one year of the decedent's death which is gifted
by the decedent back to the donor will not receive an adjustment to basis
by reason of the decedent's death. IRC §1014(e).

6.

Exception for Previously Gifted Property.

7.

a.

Property gifted during lifetime that is nevertheless included in the
decedent's estate for estate tax purposes (such as IRC §§2035,
2036,2037, or 2038 property) will be entitled to an IRC §1014
basis adjustment by reason of the decedent's death, but the
transferee must reduce such new date of death basis by any
depreciation, depletion, or amortization taken by such transferee.
Treas. Reg. §1.1014-3(d).

b.

Conceptually difficult issues are raised when previously gifted
property included in the decedent's estate (such as IRC §§2036,
2037, or 2038 property) has been sold and reinvested in something
else prior to the decedent's death. For estate tax purposes, the
original property is deemed included in the decedent's estate. But
ifit has been sold prior to the decedent/donor's death, can the
donee file an amended income tax return and claim the date of
death value as the adjusted basis? See Humphrey's Estate v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5 th Cir), cert. denied, 332 US817
(1947); Rev. Rul. 72-282, 1972-1 CB 306.

Exception for Certain Spousal Joint Tenancies.
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8.

a.

The current rules relating to estate taxation ofjoint tenancy
interests provide that one-half of a spousal joint tenancy asset is
included in the deceased spouse's estate under IRC §2040, which
results in the deceased spouse's one-half of the asset having its
basis adjusted under IRC §1014 and the surviving spouse's onehalf of the asset being left with its historic cost basis.

b.

Prior to 1982, the portion of a spousal joint tenancy asset included
in the deceased spouse's estate was determined with reference to
the deceased spouse's relative contribution to the acquisition of the
asset (the so-called "tracing of contribution" test). Accordingly,
before 1982 as little as 0% or as much as 100% ofa spousal joint
tenancy asset might have been included in the deceased spouse's
estate under IRC §2040 (and have its basis adjusted in IRC §1014).

c.

The IRS has recognized that 1981 amendments to IRC §2040(b)(2)
did not repeal the effective date ofIRC §2040(b)(1), the net impact
of which is to still apply the tracing of contribution rules to spousal
joint tenancy assets acquired before 1977. See Gallenstein v. U.S.,
975 F.2d 286 (6 th Cir. 1992); Patten v. U.S., 116 F3d 1029 (4th Cir.,
1997); Anderson v. U.S., 78 AFTR 2d 96-6557 (DC MD 1996),
and Hahn v. U.S., 110 TC 14 (1998).

Exception for Community Property Interests.
a.

The survivor's one-half interest of community property, as well as
the decedent's one-half interest in such property, gets new basis
(equal to the fair market value of such assets) at the decedent's
death. IRC §1014(b)(6).

b.

It is thus essential to ascertain whether or not the decedent and his
or her spouse ever lived in one of the community property states
(i.e., Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin), and ifso, if community
property was thereby created (and subsequently preserved) --- even
if the client resided in a non-community property state at death.
Additionally, Alaska has adopted an elective form of community
property.

c.

Some states now allow community property to be held in joint
tenancy, and it is unclear whether the joint tenancy or community
property rules will apply to such arrangements. See Estate of
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Wayne-Chi Young, 110 TC No. 24, Doc. 98-14934 (1998).
F.

G.

Special Basis Transitional Dates. A number of special basis transitional dates
exist to deal with changes in the law. IRC§1014(b).
1.

Death After 12-31-51. IRe §1014 applies to property transferred to a
revocable trust.

2.

Death After 10-21-42 But Before 12-31-47. Basis of surviving spouse's
share of community property was the greater of its adjusted basis or its
estate tax value.

3.

Death After 12-31-47. The surviving spouse's one-half share of
community property assumes the same basis as the decedent's share.

4.

Death Between 1-1-51 and 12-31-53. The survivor's interest in a joint and
survivor annuity received a basis adjustment if the decedent's interest was
includable in his/her gross estate.

5.

Death After 12-31-53. All property acquired from a decedent by reason of
death receives a stepped-up basis.

6.

Death After 8-26-37. The decedent's stock or securities in a foreign
corporation which is a foreign personal holding company receives a basis
which is the lower of the fair market value at date of death or the
decedent's basis.

Other Basis Issues.
1.

Appraisal Necessity. The applicable date for determining fair market
value is "as of' the decedent's date of death, unless alternate valuation date
is elected under IRC §2032. The appropriate values will appear on the
Form 706.

2.

Where No Form 706 Required. Successors to the decedent's property are
entitled to new basis even if no estate tax was due by reason of the
decedent's death. The fiduciary should obtain an appraisal or other proof
to support the new cost basis even ifno Form 706 is required (i.e., because
the decedent's gross estate totals less than the estate tax exemptionequivalent).

3.

Impact on Depreciation, Depletion, etc. Be mindful of the need to
recompute future depreciation, depletion, and amortization relative to
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assets (or that portion of an asset) included in the decedent's gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes. Such assets will get a new basis and date
of acquisition after the decedent's death, which may also result in a new
life and method of depreciation as to such asset (or portion of an asset).
Consider electing cost depletion where appropriate.
4.

Elective Partnership Basis Adjustments. A partnership (or other entity
taxed as a partnership, such as an LLC) may elect to adjust the inside basis
of its assets to reflect the outside basis adjustment occurring by reason of a
partner's death. IRC §754.

5.

Appreciated Undistributed Devises Due Decedent. The death of a
beneficiary due undistributed appreciated assets as beneficiary of another
estate mayor may not result in such undistributed assets having their basis
adjusted, depending upon which authority you believe. Compare
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company v. U.S., 410 F.2d 77 (1969) and
Connecticut National Bank v. U.S., 937 F.2d 90 (1991).

6.

Post-Death Capital Gains and Losses.
a.

All capital gains or losses that occur after death are long-term
capital gains or losses if the property sold was included in the gross
estate of the decedent, regardless of the length of the post-death
holding period. IRC §1223(11).

b.

Such long-term treatment may be valuable where a gain occurs,
inasmuch as long-term capital gains have historically been afforded
favorable tax treatment.

c.

Such long-term treatment may be unfavorable where a loss occurs,
inasmuch as long-term capital losses in excess of offsetting capital
gains can only be utilized to offset ordinary income to the extent of
$3,000 per year.

d.

It is common to have post-death capital losses. For example,
imagine a decedent owning only a home appraised at $100,000
which is sold 1-2 months after date of death for a net of $92,000
after commissions and other selling expenses of $8,000. The
$8,000 of selling expenses, which will be taken on the income tax
return (after all, there is no estate tax return due to deduct such
expenses on), cause an $8,000 long-term capital loss on the seller's
income tax return.
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7.

8.

Certain Joint Spousal Trusts.
a.

It has been suggested that husband and wife can create a single
trust with their collective assets (called a "joint spousal trust"),
wherein the first to die has a general power of appointment over
the entire trust, with the result that all of the their collective assets
will have their basis adjusted to fair market value upon the death of
the first spouse to die.

b.

The IRS has ruled that this doesn't work, because ofIRC §1014(e),
by reason of the simultaneous passage to the decedent and return to
the surviving spouse as of the decedent's death of that portion of
the assets owned by the surviving spouse prior to the decedent's
death. PLR 200203045 (January 5, 2001); 200210051 (December
10, 2001).

c.

It may be possible to draft the will or trust in a manner so that the
property is not deemed to pass back to its original owner.

Impact of Distributions to Beneficiaries.
a.

b.

Timing of Beneficiary's Tax Consequences.
(1)

Where the beneficiary has the same year end as the estate or
trust, the beneficiary reports the distribution in the
beneficiary's tax year in which the estate or trust deducts
the distribution.

(2)

Where the beneficiary has a different year end from the
estate or trust, the beneficiary reports the distribution in the
estate's year which ends within the beneficiary's taxable
year. IRC §§652(c) and 662(c).

(3)

In the year ofa beneficiary's death, all income actually
received (even if from a trust with a fiscal year ending after
the date of decedent's death) is reported on the
beneficiary's final Form 1040.

Distributions From Simple Trusts.
(1)

A simple trust is one which is required to distribute all of
its income currently, which does not make any corpus
distributions during the taxable year, and which does not
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have any charitable beneficiary. IRC §651.
(2)

Income required to be distributed currently is taxed to
beneficiaries even ifnot actually distributed. IRC §652(a).

(3)

Income currently distributable but accumulated because of
a contest re beneficiary identity is retroactively currently
taxed to actual beneficiary. Higgenson v. U.S., 238 F.2d
439 (1st Cir. 1956).

(4)

DNI and the various types of income received are allocated
ratably among multiple beneficiaries in proportion to their
respective income interest, unless otherwise specifically
allocated under the terms of the trust. IRC §652(b).

(5)

A simple trust will be entitled to a distribution deduction in
order to avoid having the same income taxed to both the
trust and its beneficiary or beneficiaries.

(6)

For simple trusts the distribution deduction, for regular
income tax purposes under IRC §651, is limited to the
lower of:
(a)

Income (i.e., net fiduciary accounting income)
required to be distributed currently, whether or not
actually distributed, or

(b)

Distributable net income.

(7)

The income beneficiary will benefit from any deductible
principal expenses.

(8)

Items which are charged to income for accounting
purposes, but which are not fully deductible for income tax
purposes, can cause the estate or trust which distributes all
of its accounting income to have phantom income for tax
purposes. Such a result may occur because of suspended
passive activity losses, nondeductible investment interest,
or nondeductible "miscellaneous itemized deductions".

(9)

Example: Assume that a simple trust is to pay 1/2 of its
income to Mary, 1/4 of its income to Sam, and 1/4 of its
income to Bill. It has $30,000 of dividends, $40,000 of
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taxable interest, $50,000 of capital gains, and pays a
trustee's fee (charged 1/2 each to principal and income) of
$20,000.
(a)

Accounting income is $60,000, which is the amount
distributable to the beneficiaries. This is because
the $70,000 of dividends and interest is reduced by
the $10,000 of trustee fees charged to income.
Mary will get $30,000, Sam will get $15,000, and
Bill will get $15,000.

(b)

Taxable income of the trust, disregarding the
distributions deduction and personal exemption, is
$100,000. This is because the $30,000 of
dividends, $40,000 of taxable interest, and $50,000
capital gains, totaling $120,000 of income, are to be
reduced by the $20,000 trustee fees.

(c)

Distributable net income is $50,000. This is the
trust's $100,000 taxable income, disregarding the
distributions deduction and personal exemption, less
the $50,000 capital gain which is not included in
distributable net income.

(d)

The trust will get a distributions deduction of
$50,000 (i.e., equal to the lower of its $60,000
accounting income or $50,000 distributable net
income. The trust will thus have $50,000 of taxable
income, less the $300 exemption to which it is
entitled. The $50,000 taxable income of the trust
will be taxed at the rates then in effect pursuant to
IRe §1(e).

(e)

The beneficiaries will have $50,000 of taxable
income, of which Mary will have $25,000, Sam will
have $12,500, and Bill will have $12,500. This is
because, although they got $60,000, they are entitled
(for tax purposes) to get the benefit of the $10,000
of trustee fees charged to principal.

(f)

The trustee can offset an indirect expense such as
trustee fees against any category of income in this
case, as there is no exempt income against which a
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portion must be allocated. Assuming that dividends
are reduced by the trustee fees, $10,000 of
dividends and $40,000 of taxable interest will be
allocated 1/2 to Mary, 1/4 to Sam, and 1/4 to Bill.
c.

Distributions From Complex Trusts.
(1)

A complex trust is one which may accumulate income,
which distributes corpus during the taxable year, or which
has a charitable beneficiary. IRC §66I.

(2)

Complex trusts are substantially identical to simple trusts
for income tax purposes, except as to distributions of
amounts other than "income required to be distributed
currently."

(3)

For complex trusts the distributions deduction, for regular
income tax purposes, under IRC §66I(a) is limited to the
lower of:

(4)

(a)

The aggregate of: (a) income (i.e., net fiduciary
accounting income) required to be distributed
currently, whether or not actually distributed, and
(b) other amounts paid, credited, or required to be
distributed (whether out of income or principal); or

(b)

Distributable net income.

Where current income and principal distributions are made,
the taxable portion of the distribution is allocated among
the different beneficiaries under the tier system provided in
IRC §66I(a):
(a)

First tier distributions include the amount of income
required to be distributed currently. The
distributees who receive such distributions are
deemed to receive DNI to the extent thereof.

(b)

Charitable contributions reduce DNI after first tier
distributions are taken into account.

(c)

Second tier distributions are all other distributions
(i.e., discretionary income and principal
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distributions). The distributees who receive such
distributions, to the extent that first tier distributions
and charitable contributions have not absorbed all of
the DNI, are taxed to the extent thereof
(5)

(6)

Example: Assume that a complex trust must pay $10,000
to John each year, and the trustee is also given the
discretion to make additional distributions to John and/or
Mike if deemed appropriate. It has $20,000 of dividend
income and no expenses.

(a)

If the trustee makes only the required $10,000
distribution to John, John will have received a
$10,000 tier one distribution. John will have
$10,000 of dividend income since there is $20,000
ofDNI to allocate.

(b)

If the trustee makes the required $10,000
distribution to John and a $10,000 discretionary
distribution to Mike, John will have received a
$10,000 tier one distribution and Mike will have
received a $10,000 tier two distribution. Each will
have $10,000 of dividend income since there is
$20,000 ofDNI to allocate.

(c)

If the trustee distributes the required $10,000
distribution to John, a $20,000 discretionary
distribution to John, and a $30,000 discretionary
distribution to Mike (i.e., they each get a total of
$30,000), John will have received a $10,000 tier one
distribution and a $20,000 tier two distribution, and
Mike will have received a $30,000 tier two
distribution. John will have $14,000 of dividend
income (i.e., $10,000 because of the tier one
distribution, and $4,000 as his proportionate share
of all tier two distributions) and Mike will have
$6,000 of dividend income (as his proportionate
share of all tier two distributions).

The trustee of a complex trust can elect to treat
distributions made within the first sixty-five (65) days of a
taxable year as having been distributed in the preceding
taxable year. IRe §663(b).
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(7)

d.

e.

For tax years beginning prior to 1998, income accumulated
in a complex trust and distributed to a beneficiary in later
years may be subject to the complex (and often changed)
throwback rules on accumulation distributions. These rules
eliminate most domestic trusts from being subject to the
throwback rules for years beginning after 1997.
IRC §§665-668. See, IRS Form 4970 and printed
instructions which are used to compute the tax on
accumulation distributions from trusts.

Distributions From Estates.
(1)

Estates are generally taxed like complex trusts (but the
throwback rules were never applicable to estates).

(2)

Income from an estate is generally not required to be
distributed currently, so all income and principal
distributions are second-tier distributions.

(3)

Widow's allowances paid from principal result in a
distribution deduction to the estate and count as a
second-tier distribution to the widow. Treas. Reg.
§1.661(a)-2(e).

(4)

In a much criticized decision, interim distributions from an
estate were excluded from the DNI mechanism on the
ground that the estate could recapture them prior to the
decree of final distribution, and that they were not
"properly" paid. Bohan v. United States, 456 F.2d 851,
72-1 USTC ~9286 (8th Cir. 1972); non-acq., Rev. Rul.
72-396,1972-2 C.B. 312.

(5)

For estates of decedents dying after 8/5/97, the executor of
an estate can elect to treat distributions made within the
first sixty-five (65) days of a taxable year as having been
distributed in the preceding taxable year. IRC §663(b).

Recognition of Gain Or Loss When Making Distributions.
(1)

Income Taxation of Specifically Gifted Assets.
(a)

No gain or loss is recognized by the estate or trust
when it distributes specifically gifted property (e.g.,
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100 shares of AT&T stock, the family home, etc.).

(2)

(b)

The estate or trust gets no distributions deduction,
nor is the beneficiary deemed to receive DNI, upon
distribution of specifically gifted property. IRC
§663(a)(1).

(c)

The distributee succeeds to the estate's or trust's
income tax basis upon the distribution of
specifically gifted property.

Income Taxation of Non-Formula Pecuniary Gifts.
(a)

A non-formula pecuniary gift is a gift of a specific
amount of money (e.g., "I give $50,000 to Joe").

(b)

The estate or trust gets no distribution deduction,
nor is the beneficiary deemed to receive DNI, upon
the distribution of a specific amount pecuniary gift
(e.g., $10,000 to Sally). IRC §663(a)(1).

(c)

The estate or trust does get a distribution deduction,
and the beneficiary will be deemed to receive DNI,
upon distribution of a specific amount payable in
more than three installments under the terms of the
governing instrument (e.g., $10,000 to John, which
is required under the terms of the will or trust to be
paid in 4 quarterly installments, the first to
commence upon the grantor's death). IRC
§663(a)(1).

(d)

The distribution of appreciated property in
satisfaction of a pecuniary gift will trigger gain or
loss to the distributing estate or trust. Treas. Reg.
§1.1 014-4(a)(3).
Example: The decedent's will leaves $100,000 to
David. The estate gives David stock worth
$100,000, but having a basis of $80,000, in
satisfaction of such gift. The estate will be deemed
to have sold the stock to David, resulting in a
$20,000 capital gain. David has no taxable income,
and will have a $100,000 basis in such property.
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(3)

Income Taxation of Formula Pecuniary Gifts.
(a)

A formula pecuniary gift is one which uses a
formula to back into the amount of the gift (i.e., "I
give Joe an amount equal to one-half of my federal
gross estate, valued as of my date of death. ").
Formula pecuniary gifts are often used to determine
the amount of marital deduction gift to be made.

(b)

Gain or loss (unless IRC §267 prevents a loss from
being recognized upon the distribution from a trust)
will be recognized when a formula pecuniary gift is
satisfied with property, rather than cash, based upon
the fair market value of such property at the date of
distribution. IRC §1.1014-4(a)(3).

(c)

However, under a much criticized (and seemingly
inconsistent) Subchapter J regulation, a formula
pecuniary gift is not deemed to be a gift of a specific
sum. Accordingly, the estate or trust making such a
distribution will get a distributions deduction, and
the recipient will be deemed to receive DNI. Treas.
Reg. §1.663(a)-1(b).

(4)

Income Taxation of Fractional Share and Residuary Gifts.
A distribution made pursuant to a fractional or percentage
share formula, or a distribution of the residue or a share of
the residue, is not "a gift or bequest of specific property or
ofa specific sum of money". Treas. Regs. §1.663(a)1(b)(2). Accordingly, such gifts will carry out the income
of the estate or trust, if any, to the beneficiary.

(5)

Income Taxation of In-Kind Distributions.
(a)

Distributions in kind generally don't result in the
recognition of gain or loss, unless the distribution is
in satisfaction of a pecuniary or fixed dollar gift.
Treas. Reg. §1.1014-4(a)(3). In the case of in-kind
distributions where no gain or loss is recognized,
the beneficiary gets the estate's or trust's income tax
basis in the property so distributed and a second tier
distribution takes place in an amount equal to the
lesser of the property's basis or fair market value at
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the time of such distribution. IRC §643(e).

(6)

(b)

The executor or trustee can make an irrevocable
election to recognize gain or loss upon the making
of a distribution in satisfaction of a fractional or
percentage share formula, or a distribution of the
residue or a share of the residue. If such election is
made, the property will be deemed sold to the
beneficiary at its fair market value on the date of its
distribution, and a second tier distribution will take
place equal in amount to such fair market value.
IRC §643(e)(3).

(c)

It is often desired to make non-pro rata distributions
in kind to beneficiaries. For example, two equal
beneficiaries may decide to let one take all of the
AT&T stock and the other take all of the GM stock,
with cash being used to equalize the distributions to
the extent necessary, rather than splitting each and
every asset. Such non-pro rata distributions can be
taxed as constructive taxable exchanges between the
two beneficiaries unless either the governing
instrument (i.e., the will or trust) or applicable local
law specifically allow non-pro rata distributions to
be made.

Distributions of Installment Obligations and IRD Items.
(a)

An in-kind distribution by an estate of an
installment obligation which was created prior to
the decedent's death, unless the distribution is in
satisfaction of a pecuniary or fixed dollar gift, will
not be a disposition of such installment obligation
for the purpose of acceleration of gain. IRC
§453(e)(6).

(b)

No such exception exists for in-kind distributions of
an installment obligation created after the decedent's
death, and any distribution of such an installment
obligation will trigger gain.

(c)

When doing estate planning for a person whose
assets consist of a great deal of installment
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obligations receivable and IRD items, it will be
desirable to avoid pecuniary formula gifts under the
estate planning documents that must be funded with
such items and/or to make specific gifts of such
items to the desired individuals'or sub-trusts.
(d)

When administering an estate or trust with a highly
appreciated asset which is about to be sold on an
installment basis, consider first distributing the asset
to the beneficiary and then letting the beneficiary
enter into the installment sale. This will avoid
having the gain accelerated upon the subsequent
distribution of the installment obligation to the
beneficiary of the estate or trust.

(e)

When administering an estate or trust that has a
substantial installment obligation receivable that
was created after the decedent's death, it may be
desirable to find some excuse to keep the estate or
trust open for as long as possible to avoid having to
distribute the installment note and thus accelerating
the gain.
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SECTION J

Ethical Issues Under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky
for Estate Planning and Family Business Succession Advisors

by
Eric A. Manterfield

While estate and business succession planning is frequently non-adversarial and clientcentered, there are numerous ways in which advisors can be confronted with ethical issues.
Someone once said that you either have integrity or you don't, but we can all learn something
more about the Rules that apply to ethical dilemmas!
Too many unhappy beneficiaries are seeking ways to premise malpractice actions by
citing violations of the ethics Rules, particularly conflicts of interest.

All estate planning

advisors must be aware of the ethical constraints that apply to our work. To the extent that the
advisors become more aware of the issues involved, there can be more effective loss prevention.
While the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the American Bar
Association, Kentucky has not yet adopted those Rules. The Rules of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, which govern the ethical conduct of lawyers in that Commonwealth, became effective
as of January 1, 1990. A committee has been established in Kentucky to study the ABA model
Rules; however, I am infonned that its recommendations (let alone action on those
recommendations) is still far in the future.
In 1999, the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel adopted "commentaries" on

the American Bar Association's then-Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are published
as ACTEC, Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, 3d Edition (March
1999), which are hereafter referred to as the "ACTEC Commentaries." Because Kentucky's
Rules closely follow those then, model Rules, the ACTEC Commentaries provide useful
guidance for the estate and family business succession planner.
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The Reporter's Note included at the beginning of the ACTEC Commentaries recognizes
both the prevalence of conflict situations in estate and family business succession planning and
the absence of specific guidelines for these planners in the ethical Rules:
"The main themes of the Commentaries are: (1) the relative freedom that lawyers
and clients have to write their own charter with respect to a representation in the
trusts and estates field; (2) the generally nonadversarial nature of the trusts and
estates practice; (3) the utility and propriety, in this area of the law, of
representing multiple parties, whose interests may differ but are not necessarily
adversarial; and (4) the opportunity, with full disclosure, to moderate or eliminate
entirely many problems that might otherwise arise under the MRULE. The
Commentaries additionally reflect the role that the trusts and estates lawyer has
traditionally played as the lawyer for members of a family. In that role a trusts
and estates lawyer frequently represents the fiduciary of a trust or estate and one
or more of the beneficiaries. In drafting the Commentaries we have attempted to
express views that are consistent with the spirit of the MRULE as evidenced in
the following passage: 'The Rules of Professional Conduct are Rules of reason.
They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation
and of the law itself. '" (emphasis added)
Any examination of the ethical issues for estate planning lawyers must begin with the
applicable Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky (SCR 3.130). While these Rules expressly
apply to attorneys, it is reasonable to expect that the spirit of these standards will be applied to
other professionals who assist clients with this planning.
My hope in this work is not to provide an ironclad "road map" for every situation; rather,
my goal is to illustrate the Rules in several common situations, to give some thoughts on the
resolution of the problems and to raise issues that are commonly ignored (perhaps in the
mistaken belief that the problem will "go away" all by itself).
It is not particularly useful for a discussion of these issues to conclude with the
observation that "this is an interesting problem," with no guidance on a solution!
Little can be obtained from reported case decisions in the ethics arena. Perhaps this is
because violations of ethical requirements more frequently lead to malpractice actions.
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Our obligations begin with the need to provide a client with "competent representation"
(Rule 1.1) and to keep the client "reasonably infonned" (Rule 1.3).

The latter obligation

frequently causes problems for those advisors who are less than diligent.
Beyond these basic requirements, however, a planner can be presented with ethical issues
involving conflicts of interest, the failure to exercise independent judgment, the violation of
client confidences, incomplete or inadequate representation, even potential criminal liability for
bankruptcy fraud and excessive fees. Starting with some thoughts on engagement letters and
client communication, I will spend most of this paper on the other issues listed.

Engagement Letters
The advisor and the client must agree on the scope of the lawyer's representation
according to Rule 1.2.

Should not that agreement be documented?

Should you use an

engagement letter?
Some advisors may find a fonnal engagement letter to be intrusive on the so-called "open
and honest" relationship they have with their clients.

Why put "the objectives of the

representation" [Rule 1.2(a)] in a letter, they wonder, when both the client and the advisor know
perfectly well that the client came in for estate planning services? This issue was addressed in
the ACTEC Commentaries:
"Variations in the circumstances and needs of trusts and estates clients and in the
approach and practice of individual lawyers naturally result in lawyers and clients
adopting very different methods of working together. The agreement between a
lawyer and client regarding the scope and objectives of the representation is often
best expressed fonnally in an engagement letter or other written communication.
However, most often their agreement is implicitly reflected in the manner in
which they choose to work together."
Estate planning engagement letters. I recommend that all estate planning advisors
consider the use of written engagement letters, however, particularly regarding the representation
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of a married couple. As will be discussed later in this material, it is frequently helpful if the
advisor notifies the clients at the beginning of the representation that there can be no confidences
in the representation of a husband and wife. This engagement letter can also set forth the method
of your compensation, the procedure for billing, the termination of the relationship and dispute
resolution.
Rule 1.5(b) provides as follows:
"When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the
fee should be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a
reasonable time after commencing the representation." (emphasis added)
Comment [1] to Rule 1.5 includes this statement: "A written statement concerning the
fees reduces the possibility of misunderstanding."
A form of engagement letter for estate planning services is attached at the end of this
material.
Family business succession planning engagement letters. These issues may become

even more critical if you represent a family business and its multiple owners who come to you
for family business succession planning advice.
Potential conflicts of interest among the owners of the business should be acknowledged.
A written engagement letter can also set forth the method of your compensation, whether the fees
are to be paid by the business or its owners, the procedure for billing, the termination of the
relationship and dispute resolution.
A form of engagement letter for family business succession planning is also attached at
the end of this material.
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Diligence and Effective Client Communication

Rule 1.3 demands that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."

The appearance of procrastination, as well as its reality, can be

exacerbated by ineffective client communications.
Rule 1.14 requires the lawyer to "keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." The failure to
communicate regularly with a client may be one of the leading causes of ethical lapses and estate
planning malpractice complaints, particularly with respect to the reasonableness of fees. The
problem may be more acute in representations where much of the work is done outside of the
eyes of the client.
Examples include estate work, where the personal representative and beneficiaries are
often unaware (in the absence of good client communication) of the extensive work done on tax
returns, inventories and the like. Other examples include will contests with corresponding time
spent on legal research, depositions, document review and other matters not commonly requiring
client participation, and planning for lifetime gifts with difficult valuation issues.
The more the work is done beyond the client's eyes, the more important is the
requirement that we keep the client "reasonably informed." This may be more a matter of
common sense than of malpractice.

Conflicts of Interest

The Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky present several standards addressing
conflicts of interest, which are primarily found in two Rules:
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1.

Rule 1.7 provides the general rule that "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the

representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client...."
2.

Rule 1.9 provides that "a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter

shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which
that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation."
These Rules can have significant implications for the estate planner in even the most
common situation. The joint representation of multiple clients often produces a better result than
would be the case had each party sought separate counsel. Economies of scale can be achieved,
reducing the cost of services; the plans can be more effectively coordinated, particularly where
the predominant relationship between the parties is cooperative and not adversarial.
Indeed, Rule 1.7, which provides the general rules for conflicts of interest, provides that
the lawyer may not represent clients simultaneously unless "(1) the lawyer reasonably believes
that the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after
consultation.

When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the

consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved."
The Supreme Court issued Commentary [3] to Rule 1.7 in 1989:
"Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry
out an' appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other
responsibilities or interests....A possible conflict does not itself preclude the
representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and,
if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional
judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should
be pursued on behalf the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client
wishes to accommodate the other interest involved."
How do these conflict of interest Rules impact lawyers in the estate and trust practice?
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Representation of a married couple. While the conflicts inherent in our representation
of a couple in a second marriage may be obvious, conflicts can arise even in the case of a first
marriage:
1.

Should jointly-held assets be divided between the spouses (so as to fund a credit

trust at the death of whichever one is the first to die) or should the joint property just pass
outright to the surviving spouse?
2.

Should a spouse waive statutory benefits under retirement benefits, so that those

dollars can pass into a QTIP trust at the death of the participant?
3.

Can the advisor work with both spouses when the marital gift will be to a QTIP

trust for the benefit of children of a prior marriage?
4.

Can you represent both spouses when creditors of one spouse want to reach assets

of the other spouse?
5.

Can you advise a client of the benefits of a QTIP trust, to assure that assets will

pass as "they" intend, rather than as an outright gift to the other client/spouse?
Even if you are working with a happy couple (whether in a first or subsequent marriage)
whose interests are today the same, there is always the potential for conflict. Some advisors may
feel that the potential for conflict is so high that one spouse must always seek other counsel.
However, that solution may be too drastic and not in the best wishes of the couple you represent.
Rule 1.7 permits joint representation, so long as the potential for conflict is raised and so long as
the clients together consent in writing to the joint representation. This is clearly another reason
to have a written engagement letter with a married couple.
Here is some language which I use in engagement letters sent to married couples:
"We represent you both. Our representation will be of you jointly in your estate
planning. Because we represent both of you, anything disclosed by either one of
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you to me or to any personnel at [the law finn] will necessarily be open for
complete disclosure to the other.
I am not suggesting that this would become an issue at any point; rather, it is
appropriate for us to advise all married couples of the fact that our representation
of you is as a couple, simply because we are representing two people whose
interests are not always exactly the same. "
This approach seems to me to be preferable to an engagement in which the advisor represents
each spouse independently of the representation of the other spouse.
Even with this consent by both husband and wife to the lawyer's joint representation,
conflicts can later arise.
1.

Where the advisor meets with only one spouse. You may have a conference with

only one spouse, either because the other spouse is working, is with the children, is having a bad
day or what have you. Suppose that the client with whom you meet assures you that the other
spouse is in full accord with the estate plan. Can the advisor simply prepare documents and have
them signed on that assurance, perhaps never meeting that other spouse?
I suggest that the advisor always meet with the other spouse, to verify the statement that
he or she is in "full accord with the estate plan." Go over the options and decisions that were
made in the first conference. Is there understanding? Is there agreement?
If, as is frequently the case, the answers to these questions are in the affirmative, you can
proceed with the execution of the documents. If, on the other hand, there is not agreement, you
must decide whether joint representation can continue. It probably cannot.
2.

Gift splitting. Suppose that both spouses have separate assets and that one client

wants to make gifts to children from a prior marriage. Can the advisor recommend to the other
spouse with no further discussion merely to consent to gift splitting even with the knowledge that
it may impair gifts by that other spouse?
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Merely asking the question leads to the obvious answer of "no." However, if you advise
both spouses of the implications of gift splitting, there is no reason why you cannot continue to
represent both of them, in my opinion.
3.

Where the husband and wife cannot agree.

While many couples agree on the

basic components of an estate plan, there may easily be disagreements.. Do those disagreements
present the advisor with such a conflict that representation must be withdrawn? That may
depend upon the nature of the disagreement.
If the husband and wife cannot agree, for example, on the people who should serve as
guardian for minor children at the death of the surviving spouse, the attorney should be able to
prepare wills for each spouse with conflicting wishes in that regard. Both spouses should be
advised of the wishes of the other; each is advised that it is the will of the second to die which
will probably be examined by the local court when determining the guardian. If they each want
to proceed and sign a will on that understanding, the disagreement of the couple is not sufficient
that the lawyer must withdraw, in my opinion.
If, on the other hand, the disagreement is more fundamental, the advisor can oftentimes
be presented with an irreconcilable conflict. Suppose that the husband wants the marital share
put into a QTIP trust and his wife is furious about that. Suppose that one spouse refuses to
transfer ownership of a farm into their names as tenants in common, thereby giving up the right
of survivorship. Suppose that one spouse creates a marital power of appointment trust on the
assumption that the power will never be exercised, but the other spouse expresses an intent to
exercise the power?
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Can you then withdraw from representation of the spouse of your long time client only?
May you continue to represent the long time client in the estate planning work, while sending the
spouse to new counsel?
The answer to this question is more practical than ethical, in my opinion.

If their

differences on these issues are this fundamental, I recommend that you represent neither of the
spouses on this work. It is reasonable to foresee this planning process becoming unpleasant. It
might be preferable to have two new advisors separately represent the long time client and his
wife on this work (with all its marital difficulties), after which the long time client should return
to you for the recurring work (in other areas) you have always handled.
I suggest that, under those circumstances, it is advisable for the planner to withdraw from
representation of the spouses and recommend that each seek separate counsel.
4.

If the couple were later to divorce.

Suppose that the advisor prepared estate

planning documents for a married couple. The husband was the CEO of a local corporation
which also has used the lawyer's firm for legal representation.
Some years after the preparation of the estate plan for both the husband and his wife, the
husband consults the lawyer about a potential divorce from his wife. The only service performed
for this wife was the preparation of a will years ago. Can the lawyer represent the husband in
this divorce action?
Rule 1.9 deals with conflicts of interest with a former client, in which a lawyer who
previously represented a client cannot later represent another person "in the same or a
substantially related matter" where the former client's interests are "materially adverse" unless
the former client gives infonned consent to the representation, confinned in writing.

J-10

Rule 1.9(c) expressly provides that "[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former
client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when
the information has become generally known; or (2) reveal information relating to the
representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client."
To the extent that the pre-divorce counseling of the husband was a "substantially related
matter" to the estate planning services previously provided to the wife, Rule 1.9 would apply.
The lawyer presumably obtained confidential information about assets as part of the estate
planning work which could be used later (she asserts) to the wife's detriment in the divorce
proceeding.
Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion

~A

E-245 (issued in July of 1981) gave a

"qualified yes" to the question "Mayan attorney who does an estate planning for a husband and
wife, later represent either one in a subsequent divorce action?", so long as the lawyer met with
the husband and wife together in connection with the prior estate planning work.
Nevertheless, could the now ex-wife (bitter over the terms of the divorce) file an ethics
complaint against the lawyer on the basis of a conflict of interest? Had it not been for the
lawyer's improper utilization of confidential information received from the wife in the estate
planning process, she argues, a more favorable settlement could have been negotiated in the
divorce property agreement.
Even if the lawyer refers the divorce work to another law firm, there may easily be
liability to the extent that the lawyer counseled the husband before the divorce filing (proposed
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separation, probable amount of child support payments, possible terms of a division of the
marital assets and the like).
Recall that Rule 1.9 permits the lawyer to consult with the husband only with the
informed consent of the fonner client (wife). The lawyer should make full disclosure to the wife
before any services are provided to the husband and obtain her consent to this new
representation. The lawyer may believe that the divorce work was sent elsewhere because of this
conflict of interest; however, if the lawyer merely discussed pre-divorce matters with the
husband, an ethical violation may have occurred.
It is far preferable to tell both husband and wife that you are prohibited from representing
either one of them in the divorce action. Do not give any legal advice to either party. Most
divorce clients end up unhappy even with their own lawyer; it makes good business and ethics
sense to send both away to another lawyer in another law finn.
Family estate planning. Advisors are frequently called upon to assist in estate planning
for multiple generations. What conflicts may arise in that representation of both the parents and
the children (and even grandchildren)?
Suppose that the parents discuss the advisability of creating generation skipping trusts for
the benefit of children and grandchildren. The interests of the children may not be adequately
met by a plan that gives them only an income interest.

What is your obligation to the

children/clients to argue against a plan desired by the parents/clients?
Suppose that the parents own a successful company, with one child active in the business
and the other child not involved. The parents counsel with the advisor about a recapitalization of
their S corporation, so as to create both voting and non-voting shares. The plan is to leave voting
shares to the child who is active in the business and non-voting shares to the other child.

J-12

Can you continue to represent the children, recognizing that the interests of the child not
active in the business may not be well served by a plan that distributes only non-voting shares?
Is the issue any different if the parents want a plan which distributes assets outright to one
child and leaves the inheritance for another child in a generation skipping trust (perhaps because
the latter child is irresponsible, on drugs and so forth). If you represent the parents and the child
who will receive the outright distribution, is there a potential charge of undue influence with the
advisor caught in the middle?
Suppose that the parents want the lawyer to prepare a pre-marital agreement for a child,
even to the extent of paying the lawyer's fee. The lawyer has provided legal services to the child
before and she sees no reason for a pre-marital agreement. See Rule 1.8(f) dealing with fees paid
by someone other than the client.
The problem discussed earlier of conflicts with a former client may also arise in the
family representation setting. Suppose that you represent the owner of a closely-held business
and the son who actively works in the business. Estate plans are prepared for each client, with
the father leaving control to the son and placing other assets in trust for the children who are not
active in the business.
What is the consequence if the father later asks you to prepare a codicil to the will, in
which the control shares are to be divided equally among all the children? The son learns of this
change in his father's estate plan only after the death of his father.
Remember that you also prepared estate planning documents for the son. The son is your
client or at least used to be your client. When the father approached you about a codicil, was not
your new work for the father a "substantially related matter" to the estate planning that was done
previously and will not your new work be "materially adverse" to the interests of the son?
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The preparation of the codicil for the father should be prepared only with the consent of
the son. To proceed otherwise gives the son an open invitation to assert an ethics violation.
Representing multiple owners of a business (and the business itselO. While many of
the same issues associated with family estate planning arise in the context of family business
succession planning, the opportunities for conflicts of interest compound:
1.

Where the advisor meets with only one of the business owners. The advisor may

have a conference with only one business owner, typically the majority owner. Suppose that the
client with whom the advisor meets assures you that the other owners of the business (the
owner's children, for example) are in full accord with the business succession plan. Can you
simply prepare documents and have them signed on that assurance, perhaps never meeting the
other owners of the business?
Just as in the case of marital estate planning, I suggest that you always meet with the
other owners, to verify the statement that "they are in full agreement with my plan." Go over the
options and decisions that were made in the first conference. Is there understanding? Is there
agreement?
2.

Where the owners of the business do not agree. While many of the owners may

agree on the basic components of a business succession plan, there may easily be disagreements.
If the owners of the business cannot agree, for example, on whether all owners must also
work in the business, on who will become the next manager upon the retirement or death of the
majority owner or on the pricing mechanism for a buy-sell agreement, it is unlikely that you can
represent all the owners of the business. Each should have his or her own separate counsel.
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If there is a fundamental disagreement over an issue of this significance, you simply
cannot represent everyone. But can you continue to represent the business and the majority
owner who first approached you about this work? The answer to that question may depend on
the extent of the work you have done so far and the extent to which your prior work had been on
behalf of the now dissenting business owners.
If there is any chance that you have, in fact, provided significant representation to those
owners of the business who are now in disagreement with the majority owner's wishes, you
cannot continue to represent the majority owner without the written consent of all the owners.
I suppose that there may be a disagreement over "minor" issues, which are so
insignificant that you may continue to represent all the owners in an effort to reach an amicable
resolution; however, great caution should be exercised whenever there is any disagreement
among the owners. Raise the conflict of interest issue and ask them whether each is willing to
have you continue to advise everyone.
Even if you feel the issue is not significant and the owners all want you to continue, I
advise you to get their consent to your continued representation in writing. If everything blows
up in the future, people have too short a memory for you to rely on their assurance that it is "not
necessary" for you to get this consent in writing.
3.

If an owner of the business were later to leave.

Suppose that you prepared

business succession documents for a business and its owners with their consent. You did, in fact,
represent everyone. Sometime later one of the owners has a falling out and leaves the business.
This departure is not pleasant and there are disagreements over issues such as the price to be paid
under a buy-sell agreement or the nature and extent of any non-compete restrictions which you
helped put in place.
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Can you represent either side in the resolution of these issues? No. The departing owner
was your client and you cannot take a position which is adverse to his or her interest without full
disclosure and full written consent.
Rule 1.9 deals with conflicts of interest with a former client, in which a lawyer who
previously represented a client cannot later represent another person "in the same or a
substantially related matter" where the former client's interests are "materially adverse" unless
the former client consents to the representation.
If you helped put the buy-sell agreement or the covenant not to compete in place, it seems
clear that any disagreement over the provisions of these documents is a "substantially related
matter" when you previously represented the departing owner of the business. It is not sufficient
for you to protest that this departing owner was not your "real" client in the prior work. You did,
in fact, provide legal services to that individual, who is entitled to the protection of the conflict of
interest provisions of our ethical standards.
You cannot represent either side without everyone's written consent. Even if you
refer the work to another advisor, there may easily be liability to the extent that you counseled
the majority owner of the business before someone else was brought in. Did you give any
advice which might later have been used against the interest of the dissenting owner?
Recall that Rule 1.9 permits the lawyer to consult with the majority owner only with the
informed consent of the former client (departing owner), confirmed in writing.

The lawyer

should make full disclosure to the former client before any advice is given to the majority owner
and obtain the written consent of the dissenting owner to this new representation of the majority
owner.
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Representing the elderly parent or child of an existing client. Planners are frequently
asked for advice about elderly relatives. "How can we get Dad on Medicaid?" they wonder.
Parents may want you to advise children about expected inheritances. The conflicts are apparent.
The existing client may bring in his or her parent to do estate planning. Sometimes, the
parent is not able to come to your office, but you are assured by the existing client that he or she
will tell the parent all that he or she needs to know. Indeed, the child will arrange for the
execution of the documents without it being necessary for you ever to meet the "client."
Suppose you represent the parent of a child who is about to receive a distribution from a
trust established by another relative. Your client wants you to advise the child to take the
inheritance and put it into an irrevocable trust for the child's benefit (perhaps revocable only
with the consent of the parent, your existing client).
Can you represent both the existing client and the relative, giving independent advice to
each? Before you take on the representation of this elderly parent or this child of an existing
client, Rule 1.7 requires you to determine that the, new representation will not be "materially
limited" by your responsibilities to the existing client.
The Rule goes on to require you to consult with both clients (you must meet with the
elderly parent and with the child) to tell them of the possibility of a conflict. You must inform
each client of the implications of the common representation and the risks and advantages
involved. Both clients must give informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Where applicable, Rule 2.2 may also be involved in multiple, generational representation
of this sort, particularly where "the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on
terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately
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informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests
of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessfuL ..."
Written consents from both clients. If Rule 2.2 is applicable (the lawyer is serving as an
intermediary), you must consult with both clients, advising them of the implications of the joint
representation, the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privilege.
Written consents should be obtained from everyone.
A client who is disabled. If one of the parties is under an incapacity, it appears that the

conflict cannot be resolved. For example, if the elderly parent is incompetent, can the child
(existing client) consent on behalf of the parent on the authority of a durable power of attorney
given to the child by the parent?
Perhaps, if it was an only child, there may be no other person with an interest; but what if
the advisor is consulted by only one child of several and the other children are not aware of the
services to be provided to the incapacitated parent? I recommend that you not accept the waiver
of a conflict signed by the single child without the knowledge and consent of the other children.
In a similar fashion, the consent of a minor cannot be obtained. Even when distribution is

to be made on the day the child attains the age of majority, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in
. which the advisor (with "consent" of the child) counsels the child -- just before his or her 18th
birthday -- to put the expected inheritance into an irrevoc.able trust that cannot be changed by this
new "client!"
How is putting the inheritance into an irrevocable trust in the best interests of the child
(even though that is exactly what the parent desires)? Even if you believe that putting the
inheritance in trust really is in the best interests of the child (presumably because the
irresponsible child will waste the funds), the advisor should consider Rule 1.14 (Client under a
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disability) before advising this new client.

A court-appointed guardianship may be a more

appropriate remedy.
Who pays your fee? Finally, if your fees are to be paid by the existing client (the parents
of the young child or the adult child of the elderly parent, for example), Rule 1.8(t) requires you
to disclose this fee arrangement to the new client and to determine that this fee arrangement will
not interfere with your independent judgment of what is best for the new client. The new client,
of course, must then provide informed consent in writing to the fee arrangement.
The advisor must exercise great care to overcome any argument that undue influence
affected your advice in these circumstances. This is an obvious problem when, at the urging of
an existing client, you advise a young person to place assets in an irrevocable trust, primarily to
protect the child from himself In a similar fashion, you should be very wary when an existing
client dictates the terms of his parents' wills, particularly if this new will gives to that child more
than his "fair" share of the assets!
The safest avenue is to assume that full disclosure of the dual representation must be
made to both parties and written consent must be obtained from each of them.

Multiple representation in an estate setting. It is clear that advisors are frequently
presented with potential conflicts of interest when a client dies. You may represent the personal
representative of the estate, the surviving spouse and, perhaps, the trustees, children or other
beneficiaries of the estate.
Who is the client? Is it only the personal representative or do you also represent the
beneficiaries of the estate? Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion E-401 (issued in
September of 1997) adopted the position taken in the ACTEC Commentaries that the lawyer who
represents the fiduciary does not simultaneously represent the beneficiaries.
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Rule 1.7 states that the lawyer can represent these multiple clients (fiduciary and
beneficiaries), so long as the clients are advised of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved and if the clients all consent. Nevertheless,
it is certainly possible that later, serious conflicts can arise during the estate administration,
which will lead the lawyer to withdraw as counsel for the personal representative, the surviving
spouse or both.
If, as is frequently the case, there are estate beneficiaries who are not represented, the
advisors to the personal representative must be certain that those beneficiaries understand that
you do not represent them. Rule 4.3 provides that:

"In dealing on behalf of a client [the personal representative] with a person [the
beneficiary] who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply
that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. "

Multiple representation in a trust setting.

All these same Rules and requirements

relate to the advisors who represent a trustee.
Suppose that a question arises concerning the proper interpretation of the will or trust
agreement. May the lawyer petition the court for instructions on behalf of the trustee and then
take a position with respect to the resolution of the ambiguity? May the lawyer for the trustee
represent the spouse in the subsequent hearing and assert a position on the merits of the matter
before the court?
The answer is "no." Both the trustee and the trustee's lawyer are under a fiduciary duty of
impartiality towards the interests of all trust beneficiaries.
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This position is a well settled matter of common law. This principal was expressed well
in the dissenting opinion in Estate of Goulet v. Goulet, 10 Ca1.4th 1074, 1086,898 P.2d425, 432
(1995), as follows:
"It has long been settled, not only in California but elsewhere, that a fiduciary
(such as the trustee of a trust or the personal representative of a decedent's estate)
administering property on behalf of multiple beneficiaries must act impartially
towards all the beneficiaries and must not favor, or expend funds litigating, the
interest of one beneficiary over another. The fiduciary may not take sides when a
dispute arises as to the relative rights and interests of various beneficiaries, and
may not work to advance or oppose the claim of any beneficiary." (emphasis
added)
Other cases setting forth this Rule of law include In the Matter of the Trust for Duke, 305
N.J. Super. 408, 702 A.2d 1008 (1995); The Northern Trust Company v. Heuer, 202 IIl.App.3d
1066,560 N.E.2d 961 (1990); In re Cudahy, 26 Wis.2d 153, 131 N.W.2d 882 (1965); and In re
James Estate, 86 N.Y.S.2d 78 (SUIT. Ct. 1948).
In The Northern Trust Company case, the trustee had advocated a construction of the

trust that was unfavorable to a beneficiary. The court held that while it was proper for the trustee
to seek the court's construction of the trust by filing the complaint for construction and in
gathering and presenting the information necessary for the court to interpret the trust, it breached
its duty of impartiality and exceeded its duty as trustee when it argued for an interpretation
adverse to a beneficiary.
The court disallowed Northern Trust's petition for attorney fees and costs related to the
inappropriate activity. The court stated that while
"generally the costs of litigation to construe a trust in which there are adverse
claims are paid by the trust estate,... where a trustee breaches its duty to
administer the trust according to its terms and performs in a manner which favors
one beneficiary over another, the trustee is not entitled to attorney fees and costs
even though the breach is technical in nature, done in good faith and causes no
harm." (emphasis added)
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The court stated further that"... it is preferable that we reiterate established precedent and
foster every incentive for a trustee to adhere to its well-established duty of impartiality." 560
N.E.2d at 964,965.
If the lawyer represents most of the trust beneficiaries, neither the trustee nor the
trustee's lawyer may take a position on the merits because, to do so, must necessarily be adverse
to the interests of some beneficiaries. Even if the lawyer represents all of the trust beneficiaries,
a resolution of the ambiguity must have an negative impact on some of the lawyer's clients. That
is an impermissible conflict of interest.
What if the beneficiaries agree on the resolution? If all the beneficiaries consent to a
proposed resolution, the lawyer may present that settlement to the court; however, great care
must be exercised by the attorney who attempts to negotiate that consent, to be certain that each
of the lawyer's clients understand the role that is being played.
If the trust beneficiaries cannot agree on a resolution, the trustee must present the
problem to the court, have the court give notice to all the beneficiaries and then the trustee must
step back and let the beneficiaries make their own arguments as to the proper interpretation of
the language. If the trustee were to argue in favor of one construction, it would violate the
trustee's duty of impartiality because any interpretation will necessarily have a negative impact
on the interests of another beneficiary (if not, why have the interpretation issue presented to the
court for resolution?).
The lawyer for the trustee may not assert a position for a beneficiary. Just as the trustee
cannot assert a position in this action, the trustee's lawyer may not assert a position "solely" on
behalf of a beneficiary.

That representation conflicts with the lawyer's simultaneous
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representation of the trustee on all other trust matters, when the trustee must be impartial towards
the interests of all beneficiaries in everything.
I suppose that it is possible for the lawyer to disclose to all the parties his or her joint
representation of the trustee and some of the beneficiaries and to obtain their consent; however, I
believe that the trustee should obtain the consent of the other trust beneficiaries (who are not to
be represented by the lawyer) to this joint representation. And why would those other trust
beneficiaries give their consent?
It is easier for the lawyer to decide whether to represent the fiduciary or the beneficiary,
but not both.

The Failure to Exercise Independent Judgment
Advisors can be presented with conflicts of interest, including the possible allegation that
you violated your duty to exercise independent judgment, when a client asks you to serve as
personal representative, to serve as trustee, to receive a gift under the will or trust agreement and
so forth.
1.

Gifts to the advisor. While you may prepare estate planning documents for close

relatives (parents, for example) from whom you will receive benefits in the future, you cannot do
so if the client is not closely related. Guidance in these situations can be found in Rule 1.8(c):
"A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to
the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client,
including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee."
Comment [2] to Rule 1.8 provides that:
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"A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of
fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of
appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal
instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the detached
advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) provides an exception where the
client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial."

The ACTEC Commentaries provide that "a closely related person is one who would
receive part or all of the client's estate if the client were to die intestate; and the substantiality of
a gift is determined by reference both to the size of the client's estate and to the size of the estate
of the lawyer or the lawyer's spouse or children."
The prohibition against having an unrelated client make gifts to the advisor also extends,
of course, to gifts that are accomplished by use of j oint ownership and beneficiary designations.
Although not required by the Rule, the mere appearance of impropriety leads me to
recommend that you send a non-related client who wishes to make a substantial gift to you to a
lawyer in another law firm. It is not sufficient, in my opinion, to avoid the Rule by having a
partner or associate in your law firm prepare the necessary documents to effectuate the gift.
2.

Selection of the advisor as fiduciary. A client can name anyone he or she chooses

as a fiduciary. There is nothing in the Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky which prohibits
the selection of the advisor as personal representative or trustee, so long as the client is properly
advised, the appointment does not violate Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.8 and the appointment is not the
result of undue influence or improper solicitation.
Care must be exercised, however, to be certain that your conduct (in preparing an
estate plan in which you are named as a fiduciary) does not have even the appearance of
impropriety.
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In order to advise the client "properly," the ACTEC Commentaries suggest that (before

accepting an appointment as a fiduciary) you tell the client about the duties of the fiduciary, the
ability of another individual or corporate fiduciary to serve in that capacity and the comparative
costs of the different alternatives (including the fees to be paid to you as the fiduciary).
If you or your firm also represents a prospective corporate fiduciary, you should disclose
that representation to the client who is considering that bank as a fiduciary. Finally, you should
advise the client if it is the bank's practice to employ as its counsel the attorney who wrote the
will or trust agreement.
If the client, after receiving this advice, still requests that you serve as executor or other
fiduciary, the client should give informed consent, confirmed in writing. I recommend that this
written confirmation also address the fees which you propose to charge as a fiduciary. Will you
charge you normal hourly rate or will that compensation reflect the responsibilities of a
fiduciary, rather than those of an attorney?
Can the lawyer serve both as fiduciary and as counsel to the fiduciary?

While the

ACTEC Commentaries note that such joint capacities may be appropriate when there has been a
long standing attorney-client relationship,
"generally, a lawyer should serve in both capacities [both as fiduciary and as
counsel to the fiduciary] only if the client insists and is fully aware of the
alternatives, and the lawyer is fully competent to do so. A lawyer who is asked to
serve in both capacities should inform the client fully regarding the costs of such
dual service and the alternatives to it. A lawyer undertaking to serve in both
capacities should attempt to ameliorate any disadvantages that may come from
dual service, including the potential loss of the benefits that are obtained by
having a separate fiduciary and lawyer, such as the check that a separate fiduciary
might provide upon the amount of fees sought by the lawyer and vice versa."
3.

The document which directs the lawyer's employment as counsel. Maya will or

trust agreement direct the employment of a particular attorney as counsel for the fiduciary? Is
that direction binding on the fiduciary or may the fiduciary employ any lawyer selected by the
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fiduciary?
If the direction is neither binding on the fiduciary nor a customary practice among the
legal community in that marketplace, the lawyer should take steps to counter the appearance of
impropriety and undue influence whenever a client mandates that provision in his or her estate
planning documents.
I recommend that, if the client wants the lawyer to include such a direction in a will. or
trust agreement, the lawyer should advise the client that this "direction" may not be legally
binding on the fiduciary, who is nevertheless free to employ as counsel any attorney of the
fiduciary's selection. The lawyer should document the fact that this direction is being made at
the request of the client and not at the instigation of the lawyer.
4.

Charitable activities of the advisor. Suppose that the advisor is actively involved

in a local charitable organization. Can the advisor recommend to clients that they make gifts to
that charity? Recall that Rule 1.7(b) states that "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by ... the lawyer's own interests...."
Weare obligated to give to our clients independent advice and judgment, which may be
clouded if we have a personal interest in the charity. Even if you will not receive a fee from the
charity for this sort of gift, your independence ofjudgment is clearly in question.
If the client has also had a long-standing interest in the charity, the ethical issues may be
lessened. The gift is not being made solely on the recommendation of the advisor.
Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion E-391 (issued in July of 1996) said that a client
could consent to representation by a lawyer who served on the charity's planned giving
committee so long as the attorney is able "to reasonably conclude that the representation will not
be adversely affected by the relationship with the charity...."
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However, great care must still be exercised when both the client and the lawyer have an
interest in the same charity and choices to be made by the client conflict with the wishes of the
charity. For example, if the client is creating a charitable remainder trust, the client may retain
the power to change the charitable beneficiary by the client's will, an action which the charity
would discourage. If the lawyer fails to advise the client of this power to change the charity
because of the lawyer's loyalty to the charity, an ethical violation has occurred.
If the client has no demonstrated interest in the charity and the gift is being made on the
basis of the advisor's recommendation, it is likely than an ethical violation has occurred.
5.

Other financial activities of the advisor. What ethical issues are presented by the

advisor who also is a financial planner or sells insurance or mutual funds? Are these problems
eliminated merely because those ancillary activities are carried on by a separate legal entity?
It seems clear that these other activities (or even of another organization in which the
advisor has an ownership or other financial interest) present issues of self-dealing and lack of
independent professional judgment regarding which course of action·is in the best interests of the
client. These issues cannot be ameliorated just by having the other activities carried on by a
separate entity controlled by the planner.
RULE I.8(a) applies to these transactions, and states that
"A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a
client unless:
(1)
the transaction and terms on. which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2)
the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3)
the client consents in writing thereto."
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It is irrelevant that the commission paid the advisor is the same as would have been paid
by the client had the transaction been concluded with another provider of the product or service.
An ethics violation can result even if there is no financial harm to the client. Full disclosure to

the client, advice to seek independent counsel on this issue and the written consent of the client
must all be obtained.
Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion E-376 (issued in March of 1995) expressly
answered "no" to this question: "May I sell insurance to a client, and receive a commission for
it, when the sale of insurance is related to my representation of the client., and the legal
representation involves estate and employee benefit planning?"
6.

Clients who are referred to the advisor. Many advisors obtain new clients as a

result of referrals from attorneys, trust departments, accountants, life insurance professionals and
so forth. Those referral sources obviously hope (expect?) that the estate plan resulting from this
relationship will result in the client's use of services or products provided by the referral sources.
Is the use of those services an ethics violation?
You should advise the client of the ongoing relationship with the referral source and
should affirm your primary obligation to the client.
Recall the general obligation to provide clients with advise which is solely in the client's
best interests. Surely, it is frequently in the best interests of clients that the estate plan utilize the
services of these outside professionals, particularly when the client has had a long-standing
relationship with the referral source and the service provided is comparable in cost and quality to
that provided by others.
The advisor can be presented with a dilemma, however, if he or she concludes that the
best interests of the client will be served by doing business with someone other than the referral
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source. Suppose a bank trust officer refers a client to you and you are well aware that this trust
department charges very high fees. What should the lawyer do?
Be certain that you are comparing "apples to apples" when evaluating the product or
services provided by the referral source. Is the product or service provided by a competitor
really comparable?

Are the higher trust fees fully justified by higher levels of service or

investment results?
The first obligation is to the client.

If the competing services or products are truly

comparable, can the referral source meet the terms and conditions of the competing service
provider? The advisor should, after discussing the matter with the client, consult with the
referral source and begin the conversation by confirming the advisor's obligation to the client.
Without disclosing client confidences, it may be possible for you to obtain from the
referral source better terms and conditions, such that use of the original referral source's products
or services is, in fact, in the best interests of the client. Full disclosure should be made to the
client.
Can you send the client to the referral source, so as to get more referrals in the future,
even though you believe that alternative service providers will be more in the client's best
interests? The answer must be "no," of course.

The Violation of Client Confidences

A fundamental tenet of our professions is the requirement that we keep confidential all
information acquired from or about the client relative to the representation. Rule 1.6 states that
"[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation...." This obligation of confidentiality continues even after the death
of the client.
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There are several implications of this general Rule.
Multiple representations. The advisor may represent several clients simultaneously,
subject to the requirements of Rule 1.7 (conflicts of interest) and, where applicable, Rule 2.2
(intermediary). This sort of representation typically involves the sharing of information among
the multiple clients and preserving the confidentiality of the information from others. You
should advise the clients, at the beginning of the representation, of the lack of confidentiality as
between themselves.
Others in your office. The advisor may share confidential client information with others
in his or her office to the extent necessary for the representation. The advisor should, of course,
advise those other professionals, assistants, secretaries, office staff and paralegals of the
confidentiality of the information.
Confidential information from one spouse. Suppose that the advisor prepared an estate
plan for a husband and wife, after advising them of conflicts inherent in this joint representation.
What limitations occur when only one spouse shares confidences with the advisor?
Just as in the case of the prior discussion regarding conflicts of interest, issues of client
confidentiality may arise years later when one spouse returns and requests a "confidential"
codicil that makes special gifts that this client does not want the other spouse to learn about (at
least not until he is dead!).
Suppose the couple had an oral agreement that assets are to be left in a certain way at the
death of the surviving spouse, but now the husband comes to the advisor with the request that
you prepare a codicil that will be contrary to this agreement?
Can the lawyer disclose this request to the husband's wife (the lawyer's prior client)
without violating the husband's confidence?

Must the lawyer disclose this request to the
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lawyer's prior client? Clearly, the lawyer can be put on the horns of a dilemma by one spouse
who wishes the lawyer to keep confidences from the other spouse who had been (or may still be)
a client.
There are at least these alternative solutions to the problem:
1.

The lawyer can refuse to draft the codicil, but does that relieve the lawyer of the

obligation to advise the wife of the requested change that may be adverse to his or her interests?
2.

The lawyer could withdraw from the representation of the wife, make the

requested change in the husband's estate plan and "hope" that the wife does not ask why the
lawyer withdrew from her representation. But does the lawyer's withdrawal relieve the lawyer
of the duty to advise the wife who was the lawyer's client?
3.

The lawyer could withdraw from representing the spouses, but (again) does that

relieve the lawyer of a duty to advise the wife of the requested change in "their" estate plan?
4.

Perhaps the recommended approach is to rely on a written engagement letter, in

which the lawyer advised the couple at the beginning of the representation that there can be no
secrets between them in the lawyer's representation. If the lawyer had such an engagement
letter, the lawyer can remind the spouse who requests the change of the lawyer's obligation to
advise the other spouse.
This solution puts the dilemma back on the shoulders of the client, who can then decide
whether to seek another attorney. Nevertheless, even this "solution" does not necessarily relieve
the lawyer of any obligation that may exist to advise the other spouse of the requested change in
the estate plan.
Therefore, I recommend that the advisor should stop the client before he or she discusses
any matter which the client does not want shared with the other spouse. How can you stop
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someone from blurting out these matters?

While that can oftentimes be difficult (or even

impossible), there may be clues that the client is about to share a confidence with only you (the
client comes alone to your office, looks embarrassed when you ask about the other spouse, starts
by saying "Now, I don't want [the other spouse] to learn about this, but ...." and so forth).
If the advisor does have these clues, I suggest that you stop the client before the
disclosure is made, remind him or her of your prior (hopefully written) agreement that there can
be no confidences between the spouses in the representation and advise the client that anything
he or she is about to tell you must be disclosed to the other spouse.
Again, this approach puts the dilemma back on the client, who can then decide whether to
proceed with the advisor (knowing that you must advise the other spouse) or to seek other
counsel.
The client who later becomes incapacitated. Suppose that, after representing a client in

an estate planning matter, the advisor becomes aware that the client is "slipping." This growing
inability to manage his or her own affairs may be the result of medical problems, alcohol or drug
abuse, dependency on prescription medicines or even the undue influence of others. The advisor
might learn, for example, that someone is "abusing" a durable power of attorney the lawyer
drafted years ago.
Some guidance can be found in Rule 1.14, which provides that:
"(a)
When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions
in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of [minority]
age, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b)
A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other
protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably
believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest."
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Nevertheless, the advisor can be placed in a difficult decision when he or she learns (or
even observes) that a long-standing client needs some help. Unfortunately, Rule 1.14 does not
answer every situation.
The advisor may observe, for example, that the client needs assistance in some situations,
but not in others. The client has "good days and bad days." The client may be quite capable of
handling day-to-day activities, but may need help with major transactions or decisions.
The ACTEC Comment to this Rule concludes with the obvious (but not helpful) note that
"the lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one."
What obligation does the advisor have to step forward and to take actions to protect the
client? Can or should the advisor consult with the family or the physician of the client without
the consent of the client? What if the client is, in the advisor's opinion, incapable of giving that
consent?
Do the advisor's answers to these questions change if the reason for your concern is
merely the fact that the client came to the advisor with a request for an unusual or controversial
change in his or her estate plan? What if the client is brought to the advisor's office by his
housekeeper and the client requests a change in the estate plan so as to leave all his assets to her?
The advisor suspects undue influence, but the client (without the housekeeper present)
assures you that this is exactly what he wants to do. Does your disclosure to family or physician
of the requested change in the estate plan violate your duty of confidentiality to the client?
While Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) authorizes the advisor to disclose
information which is "impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation," I doubt
whether the advisor can rely on that Rule when disclosing client confidences, merely because
you feel that the client wants to do something that "just isn't right."
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One strategy is to suggest to the client, who wants to create a controversial change in his
or her estate plan, that to do so will undoubtedly result in a will contest at death. In order to
prepare for this eventuality, you advise the client, a contemporaneous evaluation by the client's
physician would be helpful.
If the physician reports, after examination, that the client lacks testamentary capacity, the
new will cannot be prepared, of course. But what are the advisor's obligations if the physician is
not willing to make such an unequivocal statement? That is when the estate planner decides
whether to be merely a scrivener (who merely writes out the client's direction) or to be a
counselor in its finest sense (who strongly advises the client against a proposed course of action
that, after many years representing the client, the lawyer knows is simply wrong).
Look, for example, at Rule 2.1, which provides that:
"In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."

Incomplete or Inadequate Representation. Both the competence of the lawyer and the
adequacy of his or her representation are addressed by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 1.1 states that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." Rule 5.3 extends this same obligation to others in
the lawyer's office.
Rule 1.2 provides that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation...." That is, the attorney and client can and must define the scope
of the representation.
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Most clients seek assistance in the preparation of a "short, simple wil1." No client comes
in with the request that the advisors prepare "a really complicated estate plan!" Nevertheless,
many clients today need more than a short, simple will. There may be short wills and there may
be simple advisors, but there rarely is a short, simple will that is adequate for a client with
substantial assets.
There are several problems involved:
1.

What if the family business owner never gets around to a decision and then dies?

2.

Does the advisor have the technical competence required by the client?

3.

Does the advisor ask the "right" questions of the client, so that all the required

information is disclosed? Do you have documentation of this?
4.

Will the client be willing to follow through on your advice regarding the steps

required to implement the estate plan? and
5.

Is the estate plan that results from the representation appropriate for the client

under all the circumstances which should have been known?

Unwillingness of a family business owner to make a decision. One of the hardest
decisions we ask our clients to make concerns future management of the family business. Who
will take over when our client retires, becomes disabled or dies?
Many clients have no intention of retiring and cannot face realistically the possibility of
their ultimate death. We expect clients to make very difficult, emotional decisions, yet we are
surprised when we meet resistance.
If you have a long-standing business client, for whom you have done many transactions,
it is critically important that you urge this client to engage in succession planning. Most family
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businesses fail to make it to the second (let alone third) generation primarily due to a lack of
planning.
To the extent your client is unwilling to make these hard choices, you should emphasize
the risks associated with his failure to act. What will happen to the business? What will happen
to the family? Why should he continue to put in 70 hour work weeks when so much of what he
has and will accomplish is at risk?
Ultimately, you should document your efforts to have this work done. If no action is ever
taken and severe consequences result, you do not want to face the unhappy family members who
survive with no evidence of your efforts to have "the old man" take action.
Inadequate information from the client. One of an advisor's greatest challenges is to
obtain accurate and complete information from clients.

Some people are uncomfortable

discussing estate planning matters and provide information only in response to direct, specific
questions.

They do not openly speak of their daughter'S disability, so the advisor did not

recommend a trust. for her benefit in the will, for example.
It is gratifying to read in the ACTEC Commentaries that "in the ordinary case, a lawyer
may reasonably rely upon a client's statement of facts." The Commentaries go on to provide,
however, that the facts should be verified if the client appears to be uncertain or if there are
"other circumstances" that raise doubts about the accuracy of the facts.
Questions the advisor should have asked. Occasionally, we create our own problems.
The advisor did not ask how their assets are titled, for example, so you did not learn that all the
property was jointly held until one spouse died and nothing went into the credit trust.
Incomplete implementation of the plan. Sometimes, the client is not willing to pay for
the advisor to implement the plan. You advise the client to change beneficiary designations, to
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put assets into a revocable trust to avoid probate and to assign group life insurance to an
irrevocable trust.
Who is responsible for the implementation of the plan? Can the advisor document that it
was the client's (and not the advisor's) job to carry out these critical activities? Will the client
follow through on your instructions? Can you later document the fact that the client was told
what to do?

Co-counselor other consulting arrangements. In a world of increasingly complex
laws, it is difficult for the estate planner to stay "current" in every area. Inadequate estate plans
may constitute not only malpractice, but also ethical violations.

Jeff Pennell's 1991 paper

entitled "Professional Responsibility: Reforms are Needed to Accommodate Personal Family
Counseling," (25 Miami Institute on Estate Planning, 18-1) includes this statement:
"Probably the most important act a 'general practitioner' can perform these days
to protect against malpractice liability and the related ethical violation is to
establish a good referral network to bring into a situation experts in areas in which
the referring attorney is deficient."
The ACTEC Commentaries to Rule 1.1 call upon the lawyer's "additional research and
study" as the first way to meet a client's needs. The Commentaries go on to provide that "the
needs of the client may also be met by involving another lawyer or other professional who
possesses the requisite degree of skill or knowledge.

* * * The lawyer should be candid with the

client regarding the lawyer's level of competence and need for additional research and
preparation...."
Different types of consulting arrangements. The lawyer can call in another attorney on a
consulting basis in at least two different ways:
1.

The lawyer can employ another attorney to assist on an "as needed" basis on

different estate planning matters, usually to review draft documents, to discuss planning
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alternatives and the like for a variety of different clients. The lawyer's clients may not even be
aware that these consultations occur. The consulting attorney's fees are paid directly by the
lawyer; or
2.

The lawyer can employ another attorney to assist a particular client on the

development, drafting and even implementation of the estate plan. The client approves of this
co-counsel arrangement and usually pays all the fees directly.
Written engagement letter. When an outside attorney is involved in the representation (in
either approach identified above), there should be a written engagement letter between the
lawyers, in which certain issues must be addressed:
1.

What may the referring lawyer disclose to the other lawyer without the consent of

the client?
2.

Who will communicate with the client, so as to keep the client "reasonably

informed" under Rule 1.4?
3.

Who will be responsible for the due diligence requirement of Rule 1.3, so as to

assure that the representation is proceeding properly?
4.

Who will determine the amount of fees to be paid by the client and who suffers

the loss if the client does not pay?
5.

Does the consulting lawyer separately bill the client for services or is the

statement sent to the original lawyer or is there one combined bill sent to the client, with the
resulting fee shared by the co-counsel? Note Rule 1.5(e) concerning a division of fees between
lawyers who are not in the same firm.
6.

Who is responsible for "mistakes," such as inaccurate or incomplete information

provided to the new lawyer or malpractice by the new lawyer?
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7.

The scope of the representation provided by the new lawyer should be set forth,

including a discussion concerning who will continue to represent the client in the future on estate
planning and other matters ("don't steal my client!").

A Trap for the Unwary: Criminal Liability for Advising Clients on Lifetime Gifts

Suppose a new client seeks your advice in connection with a lifetime gift program. This
client has children and grandchildren and wants to transfer to them ownership interests in his
closely held business. General estate planning, to dispose at death of the rest of the business,
may also be involved. He mentions in passing that he has just been named a defendant in a big
lawsuit, but that another law finn is handling that matter.
You advise the client on the creation of irrevocable trusts for the benefit of grandchildren,
of outright gifts to the children and valuation issues for gift tax purposes. Following your advice,
the client makes gifts to the children and to the trusts for the grandchildren.
What is the consequence if this client later declares bankruptcy?

The lawsuit he

mentioned casually resulted in a huge judgment against the client and he sought bankruptcy
protection. Is there a problem because you advised the client on ways he could give away his
assets?
Be aware of 18 U.S.C. Section 152:
"A person who --

***

(7)
in a personal capacity or as an agent or officer of any person or
corporation, in contemplation of a case under title 11 by or against the
person or any other person or corporation, or with intent to defeat the
provisions of title 11, knowingly and fraudulently transfers or conceals
any of his property or the property of such other person or corporation; ...
shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both." (emphasis added)
And beware of 18 U.S.C. Section 371:
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"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both ...."
But you just advised on gifts! How, if at all, do these criminal provisions apply to you
when you advise the client on the transfer of assets? Did the advisor assist in the commission of
bankruptcy fraud by the client?
It was the client, and not the advisor, who may have had the criminal intent of trying to
hide assets from creditors. Nevertheless, it was the advisor who told the client how to commit
what later became bankruptcy fraud. That is, the client could not have made the fraudulent
transfers without your assistance.
Was there a conspiracy which will cause problems for the advisor under Section 371?
Was the advisor an agent of the client which will cause problems under Section 152? Who needs
these problems?
Some bankruptcy lawyers believe that the U.S. Department of Justice and local
prosecutors may actively target estate planners for fraud actions. Some people believe that it is
politically useful if a prosecutor has a few lawyers' "scalps" hanging from his or her belt!
Exercise great care with new clients who want to make gifts. Although I am not a
bankruptcy attorney, the possibility of a problem here came as a surprise to me. If the client

mentions a possible large creditor, the estate planner must be very careful of the
bankruptcy issues. If the advisor should have asked about creditors and other liabilities, but
simply failed to do so, there may be problems later when and if the client files bankruptcy.
There may be a simple rule. Always inquire about the existence of creditors, pending
lawsuits, contingent liabilities and the like. Document your inquiry! If there are substantial
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creditors (even contingent), the estate planner should not in any way advise the client on lifetime
gifts. To do otherwise may leave the advisor open to a charge that you aided the client in the
commission of bankruptcy fraud.
The problem may only arise if there are existing creditors of the client. Just because a
physician believes that some patient may, in the indefinite future, bring a malpractice action,
there is no current creditor whose interests should be considered before a gift program is
initiated. Once this vague uneasiness becomes even a contingent liability (long before a lawsuit
is filed against your client by a creditor) the estate planner should not advise the physician to
begin or to carry on a lifetime gift program.

The Reasonableness of Estate Planning Fees
While many attorneys charge for estate planning matters on an hourly basis, Rule 1.5(a)
authorizes you to consider other factors:
"(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2)
the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer;
(3)

the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4)

the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5)

the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6)

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7)
the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(8)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent."
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The lawyer should advise the client at the beginning of the representation of the method of fee
calculation, including whether the client will be charged for extra services, such as copying,
postage, travel and the time of secretaries and other personnel.
Is the fee based on hourly charges? Is it a flat fee, for the preparation of papers to create
a new limited liability company or a family limited partnership, for example?
Many lawyers will give to their clients an estimate of the fees to be charged, typically
within a range.

What if the fees exceed the lawyer's estimate? The actual work required may cause
the lawyer to exceed the estimated fee, perhaps because of later changes requested by the client,
because the problems presented by the client were more complex than originally thought or for
any other reason.
Comment [1] to Rule 1.5 includes this statement: "When developments occur during the
representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should
be provided to the client."
I recommend that the lawyer tell the client that the initial estimate must be revised before
the extra time is spent on the representation.
It is far better, in my opinion, for the lawyer to have this conversation with the client
before the time is put in; the alternative is to spend the time and then to explain, after the fact,
why the client should pay more than the initial estimate.
What if the client asserts later that this extra work should not have been done, that there
were other alternatives the client wanted to pursue (had he known that the initial estimate was
not accurate) and so forth? Have that billing conversation with the client before you put in time
that may later have to be written offwhen confronted with an angry client.
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Fees paid by the client's employer. What considerations are presented when a fee is to
be paid by a business of which the client is an officer, director, employee or owner (or all of the
above)?
RULE I.8(t) provides that:
"A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from
one other than the client unless:
(1)
such compensation is in accordance with. an
agreement between the client and the third party or
the client consents after consultation;
(2)
there is no interference with the lawyer's
independence of professional judgment or with the
client-lawyer relationship; and information relating
to representation of a client is protected as required
by Rule 1.6 (client confidentiality)."
(3)
I suggest that the advisor address several issues before agreeing that the fee can be paid
by the client's business:
1.

If the client is not the sole owner of the business, must the other owners be

advised that the entity's funds are being used to pay for one owner's personal estate planning?
2.

If the business entity will benefit from your representation (business succession

planning), should the engagement be with the entity and not with the individual client? Should
not all the owners then be involved in the planning?
3.

What conflicts might arise between your work for one client, your work for the

entity and your work for the other owners of the entity?
Consideration should also be given to Rule I.I3(e), which provides that:
"A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization-' s consent to the dual representation is
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders. "
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Rebates, discounts, commissions and referral fees. A lawyer's acceptance of rebates,
discounts, commissions or referral fees may involve an improper conflict of interest in violation
of Rule 1.7 and may violate Rule 5.4's prohibition against sharing legal fees with non-lawyers.
Even with full disclosure to the client, such an arrangement "involves too great a risk of
overreaching by the lawyer and the potential for actual or apparent abuse," according to the
ACTEC Commentaries.

Conclusion
The ethical issues presented to the professionals who are engaged in estate and family
business succession planning are ever present. Just being aware of the potential problems may
be a step in the right direction. Ignoring these problems will not make them go away.

Eric A. Manterfield
KD_IM-613973_1.DOC
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Sample estate planning engagement letter
- - - - -,2005

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Dear xxxxxxxxxxxxx:
I enjoyed having the opportunity to meet with you to discuss your estate plan. I will have
drafts to you by
of a new will, a revocable trust agreement, an irrevocable life
insurance trust agreement, a living will, a health care power of attorney and a general power of
attorney. These are the documents which will carry out the plan you decided upon at our
meeting.

[Give overview of the plan, decisions made by the client and any further
infonnation/decisions needed]
Tenns of our engagement.
Whenever we begin work with a new client,
_________requires an engagement letter and a retainer against future billings. I
think that it is important that we get down in writing a common understanding of our
relationship. If my understanding is correct, I ask that you indicate your approval by signing and
returning the extra copy of this letter which is enclosed.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _is very pleased to have the opportunity to assist you and
your family. Our finn is committed to providing legal services in an effective and economical
manner.
We represent you both. Our representation will be of you jointly in your estate planning.
Because we represent both of you, anything disclosed by either one of you to me or to any
personnel at
will necessarily be open for complete disclosure to the other.
I am not suggesting that this would become an issue at any point; rather, it is appropriate
for us to advise all married couples of the fact that our representation of you is as a couple,
simply because we are representing two people whose interests are not always exactly the same.
Fees are based upon the work perfonned. Our fees for legal services will be billed on an
hourly basis according to the billing rates charged by each lawyer or paralegal of our finn, which
currently range from $_ _an hour for paralegals to $_ _an hour for senior partners.
My personal billing rate is currently $_ _an hour. I mention the billing rates for
associates and paralegals because it might be more economical to have certain work perfonned
by those people. These billing rates are subject to adjustment without notice from time to time by
the finn.
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In certain instances, other factors may be taken into consideration in determining our
fees, including the responsibility and liability assumed, the novelty and difficulty of the legal
problem involved, whether the firm is requested to issue its formal legal opinion associated with
some facet of its representation, the benefit resulting to the client and any unforeseen
circumstances arising in the course of our representation.
Invoices. We will provide invoices on a monthly basis. The invoices will describe our
services and itemize our expenses in accordance with our standard firm policies. These expenses
include such items as photocopying, long-distance telephone charges, facsimile charges, travel
and related expenses, computerized legal research, postage and delivery or courier services.
Retainer. Our firm's policy is to require a retainer to be paid before we provide any legal
will require a
services to new clients. For this particular matter,
$
retainer from you before we proceed with any legal work on your behalf. We
will charge our initial fees and expenses against this retainer and credit them on our invoices.
The retainer is not an estimate of the total fees to be incurred or expenses advanced, of
course, but is a prepayment of the initial fees to be incurred by you. Once the retainer amount is
fully credited towards fees incurred and expenses advanced, it is essential to our representation
that you remain current in the payment of all invoices for fees and expenses. We reserve the
right to require the payment of subsequent retainers after the initial retainer is depleted.
Prompt payment. Payment relating to all invoices will be due within thirty days after the
invoices are mailed. Subject to any limitations imposed by the Indiana Code of Professional
Responsibility, we reserve the right to discontinue work on any aspect of this representation in
the event that any invoice is not paid within thirty days after the invoice is mailed.
If we are required to resort to collection proceedings to recover any amounts from you,
we will also be entitled to recover, of course, all costs incurred in those collections proceedings,
including reasonable attorney fees incurred either by us or by separate counsel. By signing and
returning the additional copy of this letter, you agree that any collection proceedings shall be
County, Indiana, and you consent to the
brought in the Superior or Circuit Court of
jurisdiction of that court.
Termination by either •party. You have the right at any time to terminate our
representation upon written notice. That termination will not relieve you, of course, of the
obligation to pay for all services rendered before the termination.
We reserve the right to withdraw from this representation it: among other things, you fail
to honor the terms of this engagement letter, you fail to cooperate or follow our advice on a
material matter, or any fact or circumstance which would, in our view, render our continuing
representation unlawful or unethical.
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If we elect to withdraw from your representation, you agree to take all steps necessary to
free us of any obligation to perform further and you agree to pay us for all services provided
before the withdrawal.
Conclusion. If the foregoing terms and conditions accurately summarize and confirm the
understanding of our new attorney-client relationship, please indicate your approval and
acceptance by dating, signing and returning the extra copy of this letter which is enclosed. Your
check for the amount of the retainer should also be returned with your signed copy of this
engagement letter. An additional copy of this letter is enclosed for your records.
Once again, we appreciate this opportunity to serve you and your family. Should you
have any questions or concerns with regard to the matters discussed in this letter, please do not
hesitate to contact me. We look forward to working with you.
Very truly yours,

Agreed to and accepted this

day of

, 2005.

wife

husband
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Sample family business succession planning engagement letter
_ _ _ _,2005
Owners of
[address]

[name of business]

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Dear - - - - - - You have asked
[name of law firm]
to perform certain services for you relating to
your proposed business succession planning. This work may include the creation of a new buysell agreement among the owners of the business and other matters which may have an impact on
all the business owners.
We are pleased to assist you with this work; however, it is in your best interests (and our own
ethical obligation to each of you requires) that you fully understand the considerations involved
in a "dual representation" of the' business and its owners and of the owners with respect to each
other.
The different owners may have differing (and sometimes conflicting) interests and objectives
regarding business and personal planning matters. For example, you each may have different
views on how to value the business and any ownership interest upon the death or retirement of an
owner. There may be a conflict in whether the selling owner of the business should be subject to
a covenant not to compete. There may be a conflict in how an installment payment is secured.
These are just a few examples, of course; every situation is unique.
If you each had a separate lawyer, you would each have an "advocate" for your individual
position and you would each receive totally independent advice. Information given to your own
lawyer is confidential and could not be obtained by your fellow family business owners without
your consent.
That may not be the case here (where we are advising all the business owners), but the
opportunity for conflict does exist. We cannot be advocates for one of you against the other.
Information that any of you gives us relating to your thoughts and special needs cannot be kept
from the other owners of the business.
If you ask us to continue to serve you jointly and the business, as well, our effort will be to assist
in developing a coordinated overall business succession plan and to encourage the resolution of
differing interests in an equitable manner and in the best interests of your mutual business affairs.
We will attempt to represent the business without a bias in favor of any of you.
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In the event of an irreconcilable conflict in the future, we reserve the right to continue to
represent the business and
[majority owner]
, if they wish us to do so, and we will
decline thereafter to represent other owners.
If at any time anyone of you wishes to have the advice of separate counsel, you are completely
free to do so. We hope that this information will assist you in using our services effectively.
If you each agree with our representation under these circumstances, please read the following
statement and, if you are in agreement with it, sign and return the extra copy of this letter which
is enclosed.
Again, we appreciate the opportunity to be of service to all of you. I look forward to a long and
successful professional relationship with each of you and with [family business]
Kindest personal regards,

We have each read the foregoing letter. Each of us realizes that there are areas where our
interests and objectives may differ and areas of potential or actual conflict of interest between us
in connection with the family business succession, buy-sell planning and related matters.
We understand that each of us may retain separate, independent counsel in connection with these
matters at any time. Each of us understands and agrees that communications and information
which you receive from any of us relating to these matters will be shared with the others.
We understand that, in the event of an irreconcilable conflict in the future, you reserve the right
to continue to represent the business and [majority owner]
, if they wish you to do so,
and you will decline thereafter to represent other owners.
After careful consideration, each of us requests that
[law firm]
represent us
individually and the family business jointly in connection with our business succession, buy-sell
planning and related matters.

Owner

Owner

Owner

Owner

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -, Inc.
By:
Its:
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